
HARVARDIANAE CANTAB: NOV: ANGLIAE
INSIGNIA ACADEMIAE
VE RI TAS
The Gift of
Mary Bryant Brandegee
in Memory of
William Fletcher Weld
HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY


NUMINE.
Richard Ashhurst Bowie.

ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS.

VOL. I.

Strahan and Prefton,
Printers-Street, London.

ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS,

COMPRISING HIS

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK:

ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES;

THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF HIS LIFE;

AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS;

BY

JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

F. R. S. AND S. A. LONDON; F. R. S. EDINBURGH; AND
HISTORIOGRAPHER TO HIS MAJESTY FOR SCOTLAND.

Magna animi contentio adhibenda est in explicando Aristotele.
CICERO FRAGMENT. PHILOSOPH.

THE THIRD EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES,
IN THE STRAND.
1813.

PREFACE.

ARISTOTLE is the moſt voluminous, and generally deemed the moſt obſcure, of all the Greek writers of claſſic antiquity. His imperfect yet copious remains, which are now rather admired than read[a], and which were formerly much read and little underſtood, ſtill naturally arrange themſelves in the minds of thoſe capable of digeſting them, under their original form of an encyclopedy of ſcience; in many parts of which, the author's labours are, doubtleſs, excelled by thoſe of modern philoſophers; while in other parts, and thoſe of the moſt important nature, his intellectual exertions remain hitherto unrivalled. It ſeemed high time, therefore, to draw the line between thoſe writings of the Stagirite which ſtill merit the moſt ſerious attention of the modern reader, and thoſe of

[a] I except the ſmall but incomparable Treatiſe on Poetry, excellently tranſlated and commented in two recent publications in Engliſh; the books on Rhetoric and the Hiſtory of Animals, to which Mr. Caſſandre and Mr. Camus have reſpectively done juſtice in French; and the Organum, or Logic, ſtill ſtudied in ſome Univerſities.

 which

which the perufal is fuperfeded by more accurate and more complete information. This line I have prefumed to draw in the prefent work, by endeavouring to the beft of my abilities to tranflate the former perfpicuoufly and impreffively, while I contented myfelf with giving a diftinct and comprehenfive analyfis of the latter.

The "Ethics to Nicomachus and the Politics" ought never to have been disjoined, fince they are confidered by Ariftotle himfelf as forming effential parts of one and the fame work[b]; which, as it was the laft[c] and principal object of his ftudies, is of all his performances the longeft, the beft connected, and incomparably the moft interefting. The two treatifes combined, conftitute what he calls his *practical* philofophy[d]; an epithet to which, in comparifon with other works of the fame kind, they will be found peculiarly entitled. In the Ethics, the reader will fee a full and fatisfactory delineation of the moral nature of man, and of the difcipline and exercife beft adapted to its improvement. The Philofopher fpeaks with commanding authority

[b] See vol. i. p. 241. and p. 534 & feq.

[c] Compare vol. i. p. 534 & feqq and vol. ii. pp. 393. 430. The Magna Moralia and Ethics to Eudemus are chiefly to be confidered as the firft imperfect fketch of this great work.

[d] See vol. i. p. 270. He elfewhere calls it "His Philofophy concerning Human Affairs." Ibid. p. 533.

to

to the heart and affections, through the resistless conviction of the understanding. His morality is neither on the one hand too indulgent, nor on the other impracticable. His lessons are not cramped by the narrow spirit of system, nor perverted by its wildness; they are clear inductions, flowing naturally and spontaneously from a copious and pure source of well-digested experience.

According to the Stagirite, men are and always have been not only moral and social, but also *political* animals; in a great measure dependent for their happiness and perfection on the public institutions of their respective countries. The grand inquiry, therefore, is, what are the different arrangements that have been found under given circumstances, practically most conducive to these main and ultimate purposes? This question the Author endeavoured to answer in his "Politics," by a careful examination of two hundred systems of legislation, many of which are not any where else described; and by proving how uniformly, even in political matters, the results of observation and experiment conspire with and confirm the deductions of an accurate and full theory. In this incomparable work, the reader will perceive "the genuine spirit of laws" deduced from the specific and unalterable distinctions of governments;

and with a ſmall effort of attention, may diſcern not only thoſe diſcoveries in ſcience, unjuſtly claimed by the vanity of modern writers[e], but many of thoſe improvements in practice[f], erroneouſly aſcribed to the fortunate events of time and chance in theſe latter and more enlightened ages. The ſame invaluable treatiſe diſcloſes the pure and perennial ſpring of all legitimate authority; for in Ariſtotle's "Politics," and HIS *only*, government is placed on ſuch a natural and ſolid foundation, as leaves neither its origin incomprehenſible, nor its ſtability precarious: and his concluſions, had they been well weighed, muſt have ſurmounted or ſuppreſſed thoſe erroneous and abſurd doctrines which long upheld deſpotiſm on the one hand, and thoſe equally erroneous and ſtill wilder ſuppoſitions of conventions and compacts, which have more recently armed popular fury on the other.

[e] Compare, for example, the works of the modern œconomiſts, not excepting thoſe of Hume and Smith, with the Fifth Book of the Ethics, p. 375., and the Firſt Book of the Politics, p. 42. & ſeq. Compare Monteſquieu's Spirit of Laws with Books iii. vi. and viii. of the Politics throughout; and judge whether the admirable French work be, as the Author's motto boaſts, "Proles ſine matre creata." Compare likewiſe Machiavel's "Prince," with the laſt chapters of Book vii. of the Politics, p. 436. & ſeq. from which the Italian treatiſe is entirely copied. Yet none of all theſe Authors acknowledge their obligations to Ariſtotle.

[f] For the doctrine of repreſentative government, (with which the ancients are ſaid to have been totally unacquainted,) ſee the following tranſlation, vol. ii. pp. 74. & ſeqq. 353. & ſeqq. and 475. & ſeqq. For that of governments of reciprocal controul, ſee p. 339. & ſeqq.

But

But our Author's principles and doctrines will ſpeak convincingly for themſelves. The intention of this Preface is merely to explain the plan and object of the preſent performance; which, beſides giving a tranſlation of Ariſtotle's practical philoſophy, contains a new analyſis of his ſpeculative works. This addition appeared the more neceſſary, becauſe the Stagirite's intellectual ſyſtem is ſo compactly built, and ſo ſolidly united, that its ſeparate parts cannot be completely underſtood, unleſs the whole be clearly comprehended. The writings here tranſlated, ſtand indeed more detached and more independent than almoſt any other; yet, without the aid of the prefixed "Analyſis," even the Ethics and Politics would require frequent, almoſt perpetual elucidation. The reader, I feared, would be ſoon tired with the unconnected prolixity of notes[a]; he will, I hope, be entertained by the Analyſis even of thoſe treatiſes to which, independently of any ſubſtantial utility, his attention may be ſtill allured by a liberal and commendable curioſity.

[a] I have alſo avoided to ſwell my work with hiſtorical notes; a thing as eaſy as it is uſeleſs. Ariſtotle relates with the utmoſt preciſion, the particulars neceſſary for juſtifying his concluſions; and to introduce other events and circumſtances, altogether unconnected with the ſubject, appears to me to be better calculated for diſplaying an author's erudition, than for informing the mind of his reader.

In

In my work throughout, I am ambitious of exhibiting fully, yet within a narrow compaſs, the diſcoveries and attainments of a man deemed the wiſeſt of antiquity; and to whom, even in modern times, it will be eaſier to name many ſuperiors in particular branches of knowledge, than to find any one rival in univerſal ſcience. Conſidered under this general aſpect, my "Engliſh Ariſtotle" is the natural companion and fit counterpart to my "Hiſtory of Ancient Greece;" ſince the learning of that country properly terminates in the Stagirite, by whom it was finally embodied into one great work; a work rather impaired than improved by the labours of ſucceeding ages. My time, I acknowledge, was miſerably miſpent in examining his numerous commentators[h]; Greek, Arabic, and Latin; but the attention with which I have many times peruſed the whole of his invaluable remains, with a view of rendering him a perpetual commentary on himſelf, and thereby expreſſing his genuine ſenſe clearly and forcibly, will not, I hope, prove uſeleſs to thoſe who ſtudy Greek literature on an enlarged and liberal plan; not merely as grammarians and philologiſts, but

[h] I am diſpenſed from the neceſſity of ſpeaking of former tranſlations of the Ethics and Politics, becauſe I have not borrowed a ſingle ſentence, nor derived the ſmalleſt aſſiſtance, from any of them.

10 as

as philofophers, moralifts, and ftatefmen. To this clafs of readers, many pages of the prefent work are peculiarly addreffed; but the far greater part of it, bearing an immediate reference to the people at large, will not, it is hoped, by the public, be either unregarded or unapplied; efpecially in an age when, through the ardent activity of the prefs, falutary information, whatever be its *original* form, fpeedily circulates to all claffes of the community in *new* and fit channels.

J. G.

Upper Seymour Street.
1ft May, 1797.

CONTENTS

OF

THE FIRST VOLUME.

CHAP. I.

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

CHAP. II.

A NEW ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S SPECULATIVE WORKS.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK I.

BOOK II.

BOOK

BOOK III.

BOOK IV.

BOOK V.

BOOK VI.

BOOK

BOOK VII.

BOOK VIII.

BOOK IX.

BOOK X.

THE

THE

WORKS

OF

ARISTOTLE.

CHAP. I.

LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

ARGUMENT.

Ariſtotle's birth-place.—His education at Atarneus—at Athens.—His reſidence with Hermeias.—Singular fortune of that Prince.—Ariſtotle's reſidence in Leſbos—in Macedon.—Plan purſued in the education of Alexander.—Ariſtotle's reſidence in Athens.—Employment there.—Calumnies againſt him.—His retreat to Chalcis, and death.—His teſtament—Sayings.—Extraordinary fate of his Works—Publiſhed at Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes.—Their number and magnitude.

CHAP. I. Introduction.

IT is my deſign in the preſent work to give a more diſtinct, and, I flatter myſelf, a juſter view, than has yet been exhibited, of the learning of an age, the moſt illuſtrious in hiſtory for great events and extraordinary revolutions, yet ſtill more pre-eminent in ſpeculation than it is

CHAP. I. renowned in action. A century before the reign of Alexander the Great, there ſprang up and flouriſhed in Greece a ſpecies of learning, or ſcience, totally unlike to any thing before known in the world. This ſcience was carried to its higheſt perfection by Ariſtotle: it decayed with the loſs of his writings, and revived with their recovery. But the imperfect and corrupt ſtate of theſe writings rendered them peculiarly liable to be miſinterpreted by ignorance, and miſrepreſented by envy; his philoſophy, therefore, has been leſs frequently inculcated or explained, than diſguiſed, perverted, and calumniated. It has not certainly, ſince his own time, received any material improvement. To the philoſophical works of Cicero, though that illuſtrious Roman profeſſes to follow other guides, the world at large is more indebted for a familiar acquaintance with ſeveral of Ariſtotle's moſt important doctrines, than to the labours of all his commentators[a] collectively.

[a] All theſe commentators lived many centuries after Ariſtotle. They are Greek, Arabic, and Latin. The firſt began in the age of the Antonines, in Alexander Aphrodiſienſis at Rome, and Ammonius Sacchus in Alexandria; they continued to flouriſh through the whole ſucceſſion of Roman emperors, under the once revered names of Aſpaſius, Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus, the ſecond Ammonius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. Ariſtotle was ardently ſtudied, or rather ſuperſtitiouſly adored, by the Saracens, during upwards of four centuries of their proud domination, till the taking of Bagdat by the Tartars in 1258. The names of the Arabian commentators, Alfarabius, Avicenna, and Averroes, long reſounded even in the ſchools of Europe. But the Ariſtotelian philoſophy, or rather logic, had early aſſumed a Latin dreſs in the tranſlation of Boethius Severinus, the laſt illuſtrious conſul of Rome, in the beginning of the ſixth century. After a long interval of more than ſix hundred years, Latin tranſlations and commentaries began to abound, through the induſtry of Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and the ſucceeding ſcholaſtics; and

lectively. But how loose and feeble (and often how erroneous!) is the Roman transcript, when compared with the energetic precision of the Greek original! Yet the works of Cicero circulate through and nourish the whole literary world, while those of Aristotle (with the exception of a few short and popular treatises) are allowed to moulder away in the dust of our libraries, and condemned to a treatment little less ignominious than that which befel them soon after their composition, when they were immured in a dungeon, and remained for nearly two centuries a prey to dampness and to worms. It is time once more to release them from their *second* unmerited captivity; to revive, and, if possible, to brighten, the well-earned fame of an author, sometimes as preposterously admired, as at others unaccountably neglected; and whose fate with posterity is most singular in this, not that his authority should have been most respected in the ages least qualified to appreciate his merit, but that

---

and multiplied to such a pitch, that, towards the close of the sixteenth century, Patricius reckons twelve thousand commentators on different works of the Stagirite. (Discuss. Peripatet.) This vast and cold mass of Gothic and Saracenic dulness is now consigned to just oblivion. But even to the best of Aristotle's commentators there are two unanswerable objections: first, they universally confound his solid sense with the fanciful visions of Plato, thus endeavouring to reconcile things totally incongruous: secondly, they ascribe to their great master innumerable opinions which he did not hold, by making him continually dogmatise, where he only means to discuss. To the same objections those more modern writers are liable, who have drawn their knowledge of Aristotle's philosophy from any other than the original fountain.

 philosophers

CHAP. I.

philofophers fhould have defpifed his name almoft exactly in proportion as they adopted his opinions. The multiplied proofs of this affertion, which I fhall have occafion to produce in examining his works, will not, it is prefumed, appear uninterefting to men of letters. Thofe who know fomething of Ariftotle, muft naturally be defirous of knowing all that can be told; and of feeing, comprifed within a narrow compafs, the life and writings of a man, whofe intellectual magnitude ought to have preferved and fhewn him in his proper fhape to the impartial eye of hiftory, but whofe picture, beyond that of all other great characters, has been moft miferably mangled.

Ariftotle's birth-place, Stagira.

Ariftotle, who flourifhed in Athens when Athens was the ornament of Greece, and Greece, under Alexander, the firft country on earth, was born at Stagira towards the beginning of the ninety-ninth olympiad, eighty-five years after the birth of Socrates[b], and three hundred and eighty-four before the birth of Chrift. The

[b] Socrates drank the hemlock, according to moft authors, the firft year of the ninety-fifth olympiad; and, according to Diodorus Siculus, the firft year of the ninety-feventh. Socrates therefore died at leaft eight years before Ariftotle was born. The latter was one year older than Philip, and three years older than Demofthenes. Vid. Dionyf. Halicarn. Epift. ad Ammæum. This chronology is clearly afcertained by various critics. See Bayle's Dictionary, article "Ariftotle." I know not therefore why Lord Monboddo and the late Mr. Harris (two modern writers who have paid great attention to Ariftotle's works) fhould fay, and frequently repeat, on no better authority than that of the Life of Ariftotle afcribed to Ammonius, or Johannes Philoponus, that the Stagirite was three years a fcholar of Socrates.

city

city of Stagira[c] ſtood on the coaſt of Thrace, in a diſtrict called the Chalcidic region, and near to the innermoſt receſs of the Strymonic gulf[d]. It was originally built by the Andrians[e], afterwards enlarged by a colony from Eubœan Chalcis[f], and long numbered among the Greek cities of Thrace, until the conqueſts of Philip of Macedon extended the name of his country far beyond the river Strymon, to the confines of mount Rhodopé[g]. Stagira, as well as the neighbouring Greek cities, enjoyed the precarious dignity of independent government: it was the ally of Athens in the Peloponneſian war, and, like other nominal allies, experienced the ſtern dominion of that tyrannical republic. It afterwards became ſubject to the city and commonwealth of Olynthus; which, having ſubdued Stagira and the whole region of Chalcidicé, was itſelf beſieged by Philip of Macedon; and, with all its dependencies, reduced by the arms or arts of that politic prince, in the firſt year of the 108th olympiad, and 348 years before the Chriſtian æra[h]. That the reſiſtance of Stagira was obſtinate, may be inferred from the ſeverity of its

CHAP. I.

Its hiſtory.

[c] Strabo Excerpt. ex lib. vii. p. 331. He calls the place Stageirus.

[d] Ptolemei Geograph. According to his diviſion, Stagira was in the Amphaxetide diſtrict of Macedon.

[e] Herodot. l. vii. c. 115.; & Thucydid. l. iv. p. 311.

[f] Juſtin. l. viii. c. 13.

[g] Thence the frivolous diſpute among modern biographers, whether Ariſtotle, who was really a Greek, ought to be deemed a Macedonian or a Thracian. See Stanley and Brucker's Lives of Ariſtotle.

[h] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxv.

 puniſhment;

CHAP. I.

punifhment; the conqueror rafed it to the ground[i]. Ariftotle, who was then in his thirty-feventh year, had been removed from Stagira almoft in his childhood; and he appears not, in that long interval, to have ever refided in, and even rarely to have vifited, it[k]. But the misfortunes which fell on that city gave him an opportunity of fhewing fuch ardent affection for his birth-place, as may be deemed the indubitable proof of a feeling heart. Through his influence with Alexander the Great, Stagira was rebuilt[l]: both its ufeful defences and its ornamental edifices were reftored; its wandering citizens were collected, and reinftated in their poffeffions; Ariftotle himfelf regulated their government by wife laws; and the Stagirites inftituted a feftival, to commemorate the generofity of Alexander, their admired fovereign, and the patriotifm of Ariftotle, their illuftrious townfman[m].

connected with that of Ariftotle and his family.

The city of Stagira indeed owes its celebrity wholly to Ariftotle and his family; and, if its name is ftill familiar to modern ears, this proceeds merely from its having communicated to

[i] Plutarch, adverfus Colot. p. 1126.; & de Exil. p. 605.

[k] Dionyf. Halicarn. Epift. ad Ammæum. Ammonius & Diogen. Laert. in Ariftot.

[l] Plin. Nat. Hift. l. vii. c. 29.; & Valer. Maxim. l. v. c. 6. Plutarch prefers to all the pleafures of the Epicurean, the delights which Ariftotle muft have felt when he rebuilt his native city, and placed in their hereditary feats his expatriated countrymen. Plutarch adverf. Epicur. p. 1097. He afcribes the rebuilding of Stagira to Ariftotle's influence with Philip.

[m] Plutarch. adverf. Colot. p. 1126.; & Ammonius in Vit. Ariftot.

our

our philosophy the appellation of Stagirite[n]. His father Nichomachus, who was the physician and friend[o] of Amyntas, king of Macedon, derived his descent, through a long line of medical ancestors, from Æsculapius, the companion of the Argonauts, whose skill in the healing art had raised him to a seat among the gods[p]. Nicomachus improved a branch of knowledge, which was the inheritance of his family, by writing six books on natural philosophy and medicine[q]. To the same illustrious origin which distinguished Nicomachus, the testimony of one ancient biographer[r] (but his only) traces up the blood of Phestis, Aristotle's mother; who, whatever was her parentage, certainly acknowledged for her country[s] the middle district of Eubœa, which lies within twelve miles of the Attic coast. Aristotle was deprived of his parents in early youth[t]; yet it is an agreeable, and not altogether an unwarranted, conjecture, that by his father Nicomachus he was inspired with that ardent love for the study of Nature, which made him long be regarded as her best and chosen interpreter[u]; while, from his mother Phestis, he first imbibed that pure and sweet Atticism which every where pervades his writings.

[n] Strabo, Excerp. ex lib. vii. p. 331.

[o] He was held by Amyntas, ειν φιλȢ χρειᾳ. Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.

[p] Lucian, Jupiter Tragædus; & Suidas in Nicomach.

[q] Idem ibid. [r] Ammon. Vit. Aristot.

[s] Dionys. Halic. Epist. ad Ammæum.

[t] Diogen. Laert. in Aristot.

[u] Αριστοτελης της φυσεως γραμματευς ην. Anonym. apud Suid. in Aristot. Literally, "Nature's secretary."

CHAP. I.

Ariftotle's education at Atarneus,

Ariftotle alfo inherited from his parents a large fortune: and their early lofs was fupplied and compenfated by the kind attentions of Proxenus, a citizen of Atarneus in Myfia, who received the young Stagirite into his family, and fkilfully directed his education[x]. Thefe important obligations our philofopher, in whofe character gratitude appears to have been a prominent feature, amply repaid to Nicanor the fon of Proxenus, whom he adopted, educated, and enriched[y]. At the age of feventeen[z], the young Stagirite was attracted by the love of learning to Athens, and particularly by the defire of becoming a hearer in Plato's Academy, the beft fchool of fcience as well as of morals then exifting in the world; and where the moft affiduous ftudent might find competitors worthy of exciting his emulation and fharpening his diligence. Plato early obferved of him, that he required the rein rather than the fpur[a]. His induftry in perufing and copying manufcripts was prodigious; he was named, by way of excellence, "the ftudent or reader[b]." Plato often called him the "foul of his fchool[c];" and, when Ariftotle happened to be abfent from his prelections, often complained that he fpoke to a *deaf audience*[d]. As the ftudent advanced in years, his acutenefs was as extraordinary in can-

and at Athens.

His literary induftry.

[x] Diogen. Laert. in Ariftot. [y] Idem ibid.

[z] Dionyf. Epift. ad Ammæum. Diogen. Laert. ibid.

[a] Idem ibid. [b] Diogen. Laert. ibid.

[c] Or rather the mind or intellect, νους της διατριϐης. Idem ibid.

[d] Philoponus de Eternit. Mund. adverf. Proclum, vi. 27.

vaffing

vaffing opinions, as his induftry had been unexampled in collecting them[e]; his capacious mind embraced the whole circle of fcience; and, notwithftanding his pertinacity in rejecting every principle or tenet which he could not on reflection approve, his very fingular merit failed not to recommend him to the difcerning admiration of Plato, with whom he continued to refide twenty years, even to his mafter's death; alike carelefs of the honours of a court, to which the rank and connections of his family might have opened to him the road in Macedon; and indifferent to the glory of a name, which his great abilities might early have attained, by eftablifhing a feparate fchool, and founding a new fect in philofophy[f].

His perfon and fuppofed foibles.

At the fame time that Ariftotle applied fo affiduoufly to the embellifhment of his mind, he was not neglectful, we are told, of whatever might adorn his perfon. His figure was not advantageous; he was of a fhort ftature, his eyes were remarkably fmall, his limbs were difproportionably flender, and he lifped or ftammered in his fpeech[g]. For his ungracious perfon Ariftotle is faid to have been anxious to compenfate by the finery and elegance of his drefs: his mantle was fplendid; he wore rings of great value; and he was foppifh enough (fuch is the language of antiquity) to fhave both his head and his face, while the other fcholars of Plato kept their long

[e] Diogen. Laert. ubi fupra.

[f] ὄυτε σχολὴν ἡγȣμενος, ȣτε ιδιαν πεποιηκως αἱρεσιν. Dionyf. Epift. ad Ammæum.

[g] Diogen. Laert. in Ariftot.—Plutarch. de Difcrim. Adulat. & Amic. p. 53. fays, "that many imitated Ariftotle's ftuttering, as they did Alexander's wry neck."

hair

Reflections thereon.

hair and beards. To some learned men, the omission of such particulars might appear unpardonable; yet in a life of Aristotle, such particulars are totally unworthy of being told, since his love for ostentatious finery (probably much exaggerated by his enemies) was in him merely an accessory, which nowise affected his character, nor weakened that ardent passion for knowledge which reigned sole mistress of his soul. In men born for great intellectual atchievements, this passion must, at some period of their lives, suppress and stifle every other; and, while it continues to do so, their real happiness is probably at its highest pitch. The pursuit of science indeed, not having any natural limitations, might be supposed to invigorate with manhood, to confirm itself through custom, and to operate through life with unceasing or increasing energy. But this delightful progress is liable to be interrupted by other causes than the decline of health and the decay of curiosity; for great exertions are not more certainly rewarded by celebrity, than celebrity is punished with envy, which will sometimes rankle in secret malice, and sometimes vent itself in open reproach: wrongs will provoke resentment; injuries will be offered and retorted; and, a state of hostility commencing, the philosopher, in defending his opinions and his fame, becomes a prey to the wretched anxieties incident to the vulgar scrambles of sordid interest and senseless ambition. Of this melancholy remark, both the life and the death of Aristotle will afford, as we shall see hereafter, very forcible illustrations.

Plato

Aristotle's gratitude to Plato.

Plato died in the first year of the 108th olympiad, and 338 years before the Christian æra. He was succeeded in the academy by Speusippus, the son of his sister Potona; a man far inferior to the Stagirite in abilities; and however well he might be acquainted with the theory, not strongly confirmed in the practice, of moral virtue, since he was too often and too easily vanquished both by anger and by pleasure[h]. Aristotle appears not to have taken offence that, in the succession to his admired master, the strong claim of merit should have been sacrificed to the partialities of blood. In some of the latest of his writings, he speaks of Plato with a degree of respect approaching to reverence. Soon after that philosopher's decease, Aristotle wrote verses in his praise, and erected altars to his honour[i]: and the connections which he himself had already formed with some of the most illustrious as well as the most extraordinary personages of his own or any age, might naturally inspire him with the design of leaving Athens, after he had lost the philosopher and friend whose fame had first drawn him thither, and whose instructive society had so long retained him in that celebrated city.

His residence with Hermeias. The singular history of that prince.

One of the memorable characters with whom Aristotle maintained a close and uninterrupted correspondence was Hermeias, styled, in the language of those days, tyrant of Assus and Atarneus; a man whose life forcibly illustrates the strange vicissitudes of fortune. Hermeias is

[h] Diogen. Laert. in Speusipp.
[i] Idem; & Ammonius in Aristot.

called

CHAP. I. called a ſlave and an eunuch[k]; but he was a ſlave whoſe ſpirit was not to be broken, and an eunuch whoſe mind was not to be emaſculated. Through the bounty of a wealthy patron, he had been enabled early to gratify his natural taſte for philoſophy; and, having become a fellow-ſtudent with Ariſtotle at Athens, ſoon united with him in the bands of affectionate eſteem, which finally cemented into firm and unalterable friendſhip. Ariſtotle through life purſued the calm and ſecure paths of ſcience, but Hermeias ventured to climb the dangerous heights of ambition. His enterpriſing ſpirit, ſeconded by good fortune, raiſed him to the ſovereignty of Aſſus and Atarneus, Greek cities of Myſia, the former ſituate in the diſtrict of Troas, the latter in that of Æolis, and both of them, like moſt Grecian colonies on the Aſiatic coaſt, but looſely dependent on the Perſian empire. Hermeias availed himſelf of the weakneſs or diſtance of the armies of Artaxerxes, and of the reſources with which his own ambition was ſupplied by a wealthy banker, to gain poſſeſſion of thoſe ſtrong-holds, with all their dependencies; and endeavoured to juſtify this bold uſurpation of the ſceptre, by the manly firmneſs with which he held it[l]. Upon the invitation of his royal friend, Ariſtotle, almoſt immediately after Plato's death, reviſited Atarneus[m], the ſame city in which he had

[k] Ευνυχος ων και δυλος ηρχεν Ερμειας. His maſter's name was Eubulus, a prince and philoſopher of Bithynia. Suidas.

[l] Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. ſect. 122.

[m] Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum.

had ſpent the happy years of his youth under the kind protection of Proxenus; and might we indulge the conjecture that this worthy Atarnean ſtill lived, our philoſopher's voyage to Æolis muſt have been ſtrongly recommended by his deſire of repaying the favours of a man whom his gratitude always regarded as a ſecond father, and of thus propping, by his friendly aid, the declining age of his early guardian.

Deſtroyed by Mentor the Rhodian.

Ariſtotle found at Atarneus the wiſh of Plato realiſed; he beheld, in his friend Hermeias, philoſophy ſeated on a throne. In that city he reſided nearly three years, enjoying the inexpreſſible happineſs of ſeeing his enlightened political maxims illuſtrated in the virtuous reign of his fellow-ſtudent and ſovereign. But, to render his condition enviable, an eſſential requiſite was wanting, namely, that of ſecurity. Artaxerxes, whoſe ſucceſs againſt the rebels in Egypt had exceeded his moſt ſanguine hopes, could no longer brook the diſmemberment of the fair coaſt of Myſia, through the uſurpation of an eunuch and a ſlave. Mentor, a Greek, and kinſman of Memnon the Rhodian, a general ſo famous in the Perſian annals, had ſignalized his zeal and valour in the Egyptian war. He was one of thoſe crafty[a] and unprincipled

[a] Ariſtotle himſelf brands with infamy this ſucceſsful villain by contraſting his profligate dexterity with the real virtue of prudence. Αλλα δεινος μεν και ὁ φαυλος λεγεται, &c. "A knave may be clever; for example, Mentor, who ſeemed to be very clever, but ſurely was not prudent; for it belongs to prudence to deſire and prefer only the beſt ends, and to carry ſuch only into execution: but cleverneſs implies barely that fertility in reſource, and dexterity in execution, by which any purpoſes, whether good or bad, may be fitly and ſpeedily accompliſhed." *Magn. Moral.* l. i. c. 25. p. 171.

Greeks,

CHAP. I.

Greeks, whom the ambitious hopes of raising a splendid fortune often drew to a standard naturally hostile to their country; and his recent merit with Artaxerxes recommended him as the fittest instrument to be employed in chastising the Mysian usurper. This employment he did not decline, although the man whom he was commissioned to destroy, had formerly been numbered among his friends[o]. Mentor marched with a powerful army to the western coast. He might have effected his purpose by open force; but to accomplish it by stratagem, was both more easy in itself, and more suitable to his character. He had been connected with Hermeias by the sacred ties of hospitality; the sanctity of this connection was revered by the greatest profligates of antiquity; but the impious Mentor knew no religion but obedience to his master's will. He employed his former intimacy with Hermeias as the means of decoying that unwary prince to an interview: Mentor seized his person, and sent him privately to Upper Asia, where, by order of Artaxerxes, he was hanged as a traitor[p]. The cruel artifices of Mentor ended not with this tragedy. Having possessed himself of the ring which the unfortunate Hermeias usually employed as his signet, he sealed with it his own dispatches, and immediately sent them to the cities that acknowledged the sovereignty of a man, whose mild exercise of power tended, in the minds of his subjects, to justify

His singular and cruel artifices.

[o] Diodor. Sicul. l. xvi. sect. 122.

[p] Diodor. ubi supra. Helladius apud Phot. Biblioth. p. 866. Polyaen. Stratag. vi. 48.

2 the

the irregular means by which he had acquired it. In theſe diſpatches Mentor ſignified that, through his own interceſſion, Hermeias had obtained peace and pardon from the great king. The magiſtrates of the revolted cities eaſily gave credit to intelligence moſt agreeable to their wiſhes: they opened their gates without ſuſpicion to Mentor's ſoldiers, who inſtantly made themſelves maſters both of thoſe Myſian ſtrongholds, which might have made a long and vigorous reſiſtance to the Perſian arms, and of the powerful garriſons by which they were defended[q]. One farther deception crowned the ſucceſsful perfidy of Mentor. He affected to treat the conquered places with unexampled moderation. He was particularly careful to keep in their offices the ſame collectors of revenues and intendants who had been employed by Hermeias. Thoſe officers, when they were firſt appriſed of the danger which threatened their maſter, concealed their treaſures under ground, or depoſited them with their friends; but when they found themſelves treated with ſo much unexpected generoſity by the invader, they reſumed their wonted confidence, and conveyed back into their own coffers their long accumulated wealth; of which circumſtance Mentor was no ſooner informed by his emiſſaries, than he ſeized both the effects and the perſons of theſe too credulous collectors[r].

[q] Diodor. ubi ſupra.

[r] We learn this particular, which is neceſſary to explain what follows in the text, from Ariſtotle himſelf, in his curious treatiſe De Cura Rei familiaris, p. 508.

The

CHAP. I.

Ariſtotle eſcapes to Leſbos.

The veil of moderation which Mentor's policy had aſſumed in his firſt tranſactions at Atarneus, enabled Ariſtotle to avoid the puniſhment which too naturally fell on the ambition of his friend. By a ſeaſonable flight he eſcaped to Mitylené in the iſle of Leſbos, in company with Pythias, the kinſwoman and adopted heireſs of the King of Aſſus and Atarneus, but now miſerably fallen from the lofty expectations in which her youth had been educated. But this ſad reverſe of fortune only endeared her the more to Ariſtotle, who married the fair companion of his flight in his thirty-ſeventh year[s]; which is preciſely that age pointed out by himſelf as the fitteſt, on the male ſide, for entering into wedlock[t]. Pythias died ſhortly afterwards, leaving an infant daughter named after a wife tenderly beloved by Ariſtotle, and who repaid his affection with the moſt tender ſenſibility. It was her laſt requeſt that, when her huſband left life (which might the Fates long avert!) her own bones ſhould be diſinterred, and carefully depoſited within the incloſure of his revered tomb[u].

His marriage with Pythias.

Is invited to Macedon.

The Stagirite paſſed but a ſhort time in the ſoft iſland of Leſbos, in the tender indulgence either of love or of melancholy. During his reſidence in Athens, he had ſtrengthened his hereditary friendſhip with Philip of Macedon, a prince one year younger than himſelf, who, having lived from the age of fifteen to that of

[s] Comp. Dionyſ. Epiſt. ad Ammæum; et Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot. [t] Politic. l. vii. c. 16.

[u] Diogen. Laert. ubi ſupra.

two-

two-and-twenty in Thebes and the neighbouring cities, afcended the throne of his anceftors in the twenty-third year of his age. The bufy fcenes of war and negotiation in which Philip was immediately after his acceffion engaged through neceffity, and in which he continued to be involved during his whole reign by ambition, feem never to have interrupted his correfpondence with the friends of his youth; with thofe who either poffeffed his affection, or who merited his admiration[x]. In the fifth year of his reign his fon Alexander was born; an event which he notified to Ariftotle in terms implying much previous communication between them: "Know that a fon is born to us. We thank the gods for their gift, but efpecially for beftowing it at the time when Ariftotle lives; affuring ourfelves that, educated by you, he will be worthy of us, and worthy of inheriting our kingdom[y]." If this letter was written at the æra of Alexander's birth, it muft have found Ariftotle at Athens in his twenty-ninth year, ftill a diligent ftudent in the fchool of Plato. But it is certain that the Stagirite did not affume the office of preceptor to the fon of Philip till fourteen years afterwards, when the opening character of this young prince feemed as highly to deferve, as peculiarly to require, the affiftance of fo able an inftructor[z].

Philip's letter to him.

In

[x] Hiftory of ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33.

[y] Aulus Gellius, l. ix. c. 3.

[z] The chronology is clearly afcertained by Dionyfius of Halicarnaffus's letter to Ammæus; yet the accurate Quintilian, becaufe it ferved to enforce his argument, fays, "An Philippus, Macedonum rex," &c. "Would Philip, king of the Macedonians, have thought fit

CHAP. I.

In the second year of the 109th olympiad, Aristotle, probably in consequence of a new invitation from Philip, sailed from the isle of Lesbos, in which he had resided nearly two years, escaped the dangers of the Athenian fleet, which then carried on war against Macedon, and arrived at the court of Pella[a], to undertake one of the few employments not unworthy of an author qualified to instruct and benefit the latest ages of the world.

His merit and success in the education of Alexander.

In the education of Alexander, the Stagirite spent eight years; during which long period, in an office of much delicacy, he enjoyed the rare advantage of giving the highest satisfaction to his employers, while he excited the warmest gratitude in his pupil[b]. The temper of Alexander, prone to every generous affection, loved and esteemed many; but Aristotle is the only one of his friends whose superior genius he appears unceasingly to have viewed with undiminished veneration, and whom he seems to have treated through life with uniform and unalterable respect.

Honours bestowed on him by Philip.

By Philip and his proud Queen Olympias, our philosopher was honoured with every mark of distinction which greatness can bestow on illustrious merit. Philip placed his

fit that Aristotle, the greatest philosopher of the age, should have been employed in teaching his son Alexander the first rudiments of learning, or would Aristotle himself have accepted of such an office, had he not believed it of the utmost importance to the success of our future studies, that their first foundation should be laid by a teacher of consummate skill?" QUINTIL. *Instit.* l. i. c. 1.

[a] Dionys. Halicarn. ubi supra.

[b] Plutarch. in Alexand. tom. i. p. 668.; & advers. Colot. t. ii. p. 1126.

his ſtatue near to his own: he was admitted to the councils of his ſovereign, where his advice was often uſeful, always honourable; and where his kind interceſſion benefited many individuals, and many communities[c]. On one occaſion the Athenians rewarded his good ſervices, by erecting his ſtatue in the citadel[d]: and his letters, both to Philip and to Alexander, atteſted his unremitting exertions in the cauſe of his friends and of the public, as well as his manly freedom in admoniſhing kings of their duty[e]. But the ruling paſſions of Philip and Alexander, the intereſted policy of the one, and the lofty ambition of the other, were too ſtrong and too ungovernable to be reſtrained by the power of reaſon, ſpeaking through the voice of their admired philoſopher. The ambition of Alexander had early taken root; and the peculiarities of his character had diſplayed themſelves, in a very public and very important tranſaction, which happened ſeveral months before the Stagirite arrived at the court of Pella. During Philip's Illyrian expedition, Macedon was honoured with an embaſſy from the Great King. In the abſence of his father, Alexander, ſcarcely fourteen years old, received the ambaſſadors; and his converſation with thoſe illuſtrious ſtrangers, at a period in hiſtory when the public conferences of great perſonages conſiſted not merely in words of ceremony, afforded a juſt ſubject of praiſe and wonder.

Peculiarities of Alexander's character.

[c] Ammonius, Vit. Ariſt. [d] Pauſanias Eliac.
[e] Ammonius, ibid. See alſo the fragments ſtill remaining in Du Valle's edition, p. 1102. et ſeq.

CHAP. I.

Inftead of dwelling on their external appearance, or confining himfelf to fuch fuperficial queftions as correfponded with the unripenefs of his years, he inquired into the nature of the Perfian government; the character of Ochus, who then reigned; the ftrength and compofition of his armies; the diftance of his place of refidence from the weftern coaft; the ftate of the intermediate country, and particularly of the high roads leading to the great capitals of Sufa and Babylon[f]. To his premature love of aggrandizement, Alexander already added fingular dexterity and unexampled boldnefs in his exercifes, particularly in horfemanfhip; the moft fervid affections, invincible courage, and unbending dignity[g].

The plan followed by Ariftotle in his education.

In training fuch a youth, the Stagirite had a rich field to cultivate; but he could only hope to give a new direction to paffions, which it was too late to eradicate or fubdue. In his treatife on Politics, he has carefully delineated the plan of education beft adapted to perfons of the higheft rank in fociety; and, in performing the tafk affigned to him by Philip, this plan was to be fkilfully modified, by adjufting it to the peculiar circumftances and extraordinary character of his pupil. Alexander's loftinefs could not be conquered, but it might be made to combat on the fide of virtue: if he was angry, it was proved to him that anger was the effect of infult, and the mark of inferiority[h]. His love for

[f] Plutarch. in Alexand. [g] Idem ibid.
[h] Ælian. Var. Hift. l. xii. c. 54.

military

military glory, which, while it is the idol of the multitude, will always be the paſſion of the great, could neither be controlled nor moderated; but, to rival this tyrant of the breaſt, ſtill more exalted affections were inſpired, which rendered Alexander as much ſuperior to conquerors, as conquerors deem themſelves ſuperior to the loweſt of the vulgar. Agreeably to a maxim inculcated in that book of Ariſtotle's Politics which relates to education, the two years immediately following puberty conſtitute that important period of life, which is peculiarly adapted for improving and ſtrengthening the bodily frame, and for acquiring that corporeal vigour which is one main-ſpring of mental energy. During this intereſting period of youth, with the proper management of which the future happineſs of the whole of life is ſo intimately connected, Ariſtotle obſerves that the intellectual powers ought indeed to be kept in play, but not too ſtrenuouſly exerciſed, ſince powerful exertions of the mind and body cannot be made at once, nor the habits of making them be ſimultaneouſly acquired. In conformity with this principle, Alexander was encouraged to proceed with alacrity in his exerciſes, till he acquired in them unrivalled proficiency; after which, the whole bent of his mind was directed to the moſt profound reſearches of ſcience.

Ariſtotle's acroatic philoſophy.

It is the opinion of many, that a ſlight tincture of learning is ſufficient for accompliſhing a prince. Both Philip and Ariſtotle thought otherwiſe; and the ardent curioſity of Alexander

CHAP. I.

himself was not to be satisfied with such superficial and meagre instruction as have been sometimes triumphantly published for the use of persons destined to reign. The young Macedonian's mind was therefore to be sharpened by whatever is most nice in distinction, and to be exalted by whatever is most lofty in speculation[i]; that his faculties, by expanding and invigorating amidst objects of the highest intellection, might thereby be rendered capable of comprehending ordinary matters the more quickly and the more completely[k]. This recondite philosophy, which was delivered by the Stagirite, first to his royal pupil, and afterwards to his hearers in the Lyceum, received the epithet of *acroatic*[l]; to distinguish those parts of his lectures which were confined to a select audience, from other parts called *exoteric*, because delivered to the public at large. It has been supposed that, in

[i] Plutarch. in Alexand.

[k] Arist. de Anima, l. iii. c. 5 & 6. & Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 7 & 8.

[l] This division of Aristotle's works into *acroatic* and *exoteric*, has given rise to a variety of opinions and disputes; which all have their source in the different accounts given by Plutarch and Aulus Gellius, on one hand; and by Strabo, Cicero, and Ammonius on the other. The former writers (Plutarch. in Alexand.; & Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 4.) maintain that the acroatic, or, as they call them, the acroamatic works, differed from the exoteric in the nature of their subjects, which consisted in natural philosophy and logic; whereas the subjects of the exoteric were rhetoric, ethics, and politics. But the opinions of both Plutarch and Gellius (for they do not entirely coincide) are refuted by Aristotle's references, as we shall see hereafter, from his *Ethic* to his exoteric works. The latter class of writers (Strabo, l. xiii. p. 608.; Cicero ad Attic. xiii. 19.; & Ammonius Herm. ad Categor. Aristot.) maintain, that the acroatic works were distinguished from the exoteric, not by the difference of the subjects, but by the different manner of treating them; the former being discourses, the latter dialogues.

these

these two kinds of lectures, the Stagirite maintained contradictory doctrines on the subjects of religion and morality. But the fact is far otherwise: his practical tenets were uniformly the same in both; but his exoteric or popular treatises nearly resembled the philosophical dialogues of Plato or Cicero; whereas his acroatic writings (which will be explained in the following chapter) contained, in a concise energetic style peculiar to himself, those deep and broad principles on which all solid science is built, and, independently of which, the most operose reasonings, and the most intricate combinations, are but matters of coarse mechanical practice[m]. The sublimity of this abstract and recondite philosophy admirably accorded with the loftiness of Alexander's mind; and how highly he continued to prize it, amidst the tumultuary occupations of war and government, appears from the following letter written soon after the battle of Gaugamela, and while he was yet in pursuit of Darius: "Alexander wishing all happiness to Aristotle. You have not done right in publishing your acroatic works. Wherein shall we be distinguished above others, if the important

Highly prized by Alexander.

[m] Simplicius and Philoponus allow other writings besides the dialogues to have been exoteric, as historical disquisitions, and whatever else did not require for understanding them intense thought in the reader. Simplicius says that Aristotle was purposely obscure in his acroatic writings: "ut segniores ab eorum studio repelleret & dehortaretur." Simplic. ad Auscult. Physic. fol. ii. This would have been a very unworthy motive in the Stagirite: but the truth is, that the obscurity of Aristotle's works proceeds from a corrupt text. When the text is pure, his writings are as easily intelligible, as a mere syllabus of lectures on most abstruse subjects can well be rendered.

CHAP. I.

things which we have been taught, be communicated to the public? I would rather ſurpaſs other men in the beſt kind of knowledge than in power. Farewell[n]." Ariſtotle, not conſidering this letter as merely complimental, anſwered it as follows: "You wrote to me concerning my acroatic works, that they ought not to have been publiſhed. Know that in one ſenſe this ſtill is the caſe, ſince their meaning will be fully apprehended by thoſe only who have heard my lectures[o]." Of thoſe much-valued writings, the theological part, if at all publiſhed, was probably moſt involved in a ſublime obſcurity. To have maintained, in plain and popular language, the unity and perfections of the Deity, muſt have excited againſt the Stagirite an earlier religious perſecution than that which really overtook him. Yet in this pure theology, Alexander was carefully inſtructed; as his preceptor reminded him in the midſt of his unexampled victories and unbounded conqueſts, concluding a letter with this memorable admonition; that "thoſe who entertain juſt notions of the Deity are better entitled to be high-minded, than thoſe who ſubdue kingdoms[p]."

Ariſtotle's genius for poetry.

Ariſtotle's love of philoſophy did not, like that of Plato, ſet him at variance with poetry. He frequently cites the poets, particularly

[n] Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5.

[o] Idem ibid. If theſe letters be aſcribed to their right authors, they prove in what light Ariſtotle regarded his acroatic works; he conſidered them merely as text-books.

[p] Plutarch. de Tranquillitate Animi, p. 474.

Homer;

Homer; and he prepared for his pupil a correct copy of the Iliad, which that admirer of kindred heroes always carried with him in a casket, whence this transcript was called "the Iliad of the Casket[q]." The Stagirite was not only the best critic in poetry, but himself a poet of the first eminence. Few of his verses indeed have reached modern times; but the few which remain prove him worthy of sounding the lyre of Pindar[r]; and it is not the least singularity attending this extraordinary man, that with the nicest and most subtile powers of discrimination and analysis, he united a vigorous and rich vein of poetic fancy.

The nature of his instructions to Alexander in ethics and politics.

Aristotle carefully instructed his pupil in ethics and politics. He wrote to him, long afterwards, a treatise on government; and exhorted him to adjust the measure of his authority to the various character of his subjects; agreeably to a doctrine which he frequently inculcates in his political works, that different nations require different modes of government, respectively adapted to their various turns of mind, and different habits of thinking[s]. From the ethic writings of Aristotle which still remain, and which are the most practically useful of any that pagan antiquity can boast, it is easy to detect that wicked calumny of his enemies, "that, for sordid and selfish purposes, he accommodated the tenets of his philosophy

[q] Plutarch. in Alexand. vol. i. p.688.
[r] Menag. Observat. in Diogen. Laert. l. v. p. 189.
[s] Plutarch. in Alexand.

CHAP. I.

losophy to the base morals of courts[t]." It may be safely affirmed that, if Alexander stands pre-eminent above other princes in love of knowledge and virtue[u], he was chiefly indebted for this exaltation to his preceptor: the seeds of his haughtiness and ambition were sown before Aristotle was called to direct his studies; his excellencies therefore may be ascribed to our philosopher[x]; his imperfections to himself, to Philip, above all, to the intoxicating effects of unbounded prosperity. This is the language of antiquity, and even of those writers who are the least partial to the fame of the Stagirite.

Aristotle recommends Callisthenes to Alexander. His character and behaviour.

After the most intimate communication during the space of eight years[y], the pupil and the preceptor separated for ever, to pursue, in a career of almost equal length, the most opposite paths to the same immortal renown; the one by arms, the other by philosophy; the one by gratifying

t This absurdity is brought forward and insisted on by Brucker, Histor. Philosoph. vol. i. p. 797. Nothing can be more erroneous or more unintelligible than Brucker's account of Aristotle's philosophy. I have heard it said in his own country, that this laborious German did not understand Greek.

u See the proofs of this in Plutarch, p. 668. Alexander spared the house of Pindar, in the sack of Thebes; and the town of Eressus in Lesbos, in his war with the Persians, because it was the birth-place of Theophrastus and Phanias, Aristotle's disciples. In the midst of his expedition, he wrote to Athens for the works of the tragic poets, with the dithyrambics of Telestus and Philoxenus, and the history of Philistus. Alexander was declared by the Indian Mandanis the only proficient in wisdom ever seen at the head of a victorious army. Strabo, l. xv. p. 715.

x Αριστοτελης, τα δεοντα συμβαλλειων, Αλεξανδρῳ πολλοις ωφελιμος ην. Ælian. Var. Hist. l. xii. c. 54.

y Dionys. Halicarn.; & Diogen. Laert. ubi supra.

the

the moſt immoderate luſt of power, the other by teaching to deſpiſe this and all ſimilar gratifications. During his eaſtern triumphs, terminated after the lapſe of ten years by his premature death, Alexander (as we ſhall have occaſion to relate) gave many illuſtrious proofs of gratitude to the virtuous director of his youth. One incident, and one only, ſeems to have occaſioned ſome diſguſt between them. At leaving the court of Pella, Ariſtotle recommended, as worthy of accompanying Alexander in his Perſian expedition, his own kinſman Calliſthenes, an Olynthian; a learned and certainly an honeſt man, but of a moroſe unaccommodating temper, pertinaciouſly attached to the old ſyſtem of republicaniſm, which the father of Alexander had overturned in Greece; equally daring and inflexible in his purpoſes, and unſeaſonably bold in his ſpeech[1]. Ariſtotle himſelf perceived and lamented his faults, and admoniſhed him in a line of Homer, "that his unbridled tongue might occaſion his early death[2]." The prophecy was fulfilled. Calliſthenes, not reflecting that "he who has once condeſcended" (in the words of Arrian) "to be attendant on a king, ought never to be wanting in due deference to his will," rudely and outrageouſly oppoſed Alexander's reſolution of exacting the ſame marks of homage from the Greeks which were cheerfully

[1] Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. iv. c. 8.

[2] Ωκυμορος δη μοι τεκος εσσεαι οι αγορευεις. Il. xviii. 95.

CHAP. I.

fully paid to him by the Perſians[b]. The manner of Calliſthenes's puniſhment and death is related more variouſly[c] than almoſt any hiſtorical event of ſuch public notoriety; but moſt writers concur in opinion, that he met with the juſt reward of his raſhneſs and arrogance. This tranſaction, it is aſſerted, much eſtranged Alexander from his ancient preceptor. The aſſertion however is not accompanied with any ſolid proof[d]; and the abſurd calumny, that Ariſtotle not only regarded this pretended diſpleaſure as an injury, but even proceeded to the wickedneſs of joining in a conſpiracy againſt Alexander's life, is warranted by nothing in hiſtory, but a hearſay preſerved in Plutarch[e], and the affected credit given to the monſtrous report by the monſter Caracalla, for the unworthy purpoſe of juſtifying his own violence in deſtroying the ſchools of the Ariſtotelian philoſophers in Alexandria, in burning their books, and in depriving them of all thoſe privileges and revenues which they enjoyed through the munificence of the Ptolemies, Alexander's Egyptian ſucceſſors[f].

Suppoſed rupture between Ariſtotle and Alexander.

[b] Arrian. ubi ſupra.

[c] By Arrian, Curtius, Juſtin, Diogenes, Laertius, Philoſtratus, and Suidas.

[d] Alexander's reſentment is inferred from a vague and haſty expreſſion in a letter to Antipater; "Τον δε σοφιϛην εγω κολασω, και τȣς εκπεμποντας αυτον—I will puniſh the Sophiſt (meaning Calliſthenes) and thoſe who ſent him." Plutarch. in Alexand. p. 696. Alexander, it is true, ſent preſents to Xenocrates; but ſo did Antipater, who always remained Ariſtotle's ſincere and confidential friend.

[e] "Thoſe who ſay that Ariſtotle adviſed Antipater to deſtroy Alexander by poiſon, cite for their authority a certain Agnothemis, who heard it from king Antigonus." Plut. in Alexand. p. 707.

[f] Dion. in Caracall.

Having

CHAP. I.

Plan of Ariftotle's life in Athens.

Having taken leave of the Macedonian capital, Ariftotle returned to his beloved Athens; where he fpent thirteen[g] years, almoft the whole remainder of his life, inftructing his difciples, and improving the various branches of his philofophy. His *acroatic* lectures were given in the morning to thofe who were his regular pupils[h]. A confiderable part of them is ftill preferved in his works, which form an abftract or fyllabus of treatifes on the moft important branches of philofophy. His *exoteric* difcourfes were held after fupper with occafional vifitors, and formed the amufement of his evening walks[i]; for he thought "fuch exercife peculiarly ufeful after table for animating and invigorating the natural heat and ftrength, which the too rapid fucceffion of fleep to food feemed rather fitted to relax and encumber[k]." Before his arrival at Athens, Speufippus was dead; and Xenocrates, whofe dull gravity and rigid aufterity a man of Ariftotle's character could not much admire, had taken poffeffion of the academy[l]. The Stagirite, therefore, fettled in a *gymnafium* in the fuburbs, well fhaded with trees, near to which the foldiers ufed to exercife, and adorned by the temple of Lycian Apollo, from whofe *peripaton*, or walk, Ariftotle and his followers were called Peripatetics[m]. It is reported that he opened his fchool, obferving,

[g] Dionyf. Epift. ad Ammæum.
[h] Aulus Gellius, l. xx. c. 5. [i] Idem ibid.
[k] Plutarch. Conjug. Precept. p. 133.
[l] Diogen. Laert. in Xenocrat.
[m] Menagius ad Diogen. Laert. l. v. fect. 2.

"That

CHAP. I. "That it would be ſhameful for himſelf to be ſilent while Xenocrates publicly taught[n]." Ariſtotle is not likely to have uttered ſuch a preſumptuous boaſt; but if it was really made, even this pretenſion to ſuperiority was certainly very fully juſtified by the fame which the Lyceum ſpeedily acquired, which the Stagirite himſelf maintained unimpaired through life, and which was ably ſupported by his diſciple and ſucceſſor Theophraſtus.

Such is the genuine hiſtory of Ariſtotle's life, in the moſt important paſſages of which all the ancient writers[o], who have expreſsly treated the ſubject, unitedly concur. By arranging his biography, therefore, according to our preſent method, both my own labour will be abridged, and the reader's time will be ſaved; for the calumnies againſt Ariſtotle will be no ſooner mentioned than they will refute themſelves, and they could not paſs unnoticed, becauſe they are perpetuated in the ſarcaſms of Lucian[p], and the lying whiſpers of Athenæus[q], which have been

[n] Diogen. Laert. in Ariſtot. But Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionyſius Halicarn. read "Iſocrates" inſtead of "Xenocrates." The reading in the text is the more probable, for Iſocrates and Ariſtotle, following very different purſuits, were not naturally rivals; beſides, the former is ſaid to have died ſoon after the battle of Chæronæa in extreme old age, and Ariſtotle did not return to Athens till three years after that deciſive engagement. Compare my life of Iſocrates, and the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 33.

[o] Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus, Diogenes Laertius, and Ammonius: the ancient Latin tranſlation of this laſt, firſt publiſhed by Nunneſius (Helmeſtadij 1767), contains ſome additional circumſtances, but thoſe of little value, and of doubtful authority.

[p] Lucian treats both Ariſtotle and his pupil with equal injuſtice. Vid. Dialog. Diogen. & Alexand. et Alexand. & Philip.

[q] Athenæus Deipnos. l. viii. p. 354.

too

too often miſtaken, even by the learned, for true hiſtory.

Calumnies againſt Ariſtotle.

The abſurd reports that Ariſtotle firſt ſerved in the army, that he there diſſipated his fortune by low profligacy, and then followed for bread the trade of an apothecary[r], may be confidently rejected by thoſe who know, on unqueſtionable authority, that he became, at the early age of ſeventeen, a diligent ſtudent in the academy at Athens, where he remained during the long period of twenty years. The reader who has ſeen the teſtimonies of his gratitude to Plato, will not eaſily be perſuaded that he could treat this revered maſter with the groſſeſt brutality[s]; and let him who reads and meditates the Ethics to Nicomachus aſk his own heart as well as underſtanding, whether it is likely that the author of ſuch a treatiſe ſhould, inſtead of reſtraining and correcting, have flattered[t] and fomented the vices of Alexander. Inſtead of farther examining theſe wild fictions, which ſtand in direct contradiction to the matters of fact above related, it is of more importance to inquire whence

[r] Athenæus ubi ſupra, and Ariſtocles apud Euſebium. Their report reſts on a ſuppoſititious letter of Epicurus on Study, and the aſſertion of Timæus of Tauromenon in Sicily; an author nicknamed Epitimæus, the Detractor. Diodorus Siculus, l. v. c. 1. Athenæus, l. vi. p. 272.

[s] Αριστοτελης ημας απελακτισε—"Ariſtotle has kicked at us;" a ſtrong metaphor. Diogenes Laert. l. v. ſect. 2. Ælian, Var. Hiſtor. l. iii. c. 19. aſcribes both to Plato and to Ariſtotle a behaviour totally inconſiſtent with every thing that we know of their characters. Comp. Ælian, Var. Hiſt. l. iv. c. 19. Photius, Biblioth. c. 279. Auguſtin. de Civitate Dei, l. viii. c. 12. Such contradictory reports mutually deſtroy each other.

[t] Lucian. Dial. Diogen. & Alexand.

ſuch

CHAP. I.

such improbable tales could have originated; especially as this inquiry will bring us to the events which immediately preceded our philosopher's death.

Wherein they originated.

From innumerable passages in the moral and political works of which we have presumed to offer the translation to the public, it will appear that Aristotle regarded with equal contempt vain pretenders to real science, and real proficients in sciences which he deemed vain and frivolous. His theological opinions, also, were far too refined for the grossness of paganism. He sought only for truth, and was careless of the obstacles which stood in the way to its attainment, whether they were found in the errors of philosophers, or in the prejudices of the vulgar. Such a man in such a city as Athens, where, since the days of Socrates, the learned taught publicly and conversed freely with all descriptions of persons, could not fail to have many rivals and many enemies. Sophists and sciolists, soothsayers and satirists, and that worst of banes, satirical historians[u], heaped obloquy on a character, the ornament of his own age, and destined to be the great instructor of posterity. But the name of Alexander, which then filled the world, was duly respected, even in the turbulent democracy of Athens; and it was not

[u] Aristocles (apud Eusebium) says, that Aristotle was attacked by a host of writers, "whose books and memories have perished more completely than their bodies." Even his fellow student, Aristoxenus, who had treated him most respectfully while he lived, heaped the most illiberal reproaches on his memory, because he preferred to himself Theophrastus for his successor. Suidas in Aristoxen. & Aristocles apud Eusebium.

till the year following the death of that incomparable prince, that the rancorous malignity, which had been long suppressed, burst forth against Aristotle with resistless violence. He was accused of irreligion before the Areopagus by the hierophant Eurymedon, abetted by Demophilus, a man of weight in the republic; and both of them instigated to this cruel prosecution by our philosopher's declared enemies[x]. The heads of the accusation were, "that Aristotle had commemorated the virtues both of his wife Pythias and of his friend Hermeias, with such ceremonies and honours as the piety of Athens justly reserved for the majesty of the gods." To Hermeias, indeed, he erected a statue at Delphi; he also wrote an ode in his praise. Both the inscription and the ode have come down to modern times; the former simply relating "the unworthy and treacherous death of Hermeias;" and the latter "extolling virtue above all earthly possessions; and especially that generous patriotism, for the sake of which the native of Atarneus, rivalling the merit of Hercules and Achilles, had willingly relinquished the light of the sun; whose fame therefore would never be forgotten by the Muses, daughters of Memory; and as often as it was sung would redound to the glory of *Hospitable Jove*[y], and the honour of firm friendship[z]." From the frivolousness of the accusation respecting Hermeias, which was

His accusation at Athens.

[x] Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect. 4 and 5.
[y] See above, p. 12.
[z] Laertius in Aristot. Athenæus, xv. p. 697.

CHAP. I.

considered as the chief article of the impeachment, we may warrantably conjecture that the reproach of worſhipping Pythias with honours due to Eleuſinian Ceres, was altogether groundleſs: but, in a philoſopher, whoſe intellectual rather than his moral virtues have been the object of panegyric, we may remark with pleaſure the unſhaken ſtrength of his friendſhip, and the genuine tenderneſs of his love, ſince both affections muſt have been expreſſed with an amiable enthuſiaſm, to enable even the malice of his enemies to interpret them into the crime of idolatry.

His tenets ignorantly calumniated.

It muſt not be diſſembled that the accuſation, and conſequent condemnation of Ariſtotle by the Areopagus, has been aſcribed to a different cauſe from that above aſſigned, and referred merely to the impiety of his tenets. He is ſaid by thoſe who had careleſsly examined his works, to have denied a Providence, and thence to have inferred the inefficacy of prayers and ſacrifices: doctrines, it is obſerved, which could not but enrage the prieſthood, as totally ſubverſive of its functions, eſtabliſhments, and revenues[a]. But never was any accuſation urged more falſely or more ignorantly. Ariſtotle, as it will be ſhewn hereafter, enumerates the prieſthood among the functions or offices eſſentially requiſite to the exiſtence of every community. In writing to Alexander he ſays, that thoſe are not entitled to be high-minded who conquer king-

[a] Origines contra Celſum et Brukeri, Hiſtor. Critic. vol. i. p. 799.

doms,

doms, but rather those who have learned to form just notions of the gods[b]; and in his life, as well as in his works, he uniformly shewed his veneration for religion in general, by treating, with great tenderness[c], even that distorted image of it reflected from the puerile superstitions of his country[d].

He is said to have written his own defence, and to have inveighed, in a strong metaphor, against the increasing degeneracy of the Athenians[e]. His discourse, of which the boldness would only have inflamed the blind zeal of his weak or wicked judges, was not delivered in court; since he escaped his trial by seasonably quitting Athens for Chalcis in Eubœa, saying, in allusion to the death of Socrates, that he was unwilling to afford the Athenians a second opportunity of sinning against philosophy[f]. He survived his retreat to the shores of the Euripus scarcely a twelvemonth; persecution and banishment having probably shortened his days[g].

His retreat to Chalcis, and death.

His

[b] Plutarch. de Tranquillit. Animi, p. 474.

[c] This tenderness, however, did not, probably, satisfy the Athenian priests; who, as it will appear from the following analysis of his works, had more to apprehend from his real piety, than to fear from his pretended irreligion.

[d] Diogen. Laert. l. v. sect. 16. But the best proof of this will appear hereafter, when we come to examine Aristotle's works.

[e] Laert. l. v. sect. 16. Ογχνη επ' ογχνη γηρασκει. Homer's description of the gardens of Alcinous. "The fig rotting on the fig," alludes to the Athenian sycophants, so called originally from informing against the exporters of figs.

[f] Ælian, iii. 36.

[g] St. Justin (in admon. ad gentes) and Gregory of Nazianzen (contra Julian.) say that he died through the uneasiness of discontent at not being able to explain the cause of the tides of the Euripus;

 upon

CHAP. I.

His testament.

His teſtament, preſerved in Diogenes Laertius, accords with the circumſtances related concerning his life, and practically illuſtrates the liberal maxims of his philoſophy. Antipater, the confidential miniſter of Philip, regent of Macedon both under Alexander and after his demiſe, is appointed the executor of this teſtament, with an authority paramount, as it ſhould ſeem, to that of the other perſons who are afterwards conjoined with him in the ſame truſt. To his wife Herpylis, (for he had married a ſecond time,) Ariſtotle, beſides other property in money and ſlaves, leaves the choice of two houſes, the one in Cnalcis, the other his paternal manſion at Stagira; and deſires, that whichever of them ſhe might prefer, ſhould be properly furniſhed for her reception. He commends her domeſtic virtues; and requeſts his friends that, mindful of her behaviour towards him, they would diſtinguiſh her by the kindeſt attention; and ſhould ſhe again think of a huſband, that they would be careful to provide for her a ſuitable marriage. To Nicomachus, the ſon of this Herpylis, and to Pythias, the daughter of his firſt wife, he bequeathed the remainder of his fortune, with

upon which authority the puerile ſtory is engrafted of his throwing himſelf into that arm of the ſea, ſaying, "You ſhall contain me, ſince I cannot comprehend you." Others ſay that he ended his life by poiſon to eſcape the vengeance of the Athenians (Rapin's Comparaiſon de Platon & d'Ariſtote). Such unwarranted reports would not be worthy of mention, did they not afford an opportunity of obſerving the extreme improbability that Ariſtotle ſhould have been guilty of ſuicide, ſince he always ſpeaks of it as of a ſhameful and cowardly crime.

the

the exception of his library and writings, which he left to his favourite ſcholar Theophraſtus[h]. He deſires that his daughter, when ſhe attained a marriageable age, ſhould be given to Nicanor, the ſon of his ancient benefactor Proxenus; and failing Nicanor, that his eſteemed diſciple Theophraſtus ſhould accept her hand and fortune. The bones of his firſt wife Pythias, he ordered to be diſinterred, and again buried with his own, as ſhe herſelf had requeſted. None of his ſlaves are to be ſold; they are all of them either emancipated by his will, or ordered to be manumitted by his heirs, whenever they ſeem worthy of liberty; an injunction conformable to the maxims inculcated in his "Politics," that ſlaves of all deſcriptions ought to be ſet free, whenever they merited freedom, and are qualified for enjoying it. He concludes with a teſtimony, of external deference at leaſt, for the religion of his country, by ordering that the dedications which he had vowed for the ſafety of Nicanor, ſhould be preſented at Stagira to Jupiter and Minerva, the ſaviours.

Thus lived, and thus died in his 63d year, Ariſtotle the Stagirite. His enlightened humanity was often ſeaſoned by pleaſantry. Many ſtrokes of genuine humour, little ſuſpected by his commentators, will be found in his political writings. His ſmart ſayings and quick repartees were long remembered and admired by thoſe incapable of appreciating his weightier merits.

His ſayings.

[h] Strabo, xiii. 413.

CHAP. I.

Some of these sayings, though apparently not the most memorable, are preserved in Diogenes Laertius; of which the following may serve for a specimen. Being asked, What, of all things, soonest grows old?—Gratitude. What advantage have you reaped from study?—That of doing through choice what others do through fear. What is friendship?—One soul in two bodies. Why do we never tire in company with the beautiful?—The question of a blind man! Such apophthegms would be unworthy of mention, had they not, by their perpetual recurrence in our philosopher's conversation, shewn a mind free and unincumbered amidst the abstrusest studies; and, together with the most intense thought, a readiness of wit, which never failed to repel sneerers, and to abash arrogance[i]. He exhibited a character as a man, worthy of his pre-eminence as a philosopher; inhabiting courts, without meanness and without selfishness; living in schools, without pride and without austerity[k]; cultivating with ardent affection every domestic and every social virtue, while with indefatigable industry he reared that wonderful edifice of science, the plan of which we are still enabled to delineate from his imperfect and mutilated writings.

The extraordinary fate of his writings.

The extraordinary and unmerited fate of these writings, while it excites the curiosity, must provoke the indignation of every friend to science. Few of them were published in his lifetime; the

[i] Diogen. Laert. in Aristot. & Diogen.

[k] Plutarch. de Virtut. Moral. p. 448.

greater part nearly perifhed through neglect; and the remainder has been fo grofsly mifapplied, that doubts have arifen whether its prefervation ought to be regarded as a benefit. Ariftotle's manufcripts and library were bequeathed to Theophraftus, the moft illuftrious of his pupils. Theophraftus again bequeathed them to his own fcholar Neleus, who, carrying them to Scepfis, a city of the ancient Troas, left them to his heirs in the undiftinguifhed mafs of his property. The heirs of Neleus, men ignorant of literature and carelefs of books[l], totally neglected the intellectual treafure that had moft unworthily devolved to them, until they heard that the king of Pergamus, under whofe dominion they lived, was employing much attention and much refearch in collecting a large library[m]. With the caution incident to the fubjects of a defpot, who often have recourfe to concealment in order to avoid robbery, they hid their books under ground; and the writings of Ariftotle, as well as the vaft collection of materials from which they had been compofed, thus remained in a fubterranean manfion for many generations, a prey to dampnefs and to worms[n]. At length they were releafed

[l] Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608 & 609. Bayle gives too ftrong a meaning to ιδιωταις ανθρωποις, when he calls them "gens idiots:" ιδιωτης means one who confines his attention to the private affairs of life, in oppofition to philofophers and ftatefmen.

[m] Strabo, lib. xiii. p. 608.

[n] Athenæus, l. i. p. 3. fays, that Neleus fold Ariftotle's books to Ptolemy Philadelphus; and Bayle (article Tyrannion) endeavours with Patricius (Difcuff. Peripatet. t. i. p. 29.) to reconcile this account with that of Strabo, by fuppofing that Neleus indeed fold Ariftotle's library

CHAP. I. released from their prison, or rather raised from the grave, and sold for a large sum, together with the works of Theophrastus, to Apellicon of Athens, a lover of books rather than a scholar[o]; through whose labour and expence the work of restoring Aristotle's manuscripts, though performed in the same city in which they had been originally written, was very imperfectly executed. To this, not only the ignorance of the editors, but both the condition and the nature of the writings themselves did not a little contribute. The most considerable part of his acroatic works, which are almost the whole of those now remaining, consist of little better than text books, containing the detached heads of his discourses; and, through want of connexion in the matter, peculiarly liable to corruption from transcribers, and highly unsusceptible of conjectural emendation.

---

library and works to king Ptolemy, but not before he had taken the precaution of having the whole carefully copied. According to those writers, the books thus copied, and not the originals, suffered the unworthy treatment mentioned in the text. This supposition is highly improbable; for, not to mention the difficulty of copying, in a short time, many thousand volumes, it cannot be believed that Ptolemy, had he been in possession of the genuine works of Aristotle, would have purchased at a high price those counterfeits, which had no other connection with that philosopher than bearing his forged name on their title-page. (Ammonius ad Categor. sub init.) Had a correct copy of the Stagirite's works adorned the library of Alexandria under the first Ptolemies, his genuine philosophy would have struck deeper root, and made farther progress than it ever did, in that Egyptian capital. Vossius (de Sect. Philosoph. c. xvi. p. 89.) endeavours to prove that Athenæus's words (which are certainly incorrect) imply that Neleus retained Aristotle's works when he sold all the rest.

[o] Strabo says, "rather than a philosopher."

What

What became of Ariſtotle's original manuſcript, we are not informed; but the copy made for Apellicon was, together with his whole library, ſeized by Sylla, the Roman conqueror of Athens, and by him tranſmitted to Rome[p]. Ariſtotle's works excited the attention of Tyrannion, a native of Amyſus in Pontus, who had been taken priſoner by Lucullus in the Mithridatic war, and inſolently manumitted[q], as Plutarch ſays, by Muræna, Lucullus's lieutenant. Tyrannion procured the manuſcript by paying court to Sylla's librarian; and communicated the uſe of it to Andronicus of Rhodes, who flouriſhed as a philoſopher at Rome, in the time of Cicero and Pompey; and who, having undertaken the taſk of arranging and correcting thoſe long injured writings, finally performed the duty of a ſkilful editor[r].

Publiſhed at Rome by Andronicus of Rhodes.

Though the works which formed the object of Andronicus's labours had ſuffered ſuch injuries as the utmoſt diligence and ſagacity could

Their number and magnitude.

[p] Plutarch. in Sylla.

[q] Plutarch ſpeaks with the dignity becoming a man of letters, who feels himſelf ſuperior to the prejudices of his times. "That to give liberty by manumiſſion to a man of Tyrannion's education and merit, was to rob him of that liberty which he naturally and eſſentially poſſeſſed." Plutarch in Lucull. p.504. I have melted into one ſentence, ὄυ γαρ εξιου (read αξιου) Λουκουλλος ανδρα δια παιδειαν εσπουδασμενον—and αφαιρεσις γαρ ην της υπαρχουσης ἡ της δοκουσης ελευθεριας δοσις.

[r] Plutarch. in Syll. Porphyr. in Vitâ Plotini. Boëtius in Procœmio libri de interpret. Strabo only ſays that Tyrannion, in the manner mentioned in the text, got poſſeſſion of the manuſcript; which was copied for the Roman bookſellers by careleſs tranſcribers, who did not even take the pains of comparing their copies with the original: a negligence, he obſerves, too common among the tranſcribers both in Rome and Alexandria.

not

CHAP. I.

not completely repair[s], yet in consequence of those labours the Peripatetic philosophy began to resume the lustre of which it had been deprived since the days of Theophrastus; and the later adherents to that sect, as they became acquainted with the real tenets of their master, far surpassed the fame and merit of their ignorant and obscure predecessors[t]. From the æra of Andronicus's publication to that of the invention of printing, a succession of respectable writers on civil and sacred subjects (not excepting the venerable fathers of the Christian church) confirm, by their citations and criticisms, the authenticity of most of the treatises still bearing Aristotle's name; and of more than ten thousand[u] commentators, who have endeavoured to illustrate different parts of his works, there are incomparably fewer than might have been expected, whose vanity has courted the praise

[s] Even after this publication, Aristotle's followers were obliged τα πολλα εικοτως λεγειν δια το πληθος των αμαρτιων, "often to guess at his meaning, through the faultiness of his text." Strabo, in the place above cited.

[t] Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609. He observes, "that the Peripatetic philosophers succeeding Theophrastus had, till this time, but few of their master's works, and those few chiefly of the exoteric kind; so that they were more conversant about words than things; and instead of reasoning accurately and profoundly, were contented with displaying their skill in dialectic and rhetoric." I have thus paraphrased the obscurity of the original φιλοσοφειν πραγματικως and θεσεις ληκυθιζειν, because Strabo, who had himself diligently studied Aristotle's philosophy, (Strabo, l. xvi. p. 757.) uses the word πραγματικως, most probably, in the same sense in which it occurs in Aristotle, as synonymous with ακριβως, κατα αληθειαν; and in opposition to διαλεκτικως and το διαλεγεσθαι λογικως.

[u] Patricius Discuss. Peripatet.

of

of ſuperior diſcernment, by rejecting any conſiderable portion of them as ſpurious[x]. According to the moſt credible accounts, therefore, he compoſed above four hundred[y] different treatiſes, of which only forty-eight[z] have been tranſmitted to the preſent age. But many of theſe laſt conſiſt of ſeveral books, and the whole of his remains together ſtill form a golden ſtream[a] of Greek erudition, exceeding four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyſſey.

[x] Compare Diogenes Laertius in Vit. Ariſtot. Patric. Diſcuſſ. Peripatetic. Fabricius Bibliothec. Græc. & Bruckerus Hiſtor. Philoſ. artic. Ariſtot.

[y] Diogenes Laertius (in Vit. Ariſtot.) makes Ariſtotle's volumes amount to four hundred; Patricius Venetus, a learned profeſſor of Padua in the ſixteenth century, endeavours to prove that they amounted to nearly double that number. (Patric. Diſcuſſ. Peripat.) The laborious Fabricius employs one hundred pages of his ſecond volume in enumerating and aſcertaining Ariſtotle's remains; which ſtill exceed four times the collective bulk of the Iliad and Odyſſey. The whole works of Ariſtotle, therefore, muſt have contained a quantity of proſe, equal to forty times 28,088 verſes; a fact the more extraordinary, ſince the greater part of his writings are merely elegant and comprehenſive text books, containing the heads of his lectures; laborious, but clear reaſonings; and often original diſcoveries in the moſt difficult branches of ſcience. The following paſſage concerning him in the French Encyclopedie, article Ariſtoteliſme, muſt excite a ſmile of ſomething more than ſurpriſe, "Le nombre de ſes ouvrages êſt prodigieux; on en put voir les titres en Diogene Laerce . . . encore ne ſommes nous pas ſûrs de les avoir tous: il eſt même probable que nous en avons perdu pluſieurs," &c.

[z] The treatiſes de Plantis & de Mundo are rejected by moſt writers. The former is, indeed, of little value; the latter, of the greateſt; but I do not cite it as an authority, becauſe I would willingly place my account of his philoſophy beyond the reach of cavil.

[a] Veniet flumen orationis aureum fundens Ariſtoteles. Cicero, Academ. ii. 38.

CHAP. II.

A NEW ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE'S SPECULATIVE WORKS.

ARGUMENT.

Senſation—Its nature explained—Imagination and memory—Aſſociation of perceptions—Reminiſcence—Intellect—Its power and dignity—Ariſtotle's organon—Origin of general terms—Categories—Diviſion and definition—Propoſitions—Syllogiſms—Their nature and uſe—Second analytics—Topics—Ariſtotle's organon perverted and miſapplied—Demonſtration—Ariſtotle's metaphyſics—Proper arrangement thereof—Truth vindicated—Introduction to the firſt philoſophy—Its hiſtory—Refutation of the doctrine of ideas—Elements—Analyſis of the bodies ſo called—Their perpetual tranſmutations—Doctrine of atoms refuted—Motion or change—Its different kinds—Works of nature—How her operations are performed—Matter—Form—Privation—The ſpecific form or ſight—State of capacity and energy—Ariſtotle's aſtronomy—The earth and its productions—Hiſtory of animals—Philoſophy of natural hiſtory—His book on energy—The firſt energy eternally and ſubſtantially active—His attributes—Antiquity of the doctrine that Deity is the ſource of being—Inculcated in Ariſtotle's exoteric works—Objections to Ariſtotle's philoſophy—Anſwers thereto.

CHAP. II.

THE Works of Ariſtotle derive their importance and ſplendour, neither from their number nor their magnitude, but from their variety

variety and their aim. Difdaining the conqueft of particular provinces, he boldly invaded the whole empire of philofophy; and his perfevering and generally fuccefsful exertions in this mighty enterprife excites the jufteft admiration of his genius and induftry. The heavens and the earth; things human and divine; God, man, and nature: under thefe comprehenfive divifions of whatever is the object of human thought, the Stagirite diftributes the different articles of his truly philofophical Encyclopædia; of which time has yet fpared to us the diftinct outline, with many groups imperfectly fketched, and others totally defaced, yet filled up in fome of its moft effential parts with exquifite fkill, and delineated throughout with unexampled boldnefs and inimitable precifion.

CHAP. II.

The different branches into which it is divided.

In endeavouring to communicate to the reader, in few words, a clear and correct notion of the condition in which Ariftotle found, and in which he left, philofophy, it will be impoffible ftrictly to adhere to the capricious order in which his Works have been arranged by his editors. Agreeably to his own maxim, I fhall begin, not with what is abfolutely firft either in time or in dignity, but with that which is firft in relation to man; that is, with what is firft in the order of his thoughts or conceptions; endeavouring, in my difcourfe throughout, to preferve the modefty and impartiality of an hiftorian, and to be as faithful in explaining my author's opinions, as cautious in interpofing my own judgment.

It

The sources of human knowledge.

It is the doctrine of Ariftotle, a doctrine long and obftinately difputed, but now very generally received, that all our direct knowledge originates in perceptions of fenfe[a]. Of the five fenfes, that of touch, he obferves, is widely diffufed through the whole animal frame, and cannot therefore be deftroyed without deftroying the animal[b]. The fenfe of tafte Ariftotle regards as a particular kind of touch, requifite for the purpofe of nutrition, and therefore effential to life[c]. But the three other fenfes, always refiding in particular organs, are in fome animals altogether wanting, in others extremely imperfect; and even in thofe animals in whom they are moft vigorous, are often, without deftruction to the animal itfelf, overwhelmed, weakened, or totally deftroyed, by the too powerful operation of their refpective objects[d].

Senfation.

Colours and founds are perceived refpectively by the eye and the ear, and by them only;

[a] De Anima, l. iii. c. ix. p. 656. εν τοις ειδεσι τοις αισθητοις τα νοητα εϛι . . . και δια τουτο ουτε αισθανομενος μηδεν ουδεν αν μαθοι, ουδε συνιοι· τα δε πρωτα νοηματα, τινι διοισει του μη φαντασματα ειναι; η ουδε ταυτα φαντασματα, αλλ' ουκ ανευ φαντασματων; but I no where find in Ariftotle the words univerfally afcribed to him, "Nihil eft in intellectu, quid non prius fuerit in fenfu."

[b] Compar. Ariftot. de Anima, l. ii. c. iii. p. 633. and c. xi. p. 624. & feq.

[c] ὁ δε χυμος ἐν τι των απτων εϛι. Comp. l. ii. de Anima, c. iii. p. 633, and c. 10. p. 643. & feq.

[d] De Anima, l. ii. c. 6, 7, 8, 9.
ἡ του αισθητου ενεργεια εν τῳ αισθητικῳ; and again, ἡ δε του αισθητου ενεργεια και της αισθησεως ἡ αυτη μεν εϛι και μια. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 648.

motions

motions and figures are conveyed to the mind through the inſtrumentality of more ſenſes than one; and a third claſs of perceptions are communicated and impreſſed through the united energy of all the ſenſes[e]. Thoſe of touch and of taſte may be deemed nearly a-kin, becauſe external objects *ſeem* to operate on them by direct and immediate application. This, however, is not probably the caſe; becauſe, were it true, the analogy of nature would here be violated, ſince it is found by experiment, that external objects, directly and immediately applied to the organs of the three other ſenſes, totally obſtruct the motions on which their power of ſenſation depends, and render their reſpective objects, whether ſounds, colours, and odours, altogether imperceptible[f]. By a rapid and continuous agitation of the air, ſonorous bodies affect the ear; through the intervention of light, colours are diſtinguiſhed by the eye; and odours are communicated in a ſubtile vapour, which muſt in ſome animals, before perception can have place, be accompanied with the act of inſpiring by the noſtrils[g]. Agreeably to this analogy, it is probable that the fleſhy and tender part of our external frame, which ſeems to us to be endowed with ſuch a delicate ſenſe of touch, is nothing more than the medium through which

[e] De Anima, l. ii. c. vi. p. 638.

[f] εαν γαρ τις θη το εχον χρωμα επ' αυτην την οψιν, ουχ οψεται . . . ὁ δε αυτος λογος και περι ψοφου και οσμης εστι, &c. De Anima, l. ii. c. vii. p. 639.

[g] De Anima, l. ii. c. ix. p. 643.

the

CHAP. II.

the perceptions of hardneſs, ſoftneſs, and other qualities of that kind, are conveyed and communicated[h].

Its nature explained.

The real qualities of external objects are ſuppoſed to be made known to us by our ſenſes; but, in fact, theſe qualities, ſuch as they are by us conceived and denominated, have not any actual exiſtence until they are perceived[i]. Previouſly to this, they exiſt only in power or capacity; which, in the language of Ariſtotle, here means that they exiſt only in their cauſes[k]; cauſes, which though themſelves imperceptible, have the power of moving and agitating our organs[l], and thereby of producing in them that variety of ſenſations, which relieves man from ſolitude, and connects him with the external world. To beings differently conſtituted, or to man himſelf, enjoying a direct and immediate intimacy with the cauſes of his perceptions, this world would probably aſſume an appearance

h De Anima, c. xi. p. 641. How far is this conjecture connected with the diſcovery of the nerves and their functions? And to how many diſcoveries might the ſhrewd gueſſes of Ariſtotle, attentively examined, ſtill give birth?

i ἡ δε τȣ αισθητȣ ενεργεια και της αισθησεως ἡ αυτη μεν εϛι, και μια. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 638. And again, αναγκη ἁμα φθειρεσθαι και σωζεσθαι την ȣτω λεγομενην ακοην και ψοφον, χυμον και γευσιν, και τα αλλα ὁμοιως. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 649.

k Compare διχως γαρ λεγομενης της αισθησεως και τȣ αισθητȣ, των μεν κατα δυναμιν, των δε κατ' ενεργειαν, &c. De Anima, l. iii. c. i. p. 649. And το μεν ȣν μητε τα αισθητα ειναι, μητε τα αισθηματα, ισως αληθες. τȣ γαρ αισθανȣμενȣ παθος τȣτο εϛι· το δε τα υποκειμενα μη ειναι ἁ ποιει την αισθησιν, και ανευ αισθησεως, αδυνατον. Metaphyſ. l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

l ἡ δε λεγομενη αισθησις, ὡς ενεργεια, κινησις τις δια τȣ σωματος της ψυχης εϛι. De Somn. & Vigiliâ, c. i. p. 685. ἡ δε αισθησις εν τῳ κινεισθαι τε και πασχειν συμβαινει. De Anima, l. ii. c. v. p. 636.

altogether

altogether different from that which it now wears; for all ſenſation directly and immediately depends, not merely on the nature of its external cauſes, but on that alſo of the motions and changes produced in the organs of ſenſe. Ariſtotle, therefore, juſtly reproves Democritus for ſaying, that if no medium were interpoſed, a piſmire would be viſible in the heavens[m]; aſſerting, on the contrary, that if vacuity alone intervened, nothing poſſibly could be ſeen, becauſe all viſion is performed by changes or motions in the organ of ſight; and all ſuch changes or motions imply an interpoſed medium[n].

Between the perceptions of the eye and of the ear there is a ſtriking analogy. Bodies are only viſible by their colour; and colour is only perceptible in light; and unleſs different motions were excited by light in the eye, colour and the diſtinctions of colour would no more be viſible, than, independently of different vibrations communicated to the ear, ſound, and the diſtinctions of ſound, would be audible[o]. When the vibrations in a given time are many, the ſenſation of ſharpneſs or ſhrillneſs follows; when the vibrations are, in the ſame time, comparatively

[m] De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 639.

[n] De Senſu & Senſili, c. ii. p. 665.

[o] De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641. See alſo l. ii. c. vii. p. 638. The intrepid ignorance of Voltaire might maintain, that Ariſtotle conſidered light as a quality merely; and that luminous and coloured bodies had qualities exactly ſuch as they excited the ideas of in us. (Voltaire's Newtonian Philoſophy.) But how could the learned Warburton aſſent to this erroneous account of the Peripatetic philoſophy? See Divine Legation of Moſes, &c. b. iv. ſect. 6.

 few,

CHAP. II.

few, the ſenſation of flatneſs is the reſult: but the firſt ſound does not excite many vibrations becauſe it is ſhrill or ſharp, but it is ſharp becauſe it excites many vibrations; and the ſecond ſound does not excite few vibrations becauſe it is flat or grave, but it is grave becauſe it excites few vibrations[p].

Imagination and memory.

The powers of imagination and memory originate wholly in the ſenſes, and are common to man with many other animals. As ſenſation is carried on by means of certain motions excited in our organs, ſo imagination and memory, which are the copies of ſenſation, exert their energy by means of ſimilar but fainter motions, repreſentatives of the former[q]. That independently of external cauſes ſuch motions are produced, is demonſtrable from what happens in ſleep[r]. In ſome kinds of madneſs too, the phantoms of the brain are miſtaken for realities[s]; and, in other kinds, realities are miſtaken for phantoms[t]. But when our ſenſes are ſound and awake, we can eaſily diſtinguiſh between perceptions ariſing from external cauſes, and thoſe called into being by the mere agency of our internal conſtitution; and in many caſes we can diſcover and explain the laws by which the

[p] De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641.

[q] ἡ δε φαντασια εϛι αισθησις τις ασθενης. Rhetor. l. i. c. xi. p. 536. The ſame doctrine is maintained, De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 652. and De Memor. & Reminiſcent. c. i. p. 680. c. ii. p. 682 & 683.

[r] De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 651.

[s] Of this ſee an extraordinary example in Mirabil. Auſcult. p. 1152.

[t] De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 652. and De Mem. & Reminiſc. c. i. p. 680.

energy

energy of this conftitution operates[u]. For the perceptions of imagination and memory, though not rigidly governed, like thofe of fenfe, by the power and prefence of external objects, do not, however, float at random, but are fubjected to a certain order and progreffion, conformably to eftablifhed laws of affociation, which Ariftotle was the firft philofopher that attempted to inveftigate, to enumerate, and to explain[w]. He inveftigated them in analyfing the complex act of reminifcence or recollection, in which the principles of affociation operate under the immediate direction of the human will. He enumerated them as far as feemed requifite to the fubject which he was then treating, by faying that they might be reduced to the four following heads: proximity in time; contiguity in place; refemblance or fimilarity; contrariety or contraft[x]: and he explains them by fhewing

CHAP. II.

Affociation of ideas or perceptions.

[u] De Memor. & Reminifcent. c. i. p. 680.

[w] Ibid. c. ii. p. 681.

[x] Mr. Hume fays, "I do not find that any philofopher has attempted to enumerate or clafs all the principles of affociation; a fubject, however, that feems very worthy of curiofity. To me there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas; refemblance, contiguity in time or place, and caufe or effect." Effays, fect. iii. of the Affociation of Ideas, vol. ii. p. 24. Mr. Hume might be ignorant that Ariftotle had attempted to enumerate the principles of affociation; but it is an unpardonable error in logic, to affign caufe and effect, as one of thefe principles, fince caufe and effect, as far as affociation is concerned, refolves itfelf into contiguity in time or place; and according to Mr. Hume's doctrine, the very idea of caufe arifes folely from thefe connexions. Effays, vol. ii. pp. 34, 35. 88. 107. It may be remarked that "the affociation of ideas" is a modern expreffion. Ariftotle did not need it, fince the thing meant by it is referred by him to cuftom. τῳ γαρ εθει ακολυθυσι αἱ κινησεις αλληλαις, ἡδι μετα τηνδι. De Memor. p. 682.

that

CHAP. II.

that in every act of recollection we are conscious of *hunting about, as it were, among our thoughts*, until we hit on some one which is intimately connected with that which we wish to recall; or, in other words, that we produce in succession a multitude of vibrations or motions in our organs, until we hit on some one of them intimately connected with that of which we are in quest; and which has the power of reviving this last, because the one motion is either excited nearly at the same time with the other, or is entirely the same in kind with it, or so nearly the same, that the minute difference between them is continually overpowered and lost, and from near agreement finally reduced to perfect coincidence. Thus far our author proceeds in unfolding the mechanism of sensation, fancy[y], memory, and recollection; or, in other words, in ascertaining the laws which regulate the union of mind and matter, without attempting the fruitless task of explaining in what manner these totally heterogeneous[z] substances are united.

Every exercise of recollection, he observes, is a species of investigation, in which the mind may be conscious of its own activity in directing the

[y] Fancy is here *used* in its strict and original meaning; not, as in books of rhetoric and criticism, for the power of combining ideas or images by creative genius, agreeably to the dictates of correct judgment and refined taste.

[z] Aristotle carefully distinguishes the percipient power from the motions accompanying perception. αναγκη αρα έν τι ειναι της ψυχης, ῳ άπαντα αισθανεται, καθαπερ ειρηται προτερον, αλλο δε γενος δια αλλου. De Sensu, c. vii. p. 675. See also De Anima, l. iii. c. x. p. 656.

current of its thoughts, in turning them from one channel to another, in rejecting thoſe which hold by no tie to the perception or image of which it is in queſt, and in preferring, examining, and contemplating in all their relations, thoſe which, by their connexion with this perception or image, have a natural tendency to rouſe the one or to revive the other[a].

Reminiſcence the firſt boundary between man and other animals.

It is the characteriſtic of animals, in contradiſtinction to the inanimate parts of nature, to be endowed with ſenſation; and whatever is endowed with ſenſation muſt have perceptions of pain and pleaſure; and whatever has ſuch perceptions muſt feel the impulſe of appetite; the great moving principle in all animated beings[b]. But in the exerciſe of reminiſcence, which is the immoveable boundary between man and other animals, he, and he alone, recogniſes the divine principle of reaſon or intellect co-operating with the coarſer powers of fancy or memory; ſince every act of reminiſcence, as above explained[c], implies compariſon; and every the ſlighteſt compariſon, expreſſed in the ſimpleſt propoſition, indicates a ſubſtance different and ſeparable from matter, a ſubſtance totally incon-

[a] τυτο δε γινεται κινυντα πολλα, έως αν την αυτην κινηση κινησιν ἡ ακολυθηση το πραγμα. De Memor. & Reminiſcent. c. ii. p. 682. He adds, anticipating the philoſophy of Hobbes and Hartley, τυ δε απο τυ αυτυ ενιοτε μεν μνησθηναι ενιοτε δε μη, αιτιον, ὁτι επι πλειω ενδεχεται κινηθηναι απο της αυτης αρχης—ώσπερ γαρ φυσις ηδη το εθος, &c. ibid. "But the cauſe that the ſame thing recalls ſometimes one perception, and ſometimes another, is, that different motions may ſpring from the ſame principle; for cuſtom is like nature," &c.

[b] De Anima, l. ii. c. iii. p. 632. & ſeq.

[c] De Memor. & Reminiſc. c. ii. p. 683.

CHAP. II.

ceivable by man in his preſent ſtate, where the groſs perceptions of ſenſe are the only foundation and ſole materials of all others, how lofty ſoever and refined; but a ſubſtance, notwithſtanding, of whoſe exiſtence we are aſſured by our conſciouſneſs of its energies[d]. To illuſtrate this further by an example, Ariſtotle ſays, let the compariſon or propoſition be one of the ſimpleſt imaginable, that whiteneſs is not ſweetneſs[e]. Theſe ſenſible qualities which the vulgar aſcribe to external objects, the philoſopher knows, as above explained, to depend on certain motions communicated to his internal organs, motions vivid and forcible when firſt produced by ſenſation, more faint and languid when afterwards revived by imagination or memory[f].

Proof of an intellectual principle in man.

[d] Com. De Anima, l. i. c. v. p. 625. and c. ix. p. 629.

[e] De Anima, l. iii. c. ii. p. 649.

[f] De Memor. & Reminiſcent. c. i. p. 680, and De Anima, l. iii. c. iv. p. 652. Senſible qualities as perceived by the mind, Ariſtotle calls, therefore, παθηματα εν τη ψυχη, of which, he ſays, words are the ſigns: De Interpret. c. i. p. 37: meaning, thereby, that language expreſſes things as they are perceived, not as they really are. το μεν ου μητε τα αισθητα ειναι, μητε τα αισθηματα, ισως αληθες· του γαρ αισθανομενου παθος τουτο εστι· το δε τα ὑποκειμενα μη ειναι ἁ ποιει την αισθησιν, αδυνατον. ου γαρ δη ἡ αισθησις αυτη ἑαυτης εστιν, αλλα εστι τι ἑτερον παρα την αισθησιν, ὁ αναγκη προτερον ειναι της αισθησεως· το γαρ κινουν, του κινουμενου φυσει προτερον εστι· κἂν ει λεγεται προς αλληλα ταυτα αυτα, ουθεν ἡττον. Metaph. l. iv. c. v. p. 879. "To ſay that things perceptible by ſenſe, and the objects of our perceptions, do not exiſt, is perhaps true; for theſe are merely the affections of the percipient: but that there ſhould not be certain cauſes producing ſenſation, and exiſting independently of it, is impoſſible; for ſenſation is not its own work, but there is ſomething beſide ſenſation neceſſarily prior to it, ſince the principle of motion is neceſſarily prior to the movement communicated; and not the leſs, that theſe things are relatives." The exiſtence of imperceptible, and therefore unknown cauſes of our ſenſations, is maintained by Ariſtotle againſt the ancient ſceptics; in whoſe errors he refuted, by anticipation, thoſe of Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, &c. as we ſhall ſee hereafter.

But

But the comparifon of any two objects neceffarily implies, that they fhould be both prefent in the fame indivifible point of time, to one and the fame comparing power. Yet their prefence to the fenfes, the fancy, or the memory, is known to confift in nothing elfe but certain motions produced in our bodily organs. If the comparifon, therefore, could be made by any of them, it would follow that this organ was fufceptible of different and contrary motions, precifely at the fame indivifible inftant; for it is neceffary that the fame fimple power fhould comprehend at once the fweetnefs and whitenefs, or whatever elfe be the fenfations compared, fince if it comprehended them diftributively, by its parts however minute, or fucceffively in particles of time however fhort, it could no more draw the refult of the comparifon, than if the one fenfation was recognifed by one man, and the other by another, or one of them recognifed in the laft century, and another in the prefent. The perception of truth, therefore, being altogether unrelated to time and fpace, muft be totally diffimilar to any corporeal operation, and fo effentially one fimple energy, that it cannot without abfurdity be fuppofed capable of divifion. But all the motions and actions of body, being performed in fpace and time, are therefore indefinitely divifible; and although their fmallnefs or quicknefs foon efcapes the perception of fenfe, and foon eludes the grafp of fancy, yet the intellect ftill purfues and detects them, knowing that they can never vanifh into nothing by their

 indefinite

CHAP. II.

indefinite minuteneſs. By our diviſions and ſubdiviſions without end, we ſtill leave, in the ſmalleſt particle, body with its properties; and after all the ſteps that poſſibly can be taken, remain preciſely as diſtant from the goal, as at our firſt ſetting out. This goal, therefore, it is impoſſible for us ultimately to attain; ſince, in the language of geometers, infinite will be ſtill interpoſed between operations diviſible and indiviſible, between perceptions of ſenſe and perceptions of reaſon, between the nature and properties of mind and the nature and properties of matter. It is not ſenſe or fancy, but mind alone, that recogniſes itſelf; and this intellectual ſubſtance, of which we muſt be contented in our preſent ſtate merely to know the exiſtence and to exerciſe the energies, is that which characteriſes and ennobles the creature man, and which gives him a reſemblance to his Maker. It is this which, ſeparated from body, is then, only, properly what it is[g], immortal and divine; which

The power and dignity of this principle.

[g] De Anima, l. iii. c.6. which paſſage is commented by Plutarch from Ariſtotle himſelf. Vid. Plut. de Conſol. ad Apollon. p. 115. where he ſays, that the dead are happy and bleſſed; and that to ſpeak ill of them falſely, is to blaſpheme againſt thoſe far ſuperior to ourſelves. This work of Ariſtotle's was a Dialogue, written in honour of Eudemus of Cyprus. It is mentioned by Plutarch in Dion. p. 967. The paſſage above alluded to, in the work De Anima, is ſtrangely perverted by Ariſtotle's commentators; whoſe erroneous interpretation is adopted by Warburton in the following paſſage, as bold in aſſertion as defective in proof. "Ariſtotle thought of the ſoul like the reſt, as we learn from a paſſage quoted by Cudworth* out of his Nicomachean Ethics; where having ſpoke of the ſenſitive ſouls, and declared them mortal, he goes on in this manner: 'It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone pre-exiſting, enter from

* Intellectual Syſtem, p. 55.

which does not decay with our corporeal powers; and whose energies are so totally different

---

from without, and be only divine *.' But then he distinguishes again concerning this mind or intellect, and makes it two-fold, agent and patient, the former of which he concludes to be immortal, and the latter corruptible. The agent intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible. Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage, and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly by his doctrine of forms and qualities, whereby corporeal and incorporeal substances are confounded together. But had that great man reflected on the general doctrine of the το εν, he would have seen the passage was plain and easy; and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the human soul's being part of the divine substance, here draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence, which though it now appears all the philosophers embraced, yet all were not, as we said, so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: "The agent intellect (says he) is only immortal and eternal, but the passive corruptible, *i. e.* the particular sensations of the soul will cease after death, and the substance of it will be resolved into the soul of the universe; for it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the soul to a *tabula rasa*, that human sensations and reflections were passions. These, therefore, are what he finely calls the passive intelligent, which he says shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the agent intelligent, we learn from his commentators, who interpret it to signify, as Cudworth here acknowledges, the divine intellect; which gloss Aristotle himself fully justifies, in calling it θειον, divine †." On this passage I would first observe, that though I had frequently read the *Nicomachean Ethics*, I could not meet with the words cited by Warburton; and for this good reason, that such words are not there to be found. In the first edition of Cudworth's Intellectual System, that great Author is very negligent in citing his authorities; and in the second edition published by Birch, we are referred to Aristotle de Generatione & Corruptione, l. ii. c. 3. The passage quoted, however, is not to be found there, nor in any part of the work on Generation and Corruption. It is to be found, indeed, in the admirable treatise de Generat. Animal. l. ii. c. iii. p. 1077.; and words to the same purpose occur in the fifth chapter of the first book de Anima. ὁ δε νυς εοικεν εγγινεσθαι, υσια τις υσα, και υ φθειρεσθαι. "It is likely that the mind is a substance existing in the body, and not liable to be destroyed with the body." From this and several other passages, where Aristotle always speaks with the

* λειπεται δε τον νυν μονον θυραθεν επεισιεναι, και θειον ειναι μονον.

† Divine Legation, vol. i. book iii. sect. 4.

greatest

CHAP. II. different from those of organised matter, that whereas our senses are easily fatigued, overpowered,

---

greatest modesty on the subject of the human intellect, qualifying his words with a "perhaps," "it is likely," Warburton had no right to conclude that Aristotle maintained the pre-existence of the mind as a part of the Divinity. The argument which he brings in support of this assertion, "that Aristotle calls the active intelligent, Divine," is not conclusive, because Aristotle, with other Greek writers, might use the epithet "Divine" as synonymous with excellent, as the Lacedæmonians, when they admired any one greatly, called him Σειος (instead of θεῖος) ανηρ. Ethic. Nicom. l. vii. c. 1. But the Stagirite seldom uses any word which he does not accurately define, and when he calls the intellect *divine*, or what *is most divine in us*; Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. 7. sub init.; he tells us plainly what he means by these expressions, which he says can have no other sense, but either that thought, *i. e.* the energy of intellect, from which only it derives its excellence and dignity, exists most perfectly in the divine nature; or, secondly, because intellect enables us, imperfectly indeed, to comprehend that nature. The learned reader may compare the following passages, Aristot. Metaphys. l. i. c. ii. p. 841. De Anima, l. i. c. v. p. 625. and Metaphys. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004. That *intelligence in capacity is prior in time to intelligence in energy, in the individual, but not absolutely*, means merely that the human mind is capable of intelligence before it becomes actually intelligent; but that all intelligence in capacity is derived from intelligence in energy, that is, from God. Metaphys. l. ix. c. viii. p. 938. & seq. and the last chapters both of his Physics and Metaphysics. That the mind when separated from the body *is only what it is*, means that it then assumes its true nature, activity, and dignity, and is then better and happier than it was before, in which Aristotle says that many agreed with him. ειπερ βελτιον τῳ νῳ μη μετα σωματος ειναι, καθαπερ ειωθε λεγεσθαι, και πολλοις συνδοκει. Aristot. de Anima. l. i. c. iii. p. 623. That it then *perpetually energises*, not needing the assistance of memory, is explained by what Aristotle says on memory, in his book on that subject, c. ii. p. 681. & seq. in which he shews that memory depends on association of perceptions, and that association again depends on motion; whereas the intellect is simple, impassive; and, existing independently of space, incapable of motion; except by way of accession or appendage, as a sailor is moved in a ship. De Anima, l. i. c. 3.

Since writing the above note, I find that Lord Monboddo, in his Ancient Metaphysics, vol. ii. p. 165., cites and translates part of the passage which I have endeavoured to explain; but His Lordship, I think,

powered, and deftroyed by the force and intenfity of objects fenfible[h], the intellect is roufed, quickened, and invigorated by the force and intenfity of objects intelligible: inftead of being overftrained or blunted, it fharpens and fortifies amidft obftinate exertions, finding in fuch alone, its beft improvement and moft exquifite delight[i].

CHAP. II.

Ariftotle's Works referred to three heads.

Having recognifed the dignity and the powers of man, Ariftotle, in his Works throughout, examines how thefe powers have been exercifed in rearing the fair fabric of fcience, which it was his own ambition to complete and to adorn. Adverfe accidents intercepted, as we have feen, from pofterity the full benefit of his labours; yet the treatifes which emerged amidft the general

---

think, conftrues it wrong. On the words *ου μνημονευομεν δε, ότι τουτο μεν απαθες· ὁ δε παθητικος νους φθαρτος, και ανευ τουτου ουθεν νοει,* he obferves, "that what Ariftotle here fays of the mind's thinking of nothing without the paffive intellect, refers to the progreffion from the ftate of mere capacity in which the intellect is, before *it is impreffed by external objects; which impreffion* is abfolutely neceffary for its operating in this our prefent ftate." His Lordfhip here condefcends to fpeak rather like a follower of Locke or Hume than as the difciple of Ariftotle; and the text will not at all bear his interpretation, for the *ανευ τουτου* can only refer to the active intellect, without which Ariftotle fays the paffive thinks of nothing. Plutarch expreffes Ariftotle's meaning in popular language: *παιδεια δε των εν ἡμιν μονον εστι αθανατον και θειον,* &c. "That of all things belonging to man, the improvement of his mind alone is immortal and divine;—neither to be affailed by fortune nor fhaken by calumny; not to be deftroyed by difeafe nor weakened by old age." Plutarch. de Liber. Educand. p. 5. Edit. Xyland. My explication of the obfcure paffages in Ariftotle concerning the foul is confirmed by what he himfelf fays on the fubject of education in the 15th chapter of the feventh book of his Politics. The reader will find the paffage in the following tranflation, book iv. c. 15.

[h] De Anima, l. ii. c. xii. p. 646.

[i] De Anima, l. iii. cc. 5, 6, 7, 8. p. 653. et feq. and Ethic. Nicom. l. x. cc. 7 and 8.

wreck

CHAP. II.

wreck of his writings, beſt arrange themſelves under the three-fold diviſion of the objects of human thought; God, Nature, and Man: which diviſion he himſelf ſeems continually to keep in view.

I. God.

Whatever reaſonings relate to theology, though ſcattered in different treatiſes, may be referred, therefore, to his Metaphyſics; a name unknown, indeed, to Ariſtotle, but given to his theological works by his editors, and importing that the fourteen books which bear it, ſhould immediately follow his numerous treatiſes on the ſubject of phyſics or natural philoſophy; that we may not reſt ſatisfied with the knowledge of bare effects, but proceed to the inveſtigation of cauſes, and of the Deity himſelf, the primary cauſe of all[k].

II. Nature.

His hiſtories of the heavens and of the earth; of animals, plants, and minerals; and even of man, conſidered merely as a material and ſentient Being, may conformably with modern language be arranged under the head of Nature; though, in Ariſtotle's own acceptation, that term has a more limited ſenſe; and, for a reaſon which will appear hereafter, is confined to terreſtrial objects, and thoſe exiſting between this earth and the lunar ſphere.

III. Man.

Upon the Philoſophy of Man[l], as our Author calls it, that is, of Man conſidered as a ſocial and rational Being, endowed with ſentiment, affection, and intellect, Ariſtotle's writings are as clear and copious as they are ſolid and ſatisfactory. His treatiſes on Logic, Ethics, and Politics, as well

[k] Metaph. l. xiii. c. 7. p. 988.

[l] ἡ περι τα ανθρωπινα φιλοσοφια. Ethic. Nicom. l. x. c. ult.

well as his books on Rhetoric and Poetry, may all be referred to this one head, and viewed as connected parts of one great fyftem of knowledge, to which, after the moft patient examination, it will be found that the labours of his fucceffors and detractors have made but flender additions.

The proper fubject of his Organon.

In endeavouring concifely, but clearly, to communicate to my readers the refult of our Author's reafonings and difcoveries under the three heads abovementioned, I fhall begin, for a reafon which will prefently appear, with that work of his, recently the moft decried of all, but long extravagantly magnified as the great engine of difcovery, and fole inftrument[m] of univerfal fcience. Ariftotle himfelf never viewed it in this falfe and flattering light, nor ever beftowed on it thefe pompous titles. The various tracts compofing the Organon, as it is called, are not even given by him as parts of one and the fame work[n]. They all relate, however, to

[m] The word οργανον, organum, is found in Diogenes Laertius (L. i. fect. 28.); where Ariftotle's philofophy is divided into practical and fpeculative; the practical comprehending his Ethics and Politics; the fpeculative, Natural Philofophy and Logic. Diogenes, however, does not ufe the word in the fenfe in which it was afterwards taken by Ariftotle's commentators. Befides, when Laertius fays, that logic is a part of fpeculative philofophy, he contradicts Ariftotle himfelf, who divides fpeculative philofophy into the three branches of Mathematics, Phyfics, and Theology. Metaph. l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

[n] Thefe tracts formed fo many diftinct works which muft have been arranged otherwife than they now ftand, fince in fome of the firft of them we find references to thofe now publifhed as the laft.

one

CHAP. II.

one and the fame fubject; fince dialectic[o], in the ftrict and proper fenfe, is merely the art of dialogue, that is, the art of converfing. Ariftotle's Organon, therefore, rightly underftood, is nothing more than an endeavour to teach the rational and fkilful employment of that characteriftic faculty of man, by which he expreffes, through appropriate figns[p], not only his perceptions of fenfe, but what is indefinitely more various, the comparifons, abftractions, and conclufions of his own mind concerning them. It is in this fenfe that logic, or dialectic, in the order of communicating liberal and univerfal knowledge, ought to precede the more abftrufe and loftier branches of philofophy, becaufe, in carefully analyfing the figns by which internal operations, as well as external objects, are expreffed, we remount at once to the origin and fource both of our notions and of our perceptions; difcover their intimate connections with each other; and unfold, even to the unexperienced minds of youth, a vaft intellectual

[o] Dialectic is the word often ufed by Ariftotle himfelf to denote what is commonly called his Logic, or the fubject of the books compofing his Organon. Vid. Metaph. l. xiv. c. 4. Rhetor. l. i. c. ii.

[p] των δε ονοματων εκαστον συμβολον εστι. "Each word or name is a fymbol or fign." De Senfu & Senfili, l. i. c. i. p. 663. The whole paffage, beginning with αυτων δε τουτων κρεισσων and ending with the words juft cited, may be abridged as follows: "Hearing is the fenfe moft inftrumental to knowledge, not effentially or neceffarily, for the fenfe of feeing difcovers to us more of the differences of things; but becaufe found, the object of hearing, is the vehicle of language; which is compofed of words, each of which is a fign." Vid. etiam De Interpret. l. i. c. i. p. 36 and 37.

treafure,

treaſure, of which, without being aware of it, they were already in poſſeſſion[q].

CHAP. II.

His analyſis of language.

Agreeably to theſe principles, the Stagirite defines diſcourſe, or ſpeech, to be found ſignificant by compact, of which the parts alſo are ſignificant[r]; all diſcourſe which ſimply affirms or denies, he reſolves into arguments, arguments into propoſitions, and propoſitions into words; which laſt are the ultimate elements of language, becauſe, though ſignificant themſelves, their parts are not ſignificant[s]. Sounds ſignificant by compact are either nouns, that is, names denoting things without any reference to time; or verbs, whoſe ſignification is accompanied with the appendage of time[t]. Nouns are either proper names or appellatives: a proper name denotes one individual only; an appellative denotes various individuals, and often various kinds or claſſes of individuals. The formation of appellatives is, according to Ariſtotle, the united work of abſtraction and aſſociation[u]; abſtraction, by which we ſeparate the combinations of

Origin of general terms.

[q] Comp. Ariſtot. Topic. l. i. c. ii. p. 181. & Ariſtot. de Anima. l. iii. c. ix. p. 656.

[r] De Interpret. l. i. c. iv. p. 38.

[s] To obviate objections ariſing from the ſignificant parts of compounds words, Ariſtotle ſays, εν δε τοις διπλοις, σημαινει μεν τι, αλλα ȣ καθ' αυτο . . . The ſyllables are ſignificant, but not eſſentially; ſince the whole word is ſignificant by compact; for however ſubtilely words may be analyſed, they will ultimately reſolve themſelves, not into οργανα, but into συμϐολα: not into natural inſtruments, but into conventional ſigns. De Interpret. c. iv. p. 38.

[t] Ibid. c. iii. Thoſe parts of verbs, therefore, which do not imply time, are merely nouns. Ibid.

[u] Compare Metaph. l. xi. c. ii. pp. 955, 956. Ibid. c. xii. pp. 957, 958. Analyt. Poſterior. l. ii. c. xix. p. 179. & ſep. De Memor. & Reminiſc. p. 181. & ſeq.

ſenſe,

CHAP. II.

ſenſe, and conſider a complex object in one view, without attending to the other aſpects under which it may be examined[w]; aſſociation, by which perceptions that are ſimilar naturally revive each other in unbroken ſucceſſion; and, in conſequence of their ſimilarity, are expreſſed by a common name, or appellative, which is equally applicable to them all[x]. In reference to this common name, which is merely a ſign that different objects have been compared together, and found to agree in one or more reſpects with each other, different individuals are ſaid to belong to the ſame ſpecies, and different ſpecies are ſaid to belong to the ſame

[w] Metaph. l. xi. c. iii. pp. 956, 957.

[x] δηλον δη ὁτι ἡμιν τα πρωτα επαγωγη γνωριζειν αναγκαιον· και γαρ και ἡ αισθησις ὑτω το καθολυ εμποιει. The author here maintains, that even general principles can only be gathered by induction from perceptions of ſenſe, or from repeated acts of memory coaleſcing into one experience (αἱ γαρ πολλαι μνημαι τῳ αριθμῳ εμπειρια μια εϛι). And the compariſon by which this intellectual operation is explained equally applies to that by which "τα καθολυ," "abſtract notions," gathered from repeated ſenſations, are generaliſed and embodied in language. "In a flying army, when one man ſtops, the next to him will often ſtop alſo, and ſo on in ſucceſſion, until the whole will ſometimes ſtand firm. The ſame thing happens in the irregular flow of our thoughts. The ſteady contemplation of any individual object, under that aſpect in which it agrees with other individuals, will recall many ſimilar objects to the mind; the ſtability of the one will communicate ſtability to the others, and thus give birth to what are called Univerſals, that is, to general terms, equally applicable to an indefinite number of individuals." ϛαντος γαρ των αδιαφορων ἑνος, πρωτον μεν εν τῃ ψυχῃ καθολυ· και γαρ αισθανεται μεν το καθεκαϛον, ἡ δε αισθησις τυ καθολυ εϛι. When Ariſtotle ſays that we perceive, by ſenſe, the univerſal, he means that we view the object under that aſpect in which it agrees with other objects; and the contemplation of it under that aſpect only, or, in other words, the conſidering certain appearances of it apart from the reſt, produces in the mind an abſtract notion, of which, though itſelf be particular, the name is general. Metaph. ibid.

genus;

CHAP. II.

genus; for in order to explain the nature of things, and to ſee their agreements and differences, it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of general ideas, but it is neceſſary that one word or term ſhould, in the ſame ſenſe, be applicable to many individuals, and alſo that one word or term ſhould, in the ſame ſenſe, be applicable to many ſpecies[y]. Independently of this power in man, of expreſſing things that are alike by a common ſign, his knowledge would be confined to the coarſe and complex intimations of ſenſe; he could not form even the moſt common notion of all, namely, that of number, ſince objects could not be enumerated, unleſs they were previouſly referred to the ſame genus or claſs, that is, unleſs they were expreſſed by one common ſign. They muſt be ſo many trees, ſo many animals, or at leaſt, ſo many beings; and thus generically united, before they can be ſpecifically or even numerically diſtinguiſhed. For this reaſon Ariſtotle obſerves, that "one" and "being" are, of all terms, the moſt univerſal; they are applicable to all other general terms; they can be ſaid in the ſame ſenſe of them all, but no other term can be correctly ſaid of them, becauſe no other term expreſſes the full extent of their meaning[z]; or, in other words, is uſed as a ſign for all the variety of things which they are employed to denote.

Their importance.

[y] Analyt. Poſter. l. i. c. xi. p. 141. ibid. c. xxiv. p. 155.

[z] Metaph. l. x. c. ii. p. 945. The το εν και το ον "unity and being," agree, he obſerves, in the univerſality of their ſignification. They contain all the categories, but are not confined within the limits of any of them.

Next

CHAP. II.

The categories.

Next to them, in point of universality, the ten categories immediately follow. These most comprehensive signs of things are called, in Latin, Predicaments, because they can be said, or predicated in the same sense, of all other terms, as well as of all the objects denoted by them; whereas no other term can be correctly said of them, because no other is employed to express the full extent of their meaning. They are: substance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place, action, passion, position, and habit[a]. All the objects of human thought that can be expressed by single words, arrange themselves under one or other of these general terms. Aristotle (not indeed in his "Categories," but in his works collectively) explains the nature and properties of each; and thus opens to the inquisitive mind a wide field of various knowledge, since the properties of each predicament belong to

[a] εϛι δε ταυτα τον αριθμον δεκα· τι εϛι, ποσον, ποιον, προς τι, που, ποτε, κεισθαι, εχειν, ποιειν, πασχειν. Topic. l. i. c. 9. p. 285. What is here called τι εϛι, the author elsewhere calls substance, as Categor. c. iv. p. 15.; where he says, that all single words denote either substance, or quantity, or quality, &c. This tenfold division had been made before Aristotle's time, and explained by the Pythagoreans, particularly by Archytas of Tarentum, in his book περι τυ παντος, "concerning the Universe." A great part of that work, in its primitive Doric, is preserved in Simplicius' Commentary on Aristotle's Categories. But Archytas and the other Pythagoreans considered as "the principles of things," what Aristotle calls σχηματα κατηγοριας, "figures or forms of predication," and λογυς καθολυ, "universal denominations." Thus also they are called by Archytas the Peripatetic (Boeth. in Predicam. p. 112.), whom Mr. Harris (Philosoph. Arrangements, c. ii. p. 31.) confounds with Archytas the Pythagorean; though to consider these comprehensive genera as the *principles and causes of the universe with the Pythagoreans*, or merely as *universal denominations with Aristotle*, constitutes as wide a difference as that between a visionary and a philosopher.

to all the objects, or classes of objects, comprehended under[b] it, and the properties of the ten predicaments together, extend to all things in the universe. But to avoid the reproach of bewildering his reader in barren generalities, the philosopher frequently applies his reasonings concerning signs to the things signified by them; perpetually inculcating that individuals only have a real existence, and that what are called, in the Pythagorean or Platonic philosophy, numbers, ideas, immutable and eternal essences, are merely the work of human thought expressed and embodied in language[c]. This doctrine is

[b] Categor. c. v. to c. ix. inclusively.

[c] Categor. c. v. p. 17. "That if individuals, or the first substances, were not, nothing else could be;" so that, instead of ideas, &c. making them, every thing that exists is made by or from them. And again, ειδη μεν ϐν ειναι, η ἱν τι παρα τα πολλα, ϐκ αναγκη, ει αποδειξις εςαι· ειναι μεντοι ἑν κατα πολλα αληθες ειπειν αναγκη . . . δει αρα τι ἑν και το αυτο, επι πλειονων ειπειν, μη ομονυμον. "For the purpose of demonstration, it is not necessary to suppose the existence of general ideas, but only that one general term can be applied with truth, and in the same sense, to many individuals." Analyt. Poster. l. i. c. xi. p. 141. Compare cxxiv. p. 155. Ετι δε ϐδεμια αναγκη τι ειναι τϐτο παρα ταυτα, ὁτι ἱν δηλοι, ϐδεν μαλλον η επι των αλλων, ὁσα μη τι σημαινει, αλλ' η ποιον, η προς τι, η ποιειν· ει δε αρα, ϐχ ἡ αποδειξις αιτια, αλλ' ὁ ακϐων. "It is not necessary to suppose that the general term, denoting any class of substances, expresses any thing beside the different particulars to which it applies, any more than the general terms denoting qualities, relations, or actions. One general term stands as the sign for a variety of particulars considered under one and the same aspect; but to suppose that this term requires one substantial archetype, or idea, as general as itself, is the hearer's fault; such a supposition not being necessary for the purpose of demonstration." The simplicity and solidity of Aristotle's Philosophy was early destroyed by combining and confounding it with Platonism. The evil has been perpetuated from age to age, by his commentators and pretended followers; not excepting the latest of them all, Mr. Harris and Lord Monboddo, who perpetually ascribe to the Stagirite the doctrine of general ideas, which, in the passages above cited, he formally

CHAP. II. is nearly allied to another of Ariſtotle's above explained, that all our direct knowledge originates

mally denies. Thoſe laſt mentioned writers acknowledge that Ariſtotle oppoſed Plato, in denying the ſeparate and ſubſtantial exiſtence of ideas, but maintain, that he aſſerted their exiſtence originally in the divine intellect, forming what we call the intellectual world. "From thence proceeds the material world, which is a copy of theſe forms, or ideas. The firſt kind of ideas, the Peripatetics called προ των πολλων, "before the many;" the other kind they called εν τοις πολλοις, "in the many;" and theſe laſt are the ſubſtantial forms of the Peripatetics; that is, the form which gives the ſubſtance or eſſence to the thing. And, laſt of all, come the ideas in our minds, which, being formed from the many, and only in conſequence of their exiſting in the many, are ſaid to be επι τοις πολλοις, "after the many." Monboddo Ancient Metaph. vol. i. p 466. Mr. Harris, in deſcribing this triple order of ideas, ſpeaks to the ſame purpoſe. "By mind we mean ſomething which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; ſomething ſtored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas theſe works are faſhioned." Hermes, book iii. c. iv. p. 380. Again, To work and to know what one is about is to have an idea of what one is doing; to poſſeſs a form internal, correſponding to the external, to which external it ſerves for an exemplar or pattern. Here then we have an intelligible form which is prior to the ſenſible form." Ibid. p. 376. The ſame authors abound in repetitions of the ſame doctrine, which ſeems indeed to have been univerſally that of Ariſtotle's commentators. But what ſays the author himſelf? I ſhall repeat his own words, leſt I ſhould incur the reproach of ſpeaking harſhly. το δε λεγειν παραδειγμα ειναι και μετεχειν αυτων τα αλλα, κενολογειν εςι, και μεταφορας λεγειν ποιητικας· τι γαρ εςι το εργαζομενον προς τας ιδεας απαβλεπτειν: ενδεχεται τε ειναι και γιγνεσθαι ότιουν και μη εικαζομενον. Metaph. l. xi. c. 5. p. 959. "To call ideas exemplars or patterns, and to ſay that other things are made in imitation, or by participation of them, is mere empty ſound and poetical metaphor. Whoever, 'midſt working, conſidered an idea as his model? Things may exiſt or be made that never had an exemplar or archetype." According to Ariſtotle, "the definition is the idea of the thing, and the definition is compoſed of words." ὁ λογος ειδος τȣ πραγματος . . . και ὁ λογος συγκειται εξ ονοματων. Comp. De Anima, l. i. c. i. p. 618. and De Senſu, c. i. p. 663. I cannot conclude this note without obſerving, that ſomething nearly akin to Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning the categories or univerſals was revived, in the darkneſs of the eleventh century, by the ſect called Nominaliſts, which had for its authors John, ſurnamed the Sophiſt, and Roſcellinus, a native of Brittany and Canon of Compiegne. But the Stagirite's genuine tenets were generally unknown

nates in perceptions of ſenſe; and in both theſe capital points, the learned, after innumerable diſputes,

---

unknown in that century, and ſo little underſtood afterwards, (being ſtudied only in corrupt verſions, Arabic and Latin,) that the ſect of the Nominaliſts, after the complete triumph of the ſuppoſed Ariſtotelian philoſophy in the twelfth and ſucceeding centuries, were regarded as raſh innovators and philoſophical heretics. Their ſentiments, however, agreed more nearly with Ariſtotle's, than the opinions of thoſe who believed themſelves the Stagirite's moſt obſequious followers; although the language of the Nominaliſts ſeems to have been extremely liable to be perverted to the purpoſes of ſcepticiſm, as taking away the ſpecific diſtinctions of things; and is in fact thus perverted by Hobbes, Berkeley, Hume, and their innumerable followers. But Ariſtotle's language is not liable to this abuſe; he every where maintains the ſtability of truth, and the reality of thoſe ſpecific diſtinctions which general terms are employed to expreſs. He agrees with the Nominaliſts, for example, that the words "horſe" and "dog" have not any correſpondent archetypes or ideas in the mind, as general as themſelves, but he maintains that theſe words imply the reſult of the compariſon of different individuals agreeing in the ſame ειδος, the ſame ſhow or appearance; for the ſight, as he obſerves, is that of all the ſenſes which enables us to perceive the greateſt number of the agreements and differences of things, and is therefore moſt generally uſeful in claſſing them; or, in other words, in diſtinguiſhing thoſe which are alike by a ſign common to them all; that is by a general name. Metaph. l. iv. c. 7. p. 881. Comp. De Senſu, c. i. p. 662. and Metaph. l. i. c. i. p. 838. To prevent the poſſibility of miſtake or obſcurity in the above note, it is neceſſary to obſerve, that the word "idea" in Engliſh is popularly uſed, not merely to denote an object of thought, but thought itſelf. To deny ideas in this latter ſenſe is to deny thinking. But this is not the philoſophical meaning of the word, as underſtood by the pretended followers of Ariſtotle, any more than by Locke in his Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding; by whom, ideas are ſaid to be the objects immediately preſent to the mind in thinking. Eſſay, b. i. c. i. p. 13. Now Ariſtotle, in the following paſſage, expreſsly denies the preſence or exiſtence of any object in the mind, when it theoriſes or thinks, diſtinct from the act of the mind itſelf. επι των θεωρετικων, ὁ λογος το πραγμα, και ἡ νοησις· ουχ ἑτερου ουν οντος του νοουμενου και του νου, ὁσα μη ὑλην εχει, το αυτο εσαι· και ἡ νοησις του νοουμενου μια. Metaph. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004. In another paſſage he ſays, ἡ ψυχη πως εςι τα παντα. "The mind is after a ſort all things." De Anima, l. iii. c. ix. p. 656. What is meant by τα καθολου, "generals, univerſals, ideas," as the words are tranſlated by his pretended followers, he ſtates clearly thus: Επει δ' εςι, τα μεν καθολου των πραγματων, τα δε καθ' εκαςον· λεγω δε καθολου μεν, ὁ επι πλειονων πεφυκε κατηγορεισθαι

CHAP. II.

disputes, carried on with equal eagerneſs and perſeverance through many centuries, have generally embraced his opinion; and, what is moſt remarkable, chiefly ſince the time that undue deference ceaſed to be paid to his writings, and that his name was no longer ſuperſtitiouſly venerated by thoſe who either read what they did not underſtand, or who affected to admire what they had never condeſcended to read.

Diviſion and Definition.

The reduction of things to genera or claſſes, by applying to them common names, is the foundation of diviſion and definition, which have been called by a juſt metaphor, the firm Handles of Science. Each of the categories, or claſſes, above-mentioned, that of ſubſtance for example, may be variouſly divided according to the intent of the diviſion, which may be undertaken for explaining the works of art or of nature; for delineating the inſtitutions of civil policy, or deſcribing the ſtructure of plants and animals; in a word, for examining any object, whether material or intellectual, about which human thought is converſant. But for whatever purpoſe the diviſion is intended, it can be perſpicuous and ſatisfactory only when it deſcends from the more general claſſes, or terms, to thoſe which are leſs general, until it arrives at the loweſt ſpecies of all, which rejects every

γοϱευσθαι, καθ' εκαςον δε, ὁ μη· ἰιον ανθϱωπος, των καθολυ· καλλιας δε. των καθ' ἑκαςον, &c. De Interpret. c. vii. p. 39. "The diſtinction is to be made between univerſals and particulars; univerſals, which can be predicated of many, as the term "Man;" particulars, as "Callias," the proper name of an individual."

other

other partition but into individuals only[d]. The intermediate terms between the highest genus and this lowest species, stand each of them in two distinct relations, and therefore receive two different names, that of genus with respect to the less general terms which they contain, and that of species with respect to the more general terms under which they are contained[e]. Such is Aristotle's own doctrine concerning classification and division; a doctrine continually exemplified in his works throughout, moral as well as physical; and admirably illustrated by some modern writers, especially on the subjects of natural history.

Propositions.

Having explained the uses and functions of single words, the author proceeds to examine their combinations into propositions, and the combinations of propositions into reasoning or

[d] Analyt. Poster. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 175.

[e] Compare Categor. c. ii. p. 15. and Analyt. Prior. c. i. p. 52. The subject has been strangely perplexed by mistaking Aristotle's language, which is in itself highly perspicuous. το δε εν ὁλῳ ειναι ἑτερον ἑτερῳ, και το κατα παντος κατηγορεισθαι θατερον θατερȣ, τ'αυτον εςι· λεγομεν δε το κατα παντος κατηγορεισθαι, ὁταν μηδεν η τȣ ὑποκειμενȣ λαβειν, καθ' ὁ θατερον ȣ λεχθησεται. "To say that one term is contained in another is the same as saying, that the second can be predicated of the first in the full extent of its signification; and one term is predicated of another in the full extent of its signification, when there is no particular denoted by the subject, to which the predicate does not apply." This remark, which is the foundation of all Aristotle's logic, has been sadly mistaken by many. Among others, the learned and truly respectable Dr. Reid writes as follows: "The being in a subject, and the being truly predicated of a subject, are used by Aristotle in his Analytics as synonymous phrases. And this variation of style has led some persons to think that the Categories were not written by Aristotle." See Kaims' Sketches, vol. iii. p. 316. But the two phrases of "being in a subject," and "being predicated of it," are so far from "synonymous phrases," that the meaning of the one is directly the reverse of the meaning of the other.

CHAP. II.

diſcourſe. According to the meaſure of our deſires or exigencies, our power or inability, language is variouſly moulded into commands, prayers, or wiſhes; but for the purpoſes of inſtruction or argument, it requires the form of an enunciative propoſition, which is defined by Ariſtotle " the affirming or denying one thing of another." But all that can be directly affirmed of any ſubject is, either that it belongs to a certain claſs, or that it is poſſeſſed of certain qualities. Theſe qualities are either ſuch as neceſſarily inhere in the thing itſelf while it remains what it is, and retains its diſtinctive name; or ſecondly, qualities neceſſarily proceeding from the former; or thirdly, qualities which do not uniformly belong to the ſubject, nor proceed from thoſe uniformly belonging to it, but which accede to it merely by way of adjunct or appendage[f]. Thus we can ſay of man, that he is an animal, which is the claſs to which he belongs; that he is an animal capable of reaſon, which is the quality neceſſarily inherent in him, while he deſerves his diſtinctive name; that he is capable of learning grammar or geometry, which are qualities neceſſarily flowing from the former; but when

[f] Topic. l. i. c. viii. p. 285. The Greek word συμβεβηκος is, as far as I know, univerſally tranſlated " accident;" συμβεβηκοτα, in the plural, " accidents;" from which, " Accidence," denoting the little book that explains the properties of the eight parts of ſpeech, is generally held to be a corruption. But accident, in its proper ſenſe of what is caſual or fortuitous, has nothing to do with the one or the other; and Ariſtotle's meaning of συμβεβηκος ought to be expreſſed by a Latin or Engliſh word derived, not from 'accĭdo,' but from 'accēdo.' The miſunderſtanding of this ſingle term has hitherto been ſufficient to darken and perplex the whole of Ariſtotle's philoſophy, ſo perpetually does the term in queſtion occur in his writings.

we

we proceed farther, and afcribe to him qualities not neceffarily flowing from thofe inherent in the fpecies, although they may be found in many individuals, and even many nations, it is plain that thefe qualities are mere acceffions or appendages to his diftinctive name or fpecific character.

The fpecific difference.

To define a thing, or to define a term, (for when words are confidered as figns, thefe expreffions are fynonymous,) is to tell, as precifely and perfpicuoufly as poffible, what that thing is, or what that term fignifies. This can only be done by afcertaining the clafs to which the object to be defined immediately belongs, and the quality or qualities which, neceffarily inhering in it, uniformly diftinguifh that object from other objects belonging to the fame clafs or genus. That quality, therefore, or thofe qualities form what is called the fpecific difference, becaufe they diftinguifh the fpecies in queftion from the other fpecies in the fame genus, or the object in queftion from the other objects that moft nearly refemble it. Thus, to define the number three, or the triad, we may fay or predicate of it, that it is a quantity, and that kind of quantity called number, and that kind of number called an odd number; but each of thefe predicates, and all of them united, have a fignification far more extenfive than that of the fubject; fince there are other quantities befide number, and other numbers befide odd numbers, and many other odd numbers befide three. How then are we to proceed to find the exact definition of the triad? We muft continue to combine

bine ſtill more of thoſe predicates, until the whole of them unitedly will apply to the number three, and to it only; although each of them taken ſeparately, and even any number of them ſhort of the whole, have a far more extenſive ſignification. Thus with the predicates "number" and "odd" we muſt join that of "firſt," defining the triad "the firſt odd number;" for though the predicate "firſt" applies to the number "two" as well as to "three," yet "the firſt odd number" applies to "three" only[g]. It may be neceſſary here to remark, that, in the accurate language of Ariſtotle, unity is not number, but the element of number[h]; all numbers are compoſed of units, but they themſelves are indiviſible and ultimate elements, incapable as units of farther reſolution[i]. For coarſe practical purpoſes, arithmeticians talk of the parts of unit; but when they do this, they have always previouſly converted unity into number; as when we ſpeak of the tenth of an inch, we muſt neceſſarily have firſt changed the one inch into ten portions; the inch therefore, before it can be divided, ceaſes to be an unit, and is converted into ten.

According to Ariſtotle, definitions are the fountains of all ſcience[k]; but thoſe fountains

[g] Analyt. Poſter. l.ii. c.xiii. p.173. & ſeq.

[h] διοτι το ἑν αριθμου αρχη, ἡ αριθμος. Metaph. l.x. c.i. p.943.

[i] ουτε γαρ του εσχατου, εσχατοτερον ειη αν τι. Ibid. c.iv. p.946; and again, αντικειται το ἑν και τα πολλα, ὡς αδιαιρετον και διαιρετον. Ibid. c.iii. p.945.

[k] αἱ αρχαι των αποδειξεων, ὁι ορισμοι. Analyt. Poſter. l.ii. c.3. p.164. Compare Analyt. Poſter. l.ii. c.xvii. p.178.

are

are pure, only when they originate in an accurate examination and patient comparifon of the perceptible qualities of individual objects; for it is in that cafe only, that our words being the correct figns of things, the conclufions drawn from our intellectual operations on the figns, exactly apply to the things fignified by them. We muft cautiouſly proceed, therefore, from particulars to generals[l], that we may not be cheated by words[m]; endeavouring to difcover, in each object of our examination, that principal and paramount property in which all its other inherent qualities unite and terminate[n]. To this property we muft affign a name, when an appropriate name for it is wanting; and in the affignment of this name, we muft refpect the analogies of language[o], that the fame relations may be preferved among words which fubfift among the things which they denote[p]. The name, thus invented, is called the fpecific difference; which, in the objects to which it applies, is not always that quality which is moft palpable or moft ftriking; for many other qualities are often actually difcovered in them, before we diftinguifh that moft important and moft

[l] δια δει απο των καθεκαστων επι τα καθολε μεταβαινειν. Analyt. Pofter. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 176.

[m] αἱ ὁμωνυμιαι λανθανεσι μαλλον εν τοις καθολε. Ibid.

[n] Analyt. Pofter. l. ii. c. xiv. p. 176. & Topic. l. i. c. iv. p. 182.

[o] ὁυτω δε ῥαςα αν ισως τις λαβοι ὡς μη κειται ονοματα, ει απο των πρωτων, και τοις προς ἁ αντιςρεφεσι, τιθειη τα ονοματα. Categor. c. vii. p. 23.

[p] Comp. Metaph. l. iv. c. vii. p. 881. ὁ γαρ λογος ἑ το ονομα σημειον, ορισμος γινεται τε πραγματος, & Metaph. l. vii. c. iv. p. 908. c. vi. p. 911. & feq.

general

CHAP. II.

general one, which is implied in all the reft, and which forms, as it were, the bafis on which they all ftand[q]. This paramount property exifts independently in its fubject; but none of the other properties can fubfift independently of the fpecific difference, which is therefore the principle in which they originate, and the fource from which they flow. In many objects with whofe fenfible qualities we are moft converfant, this fource is concealed; yet to remount to it, when poffible, is the main bufinefs of philofophy, fince the more our knowledge is generalized, it will be the more fatisfactory, and, therefore, the more delightful[r].

Syllogifm.

The patient examination of objects, and the accurate definition of terms, are continually employed by our philofopher, as the beft means for arranging perceptions into fcience. Thefe, and not fyllogifms, are the fole inftruments ufed by himfelf in the deepeft and moft various refearches that ever exercifed the ingenuity of man. Yet his art of fyllogifm (an art ignorantly depreciated in the prefent age, and more abfurdly magnified in preceding times beyond its real worth) is not therefore ufelefs, although its real ufes, as will prefently appear, are altogether different from the purpofes to which it was long moft injudicioufly applied. The art of fyllogifm was entirely Ariftotle's invention;

[q] το δε ταξαι ὡς δει ειναι, εαν το πρωτον λαβῃ. τουτο δε ειναι, εαν ληφθῃ, ὁ πασιν ακολουθει, εκεινῳ δε μη παντα. Analyt. Pofter. l. ii. c. xiii. p. 175. The word ακολουθει is ufed in the fame fenfe, when he fays (as quoted above) that ἑν & ον, "unity and being," is implied in all the Categories.

[r] Analyt. Pofter. l. i. c. xxiv. p. 155.

and

and in appreciating his merit as a philosopher, it becomes necessary to examine his first Analytics, in which this art is contained, that we may be enabled to decide whether the supposed improvements of his system by some writers be not ignorant perversions, and the objections made to the whole of it by others, be not senseless cavils.

It was formerly observed that every proposition, affirming or denying one thing of another, must affirm or deny that the subject, of which we speak, belongs to a certain class, or that it is endowed with certain qualities*. But to affirm one term of another when both of them are taken in the full extent of their signification, is merely to say that there is not any species or any individual contained under the name of the subject, to which the name of the predicate does not apply. It matters not whether those names denote substances or qualities, or any other of the ten predicaments. Whatever they denote, the name of the species, according to the prin-

* The author proves this by observing, that every subject must either reciprocate with its predicate, or not. If the subject reciprocates with the predicate, that is, if the subject can in its turn be predicated of it, then the predicate must have been either the definition or the peculiar and exclusive property of the subject: if the subject does not reciprocate, then the predicate must have been either something contained in the definition, namely the genus or specific difference, or something not contained in the definition, but acceding to it as an appendage. Topic. l. i. c. viii. p. 285. These relations of genus, difference, &c. which the predicates can stand in to their subject are called the Predicables. They are the only things that can be affirmed or denied of any subject, categorically; which means, in the language of Aristotle, that can be affirmed of any subject merely by the interposition of the substantive verb between two terms. De Interpret. c. x. p. 43.

CHAP. II.

ciples on which all languages are conftructed, may ftill be predicated of every individual, and the name of the genus of every fpecies. When the definition of any term is predicated of that term, the definition and word defined, having exactly the fame fignification, they both neceffarily apply to exactly the fame number of things, and are therefore of exactly the fame extent. But in all propofitions not identical, but which affirm or deny one thing of another, the predicate is according to the ftructure of all languages, naturally more extenfive than the fubject [t]; becaufe, as before obferved, to predicate one term of another is merely to fay that there is not any thing contained under the name of the fubject to which that of the predicate does not apply. The predicate, therefore, in every propofition is called the major term; the fubject, the minor term; and thefe terms are conjoined in difcourfe by the fubftantive verb "is," called therefore the copula. When we fay, "the wall is white," the fubftantive verb is expreffed; the fame verb is underftood, when we fay "Achilles runs;" becaufe the word "runs" may be refolved into "is running;" being in fact merely an abbreviation of it for the purpose of communicating the rapidity of our thoughts with fuitable rapidity of fpeech [u]. To prevent impofition arifing from the abufe of words, it is neceffary to be

Nature and ufe of fyllogifm.

[t] Categor. c. v. p. 17.

[u] ουδεν γαρ διαφερει το ανθρωπος υγιαινων εςι, η το ανθρωπος υγιαινει, &c. Metaph. l. v. c. 7. p. 889.

able

able quickly to difcern whether one term can be juftly predicated of another. Ariftotle, for this purpofe, invented the fyllogifm, which confifts in comparing both the fubject and the predicate of any propofition with what is called the middle term, becaufe its natural place is the middle between the other two terms, called therefore the extremes. Let the queftion be propofed, whether temperance be a habit? I readily find a middle term which is contained under the more extenfive appellation of habit, and which itfelf contains the more limited appellation of temperance. The terms, therefore, ftand in this order. Habit, Virtue, Temperance; or, in the form of propofitions,

Virtue is a Habit,
Temperance is a Virtue;

therefore, Temperance is a Habit. Now the whole cogency of this argument depends on that great principle which prefides in the formation of language, that things, which have a common nature, receive a common name. They may differ in many important particulars, yet having received one common appellation from the particular in which they all agree, the term denoting the genus may be predicated of every fpecies and every individual contained under it. Whatever is affirmed or denied of a more general term, may therefore be affirmed or denied of all the more particular terms, as well as of all the individual things to which its fignification extends. This is the meaning of Ariftotle, when he calls thofe things fynonymous which

CHAP. II.

which have the ſame name in the ſame ſenſe. Thus "man" and "ox" are, according to him, ſynonymous, becauſe the name of animal is equally applicable to both[x]; an obſervation which muſt ſound harſhly to thoſe Engliſh readers who have derived their knowledge of Greek through the circuitous channel of France.

Wonderful variety in a ſubject ſeemingly ſo ſimple.

On the baſis of this one ſimple truth, itſelf founded in the natural and univerſal texture of language, Ariſtotle has reared a lofty and various ſtructure of abſtract ſcience, clearly expreſſed, and fully demonſtrated. To convince ourſelves of the wonderful variety in a ſubject, ſeemingly ſo ſimple, it is ſufficient to obſerve, that the middle term may either be the ſubject of both the premiſſes; or the predicate of both; or, as in the ſyllogiſm given above, the ſubject of the major premiſs, in which it is compared with the major extreme, and the predicate of the minor premiſs, in which it is compared with the minor extreme. Theſe various arrangements form what are called the three figures of ſyllogiſm[y];

[x] Categor. c. i. p. 14. Words, ſynonymous in the modern ſenſe, have nothing to do with philoſophy, whoſe terms, if accurate, cannot be interchangeable. Their proper place is poetry: accordingly we find that Ariſtotle, in his now imperfect treatiſe on that ſubject, had treated of συνωνυμα ὧν πλειω τα ονοματα, λογος δε ὁ αυτος, that is "of various words meaning the ſame thing;" which agrees with the modern acceptation. Simplicius in Categor. fol. viii.

[y] It may be proper to remark, that in books of logic there is a fourth figure which is ſaid to have been invented by Galen the phyſician. In this Galenical figure, as it is called, the middle term is predicated of the major, and the minor term is predicated of the middle. In this abſurd figure, the more general term is placed as the ſubject of the more particular. The natural arrangement of the terms is thus totally reverſed. But every ſyllogiſm in this figure, when properly expreſſed, naturally falls under Ariſtotle's firſt figure.

and

and in each of thefe three figures, every one of the three propofitions may be either affirmative or negative; and each of the affirmative and negative propofitions may be either univerfal or particular; univerfal, when their fubject is taken in the full extent of its meaning, as "all men are mortal;" particular, when their fubject is reftricted to a part of the things which its name properly denotes, as "fome men are wife." If we exprefs thefe four kinds of propofitions; the univerfal affirmative, the univerfal negative, the particular affirmative, and the particular negative, by the four vowels, a, e, i, o, we fhall find that they will afford fixty-four different combinations by threes, which are called the different modes in each figure; and therefore one hundred and ninety-two combinations in the three figures collectively. But the variety does not end here; for propofitions themfelves are either pure or modal. A pure propofition fimply affirms or denies one thing of another; a modal propofition affirms or denies with the addition of neceffity or contingency, poffibility or impoffibility. When we confider, therefore, the numerous combinations that will refult from thefe new elements varioufly joined with the old, and that every new combination forms a diftinct fyllogifm, it is impoffible not to admire the perfevering energy of mind that could contemplate each feparately, and examine how the truth of the conclufion was affected by each fpecific arrangement.

CHAP. II.

All ſyllogiſms reduced to thoſe of the firſt figure.

From this induction, the moſt copious and complete that any ſpeculation ever exhibited, Ariſtotle infers that all concluſive ſyllogiſms whatever may be reduced to concluſive modes in the firſt figure[a]; of all which, the truth reſts immediately on the grammatical principle above explained; and of which, therefore, the ſyllogiſm already given may ſerve for an example. When the three terms of a ſyllogiſm, therefore, are accurately defined, and the three propoſitions compoſing it are properly arranged, the ſtrength or weakneſs of its argument may always be perceived by a rapid glance of the mind thrown on the premiſſes, and diſcerning, by means of the minor premiſs, in which the ſubject of the concluſion is compared with the middle term, whether the major premiſs, in which the predicate of the concluſion is compared with the ſame middle term, neceſſarily infers the concluſion. For enabling the mind readily to draw this inference in the caſe of all ſyllogiſms whatever, whether their concluſions be affirmative or negative, univerſal or particular, and how awkwardly ſoever their terms may have been arranged, the Author has recourſe to no other rules or axioms than thoſe which concern what is called converſion and oppoſition; and that moſt extenſive principle of reaſon which infers the truth of any propoſition by ſhewing, that to ſuppoſe it falſe leads to an abſurdity. To convert a propoſition, is to make

Rules of Converſion.

[a] Comp. Analyt. Prior. c. vii. p. 60. and c. xxiii. p. 79.

its

its ſubject and its predicate change places. This may often be done ſafely, becauſe in many propoſitions the converſe will retain that truth which was in the propoſition to be converted. All univerſal negatives, for example, can always be completely converted. If no A is B, no B is A; for if A could be predicated of any thing called B, for example of C, then C would fall under the names both of A and of B, which is contrary to the firſt ſuppoſition, that no A is B; or that B cannot be predicated of any thing called A[a]. When one term, therefore, is univerſally denied of another, that other may, without heſitation, be univerſally denied of the firſt. An univerſal affirmative propoſition does not admit of a complete converſion, becauſe, according to what was formerly obſerved, in every ſuch propoſition the predicate muſt apply to all the ſpecies and individuals expreſſed by the name of the ſubject, but the ſubject needs not therefore apply to all the ſpecies and individuals contained under the name of the predicate. But an univerſal affirmative, though it rejects a complete, yet admits of a partial converſion. Thus, if every A is B, ſome B muſt be A; for if no B is A, then no A is B, as juſt proved in the caſe of univerſal negatives. Particular affirmatives admit of a complete converſion; for if ſome A is B, then ſome B is A; ſince, when no B is A, no A is B, as formerly proved in the caſe of univerſal negatives. Particular negatives do not at all admit of converſion, either com-

[a] Analyt. Prior. c. ii. p. 52.

 plete

plete or partial. Thus, ſome A is not B, cannot be converted by ſaying that ſome B is not A, becauſe, though the name of a ſpecies does not apply to ſome things comprehended under the name of its genus, it does not thence follow that the name of the genus does not apply to all the individuals comprehended under the name of the ſpecies[b]. The rules concerning converſion then are, that univerſal negatives, as well as particular affirmatives, may be converted completely; that univerſal affirmatives can only be converted partially; and that particular negatives are totally incapable of converſion. Theſe rules, perhaps, may all be reſolved into one and the ſame primitive truth, of which they are only different expreſſions; yet theſe different expreſſions will on many occaſions render the perception of that truth more diſtinct, and the application of it more eaſy as well as more expeditious[c]. The ſame thing holds here, as with reſpect to the axioms of geometry, concerning

[b] The doctrines of Ariſtotle's Organon have been ſtrangely perplexed by confounding the grammatical principles on which that work is built with mathematical axioms. All the modern ſyſtems of logic that have fallen into my hands, employ in demonſtrating the theory of ſyllogiſm theſe two axioms, "Things agreeing with the ſame third agree with each other:" "When one thing agrees with the third, and the other does not, they do not agree with each other." But Ariſtotle tells us, that theſe axioms do not at all apply to the predication of terms, the one of the other; except when thoſe terms denote mathematical quantities. The reaſon why they do apply to mathematical quantities he ſays is, becauſe in them, ἡ ισοτης, ἑνοτης, "equality is ſameneſs;" and in them, equality is ſameneſs, becauſe ὁ λογος ὁ της πρωτης ουσιας ἱις εςι. The definition of any particular object denoted by the one, is preciſely the ſame with the definition of any particular object denoted by the other. Metaph. l. x. c. iii. p. 843.

[c] De Sophiſt. Elench. l. ii. p. 299.

the

the whole and its parts, equality and inequality, greater and leffer, fince the comprehenfion of any one of thofe terms neceffarily implies the comprehenfion of them all[d]. Yet geometers find it ufeful to reprefent the fame elementary truth under a variety of forms, that it may be more forcibly impreffed, and more readily applied; and the indefinite number of mathematical theorems ultimately refolve themfelves into a few fimple propofitions, which may themfelves perhaps be confidered as only different expreffions of one and the fame original conception of the mind.

Rules of oppofition.

Upon this great principle of tranflating the fame truth into different words, in order to render it more familiar to our thoughts, Ariftotle next examines the doctrine of oppofition. Propofitions may be oppofite or contrary, which are not contradictory; becaufe the truth of the one does not always infer the falfehood of the other. Thus, "all men are white," "no man is white," are contrary propofitions, and both of them falfe. "Some men are white," "fome men are not white," are contrary propofitions, and both of them true. But if I fay, "all men are white," "fome men are not white," the truth of the one propofition infers the falfehood of the other; becaufe in this laft cafe only the predicate "whitenefs" is affirmed of the whole fpecies, and denied of fome individuals belonging to it; which is inconfiftent with the great

[d] Topic. l. vi. p. 248.

CHAP. II.

principle on which all language and all reaſoning is founded[e].

The deſign of Ariſtotle's firſt Analytics miſunderſtood.

In the firſt Analytics, Ariſtotle ſhews what is that arrangement of terms in each propoſition, and that arrangement of propoſitions in each ſyllogiſm, which conſtitutes a neceſſary connection between the premiſſes and the concluſion. When this connection takes place, the ſyllogiſm is perfect in point of form; and when the form is perfect, the concluſion neceſſarily follows from the premiſſes, whatever be the ſignification of the terms of which they are compoſed. Theſe terms, therefore, he commonly expreſſes by the letters of the alphabet, for the purpoſe of ſhewing that our aſſent to the concluſion reſults, not from comparing the things ſignified, but merely from conſidering the relation which the ſigns (whether words or letters) bear to each other.

[e] De Interpret. c. vii. p. 39. & ſeq. and Analyt. Prior. c. xv. p. 117. & ſeq. To ſhew how groſsly Ariſtotle's logic has been miſtaken, and with what contempt of reaſon and grammar, as well as of good manners, the character of this philoſopher has been aſſailed, I ſhall cite the following paſſage from a late author (Lord Kaims) of conſiderable reputation, and of very conſiderable merit: "His (Ariſtotle's) artificial mode of reaſoning is no leſs ſuperficial than intricate. The propoſitions he attempts to prove by ſyllogiſm are all ſelf-evident. Take for example the following propoſition, 'that man has the power of ſelf-motion.' To prove this, he aſſumes the following maxim, upon which indeed every one of his ſyllogiſms are founded, that whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together holds true of every one ſeparately." Lord Kaims' Sketches, vol. iii. p. 306. It would have been charitable in this acute author to have pointed out the paſſage where Ariſtotle maintains, that becauſe it is true of a number of particulars joined together, that they are an hundred or a thouſand, the ſame holds true of every one of them ſeparately. It is impoſſible to reſtrain indignation at ſuch unmeaning jargon, poured out againſt the moſt accurate of all writers.

Those[f], therefore, totally misconceive the meaning of Aristotle's logic, who think that, by employing letters instead of words, he has darkened the subject; since the more abstract and general his signs are, they must be the better adapted to shew that the inference results from considering them alone, without at all regarding the things which they signify.

CHAP. II.

His second Analytics.

The *form* of syllogisms may be perfect when there is much imperfection in their *matter*; that is, in the premisses from which the conclusion is derived; and which may be either certain or probable, or only seem to be probable, as a face may seem to be beautiful which is only painted. In his second Analytics, Aristotle treats of what he calls Demonstrative Syllogisms, because their premisses are certain. In his Topics, he treats of what he calls Dialectical Syllogisms, because their premisses are only probable; and, in his Refutations of Sophistry, he treats of those deceitful syllogisms whose premises seem to be, but which are not really, probable. As sophistry consists, not only in reasoning from false principles, but in reasoning unfairly from principles that are true, the Author refers all such erroneous deductions to one head, which he calls "a mistake of the question;" because, in all of them, the "conclusion or answer" will be found

[f] A truly respectable philosopher says, in speaking of this subject, "Aristotle's rules are illustrated, or rather in my opinion purposely darkened, by putting letters of the alphabet for the several terms." Reid's Appendix to Kaims's Sketches, vol. iii. p. 631.

to come out otherwise than it ought to do, when drawn agreeably to the rules of just inference[s].

His Topics.

The four classes of predicates above explained, Genus, Difference, Property, and Appendage, are applicable to single things or single terms, considered separately; there are other predicates which are applicable only to more things or more terms than one, considered conjunctly. These conjunct predicates the Author reduces to four classes; Agreement, Diversity, Opposition, and Order; under which heads, as well as those first-mentioned, he examines in his Topics all the probable arguments by which our affirmations or negations may be either strengthened or invalidated; thus supplying a vast intellectual magazine, which, when compared with the slender additions made to it by subsequent writers, attests both the unwearied ardour of his application, and the incomparable richness of his invention.

His Organon perverted and misapplied.

In as few words as seemed consistent with perspicuity, I have thus endeavoured to explain the nature and design of Aristotle's Organon; a work which has often been as shamefully misrepresented, as it was long most grossly misapplied. In that scholastic jargon, which insolently usurped during many centuries the name of Philosophy, syllogisms were perverted to purposes for which their inventor declares them totally unfit, and employed on subjects in which his uniform practice shews that he considered them as

[s] De Sophist. Elench. c. vi. p. 287.

altogether

altogether ufelefs. Our acquaintance with the properties of things, he perpetually inculcates, muft be acquired by patient obfervation, generalifed by comparifon and induction; but when this foundation is once laid, the words by which our generalizations are expreffed, deferve not merely to be regarded as the materials in which our knowledge is embodied, or the channels by which it is communicated, but to be confidered in the two following refpects, as the principles or fources from which new knowledge may be derived. Firft, by means of a fkilful arrangement of accurate and well-chofen terms, many proceffes of reafoning may be performed by difcerning the relations and analogies of words, with a certainty as great, and with a rapidity far greater, than thefe proceffes could poffibly be carried on, were we obliged, in every ftep of our progrefs, to fix our attention on things. Every general term is confidered by Ariftotle as the abridgment of a definition[h], and every definition is denominated by him a Collection[i], becaufe it is the refult always of obfervation and comparifon, and often of many obfervations and many comparifons. The improvements in mathematics have advanced from age to age, chiefly by improving the language, that is, the figns, by which mathematical truths are expreffed; and the moft important difcoveries have

Its real ufes. 1. As an analytic art.

[h] διαφερει δε ουδεν, ουδε ει πλειω τις φαιη σημαινειν, μονον δε ωρισμενα. τεθειη γαρ αν' επ' ἑκαστῳ λογῳ, ἑτερον ονομα. Metaph. l. iv. c. iv. p. 873.

[i] ει δε μη τεθειη, αλλα απειρα σημαινειν φαιη, φανερον ὁτι ουκ αν ειη λογος. Ibid.

been

CHAP. II.

been made in that noble ſcience, by continually ſimplifying the objects of our comparifons; or, in other words, by finding clear expreſſions for ratios, including the reſults of many others. In all other ſciences, this inveſtigation is of the utmoſt importance; and, in many of them, our knowledge will be found to advance almoſt exactly in proportion to the ſucceſs with which our language is improved. When terms, therefore, are formed and applied with that propriety which perpetually ſhines in the Stagirite's writings, his general formulas of reaſoning afford an analytic art, which may be employed as an engine for raiſing new truths on thoſe previouſly eſtabliſhed; and if modern languages do not afford the ſame advantage preciſely in the ſame degree, it is not from the inefficacy of words as ſigns, but from the inefficacy of ſigns ill choſen and ill arranged; from impropriety of application, contempt of analogy, and abuſe of metaphor.

As ſtrengthening the aſſociating principles, and thereby multiplying the energies of thought.

Under another aſpect, nearly connected with the former, yet really diſtinct from it, Ariſtotle's Analytics, and ſtill more his Topics, have the moſt direct and moſt efficacious tendency to invigorate and ſharpen the underſtanding; to cheriſh, nay, to rouſe and quicken the ſeeds of invention and genius. The properties and relations of external objects, whether actually preſent to the ſenſes, or treaſured up in the memory, are confined, both as to their kind and number, within narrow limits. But our abſtractions, compariſons, and concluſions reſpecting theſe

these objects, expressed and embodied in words, are of a much wider and almost boundless extent. According to that law of mental action by which our Author proves that the current of thought is moved and regulated[k], the relations and analogies of words, therefore, will appear to form the main spring of intellectual energy; and their connections and dependencies, as compared and classed by Aristotle in his Topics, must have a direct tendency to invigorate and expand the thinking faculty; to revive and brighten those associating bands that might otherwise have been effaced; to suggest those principles of reasoning which would not otherwise occur; and thus to prevent that deception and error which most commonly proceeds from partial and incomplete views of our subject; from weakness of combination, and narrowness of comprehension. To say, therefore, that this part of our Author's Works is conversant entirely about *words*, is not to depreciate or reproach it; for Aristotle well knew, that, our

[k] See the remarks above made concerning what is commonly called "the association of ideas." "Ideas are more powerfully associated," (to use modern language,) "in proportion to the attention with which they are simultaneously examined and observed." In Aristotle's language, the action of thought depends on the attentive examination of things, and of words which are their signs. When not only the things themselves, but the signs expressing them, are thus examined, the connections between these things will take faster hold of the mind; the perception of them will be more vivid, and the recollection of them more easy and more expeditious. But words are the signs not merely of perceptible objects and their qualities, but of the comparisons, abstractions, and conclusions of the mind with respect to those objects and their qualities. An attentive examination of the relations and analogies of words serves, therefore, not only to strengthen old associations, but to produce many new ones.

knowledge

CHAP. II. knowledge of *things* chiefly depending on the proper application of language as an inftrument[1] of thought, the true art of reafoning is nothing but a language accurately defined and fkilfully arranged; an opinion which, after many idle declamations againft his barren generalities and verbal trifling, philofophers have begun very generally to adopt. Let it always, however, be remembered, that the author who firft taught this doctrine, had previoufly endeavoured to prove that all our notions, as well as the figns by which they are expreffed, originate in perceptions of fenfe; and that the principles on which languages are firft conftructed, as well as every ftep in their progrefs to perfection, all ultimately depend on inductions from obfervation; in one word, on experience merely.

Of Truth Demonftrative.

To abridge Ariftotle's Works is to treat them unfairly, becaufe (where his text is correct) no author expreffes his meaning in fewer or more appropriate words. Yet, as it is the purpofe of this difcourfe to afford fuch fpecimens of every part of his writings, as may fatisfy the curiofity of one clafs of readers, while it heightens or infpires that of another, I fhall collect within a narrow compafs his obfervations on Truth Demonftrative, that is, on Science; and follow him in his application of thefe principles to the loftieft, and, as commonly treated, the moft abftrufe fcience, that ever exercifed the human intellect.

[1] Topic. l. i. c. 15. Metaph. ubi fupra, and l. v. paffim.

All

All instruction, and all intellectual discipline, he observes, proceeds on principles previously ascertained and established. This is manifestly the case in mathematics, in the arts, and in every kind of reasoning, which is universally carried on either by syllogism or by induction; the former proving to us, that a particular proposition is true, because it is deducible from a general one, already known to us; and the latter demonstrating a general truth, because it holds in all particular cases. Orators persuade by examples or arguments, examples being a rhetorical or coarser kind of induction, as arguments are a rhetorical or coarser kind of syllogism.

Wherein it consists.

Truth is the exact conformity of human conception with the real nature of things[m]. Demonstrative Truth, therefore, can apply only to those things which necessarily exist after a certain manner, and whose state is unalterable: and we know those things when we know their causes: thus, we know a mathematical proposition, when we know the causes that make it true; that is, when we know all the intermediate propositions up to the first principles, or axioms, on which it is ultimately built. Demonstration cannot be indefinitely extended, because the certainty, and even probability of every kind of reasoning would be destroyed, were we to call in question those first principles

Rules concerning it.

[m] το δε κυριωτατον ον, αληθες η ψευδος· τυτον δ' επι των πραγματων εςι συγκεισθαι η διαιρεισθαι . . εψευςαι δε ὁ εναντιως εχων, η τα πραγματα ποτε εςι, η υκ εςι. Metaph. l. ix. c. x. p. 941. Vid. etiam Metaph. l. v. c. xxix. p. 901.

which,

CHAP. II.

which, in matters of ſcience, are recogniſed by what Ariſtotle calls Intellect, and in matters of practice by what he calls Common Senſe[n].

In demonſtration, the premiſſes are the cauſes of the concluſion, and therefore prior to it. We cannot, therefore, demonſtrate things in a circle, ſupporting the premiſſes by the concluſion; becauſe this would be to ſuppoſe, that the one propoſition could be both prior and poſterior to the other. In all demonſtration, the firſt principles muſt be neceſſary, immutable, and therefore eternal truths, becauſe thoſe qualities could not belong to the concluſion, unleſs they belonged to the premiſſes, which are its cauſes. An affirmative demonſtration is preferable to a negative one, and a direct demonſtration of any truth to that drawn from the abſurdity of ſuppoſing it falſe; becauſe, other things remaining the ſame, the ſhorteſt demonſtration is always the beſt. Ariſtotle debates the queſtion, whether an univerſal demonſtration is better than a particular one; and, as his remarks on this ſubject form an apology for the univerſality and abſtractedneſs of his own reaſonings in many parts of his Works, I ſhall ſubjoin a tranſlation, or paraphraſe, of the whole chapter[o].

Univerſal and particular; which preferable.

1ſt, To ſome a particular demonſtration may ſeem preferable, becauſe we know any object better by examining itſelf, than by examining the claſs to which it belongs. Thus, that the three

[n] αλλα αισθησις, ȣχ ἡ των ιδιων. Ethic. Nicom. c. vi. p. 8.

[o] Analytic. Poſterior, l. i. c. xxiv. p. 154, & ſeq.

angles

angles of an ifofkeles triangle are equal to two rights, may be thought more convincing when proved with regard to the ifofkeles itfelf, than when proved with regard to triangles in general, to which clafs of figures the ifofkeles belongs; and therefore the particular demonftration may appear better than a general one. 2d. If individuals only have a real exiftence in nature, and every demonftration fuppofes the exiftence of its fubject, a general demonftration muft be worfe than a particular one, becaufe it leads us to fuppofe the exiftence of nonentities.

The former more informing and more fatisfactory.

In anfwer to thefe objections let it be remarked, that the firft does not apply, becaufe if the property of having the three angles equal to two rights belongs to the ifofkeles, not as it is an ifofkeles, but as it is a triangle, he who demonftrates this truth refpecting the ifofkeles only, lefs examines the object in itfelf, than he who demonftrates the fame truth refpecting triangles in general: for the definition of a triangle enters into that of an infofkeles; and becaufe it is a triangle, the ifofkeles has its angles equal to two rights; fo that he who demonftrates univerfally, better fhews the caufe and reafon of the conclufion, than he who demonftrates particularly; and he fhews it from confidering the object itfelf, that is, the definition of the object, and that part of the definition from which the conclufion refults. Again, if univerfals are merely words, denoting certain claffes or fpecies, to all the individuals of which they equally apply, there is no reafon to fay that they are nonenities when

CHAP. II.

when applied to thoſe objects or individuals. Their exiſtence is even firmer than that of any *portion* of the individuals ſignified by them, which is continually liable to corruption or change; whereas the general name denoting the whole ſpecies is not liable to either, but has a preciſe and permanent meaning as long as any objects of that ſpecies continue to exiſt. But to ſuppoſe that univerſals, becauſe they are employed in demonſtration, have any exiſtence independently of the objects or individuals which they denote, is a miſtake chargeable, not on thoſe who employ ſuch terms, but on thoſe who miſconceive their uſe[p].

[p] Had the learned Lord Monboddo proceeded to read this ſentence, he would not ſurely have quoted that immediately preceding it, to prove it to be Ariſtotle's opinion, that "ideas, conſidered as in the Divine mind, have an exiſtence, and an exiſtence more real than particulars, becauſe they are eternal and unchangeable." Monboddo's Ancient Metaphyſics, vol. i. p. 470.

Ariſtotle ſpeaks with great caution concerning the Divine mind, nor ever ſays that any thing exiſts *in* it. Of ideas or exemplars he ſpeaks often, and always contemptuouſly, as of metaphors and vain flouriſhes. Analyt. Poſt. l. i. c. xxii. p. 151. Metaph. l. i. c. vii. p. 853. So that it is plain what he would have thought of the diſtinction, προ των πολλων, εν τοις πολλοις, επι τοις πολλοις: which was adopted by his followers, and is ſo much inſiſted on, as the great doctrine of the Peripatetics, by Lord Monboddo and Mr. Harris. The following paſſage may be quoted to ſhew what Ariſtotle thought of the προ των πολλων, "thoſe eternal exemplars." αυτο γαρ ανθρωπον φασιν ειναι, και αυτο ἱππον και ὑγιειαν, αλλο δε ουδεν· παραπλησιον μεν ποιουντες, τοις θεους μεν ειναι φασκουσι, ανθρωποειδεις δε. ουτε γαρ εκεινοι ουθεν αλλο εποιουν η ανθρωπους αιδιους, ουτε ουτοι τα ειδη αλλα η αισθητα αιδια. "They who maintained the eternal exiſtence of ſuch exemplars, as the ideas of man, horſe, health, acted exactly like to thoſe who maintained there were Gods, but that the Gods were of a human ſhape. The Gods of ſuch theologians were nothing more than eternal or incorruptible men; and the ideas of ſuch philoſophers are nothing more than eternal or incorruptible objects of ſenſe." Metaphyſ. l. iii. c. xi. p. 861.

The

CHAP. II.

The more univerſal the demonſtration of any propoſition is rendered, it becomes at the ſame time the more informing and the more ſatisfactory; the more informing, becauſe it comprehends the greater number of particular truths; and the more ſatisfactory, becauſe it demonſtrates theſe truths from their firſt and ultimate cauſe; at leaſt, approximates nearer to this cauſe in exact proportion to its greater univerſality. To deſcend from generals is alſo more natural; becauſe, in matters of ſcience, they are the ſource and fountain of particulars. It has alſo more dignity, becauſe generals are the work of intellect, whereas the more particular propoſitions are, the more nearly they approach to perceptions of ſenſe, with which, when ſtrictly particular, they intirely coincide.

Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics

From this part of Ariſtotle's Logic, there is an eaſy tranſition to what has been called his Metaphyſics; a name unknown, as above obſerved, to the Author himſelf, and given to his moſt abſtract philoſophical works by his editors, from an opinion that thoſe books ought to be ſtudied immediately after his Phyſics, or Treatiſes on Natural Philoſophy. Conſidered under one particular aſpect, thoſe books may be properly thus arranged[o]; becauſe, as we ſhall ſee hereafter, the ſtudy of nature, conducted according to Ariſtotle's principles, neceſſarily leads to Deity, and to the moſt delightful of all contemplations, that of the Divine Goodneſs. But viewed in the full extent of their relations,

[o] Topic. l. i. c. ii.

 Ariſtotle's

CHAP. II.

extended to every branch of human science.

Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics are intimately connected with every branch of human ſcience, whether natural or moral, ſince their real ſubject (which has been groſsly miſtaken through a prepoſterous arrangement of the treatiſes which they compriſe) is the vindication of the exiſtence and nature of truth againſt the cavils of Sophiſts, and thoſe now called Metaphyſicians; and this doctrine concerning truth illuſtrated in the demonſtration of the being of one God, in oppoſition to Atheiſts on one hand, and Polytheiſts on the other. The whole of Ariſtotle's metaphyſical works may be referred to one or other of theſe two heads; ſince to them the greater part of his treatiſes relate immediately, and the ſmaller part will appear to be merely preparatory, to their diſcuſſion.

Begin with a Philoſophical Vocabulary,

The unſkilfulneſs of his editors[p] has placed near the middle of the work, a book plainly preparatory, ſince it merely exhibits the different acceptation of the terms of which he has occaſion afterwards to make uſe. This fifth book of his Metaphyſics, which ought undoubtedly to ſtand as the firſt, contains, in thirty chapters, an accurate philoſophical vocabulary, which Ariſtotle thought peculiarly requiſite as an introduction to the firſt and moſt comprehenſive[q] of all

[p] Dr. Morton of the Britiſh Muſeum, who has long ſtudied the writings of Ariſtotle, with equal diligence and ſucceſs, firſt ſhewed to me, that Samuel Petit, in the fourth book of his *Miſcellanea*, had already placed Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics in nearly the ſame order in which I alſo had arranged them.

[q] αλλα ἡ μεν γεωμετρια και ἡ αςρολογια περι τινα φυσιν ιδιαν εισιν· εκεινη δε (ἡ πρωτη φιλοσοφια, ſeu θεολογικη,) καθολε πασων κοινη. Metaphyſ. l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

all ſciences, that of which truth in general was the ſubject, ſince the terms employed in it having neceſſarily a variety of meanings, it was impoſſible to uſe thoſe ſigns properly, without preciſely aſcertaining the things which they ſignified. Wonder and admiration, he obſerves, are the paſſions naturally excited by the contemplation of the univerſe, whoſe ſublime obſcurity, while it fixes the attention, inflames the curioſity of man, and makes him ambitious to know and comprehend ſo intereſting and magnificent a ſpectacle. But it is impoſſible to know any thing without knowing its cauſes and principles. Ariſtotle, therefore, begins his vocabulary with an explanation of theſe terms; obſerving that all cauſes are principles; and defining a principle to be that from which any thing exiſts, is made, or is known. The notion of a cauſe always includes that of priority, which is the ſpecific quality belonging to all the different acceptations of the word principle. Ariſtotle enumerates four kinds of cauſes, the ſame word being taken in Greek in four different meanings. 1. The material cauſe, that is, the matter from which any thing is made; as braſs of the ſtatue, and ſilver of the goblet; and which are evidently cauſes, ſince, independently of them, neither the ſtatue nor the goblet could exiſt. The braſs and the ſilver have alſo their material cauſes, namely the ſubſtances from which thoſe metals are compoſed; and in the works both of nature and of art, the firſt component ſubſtances, which are ſo ſimple as not to admit of any further

Illuſtrated in words, cauſe or principle.

The material,

 reſolution,

CHAP. II.

formal, efficient, final.

refolution, are called Elements. 2. The formal caufe, which is that fpecific form or fhape, or quality, moft commonly diftinguifhed by fight, which characterifes each particular object, and gives to it an appropriate nature and effence. It is from their agreement in the fame form or effence, that different objects receive a common name; of which name, this form or effence is therefore the proper definition. In lofing their appropriate form, objects lofe their name and nature; this form, therefore, is a caufe of thofe objects, fince, independently of it, they could not have been originally, or would not continue to exift. 3. The efficient caufe is the principle of motion or change; or, in other words, the maker; which term fufficiently explains itfelf. 4. The final caufe, that is, the end or purpofe for which any thing is made, and, independently of which end or purpofe, the maker could not have exerted his power or fkill; and therefore his work would never have commenced; that is, the thing made would never have exifted[r]. Of thefe four caufes, the two firft are always in-

[r] Juftnefs of thought is infeparably connected with propriety of language. The feveral caufes enumerated by Ariftotle, the names of which found aukwardly in Englifh, were expreffed briefly in Greek, each by a particular prepofition. The material was the ἐξ ὗ: the formal, the καθ' ὃ: the efficient, the ὑφ' ὗ: and the final, the δια ὃ: befides which, the Greeks indicated the means, or inftrument, by which any thing is done, or made, by δια ὗ: and the model after which it was made, by προς ὃ. This model, or exemplar, was confidered as a caufe by the Pythagoreans and Platonifts; the former of whom maintained, that all perceptible things were imitations of *numbers;* and the latter, that they owed their exiftence to the participation of *ideas:* but wherein either this imitation or this participation confifted, thefe philofophers, Ariftotle obferves, omitted to fhew.

herent

herent in the object caufed: in works of art, the two laft caufes are always feparate from this object; we fhall fee in the fequel, whether this is alfo the cafe with refpect to the works of nature.

The fecond book confiders words as ftanding in oppofition to each other.

Ariftotle's enumeration of the different meanings of the word "caufe," which muft be carefully diftinguifhed in all parts of his philofophy, may ferve as a fpecimen of that book, which was intitled "An Explanation of Words with various Significations." That book is naturally followed by the tenth, which ought therefore to ftand as the fecond; becaufe, in it, words are confidered, not fimply in themfelves, but as ftanding in the relation of oppofition or contrariety to each other. It is briefly intitled "The Selection of Contraries," and treats of one and many; likenefs and unlikenefs; contraries in the fame genus, as "white" and "black;" and contraries which are not in the fame genus, as "corruptible and "incorruptible." The firft kind of contraries may fubfift at different times in the fame fubject; the fecond never can; becaufe the firft kind are merely appendages to the fubject in which they fubfift, and may therefore be feparated from it; but the fecond are effentials.[a]

The third book treats of fcience.

The fecond and fourth books treat of truth and fcience; they ought to be confidered as one, and to ftand the third in order; fince they naturally follow the definitions laid down in the

[a] Metaphyf. l. x. c. ix. and x. p. 951, & feq.

CHAP. II.

first and second. His treatise on science opens with great modesty. Its difficulty, he observes, arises not merely from the subject, but from ourselves, whose intellectual sight (as happens to the eyes of bats) is blinded by what is brightest. Much thanks are due, not only to those who have established truths worthy of reception, but to those, also, who have given us opinions worthy of examination. They set our faculties to work; and even their errors are useful to their successors. Had Phrynis never lived, we should not now enjoy the charming melodies of his scholar Timotheus.[t]

Of speculative philosophy, truth is the end; and each object participates of truth more or less, in proportion as it more or less participates of reality. Truth, therefore, is to be found in things eternal and unalterable, rather than in their contraries; because such things are not dependent for their reality on other things, but all others on them.

There cannot be an infinite progression of causes.

There must be some principle or first cause of whatever really exists; for if this were not the case, there would be an infinite progression of causes. But this infinite progression is impossible: 1. With regard to material causes; that flesh, for instance, should be made of earth, earth of air, air of fire; and that to this series of productions there should be no end. 2. As to the efficient cause or principle of motion; that man, for instance, should be actuated by the

[t] Metaph. l. ii. c. i. p. 856.

air, the air moved by the ſun, the ſun by ſtrife, in endleſs ſucceſſion. 3. As to the final cauſe; that exerciſe, for inſtance, ſhould be taken for the ſake of health, and health choſen for the ſake of happineſs, and happineſs itſelf for the ſake of ſome farther object. 4. As to the formal cauſe; that the characteriſing properties of things ſhould be derived one from the other without ultimately terminating in one common ſource: For in all theſe four caſes alike, to ſuppoſe an infinite ſucceſſion of cauſes, is to ſay that things exiſt without any cauſe at all; ſince, in this infinite chain, every link is merely the effect of the link preceding it, and when the chain is endleſs, there is no firſt link, and therefore no cauſe. Were we deſired to tell which of three things is the cauſe of the other two, we ſhould name the firſt of the three. We could not ſay the laſt, for it is the cauſe of nothing; neither could we ſay the ſecond, for it is the cauſe of one thing only; and though conſidered in relation to that one, it be really a cauſe; yet conſidered in relation to the whole, it is merely an effect; and in the ſame manner all the intermediate links are effects, how numerous ſoever they may be ſuppoſed. The very term "final cauſe" expreſſes an end and boundary; and if there was not ſomething ultimately deſirable on its own account, for the ſake of which other things are deſirable as means, all deſire and all volition would neceſſarily ceaſe; and all intellection would be deſtroyed, if the properties of things could be continually traced up to other

CHAP. II.

properties ſtill more eſſential; that is, if formal cauſes might be traced back in infinite progreſſion, there would be no firmneſs for the intellect to reſt on; in other words, no underſtanding.[u]

The exiſtence of truth vindicated.

Democritus had ſaid, that truth either did not exiſt; or that, by man at leaſt, it was not to be diſcovered. In the ſame ſpirit of ſcepticiſm, Protagoras maintained that man was the meaſure of all things; which were true or falſe, good or bad, merely according to the mind's conception of them. It is melancholy, Ariſtotle obſerves, to hear thoſe who might be expected beſt to ſee what is true, ſince they moſt ſought and loved it, maintain ſuch opinions; becauſe, were they well founded, to aim at philoſophy would be to court diſappointment, and to purſue truth as puerile a folly as that of attempting to catch birds in their flight. But the misfortune of thoſe philoſophers is, that they confine their inquiries merely to ſenſible and ſublunary objects, which from their own nature, as well as that of the ſenſes by which they are perceived, are indefinite and variable, liable to decay and corruption, and continually appearing under different aſpects to different men; and even to the ſame man, according to the point from which he views them, and the actual diſpoſition of his organs. But theſe variations as to the objects of perception by ſenſe, take place chiefly in ſublunary things, the whole maſs of which is ſo inconſiderable in mag-

[u] ἡ νοησις ἐοικεν ἠρεμησει τινι και ἐπιστασει, μαλλον ἡ κινησει. De Anim. l. i. c. iii. νοησαι δε ουκ εστι μη στησαντα. Metaphyſ. l. ii. c. ii. p. 857.

nitude,

nitude, that it bears not any proportion to the universe at large, where all is permanent and invariable, and the stability of whose arrangement ought to convince us, that there is an eternal arranging cause [w], and some measure at least of firmness and constancy in the world by which we are surrounded [x]. Even here, it belongs to the eye to judge of colours, to the ear to judge of sounds, and to the other senses to judge of their respective objects; and they judge exactly alike, when similarly disposed and similarly circumstanced. If sublunary things are generated, and perish, there must be some material cause from which they are generated; and something that exists immutably, even while the destruction of one substance is the production of another. The sceptics are not convinced by their own arguments. None of them, while in Libya, because he can conceive himself in Athens, thinks of walking into the Odeum [y]. They confide more in their eyes, with regard to near than remote objects. As to tastes and colours, they prefer the judgment of persons in health to those of persons in sickness; and when they are themselves indisposed, they will have more confidence in the prognostic of a physician than in that of a person ignorant of the healing art. But sensible objects are neither the whole, nor the principal, of things. There are, as shall be proved hereafter, existences firm and immoveable

[w] πως γαρ εσαι ταξις, μη τινος οντος αιδιω, &c. p. 983. Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. and c. iv. p. 332.

[x] Metaph. l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

[y] The Theatre of Music at Athens.

CHAP. II.

moveable, and altogether imperceptible to corporeal organs. That our ſenſes do not ſhew us things as they really are, is perhaps true, but that there ſhould not be ſome cauſe of our ſenſation, exiſting independently of the ſenſations themſelves, is impoſſible; becauſe, whatever is produced by motion ſuppoſes a moving power[z], which exiſts independently, and is prior to the thing moved, in the order of cauſality and nature.[a]

It is the miſery of the ſceptics ſtill vainly to reaſon, while they deſtroy the only baſe on which all ſolid reaſoning muſt ſtand. Some of them do this through ignorance, and others through obſtinacy. The latter ſtand in need, not of conviction, but correction, for there are truths the oppoſers of which ought to be chaſtiſed, not confuted; as thoſe who deny that we ought to reverence the Gods, or to reſpect our parents. But it is the groſſeſt ignorance not to know, that all truths cannot be demonſtrated; for it is impoſſible that demonſtrations ſhould run back to infinity, without ſtopping at certain principles or firſt truths, which are called ſelf-evident, becauſe more certain and more neceſſary in themſelves than any arguments that could be produced in proof of them. To deny a firſt cauſe, we have already proved, is to deny all cauſation: to deny axioms, is, for the ſame

[z] Metaph. l. iv. c. v. p. 879.

[a] The moving power does not infer the exiſtence of the thing moved, μη αντιϛροφει κατα την τυ ειναι ακολυθησιν, but the latter infers the former. Ariſtot. Predicam.

reaſon,

reafon, to deny all demonftration, and to fub-vert the principles on which both reafoning and language are built[b]. The very nature of words infers, that the things fignified by them, have a certain determinate mode of exiftence; for words, even the moft comprehenfive, are nothing elfe but figns denoting that certain properties are characteriftic of certain fubjects. How numerous foever thefe properties may be, provided they be not infinite, they are ftill capable of being collected under one name; but if the properties were totally indefinite, there could not be any collection. Each term, therefore, affirms fomething definitely, refpecting the object which it denotes[c]; and to fay with the fceptics, that truth is merely apparent, or that the fame thing may be both affirmed and denied concerning the fame object at the fame time, is to maintain that it is impoffible for man, either to reafon within himfelf, or to difcourfe with his fellow-creatures.[d]

The fubject continued.

The exiftence of truth may be evinced, from the various fhades of error, which gradually

[b] Metaph. l. iv. c. iv. p. 874.

[c] ὁ γαρ λογος, ὁυ το ονομα σημειον, ορισμος γιγνεται τȣ πραγματος, p. 881.

[d] δει τοινυν των ονοματων ἑκαςον ειναι γνωριμον, και δηλουν ἑν τι, και μη πολλα, μονον δε ἑν· καν πλειονα σημαινη, φανερον ποιειν ἐφ' ὁ φερει τȣνομα τȣτων· ὁ δη λεγων ειναι τȣτο, και μη ειναι, τȣτο ὁ ὁλως ειναι φησιν· ου φησιν· ὡςε ὁ σημαινει τȣνομα, τȣτο ου φησι σημαινειν. p. 984. When it is faid that each name fhould denote one, Ariftotle means ἑν, as explained, p. 888. τα δε πρωτως λεγομενα ἑν, ὡν ἡ ȣσια μια· μια δε η συνεχεια, η ειδει η λογῳ. That unity is afcribed to things whofe fubftance is one; one in continuity, form, or definition; one in form or appearance, is what our eyes tell us is one; one in definition, is what our reafon tells us is one; the fpecific quality being fometimes vifible, fometimes intelligible. See above, p. 66.

receding

CHAP. II.

receding from the regions of light, finally darken into perfect obſcurity. As truth conſiſts in the agreement of human conception with the nature of things, the brighteſt truths reſult from thoſe ſciences which treat of things ſimple and invariable. In this view, arithmetic and geometry have long held the pre-eminence. The geometer abſtracts from body heat and cold, hardneſs, ſoftneſs, gravity, levity, and all other perceptible contrarieties; and contemplates it only under the two properties of magnitude and continuity; concerning which he demonſtrates innumerable affections, aſcertaining either the magnitudes themſelves, or their proportions to each other. His theorems therefore are more convincing than thoſe of the natural philoſopher, whoſe ſpeculations are more liable to error, on account of their complexity[e]. But there is a ſcience preceding geometry in ſimplicity as well as dignity; which, inſtead of contemplating properties and their affections, contemplates being and its properties[f]. This ſcience may be juſtly called the firſt philoſophy, and theology: it may be called the firſt philoſophy, becauſe all other ſciences imply it, and borrow from it their principles[g]; and it may be called theology, becauſe all the claſſes of being, as quantity, quality, and relation, finally reſt on ſubſtance; and God is the firſt, the one neceſ-

[e] ἀκριβεςαται των επιςημων ἁι μαλιςα των πρωτων εισι· ἁι γαρ εξ ελαττονων ακριβεςεραι των εκ προσθεσεως λεγομενων, ὁιον αριθμητικη γεωμετριας, &c. p. 842

[f] Metaph. l. iv. c. i. p. 869. and l. xiii. c. iii. p. 983.

[g] Ibid. l. iv. c. ii. p. 871. & ſeq.

ſary

ſary and independent ſubſtance, whoſe non-exiſtence implies a contradiction, and from contemplating whoſe nature, our knowledge of being and its properties is ultimately derived[h].

CHAP. II.

Ariſtotle's introduction to his hiſtory of the firſt philoſophy or theology.

Having given to his readers a glimpſe of this ſublime ſubject, our author proceeds in examining the principles of things according to his uſual method; firſt explaining the ſentiments of his predeceſſors in ſcience, before he endeavours to eſtabliſh his own ſyſtem. The book publiſhed as the firſt, and that publiſhed as the third, treat of principles; and taken together, form only one diſcourſe, which ought to ſtand as book the fourth. The elaborate exordium of this book ſeems to account for its being conſidered as the beginning of the whole treatiſe. "That all men," our author obſerves, "are naturally fond of knowledge, is proved from the pleaſure which they univerſally take in the exerciſe of their ſenſes; which exerciſe they love on its own account, independently of any end or uſe. But of all our ſenſes, the ſight is that which we moſt delight to exerciſe, and that independently of its aſſiſtance in the buſineſs of life; for even when we have nothing to do, we prefer this exerciſe to all other employments; the cauſe of which is, that the eye affords to us more knowledge, and makes us acquainted with more of the differences of things, than any of the other ſenſes. All animals are endowed with ſenſation; but in ſome only, ſenſation is fol-

[h] Metaph. c. iii. p. 872.

lowed

lowed by memory. Thofe who are endowed with memory, are fufceptible of inftruction; and even without inftruction, (fince incapable of hearing,) attain a wonderful degree of fagacity, as appears in bees, and in fome refembling tribes. The powers of hearing and remembering infer the capacity of being taught by inftruction as well as by experience: of which capacity inferior animals participate in a fmall degree, but which in man is exalted into art and fcience. His experience, alfo, arifes from memory; many particular remembrances combining into one experience. From experience, again, both art and fcience are derived; art being nothing more than the general refult of various experience; as when we obferve that a certain medicine is beneficial to Socrates, to Callias, and many others, we infer that it will prove beneficial to all fimilarly circumftanced; that is, to all men of fimilar temperaments, and labouring under like maladies. Experiments being thus generalifed into fyftem, caufes may thenceforth be affigned why in each fpecific cafe, a fpecific medicine fhould be adminiftered; and the man of art is preferred to the mere empiric, becaufe he can thus explain the reafons of his practice, and communicate his fkill to others. The practice of the empiric, however, may often be far more fuccefsful; and even his fkill in the healing art may be far greater; for, if his knowledge is derived only from individuals, it is with individuals only he has to do. Arts, therefore, are admired rather for their ingenuity than utility:

utility: and the farther they are removed from the common uſes of life, our admiration of them is the greater. Such arts, indeed, are the lateſt in invention; for men muſt be provided with neceſſaries and accommodations, before they can attain that freedom of mind which is requiſite for ſpeculation. The mathematical ſtudies, therefore, firſt aſſumed a ſyſtematic form among the prieſts of Egypt, who enjoyed independent leiſure. We make theſe obſervations to ſhow, how men are led from ſenſe and memory to experience; from experience to art, and from practical arts to ſpeculative ſciences; till they finally reach the moſt lofty ſpeculations of all, concerning the firſt principles of the univerſe.

The nature and dignity of this ſcience.

The ſcience containing theſe ſpeculations is called wiſdom; and thoſe by whom it is cultivated, are eminently diſtinguiſhed as the wiſe. The particulars in which it differs from other ſciences are, that it is the moſt univerſal, the moſt difficult, the moſt accurate, and, merely for its own ſake, of all ſciences the moſt deſirable. It is the moſt univerſal, becauſe the knowledge of firſt principles is the ſource of all other knowledge; it is the moſt difficult, becauſe it is of all ſciences the fartheſt removed from ſenſation; it is the moſt accurate, becauſe its object is the moſt ſimple, being unaccompanied with any acceſſories; as geometry is more ſimple than phyſics, and arithmetic than geometry. It is alſo the moſt deſirable on its own account, ſince in proportion as men poſſeſs all other goods of

CHAP. II.

of the mind and body, they become moſt ambitious of attaining this knowledge; which is coveted, loved, and ſought merely for itſelf, independently of any farther end than the pleaſure of enjoying it. A freeman, in oppoſition to a ſlave, lives for himſelf, not for another; ſo this ſcience is of all the moſt liberal, terminating completely in itſelf. It may therefore be thought above the reach of humanity, (ſince men are naturally ſlaves to innumerable wants,) and a ſcience fit only for gods; ſo that if the gods, as the poets ſay, are capable of envy, this ſcience ought to draw down the divine diſpleaſure on thoſe who cultivate it. But the Divinity cannot poſſibly be ſubject to envy; and the poets, even by the common proverb, are acknowledged to be liars. This ſcience, therefore, is moſt valuable, becauſe, in two reſpects, the moſt divine; firſt, as the Divinity, being a cauſe or principle, is its immediate and direct object; ſecondly, as the Divinity, to whom the univerſe is but one great truth, alone fully comprehends it. Although all other ſciences are more neceſſary[i] than this, yet none is better.

Its hiſtory.

With this preface, Ariſtotle introduces his hiſtory of what he calls wiſdom, theology, and the firſt philoſophy; and then proceeds to ſhow that of the two great ſchools, the Ionian and the Italic, the philoſophers of the former were attentive ſolely to groſs material cauſes, whereas thoſe of the latter wandered in the chimerical

[i] Neceſſary, in the ſenſe above explained, for ſupplying daily wants, and for procuring perſonal accommodations.

regions

regions of ideas and numbers; fubftituting metaphyfical abftractions for fubftantial operative beings. The materialifts differed widely from each other. Thales maintained water to be the firft principle of things; probably obferving that the nourifhment, as well as the feeds, of moft natural objects are of a humid nature; and that heat, perhaps life, is produced by fermentation. He might alfo allege the opinions of divines and poets long before his own age, who confidered Oceanus and Tethys as the fathers of generation; and who make the gods fwear by Styx, that is by water, as the moft to be revered of all things, becaufe the moft ancient. Anaximenes and Diogenes perceived that water might be refolved into air; and therefore maintained air to be the original principle of bodies. The caufe of fire was defended by Hippafus and Heracleitus, who faw all things expanded, animated, and revived by heat; and differing from each other, in proportion to their participation of the caloric, from the extreme of condenfation to that of rarefaction. Empedocles, confidering all thefe three as operative fubftances, added to them earth, as a fourth principle; and called thefe four the elements, becaufe he fuppofed that all things were compofed of them, that all things might be refolved into them, and that they themfelves were fimple, indeftructible, and totally incapable of farther refolution[k]. Anaxagoras introduced the obfcure[l] doctrine of the

[k] Metaph. lib.i. c.iv. p. 844, & feq.

[l] This doctrine is elaborately and eloquently maintained by Buffon throughout the third volume of his Natural Hiftory, though the

CHAP. II.

the omœomeria, or the production of bodies from indefinitely ſmall organic particles, exactly reſembling the bodies themſelves; and therefore maintained principles to be infinite.

In this inveſtigation, which reſpected only the material cauſe, philoſophers were naturally led to inquire what forced theſe principles or elements (whether one, many, or infinite) to undergo various and unceaſing changes. In works of art, they perceived that the materials were totally inactive; that the iron did not make itſelf into a ſaw, nor the braſs into a ſtatue. To anſwer this queſtion ſome maintained, contrary to experience, that all things were one, and unalterable. Others aſcribed an active power to fire, which produced all the changes which we behold, by its operation on the other elements. But of the order and beauty which prevail in the univerſe, neither fire nor any ſimilar ſubſtance could be conceived as the author: nor was it poſſible that ſuch regular effects ſhould reſult from blind chance. Philoſophers were again compelled therefore, by the force of truth itſelf, to look for ſome higher principle; when one, far wiſer than the reſt, like a ſober man among drunken babblers, pronounced mind to be the primary cauſe of the beauty and harmony of the univerſe. This opinion was aſſerted in plain language by Anaxagoras of Clazomené; but the firſt propoſer of it was his countryman Hermotimus[m]. Yet

the very firſt chapters of Ariſtotle's Hiſtory of Animals might have convinced him of its futility.

[m] Metaph. l. i. c. iii. p. 844.

Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras himſelf, though he employs mind as a machine for making the world, introduces it, however, only when compelled by neceſſity; and prefers having recourſe rather to every other cauſe in explaining the phænomena of nature.[n]

Fifth book, concerning ideas as cauſes of the univerſe.

We ſhall not follow Ariſtotle farther in examining the tenets of the Ionian ſchool; much leſs are we inclined to enter into his ſixth, ſeventh, and eleventh books; where he examines, with a degree of attention, of which the ſubject would now appear totally unworthy, the *numbers* of Pythagoras[o], and the *ideas* of Plato; thoſe intellectual abſtractions which the wildneſs of philoſophy had converted into real operative beings, thus ſubſtituting ſhadows for ſubſtances. Theſe three books properly conſtitute one, which ought to ſtand as the fifth, and be intitled, Concerning Ideas or Univerſals conſidered as Cauſes of the Univerſe.

The proper arrangement of the five remaining books.

In his eighth book, he explains his own doctrine concerning natural philoſophy; that is, concerning things liable to motion or change; which ſubject is treated more fully in his eight books of Phyſicks, and in his treatiſe concerning Generation and Corruption. This eighth book ought therefore to ſtand as the ſixth. The ſeventh book, which is now printed as the ninth, treats of Energy; a word, as we ſhall ſee, of

[n] Metaph. l. i. c. iv. p. 844.

[o] How erroneouſly the moſt ſublime diſcoveries in theology have been aſcribed to the firſt Pythagoreans appears from Metaph. xiv. 7. p. 1001. Ariſtotle's Works, and they only, afford a faithful and conſiſtent hiſtory of the progreſs of the human mind in matters of philoſophy.

 mighty

mighty import in the Aristotelian philosophy; from the explanation of which he naturally passes to the three concluding books of his Metaphysics, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and twelfth, which treat of a being totally distinct from matter; necessary, eternal, infinite in perfection; one substantially and numerically; the primary cause of motion, himself immoveable[p]. These three last books, which ought to stand as the eighth, ninth, and tenth of what is now called his Metaphysics, are intitled, by Aristotle himself, his Works concerning Philosophy[q]; meaning thereby, as he elsewhere explains it, the first philosophy or theology.[r]

Aristotle's natural philosophy.

In travelling over the vast space which still lies before us, we shall follow the order prescribed by our Author; beginning therefore with the Philosophy of Nature, which is treated in various parts of his works, where the same doctrines are repeated nearly in the same words. In his Analysis of Material Objects, his researches penetrate far beyond those vulgar and spurious elements, first proposed by Empedocles, earth, water, fire, and air; which are so far from being simple and unalterable, that they may be converted with great facility, and are in fact perpetually changing the one into the other[s]. But, in relation to human perception, Empedocles' division is not without merit; since the sense of touch, the most sure

[p] ἐν μεν αρα και λογῳ και αριθμῳ, το πρωτον, κινουν ακινητον ον. See p. 1001 and 1003.

[q] Ethic. Eadem, l. i. c. viii.

[r] Metaphysics, l. vi. c. i. p. 904.

[s] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. iii. p. 517.

and

and ſcientific of all our ſenſes, acquaints us with only four different qualities of bodies, diſtinguiſhed by the names hot, cold, moiſt, and dry. Ariſtotle endeavours to prove, by induction, that all other differences perceived by the touch, reſolve themſelves into theſe four; whereas no one of theſe four can be reſolved into any of the other three. The qualities, therefore, abovementioned, may be regarded as the fitteſt for diſtinguiſhing the different kinds of bodies from each other; and theſe four qualities, in their moſt ſimple combination with each other, will thus form the characteriſtics[t] of the elements as diſcovered by the ſenſe of touch. But theſe qualities combined by two, that is, in the manner the moſt ſimple, form only four combinations. The elements, therefore, are four. The combination of coldneſs with dryneſs is called earth; of coldneſs with humidity, water; of heat with dryneſs, fire; of heat with humidity, air. Thoſe elements are moſt eaſily convertible, which have one quality in common. Thus water is changed into air, when the quality of cold is deſtroyed by the caloric[u]. What was before water, has now the two characteriſtics of air, viz. humidity and heat; and, when the latter is added in due proportion, the water evaporates, and mounts to the ſky, where it remains, until a new cauſe again deprives the air of its heat, and makes it

His analyſis of the ſuppoſed elements.

Their continual tranſmutations.

[t] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. iii. p. 515, 516.

[u] More properly calorific. Το θερμαντικον—Το δε δυναμενον θερμον ειναι, παροντος τε θερμαντικε και πλησιαζοντος, αναγκη θερμαινεσθαι. "What has the capacity of receiving heat, muſt be heated by the approach and preſence of the caloric." P. 508.

CHAP. II.

fall to the ground in rain. In the ſame manner, fire may be converted into air, and air into fire; for fire is warm and dry, and air is warm and moiſt; and the element will therefore be denominated either fire or air, according to the prevalence of the dryneſs or humidity. Water, too, will be eaſily converted into earth; ſince both being cold, but the former moiſt, and the latter dry, the moiſture need only to be overcome by the dryneſs to make water earth; and dryneſs need only to be overcome by moiſture to make earth water. When the elements poſſeſs not any common quality, their tranſmutation is more ſlow and difficult. To make water into fire, it is neceſſary that both its cold and its moiſture ſhould be overcome by the contrary principles of heat and dryneſs; and to make air into earth, or earth into air, the two characteriſtic qualities of both elements muſt alſo be changed. Theſe changes, however, are continually happening around us; the air being firſt converted into water, and the water into earth. Fire alſo is viſibly generated; for flame, which is a ſpecies of fire, conſiſts of nothing but burning ſmoke, which itſelf is compoſed of air and earth."[w]

The pepetual changes of the elements and their compounds produce the ever-varying ſpectacle which we behold around us, and are themſelves produced by the revolutions of the heavenly bodies acting in concert with thoſe laws of motion which God has impreſſed on his

[w] De Generat. et Corrupt. l. ii. c. iv. p. 518.

lower

CHAP. II.

lower works[x]. Earth naturally tends to the centre of the univerſe; water riſes above earth; air above water; and fire above air. A gravitating principle, therefore, belongs properly to earth; and an anti-gravitating, to fire; which always ſeeks the extremities; and is therefore the great miniſter of the Almighty in moulding the forms of things[y]. The intermediate elements of air and water have only a relative gravity, being heavier than fire, and lighter than earth[z]; and this relative gravity diſappears when they are either in, or below, their proper place[a]: yet that air itſelf is heavy, appears evidently from this, that a bladder filled with air is heavier than when it was void of that element.[b]

The immediate cauſes of the mixed properties of bodies, and

From the active[c] principles of heat and cold, and the paſſive[d] ones of dryneſs and humidity, the denſity, rarity, hardneſs, ſoftneſs, tenacity, friability, in one word, all the mixed properties

[x] συνεπληρωσε το ὁλον ὁ Θεος εντελεχεια ποιησας την γενεσιν· ὑτω γαρ μαλιϛα συνειροιτο το ειναι, διο το εγγυτατω ειναι της ὐσιας, το γιγνεσθαι αει την γενεσιν. De Generat. et Corrupt. l. ii. c. iv. p.525.

[y] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. viii. p.523.

[z] De Cœlo, l. i. c. viii. p.444.

[a] De Cœlo, p.490, et ſeq.

[b] De Cœlo, l. iv. c. iv. p.490. The brevity of the expreſſion renders it doubtful whether the experiment was made by exhauſting or by accumulating the air. While writing this paſſage, a book fell in my way of a very eminent profeſſor. Dr. Adam Smith, in which I met with the following paſſage: "Thoſe facts and experiments, which demonſtrate the weight of the air, and which no ſuperior ſagacity, but chance alone preſented to the moderns, were altogether unknown to them (the ancients before the time of Archimedes)." Smith's Eſſays on Philoſophical Subjects, p.101.—The facts, however, were known to Ariſtotle, who flouriſhed more than a century before Archimedes.

[c] Meteor. l. iv. c. i. p.584.

[d] Ibid.

CHAP. II. — of natural phæno-mena.

of bodies are derived[e]; and from them are compounded the higheſt meteors of heaven[f], as well as the metals and minerals in the boſom of the earth[g]. The hardeſt of thoſe foſſils are produced from dry exhalations or humid vapours; which are the material cauſes of thoſe permanent ſubſtances, and the efficient cauſes of the moſt tremendous convulſions; for the earthquakes are not cauſed, as Democritus ſuſpected, merely by the agency of water burſting the too narrow caverns in which it had been accumulated and pent up, but by the agency of heat, which, converting this water into vapour, gives to it a power of overthrowing the weightieſt mountains which oppoſe its expanſion.[h]

Refutation of the doctrine of atoms.

Ariſtotle's doctrine concerning the tranſmutation of the elements, vulgarly ſo called, (a doctrine long held viſionary by his pretended followers,) is countenanced by recent experiments[i], which ſhow that water may be reſolved into

[e] De Generat. & Corrupt. p. 515.

[f] De Meteor. l. ii. c. iv. p. 558.

[g] De Meteor. l. iii. c. vi. p. 583. [h] Ibid. p. 566, & ſeq.

[i] I have juſt read a ſmall German Volume, intitled, "Antiphlogiſtiſche Chemie," by Johann. And. Scherer, Vienna, 1792, 8vo. which is written with the purpoſe of proving, that the moſt important of the diſcoveries which have eſtabliſhed the antiphlogiſtic ſyſtem, called on the Continent the ſyſtem of Lavoiſier, had been made by our countryman Mayow upwards of an hundred years ago. This wonderful young man, for he died at the age of 34, was acquainted (as his words are quoted by Scherer) with the compoſition of the atmoſphere; the nature of what is now called vital or dephlogiſticated air; the origin and common nature of acids; the doctrines of combuſtion, fermentation, reſpiration, &c. as explained by Lavoiſier, and other authors of the antiphlogiſtic ſyſtem of chemiſtry. Scherer makes the compariſon with great fairneſs, ſtating the modern doctrines in his own German text, and placing Mayow's Latin in notes at

into different gases, or airs; that atmospheric air itself is capable of resolution; and that the most subtile fluids enter into the composition of solid bodies, which may again, by the agency of the calorific, be changed into fluids. But our Author did not rest satisfied with any discoveries that mere experiment could make, nor with any analogical deductions from such discoveries, of which the most celebrated was the System of Atoms, as explained by Democritus. That philosopher, whom Aristotle often cites and refutes, but on whom he bestows the just praise of unextinguishable curiosity and indefatigable industry[k], thought it an invincible argument in favour of his atoms, that if body was infinitely divisible, it would finally vanish into nothing. Aristotle denies both the position and the inference. The error of Democritus, he observes, arose from thinking, that, because a body might be divided *any where*, it might therefore be divided *every where*. In a line, a point may be taken *any*

---

at the bottom of the page, from an edition of his works published at the Hague in 1681, intitled, "Johannis Mayow, Londinensis, &c. Opera Omnia Medico-Physica." Mayow was born in London, in 1645, where he died in 1679. He was a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. In 1668 he published there "Tractatus duo de Respiratione & de Rachitide;" and, in 1674, he published the same five Treatises, which were afterwards republished at the Hague. This work contains, besides the two tracts above mentioned, I. "Tractatus de Salnitro et Spiritu Nitro Aërio," (which he calls Spiritus Vitalis Igneus, p. 1. and Aër Purus Vitalis, p. 281, the name which is likely to prevail) II. "De Respiratione Fœtûs in Utero." III. "De Motu Musculorum & Spiritibus Animalibus."

[k] ουτος δε Δημοκριτος εοικε μεν περι απαντων φροντισαι, p. 494. De Generat. & Corrupt. p. 2.

where,

CHAP. II.

where, but points cannot be taken *every where*, becaufe one point cannot be contiguous to another[l]. Bodies, therefore, cannot actually be divided to infinity, and therefore cannot vanifh into nothing; but as the minuteft particle ftill poffeffes all the properties of body, it is ftill capable of divifion, and therefore not an atom.[m]

Of change, and its different fpecies.

According to our univerfal experience refpecting the viciffitudes of fublunary things, our Author obferves, that there are no realifings of non-entity, and no abfolute reductions of exiftence into nothing. Thefe viciffitudes or changes may all be reduced to the four following[n]: 1. A change of place, called lation, the firft and moft fimple fpecies of change, which is implied in all the three following kinds. 2. A change of quantity, which muft confift either in augmentation or in diminution. 3. A change of quality, called alteration; as from hard to foft, from health to ficknefs. 4. A change in fubftance, which confifts in generation and corruption[o]; and which is fufficiently exemplified in what is above obferved concerning the tranfmutations of the elements. When any regularly organized object changes its place, its quantity, or its quality,

Lation.

Change as to quantity.

Alteration.

Generation and cortion.

[l] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. ii. p. 497.

[m] The obfcurity of this paffage will be removed, by confidering what he afterwards proves, that our notion of infinity is entirely negative; and that to fuppofe body actually divided to infinity implies a contradiction, κατα ενεργειαν μεν ουδεν εςι απειρον, δυναμει δε επι την διαιρεσιν. Ibid. p. 499.

[n] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 498, & feq. & Phyfic. Aufcult. l. iii. c. i. p. 340.

[o] Idem ibid.

the

CHAP. II.

the object itfelf, it is plain, ftill remains the fame effentially, though altered in its acceffories. But when it changes in fubftance, that is in the unknown caufe from which all its perceptible qualities proceed, is there reafon to believe that the continuity of exiftence is broken, and that one thing is totally annihilated, and another actually created? Ariftotle thinks not; and that in this change, as well as in every other, there is fomething that departs, fomething that accedes, and fomething that ftill remains; a fomething, indeed, that efcapes fenfe, and even eludes fancy, but of whofe exiftence reafon affures[p] us, as of a fluctuating and obfcure being, fufceptible of all qualities, but unendowed with any. What iron is to the faw, or marble to the ftatue, precifely the fame is this *firft matter* to all the natural productions which diverfify and adorn the earth. It poffeffes not in itfelf any characteriftic or effentiating quality; never exifting therefore apart; but before it quits one form, conftantly affuming another[q]. As the fecondary

The firft matter.

[p] εξ απαντων των γιγνομενων τουτο εςι λαβων, αν τις επιβλεπη, ώσπερ λεγομεν, ότι δει αιει τι υποκεισθαι το γιγνομενον. Natural. Aufcult. l. i. c. viii. p. 324.

[q] ημεις δε φαμεν ύλην τινα των σωματων των αισθητων, αλλα ταυτην ου χωριςην, αλλα αιει μετ᾽ εναντιωσεως, εξ ἡς γινεται τα καλουμενα ςοιχεια. . . ου γαρ το θερμον ύλη τῳ ψυχρῳ· ουδε τουτο τῳ θερμῳ· αλλα το ὑποκειμενον αμφοιν. ώςε πρωτον μεν το δυναμει σωμα αισθητον, αρχη· δευτερον δε, αι εναντιωσεις· λεγω δε οιον θερμοτης και ψυχροτης· τριτον δε ηδη πυρ και ὑδωρ. ταυτα μεν γαρ μεταβαλλει εις αλληλα· αι δε εναντιωσεις, ου μεταβαλλουσι. De Generat. & Corrupt. l. ii. c. i. p. 515. "We fay that perceptible bodies have for their principle a certain ftuff or matter, which exifts not feparately, but is always invefted with the contraries, hot or cold, moift or dry; and from thefe two, matter and the contraries, the elements are compofed. Heat fupplies not the materials for cold, nor cold for heat; but there is a certain fubject fufceptible

CHAP. II.

secondary elements, and all the compounds formed of them, are moulded into works of art by the hand of man, that inftrument of inftruments, to which human nature owes fo much of its accommodation and comfort, fo this primary element is moulded by the hand of God into what are called the works of nature; none of which exift in a rude chaotic ftate, but of which each is diftinguifhed by its peculiar characteriftic; and all admirably adapted to anfwer their refpective ends. This peculiar characteriftic, by which objects are diftinguifhed, Ariftotle calls their appearance or form, becaufe the fight, of all our fenfes, is that which gives us moft information concerning the differences of things.

What is meant by the works of nature.

Works of art are eafily diftinguifhed by their outward fhape, but the primary form of phyfical production lies within, fince all their fenfible differences refult from that internal principle, decifive of their motion to or from a certain ftate, and of their reft during a certain time in that ftate; which principle is called their nature. Of this nature we fee, for example, the effects in plants, when they fix their roots in the earth, rear their ftems, expand their leaves, and fcatter their feeds; which operations, were thefe organized bodies endowed with intelligence, could not be more fkilfully* performed for the

ceptible of either of thefe contraries. So that this fubject-matter is the firft conftituent principle, or element of perceptible bodies; the fecond, the contraries of which this matter is fufceptible; the third, the compound elements of fire, water, &c.; which, as we have faid, change into each other; but the contraries do not fo change." See alfo De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. 6.

prefer-

preservation of the individual, and the propagation of the kind [r]. Plants, therefore, act, not

[r] Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. viii. p. 336, & seq. ατοπον δε το μη οιεσθαι ἑνεκα τȣ γινεσθαι, εαν μη ιδωσι το κινȣν βȣλευσαμενον· και τοι και ἡ τεχνη ȣ βȣλευεται· και γαρ ει ενην εν τῳ ξυλῳ ἡ ναυπηγικη, ὁμοιως αν τῃ φυσει εποιει· ὡςε ει εν τῃ τεχνῃ ενεςι ἡ ενεκα τȣ, και εν τῃ φυσει ενεςι. μαλιςα δε δηλον, ὁταν τις ιατρευῃ αυτος ἑαυτον· τȣτῳ γαρ ἑοικεν ἡ φυσις. Ibid. p. 338. "It is absurd to think, that because we do not see the moving principle actually deliberating, that it therefore acts at random, and not with an end in view. Art, then, we must say, acts at random; for if the art of ship-building was in wood, it would not act more judiciously *for making a ship*, than nature *does for nourishing, preserving, and propagating a tree*. If there is design in art, there must also be design in nature. This is most plain when a man, being a physician, cures himself. Nature acts like this man. But nature, as well as art, sometimes acts beside or beyond her intention; and sometimes fails in the execution of her own purposes. De Republica, l. i. c. vi. p. 302. By the compound word αυτοματον, (ὁταν αυτο ματην γενηται,) Aristotle expresses nature effecting either more or less than the specific ends or purposes to which her respective operations invariably tend. Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. This, he observes, happens through the concurrence or accession of causes or circumstances, (indefinite in number, since things innumerable may accede to the same thing, and causes innumerable may concur with the same cause; Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. iii. p. 331.) vitiating Nature's operations and deforming her works. Nature operating κατα συμβεβηκος, and thereby producing effects not in her intention, is called αυτοματον, or chance; and art operating κατα συμβεβηκος, and producing effects not in her intention, is called τυχη, or fortune. Thus, chance, or fortune, cannot have any existence independently of intention or design. Aristotle, therefore, concludes cogently and sublimely, that "if the heavens themselves were the work of chance, this would only prove that intelligence had been the cause of many still nobler works, and was the cause of the universe itself." Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. vi. p. 335. Chance and fortune then, are merely abridged expressions to denote nature and art producing unintentional and therefore unusual effects. Comp. Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. iv. v. vi.; Metaph. l. v. c. xxx. and l. vi. c. ii. Ethic. Nichom. l. vi. c. iv. Magn. Moral. l. ii. c. vii. How unjustly is our Author treated by modern writers, (vid. Brucker. Histor. Philosoph. in Aristotel. passim, & Voyage du Jeune Anacharsis, vol. v. c. lxiv. p. 349.) when they arraign his impiety, on account of his doctrine of chance and fortune! Our incomparable Poet far better expresses the sense of his philosophy:

Shall burning Ætna, if a sage requires,
Forget to thunder, and recall her fires, &c.

Ethic. Epist. iv. ver. 123, & seq.

indeed

CHAP. II.

indeed with, but by intelligence, in confequence of that nature or form which they have received from the firft caufe of motion and order [s]. The conftituent principles of things, therefore, are matter and form; and in all the changes which they undergo, there is a form which departs, a form which accedes, and a fubftance which remains, namely the firft matter. Unlefs this doctrine is admitted, the continuity of exiftence would, in this lower world, be perpetually interrupted; each deftruction would be an annihilation, and each production an evocation of non-entity into exiftence. The firft matter being totally inactive, all change muft proceed from matter endowed with form [t]. But things exactly fimilar cannot produce any change on each other, becaufe, having all properties in common, the one cannot communicate any thing to the other, nor act on that other any more than on itfelf. Neither do things difparate, that is, totally diffimilar, admit of any reciprocal action. Whitenefs has no action on ftraightnefs, any more than hardnefs has on bitternefs; becaufe neither of thofe qualities tends to exclude the qualities to which they are refpectively oppofed; and both the whitenefs and

[s] τῳ χρονῳ αιει προλαμβανει ενεργεια ἑτερα προ ἑτερας, ἑως της του αιει κινουντος πρωτως. "There is a continual progreffion of efficient moving principles up to the firft mover." Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.

[t] Natural. Aufcult. p. 325. De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. vii. p. 506. The fubject in which the contraries inhere is properly acted upon, and changed from the one contrary to the other; from cold to hot, white to black. When Ariftotle fpeaks of the actions and paffions of forms, qualities, or contraries, he always fuppofes them clothed with matter. Ibid.

ftraightnefs,

ſtraightneſs, as well as the hardneſs and bitterneſs, may ſubſiſt harmoniouſly in the ſame ſubject. By the acceſſion of whiteneſs, therefore, the ſubject is not altered as to its ſtraightneſs, nor by the acceſſion of any one quality is it altered as to any other quality totally diſſimilar to the former. To effect this alteration or change, the qualities or forms muſt be incapable of remaining in the ſame ſubject, which no ſooner admits the one, than it rejects the other. But this is the nature of what are called contraries, heat and cold, moiſt and dry, black and white, ſtraightneſs and crookedneſs, order and confuſion; and of all thoſe things which belong to one common genus, but are of a different ſpecies, that is, as formerly explained, which are ſimilar in one reſpect[u], and diſſimilar in another. By the reciprocal actions and ſufferings of thoſe contraries, in their utmoſt extremes and their intermediate ſtates, all the changes are effected which we behold in the world around us. One flavour deſtroys a flavour that is contrary to it, one colour its contrary, and complexly one body acts on a body endowed with many contrary qualities. Ariſtotle claims not for his own diſcovery, that contraries are the elements of generation and corruption, and of all the leſſer changes obſervable in material objects. That doctrine, he obſerves, was firſt eſtabliſhed

CHAP. II.

How her operations are performed.

Contraries.

[u] The materials of white, black; order, confuſion, &c. are the ſame. ἐςι δη των οντων τα μεν ποιητικα, τα δε ὑπο τȣτων παθητικα. τα μεν ȣν αντιςρεφει, ὁσων ἡ αυτη ὑλη ἐςι, και ποιητικη αλληλων, και παθητικη ὑπο αλληλων. De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. x. p. 507.

CHAP. II.

eftablifhed by the fchool of Pythagoras[w], which arranged contraries into two claffes, the better and the worfe: as light, darknefs; good, evil; finite, infinite; and was thenceforth adopted by all philofophers, compelled thereto by the force of truth[x]. One of thefe contraries, it was obferved, departs as foon as the other accedes; three things, therefore, are concerned in every mutation or change, the matter, which ftill remains one and the fame; the contrary which accedes, called in general form; and the contrary which departs, which Ariftotle calls in general privation[y]. This term, like many others employed by our author, is merely a fign to mark a thing indefinite and unknown; for the contrary which accedes, or, in other words, the characterifing quality, is fomething certain and definite; but the form which departed in order to make room for this characterifing quality, and without the departure of which the change could not have been effected, is, in a great meafure, uncertain and indefinite: thus, there is but one form of health, and innumerable forms of ficknefs; one form of order, innumerable forms of confufion; or, in things more fenfible and obvious, each body has its definite colour or colours; but it may have been changed into one diftinct fpecific colour, for inftance, into black, either from its contrary

Form and privation.

[w] οἱ δε Πυθαγορειοι, και ποσαι και τινες αἱ εναντιωσεις, απεφηναντο, &c. Metaphyf. l. i. c. v. p 846.

[x] Natural. Aufcult. l. i. c. v.

[y] Nat. Aufcult. l. i. c. viii. p. 325. των εναντιων ἡ ετερα συστοιχια στερησις. Ariftot. Metaph. paffim.

white,

white, or from any one of the various ſhades between theſe oppoſite extremes.[x]

In the changes which material ſubſtances undergo, they reciprocally act on each other; in other words, both ſubſtances are agents, and both patients. This is illuſtrated by what happens in mixture; which, according to Ariſtotle, conſiſts in this, that two ſubſtances, acting on each other, produce a third ſubſtance ſpecifically different from either; and of which each, the minuteſt part, is ſpecifically different from each, the minuteſt part, of either of the compoſing ingredients. Leucippus and Democritus, the fathers of the mechanical philoſophy, endeavoured to explain mixture as well as all other natural appearances by atoms and a vacuum, commenſurate pores, the motions, figures, and poſitions of the minute particles of matter. But Ariſtotle juſtly obſerves, that if mixture depended merely on mechanical cauſes, there would be no ſuch thing to the keen ſight of Lynceus, which could always diſtinguiſh theſe compoſing ingredients, how minutely ſoever they were ſubdivided, from each other; and eaſily perceive that what, to our obtuſe ſenſes,

[x] Natural. Auſcult. l. i. c. vi. p. 331. Ariſtotle maintained a definite number of colours againſt the atomic philoſophers, who made them depend on the indefinite variety of the figures and diſpoſitions of minute corpuſcles, τα ειδη των χρωματων εστι ὡρισμενα και ουκ απειρα. De Senſu & Senſili, c. iii. p. 667. He conſidered colours alſo as bearing the ſame relation to light, which ſharpneſs and flatneſs do to ſound: ὡσπερ γαρ ανευ φωτος ουχ ορᾶται τα χρωματα· ουτω ουδε ανευ ψοφου, το οξυ και το βαρυ. De Anima, l. ii. c. viii. p. 641. How ſtrangely were his doctrines perverted by the ſcholaſtics! And how nearly did they in themſelves approach to inductions from experiments with which he was not acquainted!

appeared

CHAP. II.

appeared to be the production of a new substance, was nothing more than the minute subdivision and nice juxtaposition of two old ones.[y]

Transition to his theology.

Substances endowed with different characterising qualities, in other words, different forms which have the same matter, are fitted for reciprocally acting on each other. But there is a higher order of forms, which act, without suffering; and of which, the highest of all must *necessarily* be impassive. A patient is said, with equal propriety, to be cured, either by the physician's skill, or by the medicines prescribed. The medicines, while they act, are also acted upon; are warmed, cooled, or undergo some such alteration. But the physician's skill suffers nothing from the effect produced on the patient; and by this comparison, Aristotle says we may conceive why, of substances not immerged in the same common matter, the one may produce a change on the other, without being reciprocally affected by it.

The form, species, or sight.

To know physical objects, is to know their causes; the efficient and final, which are principles external to these objects; and the material and formal, which, existing in the objects themselves, are the elements into which they must intellectually be resolved. The formal cause is that by which each object is characterised and distinguished; and from which, as from a perennial and abundant spring, its sen-

[y] De Generat. & Corrupt. l. i. c. x. p. 507. Aristotle illustrates his doctrine by observations on the mixture of metals, one of which is noticed by my ingenious friend Dr. Pearson. See Philosoph. Trans. for the year 1796, p. 432.

sible

ſible qualities, as well as latent powers, perpetually flow. Ariſtotle did not think that, in the preſent ſtate of our exiſtence, we could remount to this fruitful ſource, and behold things as they are[z]; but in all his inquiries, it is conſtantly his endeavour to approximate as nearly as poſſible to this *ſpecies*, *form*, or *ſight*, which words he often employs merely as ſigns for things ſought; and to diſcover in each object that eſſentiating characteriſtic, whether ſubſtance or property, on which its perceptible qualities depend[a]. Familiar with the correct geometry of his times, he diſcerned the concatenation of truths, which, being linked indiſſolubly together, unite the moſt diſtant, and ſeemingly unconnected extremes. Of each object he inveſtigates the true definition; and of each ſcience, the *principal* theorem; becauſe the foundation and bond of union of its parts; juſtly thinking, that the variety of our apparent knowledge is often the proof of our real ignorance; and that genuine ſcience improves in proportion to the reduction of many ſeemingly independent propoſitions into one general comprehenſive truth. Under the influence of this generaliſing ſpirit,

[z] Metaph. l. ii. c. i. p. 856.

[a] Metaphyſ. l. vii. c. ii. xi. xiii. It is worthy of remark, that Ariſtotle *did* preciſely that which he is blamed by Bacon, Hobbes, Malbranche, &c. for not doing; and declared it impoſſible to do that which he is blamed for having attempted. By examining, comparing, and claſſing the perceptible qualities of things, he endeavoured to make them known by a definition, affirming this examination to be the only method by which they could be known and defined: επειδαν γαρ εχομεν αποδιδοναι κατα την φαντασιαν περι των συμβεβηκοτων, η των παντων, η των πλειστων, τοτε περι της ουσιας ἑξομεν τι λεγειν ὁτι μαλιστα. Ibid.

 the

CHAP. II.

the true ſpirit of philoſophy, he is carried ſometimes beyond the bounds preſcribed to the human intellect; but his errors are always thoſe of a man of genius; and what intellectual adventurer ever ſucceſsfully contended in the field of truth, without ſometimes being tempted to launch on the ocean of conjecture?

Of the laws regulating this lower world.

Nothing in nature, he obſerves, exiſts in a totally crude and abſolutely unorganiſed ſtate; but it is the inward organization, or inviſible form, which moulds the external ſhape of bodies; and impoſes on the motion, producing their various figures and appearances, the laws and limits of its action. In exerting this inherent power of forms, fire ſeems to be their principal miniſter, their great perceptible agent [b]; for fire, the moſt ſubtile of material principles, and of which light ſeems to be a modification [c], always diffuſes itſelf through bodies, and ſeeks their extremities, by which their outward conformation is delineated and defined. There are forms of a peculiar nature, as we ſhall prove hereafter, totally ſeparable from matter, becauſe capable of energies and pleaſures totally unrelated to any of its properties; but the forms of moſt phyſical objects are inſeparably combined with the material principle, becauſe independently of it, they would not anſwer any poſſible end. Of what uſe would be the nutritive power of plants, were there not ſome material ſubſtance

[b] De Part. Animal. l. ii. c. vii. p. 986.

[c] πυρος η τοιετε τινος παρεσια εν τῳ διαφανει. De Anima, l. ii. c. vii. p. 638.

to

to be nourished? To what purpose would serve the fierce instincts of the lion, separated from his fangs, his paws, and his brawny members? It is highly unreasonable, therefore, to believe the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the separate existence of substantial forms[d]; and not less unreasonable to admit the opinion so strongly inculcated by some poets and philosophers, that such forms migrate from one body to another.[e]

The state of capacity and energy between which all objects in it fluctuate.

In the language of Aristotle, the word "nature" is confined to that part of the universe situate within the lunar sphere; which, according to a philosophy preceding his own times, was regarded as the intermediate isthmus separating terrestrial and perishing, from celestial and immortal, things[f]. In its primitive and proper sense, "nature" peculiarly applies to this lower world, which is the region of perpetual change, and in which all things are continually

[d] Natural. Auscult. l. ii. c. ii. p. 329.

[e] De Anima, l. i. c. iii. p. 624. It is pleasant to find Hobbes, in the 4th chapter of his Leviathan, and in many other parts of his works, combating, under the name of Aristotle's philosophy, abstract essences, substantial forms, and innumerable other doctrines, metaphysical as well as moral and political, with nearly the same arguments by which Aristotle, their supposed author, had long before victoriously refuted them. Malbranche and the French philosophers in general treat the Stagyrite with not less unfairness, and speak of his opinions with not less ignorance. I scarcely except Rapin, whose account of Aristotle, hitherto regarded as the best, is disgraced by great inaccuracies. It is not easy to conceive how a writer, who had not acquired his notion of Aristotle's writings at second hand, should so totally mistake their aim as Rapin does in speaking of the Ethics to Eudemus. See Comparaison de Platon & Aristotle, p. 345. Edit. Amsterdam, 1686.

[f] Vid. Gal. Opuscula Mythol. p. 516.

CHAP. II.

fluctuating between the extremes of generation and corruption; whereas the heavenly bodies, whether originally created, or the eternal production of an eternal cause[g], appear, as far as our experience reaches, to perform their unwearied motions exempted from the vicissitudes of renovation or decay. Every thing therefore in nature, that is, in this lower world, may be conceived as existing in two different states; so called, though variable, because relatively more stable than the other changes to which they are liable. The first state of their existence, both absolutely[h], and in the order of human conception, is that of their maturity and perfection;

[g] Natural. Auscult. l. viii. c. x. p. 422. : and we shall see hereafter that things existing in capacity must proceed universally from things existing in energy.

[h] No tenet of the Peripatetic philosophy is thought more clearly ascertained than the eternity of the world; and this tenet, I believe, is universally ascribed to Aristotle by all writers whatever, both ancient and modern. The brevity and energy of our author's style often gives to him indeed the appearance of dogmatising where he is only investigating; but, in the following passage, he speaks concerning the eternity of the world with the same becoming modesty that he shows on other subjects unfathomable to mere reason. Having mentioned that principle in the works of nature, analogous to art in the productions of man, which makes the stems of plants shoot upwards, while their roots fix deeply in the earth; which gives to animals their determinate organization and proper shape, distinguishable in their respective members, adapted to specific and salutary purposes, he proceeds thus: μαλλον εικος τον ουρανον γεγενησθαι ὑπο τοιαυτης αιτιας, ει γεγονεν, και ειναι δια τοιαυτην αιτιαν μαλλον η τα ζωα τα θνητα· το γε ουν τεταγμενον και ὡρισμενον πολυ μαλλον φαινεται εν τοις ουρανιοις, η περι ἡμας. De Part. Animal. l. i. p. 970. "It is more likely that the heavens were produced by such a cause, if indeed they were produced, and that they subsist through the efficacy of such a cause, than perishing animals, since definite arrangement and regular harmony are conspicuous far more in celestial than in terrestrial things." Besides this, when Aristotle's doctrine of time is understood, we shall see that he means by the eternity of the world something very different from the sense commonly affixed to those words.

n the ſtate of a tree, a horſe, and a man. But with reſpect to the individuals of theſe, as well as all other claſſes, though they always univerſally proceed from other individuals in a ſtate of maturity, it will be found that they all undergo innumerable changes, before they attain, by ſlow and inſenſible degrees, the perfection of their nature. As the rude marble is gradually formed by art into a beautiful or majeſtic ſtatue, ſo do ſeeds and embryos, ſcarcely perceptible to the ſenſes, expand, by aſſimilating their proper nouriſhment, into the wonderfully organiſed productions called plants and animals. Such progreſſive and ever varying natures may be conſidered therefore as exiſting either in a ſtate of capacity for attaining a certain maturity and beauty, a thing as different from abſolute incapacity as ſleep is from death; or in a ſtate of actuality and perfection, which qualifies them for performing their reſpective functions, and exerting their peculiar energies. What then is change or motion in its moſt comprehenſive and philoſophical ſenſe? It is the paſſage from a ſtate of imperfection to perfection, from diſorder to form, from capacity to energy; or the reverſe of this, from energy to mere capacity. For this reaſon Ariſtotle, anticipating the ſubtile principles which gave birth to the ſublime geometry of Newton and Leibnitz, expreſſes an object in itſelf too fugitive for words to repreſent, by the limits or extremes between which it fluctuates; calling motion the perfection of mere capacity, because the immediate end at which mere capacity

Motion defined.

 aims;

CHAP. II.

aims; and an imperfect energy or actuality, because until the productive motion ſtops, the object is only approximating to its moſt perceptible and moſt perfect ſtate.[n]

Space and time.

Ariſtotle obſerves, that the four kinds of change or motion, formerly deſcribed, all finally reſolve themſelves into lation, or change of place[o]; and that place is only a modification of ſpace, that unſubſtantial being of which no other definition can be given but that it is the recipient of body[p]. As our conception of ſpace originates in that of body, and our conception of motion in that of ſpace, ſo our conception of

[n] Ariſtot. Natural. Auſcult. l. iii. c. i. ii. iii. p. 339, & ſeq. Had Mr. Locke known what Ariſtotle meant by motion, his candour would not have allowed him to ſpeak of this definition as he does in the following paſſage: "What more exquiſite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition, 'the act of a being in power, as far forth as in power?' which would puzzle any rational man, to whom it was not already known by its famous abſurdity, to gueſs what word it could ever be ſuppoſed to be the explication of. If Tully, aſking a Dutchman what *beweeginge* was, ſhould have received this anſwer in his own language, that it was "actus entis in potentia, quatenus in potentia," I aſk whether any one can imagine he would thereby have underſtood what the word *beweeginge* ſignified, or have gueſſed what idea a Dutchman ordinarily had in his mind, and would ſignify to another, when he uſed that ſound?" Eſſay on the Human Underſtanding, vol. ii. b. iii. c. 4. p. 26. But Ariſtotle, who had taught before Mr. Locke that, what the latter calls ſimple ideas, could not be defined, ("Φανεραν τοινυν, ὁτι επι των ἁπλων ϐκ εςι τις ζητησις, ϐδε διδαξις, αλλα ετερος τροπος της ζητησεως των τοιϐτων." Metaphyſ. l. vii. c. xvii. p. 925. Vid. etiam, pp. 910 & 929.) would have more eaſily explained to Mr. L. his own definition of motion, than Mr. L. could have explained to Ariſtotle what he meant by the idea of a triangle, which is neither rectangular, obtuſangular, nor acuteangular, but at once none, and all, of theſe together—the ſuppoſed exiſtence of which ideas, and an infinity of others of the ſame kind, is the principal baſis of the whole Eſſay on Human Underſtanding.

[o] Natural. Auſcult. l. viii. c. x. p. 421. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001.

[p] Natural. Auſcult. l. v. c. i. ii. &c. p. 351—364.

time

time originates in that of motion; and particularly in thofe regular and equable motions carried on in the heavens, the parts of which, from their perfect fimilarity to each other, are correct meafures of the continuous and fucceffive quantity called time, with which they are conceived to co-exift. Time therefore may be defined the perceived number of fucceffive movements; for as number afcertains the greater or leffer quantity of things numbered, fo time afcertains the greater or leffer quantity of motion performed[q]. An inftant is not a part, but the boundary of time[r]; whofe elements are the perceptible intervals bounded by inftants[s]. If body therefore had a beginning; fo muft fpace, motion, and time, which are conceived merely as affections of body, or of each other[t]. If body cannot be fuppofed infinitely extended, without fuppofing a contradiction, (for what quantity can actually exift of which the magnitude cannot be afcertained and expreffed?) fo neither can any of its properties; and therefore motion cannot be infinite; nor time, which is conceived folely as the meafure of motion; a mere fiction of the fancy, poffeffing no real exiftence independently of us and our thoughts. The very effence of infinity, again, confifts in privation; it is a word denoting not a conception, but the negation of all conception; fo that

[q] Natural. Aufcult. p. 367.
[r] Phyf. Aufc. p. 397.
[s] Ibid. l. iv. c. xiv. &c. p. 364—373.
[t] Metaph. l. v. c. xiii. p. 894.

the

CHAP. II.

the errors committed on this ſubject by the ancients, and repeated by ſome modern philoſophers, and even ſome modern mathematicians[u], proceed from their realiſing a non-entity, and aſſigning a poſitive archetype, or what they call an idea, to a word, which is merely a ſign that no ſuch archetype or idea exiſts. Body and ſpace cannot be conceived as infinite either in greatneſs or littleneſs; and although its adjunct of motion or time is imagined to be ſo conceived, this ariſes from a mere illuſion of the fancy, which, not retaining the parts of time firſt taken, continually adds new parts, but without increaſing the whole; ſince the former parts are continually annihilated, as the latter are created[x]. To realiſe infinity muſt, in all our reaſonings,

[u] "La grandeur (ſays the admired Fontenelle) eſt ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin. Elle n'éſt donc pas & ne peut être ſuppoſée dans le même cas, que ſi elle n'étoit pas ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin: or ſi elle n'étoit pas ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin, elle reſteroit toujours finie; donc étant ſuſceptible d'augmentation ſans fin, elle peut être ſuppoſée infinie." See the ſame reaſoning throughout his treatiſe, intitled, Elémens de la Geometrie de l'Infini. It is eaſy to perceive how much this ingenious man, and his innumerable followers, might have benefited by reading the third book of Ariſtotle's Phyſics, c. iv. to chapter xiii. both incluſive, p. 342—350. ουκ αφαιρειται δε ὁ λογος ουδε τους μαθηματικους την θεωριαν, αναιρων ουτως ειναι το απειρον, ὡςε ενεργεια ειναι επι την αυξησιν, ὡς αδιεξιτητον· ουδε γαρ νυν δεωνται του απειρου, ουδε χρωνται, αλλα μονον ειναι ὁσην αν βουλωνται πεπερασμενην· τῳ δε μεγιςῳ μεγεθει τον αυτον εςι τετμησθαι λογον ὁπηλικονουν μεγεθος ετερον, ὡςε προς μεν το δειξαι εκεινως ουθεν διοισει· το δε ειναι, εν τοις ουσι εςαι μεγεθεσι. Ibid. c. xi. p. 350. "We do not deſtroy the ſpeculations of mathematicians, when we aſſert that infinite magnitude cannot exiſt. For in theſe ſpeculations, they neither employ nor need to employ infinite, but only a finite magnitude as great as they pleaſe; and the ſmalleſt may be divided in the ſame proportions with the greateſt. For finding proportions, therefore, it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of what is impoſſible."

[x] Metaph. l. v. c. xiii. p. 350.

reaſonings, neceſſarily lead to abſurdity; thus, to give our Author's example, to ſuppoſe an infinite progreſſion of cauſes in making and arranging the world, is the ſame thing as to ſuppoſe it made or arranged without any cauſe at all.[y]

CHAP. II.

Ariſtotle's aſtronomy.

It is both the glory and the ſhame of Ariſtotle's abſtract philoſophy, that his general concluſions are correct, when ſome of the arguments by which he maintains them are faulty. This is peculiarly manifeſt in the uſe which he makes of the erroneous ſyſtem of aſtronomy, which prevailed in his own age, to vindicate the doctrines contained in his books of Phyſics. His treatiſe concerning the Heavens, indeed, deſcribes with perſpicuity and preciſion the celeſtial phænomena; while, at the ſame time, it informs us of the ſublime notions entertained by the firſt Pythagoreans and their contemporaries, of the diſtances, figures, motions, and magnitudes of the planets[z]; that the moon abounded with inhabitants; that the milky-way conſiſted of contiguous cluſters of ſtars[a]; and, conjecturing what it is the boaſt of modern aſtronomy to have confirmed, that the ſame principle which makes the heavenly bodies approach to their centre, perpetually impels them in their orbits, by proportionably increaſing their celerity[b]. Ariſtotle's own ſagacity led him to perceive that, in

[y] Metaph. l. ii. c. ii. p. 857.
[z] De Cœlo, l. ii. c. xiii. p. 465.
[a] Meteor. l. i. c. viii.
[b] De Cœlo, l. ii. c. i. p. 452. Comp. c. xiii. p. 465. & l. i. c. viii. pp. 443, 444. & l. ii. c. ix. p. 462.

the

CHAP. II.

the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, all was regular, easy, and harmonious; and to reject with disdain those childish fictions, by which the moving principles of the universe were degraded by a supposed analogy with the laborious exertions of mortals in sublunary and perishing scenes[c]. But he did not think the astronomical theory of the Pythagoreans sufficiently justified by observation: telescopes were not to be invented till a far later period; and to those who held Aristotle's doctrine concerning space and time, the argument in favour of the earth's motion, resulting from the otherwise inconceivable velocity of the heavens, is but ill calculated to afford conviction, being, indeed, wholly destitute of philosophical precision. The earth, therefore, as the heaviest of bodies, he places at the centre; around which, the sun, moon, planets, and fixed stars perpetually performed their respective revolutions[d]; the only kind of motion or change to which these etherial[e] substances, unchangeable in their essence, were supposed to be liable; whereas the earth and all its productions, the metals and minerals in its bowels, the plants and animals on its surface, together with the vapours and meteors between that surface and the lunar sphere, were obnoxious to a great variety of complicated motions, which changed their characterising qualities or essence, and rendered the dis-

[c] Ibid. p. 451. & c. vi. p. 458.
[d] De Cœlo, l. ii. passim.
[e] Meteor. l. i. c. iii. p. 530.

solution

folution of one object the production of another. On the hypothefis, therefore, of the ftability of the earth and the daily revolution of the heavens, Ariftotle argues, that the material univerfe cannot be infinite; becaufe, could a radius be infinitely extended from the earth's centre to the remoteft body in the univerfe, that body could never perform a complete circular revolution[f]; fince an infinite extent of fpace could not be paffed over in a definite time. Space therefore cannot be infinite, becaufe fpace is only the receptacle of body, the place where body may fubfift; and, if fpace is not infinite, neither is motion, which depends on fpace; nor time, which depends on motion. Unalterable and divine fubftances exift, therefore, in a manner totally unfathomable to our prefent faculties. In this manner, the firft Supreme Deity exifts *neceffarily*[g]; neither generated in fpace, nor growing old in time, unchangeable and impaffive, enjoying the beft and moft perfect life through all eternity."[h]

Ariftotle makes amends for his airy fpeculations in aftronomy, by well explaining, in oppofition to Democritus, the true principles of corpufcular attraction, which gives to the earth its globular form[i]. This, he obferves, is farther afcertained by the phænomenon of lunar eclipfes, in which

[f] De Cœlo, l. i. c. v. p. 437.

[g] καθαπερ εν τοις εγκυκλιοις φιλοσοφημασι περι τα θεια πολλακις προφαινεται τοις λογοις, ὁτι το θειον αμεταβλητον αναγκαιον ειναι το πρωτον και ακροτατον, p. 446.

[h] De Cœlo, c. ix. p. 446.

[i] Ibid. l. iv. c. vi. p. 492. & l. ii. c. xiv. p. 470.

the

CHAP. II.

the bounding line is always perceived to be circular. The earth, therefore, he ſays, is plainly a ſphere, and but a ſmall[k] one, compared with many others, its periphery not exceeding 30,000 miles[l]. He ſpeaks with ſuch raptures, as the calmeſt of philoſophers could feel, of the beauty and grandeur of the heavenly motions, whoſe celerities, how frightful ſoever to fancy, yet being harmoniſed by proportion, might be ſteadily contemplated by intellect[m]. Had he known the diſcoveries of Galileo and Kepler, he might perhaps have been a Newton. But aſtronomy, being one of thoſe ſciences which requires long-continued obſervation for its baſis, was left by Ariſtotle in the ſame imperfect ſtate in which he found it; and yet, by the perverſeneſs of ſtupidity, it was that part of his works which, in the ages of darkneſs, was moſt warmly admired, and moſt obſtinately and moſt ſuperſtitiouſly defended.

His doctrine concerning the earth and its productions.

From the magnitudes and motions of the heavenly bodies, Ariſtotle deſcended to a humbler ſubject, the productions of the earth; which are connected, however, with man, by far more numerous[n] and powerful relations, namely, thoſe of his daily wants. This globe which we inhabit ſeems to have undergone various revolutions, to have been overwhelmed by inundations and ſhattered by convulſions, which ſwept away

[k] Meteor. l. i. c. iii. p. 529.

[l] Ibid. p. 471.

[m] Ibid. p. 451 & 463.

[n] De Part. Animal. l. i. c. v. p. 974.

nations

nations with their cities and their arts; ſo that the moſt valuable inventions, innumerable times, have been loſt, and times innumerable have been recovered. Of the productions with which our earth abounds, many give indications of theſe direful viciſſitudes; and many appear to have emerged from the wreck of ſome dreadful cataſtrophe. Both as the hiſtorian and the interpreter of nature, our author endeavoured to embrace and exhauſt the complete ſcience of the globe; and, if we may judge of thoſe parts of his works which are loſt or imperfect, by thoſe which have come down to us entire, it muſt have been no eaſy matter to determine whether moſt admiration was due to his deſcriptions of the great maſſes of nature, ſeas, rivers, mountains, and meteors[o], or to his minute diligence in treating the ſeveral objects of the animal, vegetable, and mineral kingdoms. His books on plants and minerals no longer remain[p]; but both his hiſtory of animals, and his philoſophy reſpecting that hiſtory, have come down to us in a far more perfect ſtate than any other portion of his writings concerning natural knowledge.

[o] Meteor. l. i. c. i. See the great views which he there gives of his undertakings. See alſo the xivth chapter of the ſame book, where he explains the converſion of ſea into land, and of land into ſea, and the *alluvions* of rivers in a manner conformable, as far as he proceeds, with the admirable elucidation of that ſubject by the great philoſophical geographer of our own times. Compare Rennell's Memoir, p. 255. & ſeq. and his Geography of Herodotus, p. 483, & ſeq.

[p] The two ſhort books on plants, p. 1007—1030. vol. ii. edit. du Val. are ſpurious. In the laſt chapter of the third book of his Meteorology, he ſays he is to proceed to give an account of all the different foſſils and metals; but that account nowhere appears.

On

CHAP. II.

His hiſtory of animals and other works relative to that ſubject.

On the ſubject of Zoology, his treatiſes are compriſed in fifty books, of which twenty-five are happily preſerved among his works. The hiſtory of animals occupies nine books; the following ſixteen are employed in explaining their general affections or properties, and their principal parts or members. Four books treat of their parts; five, of generation; the remainder treats of their ſenſations and motions, inſpiration and reſpiration, ſleeping, waking, youth, old age, life, and death; in the knowledge of which particulars, the liberal ſtudy of Zoology, or, in Ariſtotle's language, its philoſophy, appears to him principally to conſiſt. As he extends that term to its full and proper ſenſe, denoting by it the knowledge of whatever has animal life, the firſt four books of his hiſtory, beginning with what is moſt ſtriking and palpable, the outward conformation of animals, divides and diſtinguiſhes, in relation to this complex object, and in compariſon with the human form, as that which is moſt familiarly known, the inhabitants of the earth, the water, and the air, from the enormous whale and maſſy elephant to the ſcarcely perceptible productions of duſt and rottenneſs[q], enumerating and defining with incom-

[q] Buffon (vol. iii. p. 223.) carries Ariſtotle's ſyſtem of ſpontaneous generation much farther than the author intended, when he makes him ſay that "the firſt men ſprung from the earth in the form of worms." Our author is conſtantly miſrepreſented by being made to ſpeak abſolutely, when he ſpeaks merely hypothetically. His words are, ειπερ εγιγνοντο ποτε γηγενεις. De General. l. iii. c. ii. And we ſhall find hereafter, that the reſult of all Ariſtotle's inquiries into nature is a concluſion directly oppoſite to the following of M. Buffon, namely,

incomparable accuracy the agreements, differences, and analogies that prevail, in point of external organization, among all living tribes, and ſometimes referring to his treatiſes on Comparative Anatomy, which are now unfortunately loſt. In the three following books, he examines the different claſſes of animals with reſpect to the commencement, duration, and term of their generative powers. His eighth book examines their habitation and nouriſhment; and the concluding book of the hiſtory contains their manners and habits, enumerates their friends and enemies, and explains the ordinary means by which each claſs provides for its preſervation and defence. In taking this wide ſurvey of animated nature, Ariſtotle pretends not to comprehend its indefinitely varied branches (ſince infinites of every kind defy the graſp of ſcience); but in the multitude of important and well-aſcertained facts which he relates, and which is incomparably greater than will be found in any other work of equal compaſs, it is his main purpoſe to illuſtrate the general heads above-mentioned, and to explain the properties or affections common to the greateſt or moſt diſtinguiſhed portion of the whole animal kingdom. To theſe general heads or common properties, he conſtantly has reſpect in the hiſtorical

namely, "qu'il y a peut-être autant d'étres, ſoit vivans, ſoit végétaux, qu'ils ſe reproduiſent par l'aſſemblage fortuit de molecules organiques, qu'il y a d'animaux ou de végétaux qui peuvent ſe reproduire par une ſucceſſion conſtante de générations." Supplement à l'Hiſt. Nat. tom. viii. p. 18.

 part

CHAP. II.

part of his work; ſo that his minuteſt obſervations reſpecting the minuteſt inſects and leaſt-perfectly organized animals, will be often found to elucidate or confirm ſome important law of the animal œconomy.[r]

His philoſophy of natural hiſtory.

His Syſtem, that is, in the popular ſenſe of the word, his nomenclature, is indeed imperfect. The world created by the microſcope had not any exiſtence for the philoſophers of antiquity; and, by the improvements of his invention, new worlds perhaps may be brought to light in endleſs ſucceſſion. But in the chain of being, mortal eyes, however aſſiſted, can contemplate only the middle links, of which, though our glaſſes have ſhewn to us a greater number than were ſeen by Ariſtotle, yet have they not brought us nearer to what ought to be the reſult of beholding the extremity of the chain. This reſult, the hiſtory of nature in animals, the Stagyrite, by the intellectual eye of reaſon and analogy[s], endeavoured to reach and reveal; analyſing, defining, demonſtrating; ſometimes penetrating deeply into nature's myſteries; ſometimes en-

[r] Take the following example: The σηπια is a ſpecies of the Mollia, (fiſhes ſo called becauſe their ſoft parts are without, and their hard within,) which was long degraded by modern naturaliſts to a humble place among ſea plants. Ariſtotle remarks, with regard to this ſpecies, "that when the female is attacked, the male boldly defends her; but when an attack is made on the male, the female conſults her own ſafety by flight. Females, except in defence of their young, are leſs courageous than males, and leſs forward to give aſſiſtance." Hiſtor. Animal. l. ix. c. i. p. 922. & ſeq.

[s] The expreſſion of an anonymous writer, preſerved in Suidas, is bold in the extreme: Αριστοτελης γραμματευς ην της Φυσεως, τον καλαμον αποβρεχων εις νουν. "Ariſtotle was Nature's ſecretary, having dipped his pen in intellect." Suid. in Αριστοτελης.

countering

countering difficulties which the human intellect is unable to ſurmount; often foiled in his exertions, yet always renewing the combat with re-animated hope. Knowledge, he thought, was more likely to be ſtruck out from the colliſion of error than to emerge ſpontaneouſly from confuſion[t]; and while his theories are attacked and defended, exploded and revived, the facts which he collected with unexampled diligence, and which he relates with inimitable preciſion, will for ever ſupport his fame, and inſtruct the moſt diſtant ages of poſterity. Our wider ſurvey of the globe has indeed increaſed our acquaintance with quadrupeds; and the invention of glaſſes has multiplied to our eyes the ever-diminiſhing tribes of inſects, and enabled us to examine more accurately their germs and organs; yet it will not be eaſy to prove that modern writers have added any thing of importance to Ariſtotle's obſervations on birds, or that any of their works diſplay even an equal degree of knowledge on the ſubject of fiſhes.[u]

It

[t] Metaph. paſſim.

[u] In proof of this, I ſhall cite the teſtimony of an author, which derives great weight from the accuracy of his own obſervations, and the importance of his own diſcoveries. "Queſti fatti finora rapportati in ordine allo ſuiluppo delle ouva nei peſci ſpinoſi, ſono quelli pochi che ho potuto oſſervare nelle rare occaſioni che mi ſi ſon preſentati delle loro covate gattate, & gia ſuiluppantiſi. E percio la ſerie di tali fatti é di multo interrotta, ne' continuata come a giorni noſtri é quella dello ſuiluppo del feto nelle ouva della gallina. E quando io reflettendo ſu di queſta mancanza, ſcorro la Storia degli Animali di Ariſtotele, non poſſo non eſſere da ſtupore preſo, in eſſo leggendo veduti quei fatti, che a noi non ſi ſon potuti che a ſtento manifeſtare; & relevati poi con tutta la nettezza, & poſti in parallelo coi fatti gia' riconoſciuti nel feto di gallo: & tanto maggiormente in me creſce lo

ſtupore,

CHAP. II.

By what means he was enabled to render this philosophy so complete.

It may seem extraordinary that, on a branch of science, which, like all other parts of natural history, is naturally progressive, our author should have attained such accurate and extensive knowledge in so early an age of the world. But Aristotle was the friend of a man as extraordinary as himself, from whom he received two favours, which, to a mind like his, must have been of inestimable value. Alexander enabled him to rebuild and adorn his native city for the benefit of his contemporaries [x], and to improve

---

stupore, quanto che allora uso non vi era degli instrumenti microscopici, che a tempi nostri abbiamo grandemente perfezzionati. E quindi non posso che di sdegno accendarmi contra dei moderni Ichthyologi, vedendo per lor balordaggine trascurato quanto la veneranda antiquità avea scritto su questo particulare, & a quello sostituite false osservazioni, illazioni assurde ed incoerenti." "These are the few observations concerning the developement of the eggs of shell-fish, which I have been able to make on the few occasions on which I found the impregnated germs in the act of disclosure; observations, of which the series has been greatly interrupted, nor continued to the present times, like those which relate to eggs of birds. When I consider this defect, and turn to Aristotle's History of Animals, I am seized with astonishment at finding, that he should have fully and distinctly seen the facts which we have been able only very imperfectly to perceive; that he should have described them with the utmost precision, and compared them with the well-known observations concerning the eggs of birds. My astonishment is the greater, when I reflect that he was unassisted by microscopes, which instruments have in our days been greatly perfected: and I cannot therefore repress my indignation against those modern Ichthyologists, whose stupidity, neglecting the lights thrown on their subject by venerable antiquity, has substituted in their stead false observations, absurd and incongruous inferences." Memorie Sulla Generazione dei Pesci, di Philippo Cavolini. Compare p. 55. and p. 92. with Aristotle's History of Animals, b. vi. c. viii. and c. xiii.

To the petulant questions in Athenæus, l. viii. p. 352. "From whom did Aristotle learn the minute particularities which he tells of fishes? From Proteus or Nereus?" No, (we may answer with If. Casaubon,) but from fishermen. Vid. Casaubon Animadvers. in Athenæum, l. viii. p. 388.

[x] Plin. l. vii. c. 29.

science

ſcience for the benefit of poſterity[y]. Upon his firſt entering Babylon, that inimitable Prince eagerly demanded, for the uſe of his preceptor, the aſtronomical tables preſerved in that ancient capital above nineteen centuries, and remounting 2234 years beyond the Chriſtian æra[z]; and Pliny labours to deſcribe with what ardour and zeal the ſame illuſtrious conqueror, during the courſe of his expedition, collected as preſents to be ſent to Ariſtotle, at the expence of 200,000l.[a], and by the activity of ſeveral thouſand men, whatever rarities were to be found in parks or ponds, in aviaries or hives, or were to be procured by hunting, fiſhing, and fowling, in the wide extent of Aſia. Such were the reſources of Ariſtotle for writing the hiſtory of animals, beſides the aſſiſtance of a great library, which, according to Strabo, he arranged with an exactneſs of method before unknown[b]. By combining with the deſcriptions in his books, the obſervation of thoſe living wonders tranſported from the Eaſt, Ariſtotle, who preferred a philoſophical reſidence in Athens to the honour of perſonal attendance on the maſter of the world, compoſed, in the tranquillity of the Lyceum, his

[y] Plin. l. viii. c. 16.

[z] Porphyrius apud Simplicium in Ariſtot. de Cœlo.

[a] Comp. Plin. ubi ſupra, & Athenæum, l. ix. p. 398. edit. Caſaub. The ſum of 800 talents which, according to Athenæus, was granted by Alexander to his preceptor, for the improvement of ſcience, may be eſtimated at the fifth part of the annual expence of the army by which that matchleſs Prince conquered Aſia.

[b] πρωτος ὡν ισμεν συναγαγων βιϐλια, και διδαξας τους εν Αιγυπτῳ βασιλεας βιϐλιοθηκης συνταξιν. Strabo, l. xiii. p. 609.

 immortal

CHAP. II.

immortal work, which a Pliny professes to abridge[a], and a Buffon despairs to rival.[b]

In the wide survey which our author takes of the heavens and of the earth, as well as in the minute diligence with which he examines the productions of the latter, whether inanimate or living, it is his perpetual aim to remount from effects to causes, and to lead us from perceptible qualities to those operative principles, by which they are produced. These principles, not being objects of sense, can be discovered only by patient inductions from observation and experience. In this manner Aristotle treats, in three books, a subject which naturally follows his history of animals, investigating those hidden principles on which their nutrition, sensation, and appetite, with all their perceptible powers and actions, depend. In this treatise, intitled "Concerning the Soul," his language is perpetually and necessarily metaphorical, because words, in their origin, being wholly confined to sensations and feelings, metaphors become indispensable in expressing the deductions of reason. Of material as well as intellectual substances our knowledge, he observes, results entirely from their perceptible qualities, that is, from what our universal experience teaches us to regard merely as the effects of hidden causes, scarcely conceivable to ourselves, and of which our notions are totally incommunicable to other men but by images and comparisons drawn from sensible objects.

The soul or mind in its most general sense.

[a] Plin. ubi supra. [b] Histoire Naturelle, t. i. p. 63. & seq.

objects. When Ariftotle fpeaks philofophically of fire, he calls it "the power of communicating heat." In the fame manner, the hidden caufes neceffary for explaining the properties and actions of animals, he calls "the nutritive, fentient, motive, and rational," that is, the collecting "power;" and as, from the phenomena of body, he inferred the exiftence of a fubftance called Matter; fo, from the phenomena of fenfation, reafon, and intelligence, he inferred the exiftence of a fubftance called Mind; of which latter fubftance our knowledge is equally certain with that of the former[c]. But as fome of the moft noted philofophers before him had attempted to explain every thing by matter and its properties[d], Ariftotle, on the other hand, thinks that by mind chiefly all natural productions are characterifed and diftinguifhed; meaning, by mind, that inward principle and invifible form whofe effects are difplayed in the external organization of things, as well as in their perceptible properties and actions. In this fenfe, therefore, the terms "form" and "mind" are applied to whatever characterifes and diftinguifhes, whether that be merely a fpecific and principal quality; or whether it be a fubftance infeparable from matter, becaufe feparately unfit for any end or ufe[e]; or whether it be a fubftance capable of actions and pleafures peculiar to

[c] δηλον δε και ὅτι ἡ μεν ψυχη ουσια ἡ πρωτη, το δε σωμα ὑλη· ὁ δε ανθρωπος η το ζωον, το εξ αμφοιν. Metaph. l. vii. c. xi. p. 919. and l. i. De Anima, c. v. p. 625.

[d] Metaph. l. viii. c. ii. p. 927.

[e] Ibid. l. viii. c. iii. p. 929.

itfelf,

CHAP. II.

itſelf, and ſo totally different from thoſe of body, and any of its variable affections, that when ſeparated from this mortal frame, it will then, and then only, aſſume its natural activity, perfection, and dignity.[f]

The book intitled "Concerning Energy," connects his natural philoſophy with his theology.

This diſcuſſion concerning mind naturally brings Ariſtotle to what is publiſhed as the ninth book of his Metaphyſics, but which, as above-mentioned, ought to ſtand as the ſeventh. It is intitled "Concerning Energy," a word of mighty import in our author's philoſophy, ſince his doctrine on that ſubject is a link in the grand chain, by which he connects the earth with the heavens, and nature with the Deity. The ſtate of energy, as oppoſed to that of capacity, was formerly explained; but it may be a matter of ſome curioſity more minutely to examine diſtinctions, independently of which this great philoſopher thought it impoſſible to mount up from things viſible and periſhing to things inviſible and eternal.

The nature of energy explained.

Energy, then, as the word denotes, is always ſaid in reference to action; and that is ſaid to exiſt in energy, which executes its peculiar work, or performs its peculiar function[g]. The ſtate of energy is the moſt perfect ſtate of exiſtence in which any object can be exhibited; as a maſter thinks he has perfected his ſcholar when he ſhews him performing ſkilfully the proper work of the art in which he

[f] De Anima, l. i. c. iii. p 623. and c. v. p. 625. Metaph. l. xiv. c. ix. p. 1004. and De Generat. Animal. l. ii. c. iii. p. 1077.

[g] Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 339. Comp. Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.

was inſtructed[h]. Though energy always implies action, yet all actions are not energies. The actions of building, carving, healing, learning, reſpectively terminate in a houſe, a ſtatue, health, and ſcience. But the actions of thought, of life, and of happineſs, (which is a kind of life,) have not any natural limit, but may proceed eternally revolving on themſelves, perfect without addition, complete in every inſtánt[i]. That things eſſentially different may be diſtinguiſhed by different names, Ariſtotle calls limited actions, *motions;* the unlimited, *energies*; obſerving, that in the ſcale of being there is a continual aſcent from mere powers and capacities to motions or imperfect energies, and from theſe laſt to energies properly ſo called, becauſe terminating in nothing more excellent than themſelves[k]. Thoſe operations, which terminate in a certain work, are only perfect in the work or production in which they are fixed and concentrated; as painting in the picture, building in the edifice[l]. But energies not terminating in any work or production, are complete and perfect in themſelves. The former belong in a certain ſenſe to the work in which they are embodied[m]; the latter can belong only to the energiſing principle, which, when unceaſingly active, as the firſt efficient cauſe was proved

[h] Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 339. Comp. Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.
[i] Ibid. p. 937.
[k] Comp. Metaph. l. xiii. c. ix. p. 990. & p. 991. and Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 938.
[l] Idem Ibid.
[m] Metaph. l. ix. c. vi. p. 936.

neceſſarily

CHAP. II.

necessarily to be, is simple, unmixed, and pure energy.[n]

The first energy eternally and substantially active.

On such a principle as this, eternally and substantially active, both the heavens and the earth depend[o]. He is the spring of motion, the fountain of life, the source of order and of beauty[p]. All our observations and all our reasonings lead us irresistibly to this conclusion; for in all the motions or changes of body or matter, there must always be one part acted upon, as well as another that acts, otherwise no action, and therefore no motion, could possibly take place. But when we separate this acting part from the inert mass with which it is united, the same reasoning will still apply to it; it cannot be self-moved wholly[q], and the part which gives the impulse must always be different from that which receives it[r]. By our divisions and subdivisions without end, we shall therefore never come nearer to a solution than at first setting out, but shall always be compelled to consider matter as something fit to be moved, changed, or acted upon, and constantly deriving its motion, change, or activity from some foreign cause[s]. The prime mover, then, is necessarily[t] immaterial; and therefore indivisible, immove-

His attributes.

[n] ὁ γαρ νυς ενεργεια. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vi. p. 999.

[o] εκ τοιαυτης αρα αρχης ηρτηται ὁ ϐρανος και ἡ φυσις. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1000. and Physic. Auscult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418.

[p] το πρωτον παντων κινει παντα. Metaph. l. xiv. c. iv. p. 998. Comp. c. vi. p. 999. and l. xii. c. iii. p. 975. and l. ix. c. viii. p. 930.

[q] Physic. Auscult. l. iii. c. i. p. 340.

[r] Ibid. l. viii. c. vi. p. 417.

[s] Ibid.

[t] Ibid. p. 416. & seq.

able,

able, impassive, and invariable[t]; ever actuating this visible system, as is plain from the phænomena, according to the best principles both of intellection and volition, which exactly coincide[u], when traced up to Deity, their ultimate source. The phænomena of the universe are not unconnected and episodical, like an ill-written tragedy; but all of them regulated and adjusted with consummate harmony[w]. The Divinity, who comprehends and directs the whole, is not himself divisible in parts, nor comprehensible by magnitude, since all magnitude may be measured[x]; and what finite magnitude can exert infinite power[y]? He ever is what he is[z], existing in energy before time began, since time is only an affection of motion, of which God is the author[a]. That kind of life which the best and happiest of men lead occasionally, in the unobstructed exercise of their highest powers, belongs eternally to God in a degree that should excite admiration in proportion as it surpasses comprehension.[b]

[t] Metaph. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1000 and 1001.

[u] τȣτων (in reference to the ορεκτον and νοητόν) τα πρωτα τα αυτα. Comp. Metaph. l. ix. c. ix. and l. xiv. c. vii.

[w] ȣκ ἐοικε ἡ Φυσις επεισοδιωδης . . ὡσπερ μοχθηρα τραγωδια. Metaph. l. xii. c. iii. p. 975.

[x] Metaph. l. xiii. c. x. p. 991.

[y] Ibid. l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001.

[z] δει αρα ειναι αρχην τοιαυτην ἡς ἡ ȣσια ενεργεια. Metaph. l. xiv. c. vi. p. 999. Comp. De Cœlo, l. ii. c. xiii. p. 466.

[a] Metaph. l. xii. c. viii. p. 992. and το κινȣν αιδιον, και προτερον τȣ κινȣμενȣ, και το προτερον ȣσιας, ȣσιαν αναγκαιον ειναι. Metaph. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1002.

[b] ει δε μαλλον, ετι θαυμασιωτερον, l. xiv. c. vii. p. 1001. Φαμεν δε τον Θεον ειναι ζωον αιδιον αριστον· ὡστε ζωη και αιων συνεχης και αιδιος ὑπαρχει τῳ Θεῳ· τȣτο γαρ ὁ Θεος. Metaph. xiv. 7. p. 1001.

This

CHAP. II.

That Deity the source of Being handed down from antiquity.

This doctrine was delivered down from the ancients, and remains with their posterity, in the form of a fable; which, with many additions to it, has been employed for the service of legislation, and for bridling the passions of the multitude[d]. The Gods have thence been represented as endowed with human forms, and agitated by human passions; from which strange suppositions, many consequences, not less strange, have very naturally been derived. Yet, from the motley mass of fiction, if we separate this single proposition, that Deity is the first of substances, it will appear to be divinely said; and to have been saved, as a precious remnant, in the wreck of arts and philosophy, which, it is probable, have often flourished, and often fallen to decay.[e]

Aristotle refutes the materialists and metaphysicians.

Such is Aristotle's doctrine in his books intitled "Concerning Philosophy;" the far greater part of which is employed in refuting two classes of writers, who may very properly be called the Materialists and the Metaphysicians. The former, contenting themselves with the properties and laws of matter and motion, beyond which they thought it impossible to penetrate, mistook effects for causes, and confounded the Maker[f] with his works: The latter, who were the more modern, and also the more fashionable of the two, perverted logical analysis by applying it to

[d] Metaph. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003. [e] Idem Ibid.

[f] το κινεν ποιει, l. xiv. c. x. p. 1006. This must sound harsh to those who do not understand Aristotle's notion of the eternity of the world, in the sense in which it is above explained.

physical

physical subjects[g]; and substituting words for things, sought for first causes in numbers, ideas, contraries, and other metaphysical abstractions; or, in Aristotle's language, general terms; which, the more general they become, diverge the wider[h] in their nature from energies, the only substantial and efficient principles in the universe;[i] and all proceeding from the first energy or substance, who is both specifically and numerically one[k]. This doctrine perfectly agrees with that beautiful harmony discernible in the works of the First Mover; which are all of them connected by the most intimate relations[l]; and whose arrangements uniformly conspire to one great and salutary end[m]: For the perfection, excellence, and beauty, discernible in the universe, are to be ascribed to its Maker, not less than the regular arrangement of a well disciplined army is ascribed to its general[n]. This doctrine only is consistent:

Goodness of God.

[g] Compare Metaph. l. xii. c. iv. p. 977. l. xiii. c. ii. p. 981. & seq. and l. xiv. c. i. p. 995.

[h] Compare Metaph. l. xiii. c. ii. p. 982. and l. xiv. c. v. p. 998.

[i] Comp. l. xiii. c. vii. p. 988. and l. xiv. c. ii. iii. p. 996.

[k] ἑν μεν αρα και λογῳ και αριθμῳ το πρωτον κινουν ακινητον ον. l. xiv. c. viii. p. 1003. Things are one specifically or λογῳ, when they are collected into one count, and expressed by one word or κατηγορημα, the definition of which applies equally to them all. Material things may be one specifically, though many numerically: but this cannot hold as to energies; so that if there were as many different heavens as there are different men, the first necessary being would still be numerically, as well as specifically, one. Compare Phys. Auscult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418. & seq.

[l] ουχ ουτως εχει, ὡστε μη ειναι θατερον θατερῳ, l. xiv. c. x. p. 1005. & Phys. Auscult. l. viii. c. vii. p. 418.

[m] προς μεν γαρ ἑν, ἁπαντα συντετακται. Ibid.

[n] Comp. l. xii. c. iv. p. 976. & l. xiv. c. x. p. 1004. Pliny, l. ii. c. i. & l. xxvii. c. ii. strangely mistakes his great master in natural history. The same errors he commits elsewhere in speaking of God, Nature, the world, &c.

"One

CHAP. II.

"One rules alone, one, only one, bears ſway;
"*His* are the laws, and Him let all obey[o]."

The ſame doctrine inculcated in his exoteric or popular works.

Such is the ſolid and ſublime theology which Ariſtotle tells us that he had often inculcated, not merely in his acroatic works, which were lectures confined ſolely to his pupils, but alſo in his exoteric or popular writings, intended for the inſtruction of the public[p]. If this aſſertion cannot be diſproved, his character will be reſcued from the charge of diſhoneſty, in teaching a double doctrine, one to his pupils, and another to the world. Cicero[q] indeed ſays, that the Greek philoſophers (meaning our author in particular) did not "ſeem always to hold the ſame language in their popular and in their more accurate works;" which variation was, ſurely, to be expected; ſince, in the former, they often reaſoned, as Ariſtotle himſelf tells us, looſely or according to vulgar conception, and in the latter ſtrictly or philoſophically. But, as to the fundamental points of his moſt important doctrines, Ariſtotle frequently refers from thoſe of his books, "which were diſtinguiſhed by pregnant brevity, cloſeneſs of thought, and quickneſs of tranſitions[r]," to his more expanded,

[o] Iliad, l. i. v. 204. quoted Metaph. l. xiv. c. ult. p. 1006. Cicero greatly miſrepreſents his original; "Inde deinde illi tot Dii ſi numeramus etiam Cœlum, Deum," &c. De Natur. Deor. l. i. c. xii.

[p] καθαπερ εν τοις εγκυκλιοις φιλοσοφημασι περι τα θεια πολλακις προφαινεται τοις λογοις, ὅτι το θειον αμεταβλητον παν το πρωτον και ακροτατον. De Cœlo, l. i. c. ix. p. 446.

[q] De Fin. l. v. c. v.

[r] Simplicius (ad Categor. in Procem.) thus characteriſes the acroatic, in contradiſtinction to the exoteric works: "ἡ βραχυλογια, ἡ των εννοιων πυκνοτης, και το της φρασεως συνεσραμμενον." To the laſt clauſe I have given a ſenſe more conformable to truth than that which the words naturally preſent.

more

more perfpicuous, and more popular productions [a]. Much circumfpection indeed became a philofopher, detefting fuperftition and detefting democracy, yet living and teaching in the bofom of Athens; a city fhamefully deformed by whatever is moft abject in the one, and moft wild and outrageous in other. But there is not a fhadow of proof that, in any part of his writings, he encouraged or approved either of thofe grofs popular delufions; though it is highly probable that he arraigned their folly and abfurdity with more freedom in the Lyceum, than his prudence would have allowed him to exprefs in the Pantheon or the Forum.

The objection made to Ariftotle's philofophy, as not built on experiment.

An objection very commonly made to Ariftotle's philofophy is, that he is regardlefs of experience, and too fond of hypothefis. In the whole extent in which this reproach is ufually urged by his detractors, it betrays ignorance in the extreme; fince the principles of every one of his treatifes are drawn folely from experience; and, in almoft every ftep that he takes, to experience he continually recurs for trying and confirming his conclufions. That he was not fparing of experiments, in the modern fenfe of the word, upon thofe fubjects on which he thought that a philofopher might confiftently make ufe of them, is evident from his mechanical queftions, his problems, his difcourfes on the general properties or affections of animated nature, and above all, from his doctrine of fenfation, memory, re-

[a] Simplicius Comment. in Ariftot. de Cœlo, fol. 67. Ethic. Nicom. l. i. c. iii. & c. xiii. l. vi. c. iv. Ethic. Eudem. l. i. c. viii. l. ii. c. i. De Republ. l. iii. c. vi. & l. vii. c. i.

collection

CHAP. II.

collection and other powers of the soul or mind; which is entirely experimental. But Aristotle was contented with catching Nature in the fact, without attempting, after the modern fashion, to put her to the torture; and in rejecting experiments operose, toilsome, or painful, either to their objects or their authors, he was justified by the habits of thinking, almost universally prevalent in his age and country. Educated in free and martial republics, careless of wealth, because uncorrupted by luxury, the whole tribe of ancient philosophers dedicated themselves to agreeable only and liberal pursuits, with too proud a disdain of arts merely useful or lucrative. They ranked with the first class of citizens; and, as such, were not to be lightly subjected to unwholesome or disgusting employments. To bend over a furnace, inhaling noxious steams; to torture animals, or to mangle dead bodies, appeared to them operations not more misbecoming their humanity, than unsuitable to their dignity. For such discoveries as the heating and mixing of the various forms of matter, offers to inquisitive curiosity, the naturalists of Greece trusted to slaves and mercenary mechanics, whose poverty or avarice tempted them to work in metals and minerals; and to produce, by unwearied labour, those coloured and sculptured ornaments, those gems, rings, cups, and vases, and other admired but frivolous elegancies, of which (in the opinion of good judges[t]

[t] I remember a strong expression of the late Mr. Wedgewood, in viewing with him the Portland Vase, that the making of it "implied a science of chemistry, of which we have not yet the elements."

of

of art) our boafted chemiftry cannot produce the materials; nor, were the materials at hand, fupply us with tools calculated to fafhion them. The work-fhops of tradefmen then revealed thofe myfteries which are now fought for in colleges and laboratories; and ufeful knowledge, perhaps, was not the lefs likely to be advanced, while the arts were confined to artifts only; nor facts the more likely to be perverted, in order to fupport favourite theories, before the empiric had yet affumed the name, and ufurped the functions, of the philofopher.

His philofophical language

To the Stagirite, it appeared to be the proper bufinefs of philofophy, not to multiply or collect facts, but to arrange and to explain them. This can only be done through the medium of a well-defined and highly cultivated language; and the language of Ariftotle will be found the moft copious and complete, and at the fame time the moft precife and elegant, ever employed by any philofopher; ferving at once as the readieft channel of communication, and the fitteft inftrument for difcovery. In his phyfical, as well as in his moral works, facts known and afcertained are reduced to their fimpleft expreffions, and thofe doubtfully inferred, or barely fufpected, are, according to the true fpirit of analyfis, denoted by words merely expreffive of relations to things previoufly known. It is true that, in ages of ignorance, when Ariftotle's fuppofed tenets were read in barbarous and difgufting tranflations, the terms employed by him, as figns for things fought or inveftigated, and which, unlefs marked by figns, could never pof-

miftaken and perverted.

fibly be difcovered, were as grofsly miftaken, as they have been fince fhamefully mifrepresented. In the fcholaftic philofophy, that ufelefs mafs of infipid dulnefs, which infolently arrogated to itfelf the name of Ariftotelifm, the fchoolmen refted in the names of occult qualities for explaining the phenomena both of mind and matter; and neglecting the repeated warnings of him whom they called their great mafter, and who well knew how liable the beft things are to abufe, they perverted the ftudy of nature into metaphyfical fubtlety and vain logomachy. But the fame ftupid ignorance which made them incapable of appreciating the Stagirite as a philofopher, rendered them prone to worfhip him as a god. This imaginary divinity and his adorers were affailed by the giants of the fixteenth century; who, in their rage to punifh fuch grofs intellectual idolatry, confounded the mafter with his difciples, arraigned Ariftotle for opinions which he had never held, degraded him from honours which he had never ufurped; and, adopting his favourite method of analyfis, endeavoured ungratefully and infidioufly to deftroy his well-earned fame with the inftrument which he himfelf had formed and fharpened. But whatever unmerited difgrace may, in this manner, have accrued to fome fpeculative doctrines, which I have here attempted briefly to explain, his practical philofophy, which may be read in the following tranflation, will ftill vindicate his fair claim to be regarded as one of the beft inftructors of mankind, on the more important fubjects of Ethics and Politics.

SUPPLEMENT to the Analysis of Aristotle's Speculative Works; containing an Account of the Interpreters and Corrupters of his Philosophy, in Connection with the History of the Times in which they respectively flourished.

THE quibbling logic which often disfigures Aristotle's acute reasonings is not justly chargeable on that philosopher, but on those captious or fanciful writers, whom, in many parts of his works, he was obliged to combat. This was a matter, not of choice, but necessity; since several of those writers, in treating subjects of the utmost importance, had discovered such reach of thought, and such power of expression, as had widely diffused their renown wherever the Greek language was understood, and speculative science cultivated. The topics, above all others, on which Aristotle, to a modern reader, will appear most verbose and most trifling, are the doctrines of *Pythagorean numbers* and *Platonic ideas*. I ventured therefore to say in my Analysis, p. 115. that he had examined those doctrines with a degree of attention, of which they would appear altogether unworthy to the taste and reason of the present age; and from respect merely, for the good sense of the public, I abstained from entering into any copious discussion of this useless and now despised subject.

Why Aristotle's works abound in quibbling logic.

 This

This proceeding of mine has excited great wrath in the author of a book, intitled "A Tranflation of Ariftotle's Metaphyficks[a]." The tranflator, Mr. Thomas Taylor, following Ariftotle's commentators, maintains that the Stagirite's "firft principles of the univerfe are no other than thofe incorporeal caufes called by Plato ideas[b]." The fame writer accufes me of "ignorance and falfehood" for faying that Ariftotle has treated of *Pythagorean numbers* and *Platonic ideas*, in the VIIth and XIth books of his Metaphyficks, whereas thofe matters, he fays, are difcuffed only in the Ift, XIIIth, and XIVth books of that work.[c]

His fublimeft myfteries may be explained in Englifh.

Reafons extremely different[d] from Mr. Taylor's animadverfions have determined me briefly to re-examine this matter. To this fhort difcuffion I fhall give the utmoft perfpicuity, for I cannot agree with the man who has ftepped forth as my literary antagonift, in condemning "the prefent fafhionable mode of writing, in which every author endeavours to adapt every fubject to the apprehenfion of the meaneft capacity[e]." In conformity with the aim of fuch "arrogant[f]"

[a] "The Metaphyficks of Ariftotle tranflated from the Greek; with copious notes, in which the Pythagorean and Platonic dogmas refpecting numbers and ideas are unfolded from ancient fources." London, 1801.

[b] Taylor's Metaphyficks, p. 6.

[c] Taylor, p. 21. Introduction.

[d] The late Mr. Harris, Lord Monboddo, and all other writers on the Ariftotelian philofophy, have explained it by the erroneous comments of the Alexandrian School. See my Analyfis, pp. 67. & 96.

[e] Taylor, p. 4. Introduction.

[f] Taylor, p. 47. Introduction.

writers,

writers, I ſhall attempt to ſhow that thoſe matters which Mr. Taylor, after Ariſtotle's commentators, calls the ſublimeſt myſteries of Grecian philoſophy, may be eaſily explained by equivalent terms in very intelligible Engliſh.

According to Ariſtotle, then, definitions are the pure fountains of ſcience, only when they originate in an accurate examination and patient compariſon of individual objects; becauſe in that caſe only, our words being correct ſigns of things, the concluſions deducible from reaſonings on the ſigns will exactly apply to the things ſignified by them. Individuals have a real exiſtence in nature; but general names, expreſſing many individuals of the ſame kind, have not any correſpondent archetypes; they imply merely that a variety of objects, numerically different (each being a different unit or individual), have on account of certain reſemblances been aſſigned to the ſame claſs, and denoted by one common term. Thoſe ſuppoſed entities, therefore, called by the Pythagoreans *numbers* and by the Platoniſts *ideas*, and conſidered by them as eternal and immutable eſſences, the true cauſes of the univerſe, have not any real ſubſtantial exiſtence in nature, but are merely fictions of fancy, created from the fleeting action of human thought, expreſſed and embodied in language. In many parts of his writings, and particularly in the VIIth and XIth books of his Metaphyſicks, though Mr. Taylor ſeverely reprehends my "ignorance and falſehood" for ſaying that thoſe ſubjects are there touched on, Ariſtotle aſſails and

and demolishes those cloud-built castles of mystic philosophy, childishly admired in Greece in his own age, and which, rising under new forms in succeeding times, have continued to the present day to be the shadowy fortresses in which the nonsense called Metaphysick has lain intrenched. To illustrate these remarks, I shall translate the 14th chapter of the VIIth book, in preference to other chapters, merely because it is the shortest; and short as it is, I shall not be surprised if many of my readers should find it still too long.

His refutation of the doctrine of *Platonic ideas.*

The Stagirite, having in the preceding chapter spoken of Pythagoras's *numbers*, proceeds thus to treat of Plato's *ideas*. "With the same absurdities are those chargeable who regard *ideas* as substances, and separable substances; considering the more general ideas as constituting the less general included under the same common term: for example, the *ideas animal, biped, reason*, as constituting and composing the *idea man.* Suppose *ideas* to be substances, and the *idea animal*, for instance, existing in *man* and *horse*; this *idea* in those two kinds must either be numerically one and the same thing, or two different things: in definition it is plainly one and the same, for we mean the same thing by the word *animal* when we say "that men are animals" and "that horses are animals." If the *idea man* existed as a separate being or entity, it would follow of course that the *ideas animal, biped, reason*, composing the *idea man*, should also exist as separate beings; so that the *idea animal*,

animal, if it were precifely one and the fame thing in *man* and *horfe* in the fenfe in which you are identically the fame with yourfelf, would fubfift the fame individual entity in *man* and *horfe;* and thus the fame individual entity would fubfift feparately from itfelf! Farther; if one and the fame *idea, animal*, fubfifts both in *man* and *horfe*, in *man* a *biped*, and in *horfe* a *quadruped*, muft not the fame individual be at once a biped and a quadruped, and thus the fame fubject be at once endowed with two mutually exclufive attributes? As this cannot happen by actual participation of thofe attributes, fo neither can it poffibly be brought about by juxtapofition, mixture, or in any other way. The *idea, animal*, muft therefore be numerically different in *man* and *horfe;* and there muft be many feparate entities having the *idea, animal*, for their effential conftituent, fince this *idea* enters not adventitioufly, but effentially, into their refpective definitions. The *idea, animal*, therefore is many, conftituting *man, horfe*, and other fpecies or tribes; whofe different names cannot be reciprocally predicated of each other, becaufe in that cafe all thofe different *ideas* would be one and the fame *idea;* which is totally abfurd. It is impoffible therefore that the *idea, animal*, can have any fubftantial or feparable exiftence, or be any thing befide what is found in all the different tribes of animals. The abfurdity of realifing general terms will appear ftill more monftrous, if from fpecies or tribes, we defcend to the individual objects of our fenfes, and fay that this

man or this horſe is conſtituted and compoſed of *ideas*. There cannot therefore be any ſuch *ideas* or *entities* as thoſe ſpoken of by ſome philoſophers."

Mr. Taylor's interpretation of the ſame paſſage.

The reader will perhaps think that I might have ſaved both his time and my own, if, inſtead of interpreting the above chapter, I had referred him to Mr. Taylor's tranſlation. By a reference of this kind it may be ſaid, the harſh charges repeatedly urged againſt me, might moſt victoriouſly have been repelled; ſince my accuſer would thus have been convicted by his own words. But Mr. T. knows better; like a proficient in the arts of controverſy, he has had the addreſs to couch his tranſlation in ſuch terms, that it is impoſſible for a man of plain underſtanding to ſay preciſely what any part of it contains. By way of illuſtrating this remark, I ſhall ſubjoin the chapter in queſtion as interpreted by Mr. Taylor.[5]

"From theſe very things, that which happens to thoſe who aſſert that ideas are ſeparate eſſences, and who at the ſame time make form to conſiſt from genus and differences, is manifeſt. For if forms and animal are in man and horſe, there is either one and the ſame, or a different animal in number. For by definition it is manifeſt that there is one and the ſame; ſince he who ſays that it is in each will aſſign the ſame reaſon. If therefore, there is ſome man, itſelf ſubſiſting by itſelf, this particular individual, and ſeparate,

[5] Taylor, p. 183.

it

it is neceſſary alſo, that thoſe things from which it conſiſts, as, for inſtance, animal and biped, ſhould ſignify this particular individual, and ſhould be ſeparate, and eſſences: ſo that this will likewiſe be the caſe with animal. - If, therefore, animal is the ſame in man and in horſe, as you in yourſelf, how will it be one in things which are ſeparate, and why will not this animal alſo ſubſiſt ſeparate from itſelf? In the next place, if it participates of biped and multiplied, it will be impoſſible that any thing ſhould happen. For contraries will be at the ſame time inherent in the ſame thing, ſubſiſting as one, and as this definite particular. But if it does not participate, what is the mode, when any one ſays an animal is biped, or capable of walking? but perhaps they form a compoſite, and touch, or are mingled. All thoſe modes, however, are abſurd. ·Shall we ſay that that which is different in number is in each? There will, therefore, be infinite particulars, as I may ſay, of which the eſſence is animal: for man is not from animal according to accident. Further ſtill; animal itſelf will be many things. For animal which is in every individual is eſſence; ſince it is not predicated according to any thing elſe. But if this be not the caſe, man will ſubſiſt from that, and that will be the genus of man. And again, all things from which man conſiſts will be ideas. Idea, therefore, will not be of one thing and eſſence of another: for this is impoſſible. Hence each of thoſe things contained in animals will be animal itſelf. Beſides, this will ſubſiſt from a certain

a certain particular; and how will animal ſubſiſt from it? Or how is it poſſible that there ſhould be animal, which is itſelf eſſence, beſides animal itſelf? Further ſtill: theſe things will happen in ſenſibles, and things ſtill more abſurd than theſe. But if it is impoſſible that this can be the caſe, it is evident that there is not idea of them, in ſuch manner as ſome aſſert there is[h]."

Obſervation thereon.

Into this unintelligible gibberiſh has Mr. Taylor traveſtied an author, whoſe thoughts will always command reſpect, when faithfully rendered. But I call that only a faithful tranſlation, which gives the ſenſe of the original preciſely and clearly; merits unattainable by him who, following merely the order of conſtruction, interprets the philoſophical language of antiquity, of which each expreſſion is good and pure Greek, by the ſignifications uſually aſſigned in Dictionaries, to the different words of which the ſeveral phraſes are compoſed; which will for the moſt part make abſolute nonſenſe, in Latin, Engliſh, or any other language. Having endeavoured to learn from a far higher authority than Ariſtotle's, to forgive injuries, I feel not the ſmalleſt ill-will to Mr. Taylor, and ſincerely lament that his labours on ſo reſpectable a ſubject have not been better directed. He aſſures the public "that what he ſays of Dr. Gillies is not dictated either by malevolence or envy;" adding obligingly: "May his reputation in what he has deſerved well of the public be laſting,

[h] Taylor's Tranſlation of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks, B. vii. c. 14.

ing, and his laurels among his countrymen ever bloom! But it was ſurely ſome evil genius in an evil hour, that tempted him to abandon hiſtory for philoſophy, and Herodotus for Ariſtotle. Touch not Hector, Hector is my due. Touch not the obſcurity of Ariſtotle, it is not to be vanquiſhed by you[i]."

Anſwer to Mr. Taylor's animadverſions on my Analyſis of Ariſtotle's philoſophy.

Notwithſtanding this modified compliment, my reputation, if I had any, muſt have been deſervedly blaſted for ever, if one half of what Mr. T. ſays of me had been well founded. In refutation of his reproach of "ignorance and falſehood," I have ſhewn that the ſubject of Platonic ideas is really treated in the VIIth book of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks. It is alſo treated in the XIth book, as will appear from citing the ſhort titles prefixed by the Latin tranſlators. Demonſtrat non eſſe ideas, lib. xi. cap. 4.; agit de ideis numerorum, c. 6.; tollendas eſſe ideas, c. 12.

Before turning from the ſubjects of Mr. T. and myſelf to matters more generally intereſting, I muſt entreat my readers to accompany me a little further in the tireſome journey to which this ſevere critic has condemned me. In my Analyſis, p. 115. I ſay "that the VIIth book of Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks, which now ſtands as the IXth, treats of energy, a word of mighty import in the Ariſtotelian philoſophy; from which ſubject, the author naturally paſſes to the XIIIth, XIVth, and XIIth books, which treat

[i] Taylor's, p. 43. Introduction.

of

of a Being totally diſtinct from matter; neceſſary, eternal, infinite, one ſubſtantially and numerically, the primary cauſe of motion, himſelf immoveable." Mr. T. ſays, "This alſo is perfectly falſe[k]," for the XIIth book only treats of this Being, the XIIIth and XIVth books being intirely employed in the diſcuſſion of numbers and ideas. Yet the reader has only to turn to Du Val's Ariſtotle, and he will find in his XIIth book, or XIVth of Mr. Taylor and Aldus, Bonum & pulchrum primo principio convenire, l. xiv. c. 4.; a theological doctrine the moſt important of all, and independently of which all the reſt are of no value! Veterum alios negaſſe primum principium ob imperitiam, alios ob pertinaciam, l. xiii. c. vi. Eſſe aliquam ſcientiam phyſica priorem de ſubſtantia ſeparata & immobili, l. xiii. c. 7. It is unneceſſary, I believe, to proceed farther in citation; but I think it right to obſerve that this deep ſtudent in Ariſtotle ſeems not aware that the book publiſhed as the XIIth, by Aldus and Beſſareon, ſtands as the XIVth in Du Val's noble edition, Paris 1619 and 1629; and that even this XIIth or XIVth book is not confined to theology alone, as may be ſeen by peruſing the titles to the third and fourth chapters. Mr. Taylor has accuſed my propoſed arrangement of the "Metaphyſicks," of abſurdity, becauſe I would place the fourth book before that printed as the third: "which third book," he ſays, "conſiſts wholly of doubts which are ſolved in

[k] Taylor, p. 21. Introduction.

the fourth and ſucceeding books[l]." But what do the titles to the chapters of this third book ſay? Quæſtionem aliam ſolvit, c. iii.; dubitationes multas ſuprà præpoſitas ſolvit, c. iv.; aliam dubitationem ſolvit, c. v.

With profound veneration for his maſters Plotinus and Proclus, to whom we ſhall ſee preſently what credit is due, Mr. T. is highly provoked at my opinion "that the real ſubject of what is called Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks is the vindication of the exiſtence and nature of truth againſt the cavils of ſophiſts and thoſe now called Metaphyſicians; and this doctrine concerning truth illuſtrated in demonſtrating the being of one God, in oppoſition to Atheiſts on one hand, and Polytheiſts on the other[m]." Mr. T. replies, "that if by Polytheiſts Dr. G. intends to ſignify men who believed in the exiſtence of divine natures the immediate progeny of one firſt cauſe, with which they are profoundly united, Ariſtotle is ſo far from oppoſing this doctrine in his Metaphyſicks, that in the eighth chapter of his XIIth book he demonſtrates their exiſtence[n]." In the chapter alluded to by Mr. Taylor, which is the eighth of the XIVth book in Du Val's edition, Ariſtotle in deference to the opinion delivered down by the ancients, and which prevailed in moſt ages of paganiſm, ſpeaks of different gods preſiding over the motions of the heavenly bodies. But the ſentence immediately preceding this paſſage,

[l] Taylor, p. 21. Introduction. [m] Analyſis, p. 98.
[n] Taylor, p. 48. Introduction.

and

and which Mr. T. entirely omits in his refutation[o] of my opinion, maintains "the unity of the firſt cauſe, the eternal ſpring of motion, himſelf immoveable. This principle on which heaven and earth depend is one in number, as well as eſſence[p]."

The exiſtence of divine natures, the immediate progeny of one firſt cauſe "with which they are profoundly united," is not aſſerted by the Stagirite in the chapter alluded to by Mr. T., or in any other part of his invaluable writings. Such myſterious language, indeed, occurs frequently in the works of Plotinus and other eclectics, or new Platoniſts, as they are called, the pretended reconcilers of Plato and Ariſtotle; viſionaries whoſe wild dreams ſeduced the old age and dotage of reaſon under the declining empire of Rome, and impoſed on its childhood and imbecility at the firſt revival of letters in modern Europe. Of ſuch philoſophers Mr. T., as will appear preſently, is not an unworthy pupil.

To Ariſtotle's practical treatiſes on the affairs of ſocial and civil life, I prefixed an account of his ſpeculative works, in order to do juſtice to his incomparable merit, and particularly to ſhow that he had kept clear of the deluſions in which philoſophers both before and after him, not excepting his own interpreters, had univerſally been bewildered. In that part of my under-

[o] Taylor, p. 48.

[p] Metaph. l. xiv. c. 8. p. 1003. Conf. Phyſic. Auſcult. l. viii. c. 7. p. 418. & Metaph. l. xiv. c. 7. p. 1000.

taking,

taking, I conſtantly refer the reader to the precife text, copying, where they are few, the words of the original. This method, for inſtance, is purſued in the queſtion concerning the firſt cauſe, that moſt momentous of ſubjects, on which no philoſopher ever argued with more cogency and brilliancy than the Stagirite in the paſſages which I have tranſlated in the 154th and following pages of my Analyſis. But as truth, and truth only, was my aim, I obſerved[q] that in explaining the cauſes of the heavenly motions, he is miſled by the faulty ſyſtem of aſtronomy that prevailed in his own age, and through all following ages of antiquity. In this ſyſtem however, he acknowledges himſelf to be a very moderate proficient, " leaving to thoſe more ſkilled in it, to determine the number of the heavenly motions and that of their immoveable cauſes[r]." But with regard to the firſt cauſe of all, his reaſonings reſt on firm principles of demonſtration; and not to perceive this difference, is to remain blind to the main drift of his metaphyſicks, or what he calls theology. If Mr. T. had ſufficiently examined this venerable ruin, he would not have treated me as a *Northern Goth*[s] for endeavouring to give to it an arrangement more natural and eaſy than that in which it has hitherto appeared, merely becauſe a ſentence in the Xth book, which, according to my view of the ſubject, ought to precede, is borrowed, as he pretends, from the VIIth book, which, in my

[q] Analyſis, p. 139, & ſeq. [r] Metaph. xiv. 8. p. 1003.
[s] Taylor, pp. 20. and 50. Introduction.

opinion,

opinion, ought to follow. He would have known that, in whatever order the "Metaphyficks" are difpofed, many fuch objections will occur; he ought farther to have known, that the feveral books now compofing that work, no, nor even the feveral treatifes now forming the far more complete performance printed under the name of the Organum, were ever given by Ariftotle as correlative parts of one connected difquifition.

Transition from Mr. Taylor to his mafters.

Having now endeavoured to anfwer every one of Mr. Taylor's accufations (for as to the pompofity and other imperfections of my ftyle[t], the reader's tafte muft decide) with as much brevity as the abftrufenefs of the fubject would permit, I proceed with pleafure to the main fubject of this difcourfe, the literary enemies of Ariftotle himfelf; thofe fanciful explainers and commenters, who, by mifreprefenting his fenfe, have thereby difgraced his philofophy. Under this important head I intend not to difcufs the trite fubject of the fchoolmen, thofe *profound*, *irrefragable*, and *angelic* doctors, whofe dark reign extended from the eleventh to the fixteenth century, and whofe works have ceafed to be known, fince their real merits came to be duly appreciated. It is ftill lefs my purpofe to din my reader's ears with the Arabian names *Alfarabius*, *Avicenna*, and *Averroes*, able precurfors of the weftern fchoolmen; fince it will be more agreeable as well as more inftructive to proceed

[t] Taylor, p. 44. Introduction.

at

at once to the fountain head, the Greek interpreters themſelves, from whom, as will appear in the progreſs of this diſcourſe, all ſubſequent miſrepreſentations flowed.

Picture of the ages following the completion of Grecian and Roman conqueſts.

A ſtrange diverſity of fortune befel the founders of the *Lycæum* and *Academy*, the two principal ſchools of Athens: the writings of Ariſtotle having been given to the world in a mutilated and moſt corrupt ſtate; whereas thoſe of Plato deſcended to poſterity in a condition of greater purity and integrity, than any other pagan compoſitions of nearly equal extent, the poems of Homer alone excepted. Independently of this important circumſtance, the philoſophy of Plato, in itſelf, was far better calculated than that of his diſciple and rival to gain an aſcendency in the unfortunate times which followed naturally, almoſt neceſſarily, the golden ages of Alexander and Auguſtus. In explaining the completion and conſequences of Grecian and Roman conqueſts, ancient hiſtorians have chiefly directed our attention to the bright ſide of the picture; Barbarians ſubdued, the ravages of Nomades reſtrained, the knowledge of the habitable globe extended, communication facilitated by ſea and land, with the happy diffuſion of laws and arts wherever the Grecian Minerva afforded protection, or the Eagle of Rome purſued her flight. Dazzled by the magnificence of this ſpectacle, the moſt clear-ſighted writers have overlooked the deep and incurable wounds which a long ſeries of triumphs inflicted on the conquerors themſelves. They have not perceived

that, in the boundlefs communication of nations, the far greater proportions of mankind are more likely to be injured than benefited by the reciprocal exchanges of opinions and manners; and that infolent crowds, while they mutually deride each other's real advantages and pre-eminences, will be all of them alike prone to adopt fafhionable follies and foreign fuperftitions. In the heterogeneous affemblage of inhabitants crowding the great cities that haftily arofe upon the eftablifhment, firft of the Macedonian, and afterwards of the Roman power, the ferment of fuch jarring materials corrupted into unexampled virulence[s]. The vaft multitude of dupes gave encouragement to a correfpondent number of knaves. The unbridled folly of the capitals was imitated or furpaffed by the provinces; in both, the progrefs of fociety was inverted; juft tafte in writing as well as propriety in acting became extinct; and the thickening fhade at length fettled into that perfect gloom which confounded every principle and every maxim by which the Greeks and Romans had deferved admiration and acquired empire.

Their degeneracy precipitated by the

This fatal degeneracy was not, materially, either promoted or obftructed by the four great fchools of Athens, whofe tenets I endeavoured to

[s] Per urbem (fcil. Romam) quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda confluunt celebranturque. Tacit. Annal. xv. 44. Words highly applicable to my fubject, but ftrangely mifapplied by the *pretended* philofopher, (for true philofophy will not conclude, much lefs condemn without examination and proof,) when he thus abfurdly ftigmatifes the Chriftian religion.

explain

explain in a former work[t]. Neither the Academics nor Peripatetics, any more than the enthusiasts of stoical virtue, or the votaries of epicurean pleasure, who flourished after the age of Alexander, were eminently conspicuous as improvers or corrupters of philosophy. They followed without deviation the respective founders of their sects. The works of their great masters were perpetually in their hands; their study by day, their meditation by night; admired as the fountains of wisdom, and revered as the standards of excellence. Amidst the celebrity of far inferior works, those of the Stagirite, as observed above, were marked with a peculiar fatality; since his copious writings, containing, together with the author's own discoveries, the literary treasures of all preceding times, were snatched, as it were, from the world and long buried in concealment; and it was not until their imperfect revival in the age of Cicero[u], that the Peripatetics regained for a short time that pre-eminence to which they were justly entitled through their master's incomparable merit. The innovators in speculation as well as practice, who may be regarded as the great agents in the ruin of both learning and morals, belonged not properly to any of the sects of Greek philosophy, though under Alexander's successors they affected the name of Pytharogeans[x], as they afterwards did that of

Pythagoreans after the age of Alexander, and the Platonicians after that of Augustus.

[t] History of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. 40.
[u] See above, pp. 2, 3. and 42.
[x] See my account of Pythagoras, History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xi.

Platonifts or Platonicians[y] under the Roman emperors. It had been a maxim of the Peripatetic fchool, which Ariftotle continually enforced by example as well as precept, "never to intermix the concerns of philofophy with thofe of the popular fuperftition[z]." In oppofition to this found advice, the great object of both Pythagoreans and Platonifts was to combine philofophy and mythology into one fyftem, to embellifh truth by fiction; and whether they aimed at confirming or invalidating the creed of their anceftors, to effect either purpofe by new invented fables and lying prodigies.

Chain of romancers and vifionaries, down to the Platonicians in the third century.

In this manner Diodorus of Afpendus and other Pythagoreans in Egypt under the firft Ptolemy, adapted the tenets of their pretended mafter to the dark imaginations and childifh credulity of the Alexandrians[a]. Other felf-entitled philofophers travelled over the Greek conquefts of Afia, collecting every rite of fuperftition and every tale of wonder, which they afterwards amplified in their fabulous compofitions for the amufement and delight of the idle multitudes affembled in the great cities built and haftily peopled by the Macedonian conquerors. From the age of Alexander himfelf to that of Sylla the Dictator, a chain of fuch

[y] See my account of Plato, Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxxii.

[z] περι των μυθικως σοφιζομενων ουκ αξιον μετα σπουδης σκοπειν. Ariftot. Metaphyf. ii. 4. & paffim.

[a] Conf. Diogen. Laert. in Pythagor. Heracleid. & Empedoc. Athenæum. l. iv. p. 165. Jamblich. in Vit. Pythag. c. ult. Jofeph. Cont. Apion. i. 22. p. 1345.

romancers

romancers may be traced in the remains of Heraclides Ponticus[b], Diogenes Antonius[c], Timæus of Taurominium[d], Evhemerus of Messene[e], Hermippus of Smyrna[f], Neanthes of Cyzicum[g], and Alexander of Phrygia[h] surnamed *Polyhistor.*, as we should say the *omniscient*; a title of false honour which heaps much real disgrace on those who conferred it. To such early impostors, who all flourished before the age of Cicero, we may trace the origin of those extravagancies and follies, which still disgrace the biography of Pythagoras and other sages of ancient Greece: to them also must be referred that preposterous admixture of Greek learning with Asiatic superstition, which in the countries of the West first introduced the *theurgy* of philosophers; a thing equally contemptible with the magic of jugglers. The reports and the

[b] Diogen. Laert. in Vit. Heracleid.

[c] Photius, Biblioth. Cod. lxvi. p. 355. He thinks that Diogenes lived shortly after Alexander the Great. In that case he was the first traveller that brought into Greece the doctrines of magic and enchantment exactly as they are described in the Arabian tales and the romances of chivalry. See particularly Photius, p. 359. & seq.

[d] He was nicknamed Epitimæus from his calumny, and the old woman from his credulity. Suidas, Conf. Polyb. xii. 15. & Diodor. xiii. 90. His fables concerning Pythagoras, as we shall see, were greedily swallowed by the Alexandrian school.

[e] Diodor. v. 41. & seq. & Fragment. ex Lib. Sext. p. 633.

[f] According to Pliny, xxx. 1, & 2., Hermippus is the first Greek philosopher who wrote circumstantially concerning magic. He flourished in the reign of the third Ptolemy, surnamed Euergetes. From his time it came to be a prevailing opinion that the ancient Greek philosophers were famous magicians. Pliny assures us of the fact; and inconsistently enough with his own opinion of the futility of magic, treats Democritus and Plato as abettors of that art, in which he believes them to have been great proficients.

[g] Plut. Symposiac. p. 628. edit. Xyland.

[h] Diogen. Laert. viii. 36. & Clem. Alexand. i. 304.

doctrines of thoſe marvellous writers were greedily received, for reaſons that will appear in the progreſs of this diſcourſe, by Plotinus, Porphyry, Jamblichus, and the other Platonicians, or later Platoniſts as they were called, who began with the third century, and flouriſhed in an unbroken chain, chiefly in Rome, Alexandria, and Athens, for the ſpace of three hundred and fifty years. From thoſe Platonicians a ſpurious philoſophy, under venerable ancient names, was communicated to the idle loquacity of the Greeks of Conſtantinople, and by them finally diffuſed over the nations of the Eaſt and Weſt; among the Arabs under the Abaſſides in the eighth century; and, at the revival of letters, among the Italians and other nations of modern Europe.

Why Plato's philoſophy better adapted to their genius and views than that of Ariſtotle.

From the accounts which I have already given of the reſpective ſyſtems of Plato and Ariſtotle, it will be eaſy to perceive that the writings of the former were beſt adapted to the purpoſes of both Pythagoreans and Platonicians; whether, as was moſt uſual with the Pythagoreans, they wiſhed only to deceive others, or, as was moſt common with the Platonicians, they were equally induſtrious in impoſing on themſelves. A ſhort compariſon of Plato and Ariſtotle, the reſult of a careful ſtudy of their ineſtimable works, will place the matter in a clear point of view. Plato's practical philoſophy nearly coincides with Ariſtotle's. Both of them are impreſſive teachers of a pure and ſublime morality; but their ſeveral modes of enforcing the ſame maxims are as different as the oppoſite bents

bents of their genius. In Ariſtotle, demonſtration is the principal; and illuſtration, ſparingly uſed, as a decent *acceſſory* or *appendage:* careleſs of the pomp of words, he regards only the truth of things. Plato, on the contrary, diſdains no ornament within his reach; delights, after exciting ſurpriſe, to gratify well-prepared expectation; and condeſcends, on ſubjects peculiarly within the province of reaſon, to uſe the language of paſſion and fancy, to ſtrengthen argument by fable, and fortify belief by wonder; whereas his rival with more commanding authority ſubdues even the heart and affections through the reſiſtleſs conviction of the underſtanding. The form of compoſition almoſt perpetually employed by Plato is that of pure drama, a mode of writing excellently adapted to the diſplay of his verſatile genius and flowery fancy; of a mind ſtored with images that he could combine with taſte, and crowded with ideas that he could acutely diſcriminate. Yet with all theſe advantages, his *enthuſiaſm* and love of the *marvellous*, his doctrine of *ideas*, and his *Dæmon* world, his explanation of mythology by allegory, thus confounding the provinces of philoſophy and popular ſuperſtition[1]; theſe ſhadowy prominences of Plato were calculated to allure and delight many who remained blind to his brighteſt merits, and thereby fitted the labours of this great genius rather to co-operate with, than counteract, the perverters of ſenſe

[1] Conf. Platon. in Symp. p. 187. in Tim. p. 481. in Repub. l. i. p. 420. and Theaetet. paſſim.

and ſcience, who ſprang up with wild luxuriance among the Greeks and Romans, after thoſe nations had loſt, as it were, their love of truth, together with their paſſion for true glory, their manly ſpirit, and their liberty.

Origin of the Eclectics.

Under the Romans, theſe corrupters of learning as well as philoſophy aſſumed the name of Eclectics, becauſe they ſelected from all the different ſchools the tenets moſt agreeable to their fancy. But as Plato was their favourite idol, they were called alſo the later Platoniſts or Platonicians; and having new-moulded to their own taſte the wildeſt doctrines of their maſter, they applied them in this corrupt ſtate to the interpretation of the philoſophy of Ariſtotle. It was their opinion that, though the complete truth might not be found in any one of the ſeveral ſchools, it reſided, however, in the whole of them collectively: that upon due examination, they might all be reconciled and united into one general ſyſtem; and thereby, inſtead of rancorous adverſaries, be rendered uſeful allies to each other as well as to the eſtabliſhed idolatry prevalent throughout the Roman world. If we followed very reſpectable guides, the laborious Brucker[k], the learned Moſheim[l], the elegant and critical Gibbon[m], we ſhould aſcribe the origin of the Eclectics to the third century, and conſider their decided hoſtility

[k] De Sect. Eclectic. vol. ii. p. 211. & ſeq.

[l] De turbata per recentes Platonicos Eccleſia: and in both his hiſtories.

[m] Decline and Fall, vol. i. p. 474, & 679. 4to. edit.

tility

tility to Chriftianity as the foundation of their maxims, and the principle of their union. Thefe obfervations indeed apply, as far as concerns the name; but the Eclectic doctrines themfelves remount to a far earlier fource, to the fabulous writers above mentioned between the age of Alexander and that of Auguftus; from the latter of which periods hiftory alfo enables us to trace an unbroken chain of vifionaries or impoftors down to Ammonius Saccas the firft of the Eclectics, and great Platonic luminary of the third century.

Thrafyllus of Rhodes.

At the head of this chain, I fhall mention Thrafyllus of Rhodes, a man eminently fkilled in mufic[n] and mathematics, and who by his aftrological predictions, gained the confidence of Tiberius, before that deteftable monfter fucceeded to the empire[o]. With his other ftudies, Thrafyllus joined an unwearied application to the philofophy of Plato, which he regarded merely as a verbal explanation of *Pythagorean numbers*[p]. In conformity with this notion, he firft divided Plato's Dialogues into *Tetralogies*[q], and every where difcovered in them the fuppofed tenets of the Pythagorean fchool as defcribed by Diogenes and Diodorus, Heraclides and Hermippus, and the other fabulous writers above mentioned. Moft of the fubjects were

[n] Plutarch. de Mufic. He makes him by birth a Phliafian.

[o] Tacit. Annal. vi. 21. Dion Caffius, p. 555. & Sueton. in Caligul.

[p] Confer Plutarch. de Ifid. & Ofir. & Eι apud Delphos & Diogen. Laert. iii. 56.

[q] In reference to the Tetractys, that is, 4 multiplied into 9, by which the facred Pythagorean oath was fworn. Plutarch. ibid.

treated

treated by Thrafyllus, which two centuries afterwards exercifed the myftical pen of Plotinus, and which even this writer, with all his impenetrable obfcurity and wildnefs of confufion, is faid to have difcuffed with greater precifion and clearnefs.[r]

Apolloinus of Tyana.

Contemporary with Thrafyllus, we meet with the famous Cappadocian, Apollonius of Tyana, who was born about the Chriftian æra; and extended his long life of an hundred years beyond the reign of the Emperor Nerva[s]. Apollonius was in reality fuch a man as Pythagoras, by his lying biographers, is defcribed; a pretender to prophecy and miracles, fometimes the vileft of cheats, and at other times the fillieft of bigots. I have derived fome amufement from his life, preferved in the memoirs of his followers, Maximus a Macedonian, and Damis an Affyrian, and from them compiled by Philoftratus an Athenian rhetorician, who flourifhed in the court of Septimius Severus towards the clofe of the fecond century. The wondrous narrative, which frequently betrays the vain glory of Apollonius, fometimes ftartles the relater himfelf, fince in defcribing the moft extraordinary performances of his hero, particularly his raifing the dead, he endeavours awkwardly to explain them by natural caufes[t]; thus, with ftrange inconfiftency denying the miraculoufnefs of the actions for

[r] Longin. apud Porphyr. in Vit. Plotin.

[s] Philoftrat. in Vit. Apollon. p. 428.

[t] Vit. Apollon. p. 206. I refer to Morell's Edition, Paris 1608; not being in poffeffion of the more fplendid one of Gottfridus Olearius, Leipfic, 1709.

which

which he would exalt the performer to divine honours. The theurgy of philosophers indeed, he affects to distinguish from the magic of jugglers[u]; but neither Philostratus nor any succeeding Platonist has attempted to point out any real difference between them.

Alexander the Paphlagonian prophet.

From Apollonius of Tyana, there is an easy transition to Alexander the Paphlagonian prophet; since Lucian informs us that this impostor, adorned by every talent and polluted by every vice, had from early youth attended a certain Tyanean, intimately acquainted with Apollonius and deeply skilled in all his mysteries[x]. After the death of his master, Alexander, at setting up for himself, found a fit coadjutor in Kocconas, a lying chronicler of Byzantium; with whom he travelled over Lesser Asia in the character of a Pythagorean philosopher, and acquired great credit with the multitude for such prodigies and predictions as, Lucian observes indignantly, "had been absurdly ascribed to a wise and good man like Pythagoras." The reader may see, in the clear and lively narrative of a satirist, whose flashes brighten the closing night of Greek literature, by what vile and detestable artifices Alexander raised and maintained an oracle, in his native city Abonotichos in Paphlagonia, whose responses were revered not only by the provincials of Asia, but by Romans of the highest rank in the court and

[u] P. 3. & passim.

[x] Luciani Alexander seu Pseudomantis.

army

army of the Antonines. Fame had been the main purſuit of Apollonius, who was born to hereditary opulence; whereas wealth was the principal object with Alexander, who had been educated in rags and ſervitude. But in comparing their reſpective characters, we muſt remember that Apollonius is handed down to us by an impaſſioned admirer, whereas Alexander is delineated by the pen not only of a general ſatiriſt but of a declared perſonal enemy[y].

Moderatus and Nicomachus.

While thoſe impoſtors ſucceſſively employed their philoſophy for the deception of the public at large, their reſpective contemporaries Moderatus and Nicomachus were more innocently exerciſed in deluding the learned and themſelves. Following the footſteps of Thraſyllus, thoſe cloudy writers combined into one myſtical ſyſtem, Platonic *ideas* and Pythagorean *numbers*, both of which they explained allegorically as ſymbols of all things in the univerſe, whether perceptions of ſenſe or merely objects of intellect[z]. The monad denoted God; the duad, matter; the triad, all objects or actions having a beginning, a middle, and an end; while the

[y] Lucian. ibid. He tells of himſelf an action worthy of a froward child. When the prophet, according to cuſtom, held out his hand for him to kiſs, Lucian bit it pettiſhly with his teeth. Notwithſtanding a feigned reconciliation, the prophet laid a plot for drowning Lucian; which perfidy probably gave birth to the treatiſe of which Alexander is the ſubject, ſince the ſatiriſt, with anger ſparkling through his laughter, ſays, at the outſet of his work, he would gladly have ſeen him torn in pieces by apes and foxes for the amuſement of a public theatre: a wiſh characteriſtic of the bloody and abominable ſports then generally prevalent through the Roman world.

[z] Stobæus, Eclog. Phyſic. iii.; & Photius, Biblioth. cod. 187.

decade

decade formed the emblem of ſublime excellence, being the moſt perfect of numbers, as containing the greateſt variety of properties, relations, and reſemblances. Not contented with this egregious trifling, Nicomachus deviated into total abſurdity, by making the ſame number expreſs things the moſt unlike and even contrary to each other; good and evil, beauty and deformity, dignity and meanneſs: ſo that as his biographer pleaſantly obſerves, he was at once its calumniator and panegyriſt[a].

Plutarch.

The chimeras of thoſe viſionaries, which would now entitle their profeſſors to cells in a madhouſe, (ſo unaccountable to one age ſeem the follies of another!) were adopted by the whole tribe of later Platoniſts, and nearly a century before their times, by the learned and ſenſible Plutarch[b], one of the fineſt painters of actions and manners in public and private life. But this excellent writer, an exuberant ſource of inſtruction and entertainment to all ages and nations, was both a Platonic philoſopher and a prieſt of Apollo. In the ſentiments and behaviour of illuſtrious men, with whom he had lived, as it were, in his warm and impreſſive deſcriptions of them, he found paganiſm as much ennobled by Greeks and Romans in happier days, as it was afterwards debaſed and polluted by Egyptians and Syrians, and even by many of his own ſlaviſh countrymen and contemporaries. In the zeal of patriotiſm, Plutarch ſincerely re-

[a] Photius, Biblioth. cod. 187.
[b] Plutarch. de Ei apud Delphos.

ſpected

fpected even the vileft legends of his country, and eagerly clofed in with any doctrines that might ferve to clothe their nakednefs, and hide their infamy[c]. Nothing feemed better adapted to this purpofe than the application of allegory, fparingly employed by Plato himfelf, his great mafter, but lavifhly abufed in all fubjects of mythology as well as philofophy, by Thrafyllus, Moderatus, Nicomachus, and other now forgotten vifionaries of the fame ftamp. In his fpeculative writings throughout, the Hierophant and Archon of Chæronæa fhows a perpetual anxiety for explaining the fuperftition of his country in a manner the leaft fhocking to morality and reafon. He thus comments, in numberlefs paffages, even the moft childifh fables by fuch plaufible gloffes, as ferved to reconcile his incongruous characters of prieft and philofopher;—prieft of a moft contemptible worfhip, and a philofopher who, being bred in the practical fchool of legiflators and heroes, through the brighteft exemplars of human virtue, had afcended to fublime conceptions of Deity.

Plutarch fays admirably, that the fear of God deftroys all other fear[d]; but that religious fear itfelf, when pufhed to the extreme, degenerates into mad and *impious* terror; fince, in the fight of the Almighty, the character even of the atheift who denies his being, is lefs odious, than that of the bigot who invents or believes the

[c] Vid. Lib. de Ifid. et Ofirid. paffim.

[d] In Tractat. ne fuaviter quidem vivi poffe fecund. Epicuri decreta.

vileft

vileſt calumnies againſt his nature[e]. Neither the eloquence of Seneca, nor the wit of Lucian, nor the glowing invective of Juvenal, expoſes more clearly and more forcibly, than the prieſt of Chæronæa, the danger of ſuperſtitious innovations and foreign worſhip, and particularly of thoſe cruel and diſgraceful rites for propitiating the divinity, which, though excluded from Greece and Rome under their reſpective commonwealths, and even under the firſt Cæſars, ſoon began to deluge and deform every part of the empire. Yet Plutarch is hoſtile to all other ſuperſtitions, chiefly becauſe he is infatuated with thoſe of which he was the miniſter. His writings, whether of philoſophy or hiſtory, are crowded with ſigns and prodigies. His veneration is unbounded for the moſt ſenſeleſs ceremonies conſecrated by the cuſtom of his country. Oracles and omens are the unceaſing objects of his credulous wonder[f]; and he confeſſes ingenuouſly and weakly, that he had long abſtained from eating eggs, in compliance with a certain dream[g], which probably appearing ridiculous even to himſelf, he has forborn to communicate to his readers.

Apuleius of Madaura.

Another Platonic philoſopher who touches the times of Plutarch, and forms the link, as it were, between him and thoſe uſually denominated

[e] Plutarch. de Superſtition. But in this he is not conſiſtent, for in the treatiſe cited in the preceding note, he maintains the atheiſt to be more odious and more miſerable even than the bigot.

[f] Vid. Plutarch. de Oracul. defectu, & cur Pythia nunc non reddat Oracul. carmine.

[g] Quæſtion. Conviv.

nated

nated Eclectics, is the famous Apuleius of Madaura, a city and Roman colony on the confines of Numidia and Getulia. Apuleius was equally converſant with the learning of Athens and of Rome[h] but after the waſte of his patrimony in expenſive travels, being obliged to exerciſe for bread the profeſſion of an advocate in the latter capital, he preferred the uſe of the Latin tongue, in which he falls farther below the younger Pliny who preceded him only fifty years, than the ſame Pliny in a century and a half had degenerated from the claſſic eloquence of Cicero. But to Platonic adepts, the matter rather than the ſtyle recommended the "Metamorphoſes" and other writings of Apuleius, in which he is continually corrupting philoſophy by falſe religion, and religion by falſe philoſophy[i]: an allegoriſer of fables, an expounder of myſteries, and even a worker of miracles[k]: while in conformity with many writers immediately before and after him, as well as with his contemporary the phyſician and philoſopher Galen[l] of Pergamus, he ranged at large in the ſpeculative world, adopting, as occaſion required, and embelliſhing the tenets of diſcordant ſects, without yielding excluſive allegiance to the authority of any maſter.

Commencement of the

From the foregoing narrative it appears that the opinions and proceedings, peculiarly aſcribed

h Apuleius in Apollog.

i Apuleius, Metamorph. Apollog. & Florid. paſſim.

k Id. ibid. Con. Lactant. Divin. Inſt. v. 3.

l Vid. Galen. περι αμαρτηματων και παθων της ψυχης.

to the Eclectics or later Platonifts, remount to a far earlier date than that ufually affigned to them. Immediately before and after the age of Cicero, the myftic philofophers or romancers, whofe names I have recorded, felected dogmas from difcordant fects, reconciled thofe fects with each other and with the popular fuperftition, allegorifed mythology, and either wrought miracles themfelves, or believed in their performance by others. But, in as far as concerns the name merely, the Eclectics begun with Potamo of Alexandria, the mafter of Ammonius. Potamo's philofophy is but imperfectly explained: we learn however that its groundwork was Plato's doctrine of ideas[m], which thenceforward continued to be the airy phantom that deluded the whole fchool. The fame of Potamo was totally eclipfed by that of his contemporary and hearer Ammonius; a name common to many Greeks before and after the clofe of the fecond century, when, in the pompous language of his difciples, the light of Ammonius Saccas firft broke on the world[n], and fhone confpicuoufly in reconciling Plato and Ariftotle with each other, as well as with all the moft revered teachers of wifdom in the heathen world. Ammonius derived the epithet of Saccas from a circumftance expreffive of his humble origin, and the lowly occupations to which this future luminary of fcience had in fome part of his life been con-

Eclectics as far as concerns the name.

Potamo.

Ammonius Saccas.

[m] Diogen. Laert. 21. fect. 21. ὡς δ', ἐξ ὅιον την ακριβεϛατην φαντασιαν.

[n] Hierocles apud Photium, cod. ccxiv.

 demned.

demned. It is derived from a word nearly the ſame in ſound, and bearing the ſame ſenſe univerſally in all languages; and it indicates that he once carried the ſack, which has ever continued to be the badge of low drudgery, or mean traffic, in all countries of the Eaſt. He is carefully to be diſtinguiſhed from the Chriſtian Ammonius, who wrote concerning the harmony between the Moſaic and Chriſtian diſpenſations[o]; though Ammonius Saccas is ſaid to have been himſelf born of Chriſtian parents, and is perhaps one of the firſt apoſtates who turned the pure ſtreams of the Goſpel into the foul marſhes of corrupted Platoniſm. In the writings of his ſcholar Plotinus, for Ammonius left nothing behind him, we find lofty notions of Deity deformed by that myſtical jargon[p], which Plato was ſuppoſed to have copied from Pythagoras, and which Pythagoras himſelf was believed to have ſtolen from the prieſts of Egypt and the Eaſt. Even ſome peculiar doctrines of the Goſpel are clothed in ſuch ſwelling bombaſt by the new Platoniſts, as has ſhaken the faith of able and ingenuous men[q], and led them to doubt whether the momentous truths of our religion were not originally derived from Egyptian and Indian ſources, and employed with pious fraud by the firſt propagators of Chriſtianity for adorning the edifice of the church. But juſt and

[o] Euſeb. Hiſt. vi. 19.

[p] Plotin. Ennead. vi. 4.

[q] Vid. Luc. Holſten. de Vit. Porphyr. apud Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. v. iv. c. 6. p. 236.

ſolid

ſolid criticiſm, which in this caſe may be firmly eſtabliſhed on the genuine and copious writings of Plato himſelf, will evince, that the falſe philoſophy uſurping his name, inſtead of being deſpoiled by Chriſtians, was itſelf the deſpoiler.

Longinus.

Ammonius left many diſciples; particularly the dark Plotinus; the ſublime Longinus; and the philoſopher Origen, contemporary with the Chriſtian father of the ſame name, and too frequently confounded[r] with him. The fame of Longinus towers above other Platoniſts in a ſmall and imperfect treatiſe, ſometimes deformed indeed by the loaded Alexandrian ſtyle, but replete with ſuch juſt criticiſm and ſuch manly ſentiments as might be expected from an author who was honourably accuſed[s] of having the works of the ancients perpetually in his hands to the diſlike or contempt of thoſe of his contemporaries. The courſe of his extenſive travels led him to Alexandria[t], where he was a hearer of Ammonius; but, having returned to Athens, his native city, he compoſed ſeveral philoſophic works in which it ſhould ſeem that he combated the *ideas* and other leading doctrines of the new Platonic ſchool[u], though he held Plato himſelf in ſuch high veneration, that he regularly celebrated the anniverſary of his birthday[x]. His ſubſequent hiſtory, it is foreign from

[r] Even by the learned Lucas Holſtenius, in his Life of Porphyry.

[s] He was thence named φιλαρχαιος. Porphyr. in Vit. Plotin.

[t] Longin. de Finibus, apud Porphyr. ibid.

[u] This I infer from the titles of his laſt works; De Ideis, adverſus Plotinum,—De Principiis,—and, De Finibus.

[x] Euſeb. Præparat. Evangel. x. 3.

my fubject to relate. Fortune, it is well known, conducted him to fplendour and a premature death[y] in the fervice of the ill-fated Zenobia, fovereign of Palmyra and tranfient Queen of the Eaft. The rebellion of the miftrefs was punifhed by the Emperor Aurelian in the blood of her fecretary and fervant. But inftead of ignominy, Longinus derived immortal glory from a public execution, fince he died with noble fortitude, exhorting to patience his lefs enduring indignant friends.[z]

The Golden Chain of Platonicians.

The philofophical herefy of Longinus on the fubject of *ideas* excludes him from a place in the *golden* chain of Platonicians, who flourifhed from the reign of Septimius Severus, three centuries and a half, until their fchools were abolifhed by the Emperor Juftinian about the middle of the fixth century. The links of this *golden* and *facred* chain, for fo it was characterifed not only by its *own members*, but by a great proportion of their contemporaries, are chiefly filled up by Plotinus the hearer of Ammonius, whofe life is defcribed by his fcholar Porphyry; by Ædefius and Chryfanthius, admired luminaries of the apoftate Julian, whofe lives, with thofe of about twenty other Platonifts from Plotinus downwards, are written by the credulous fophift Eunapius of Sardes; by Plutarch the Athenian, and the Egyptian Syrianus; and finally by Proclus and Ifidore, whofe biogra-

[y] A. Dom. 273.

[z] ἣν (ζημιαν θανατȣ) ὡς γενναιως ηνεγκεν ὁ Λογγινος ὡϛε και τȣς σχετλιαζοντας επι τῳ παθει παραμυθεισθαι. Zofimus, i. 56.

phy is given by their respective scholars Marinus and Damascius. It may be an undertaking not unacceptable to the lovers of learning, to comprise in few words the result of much dry and rather uncommon reading, and clearly to describe the manners, doctrines, method, and style of a school that swallowed up every other, and through the muddy channel of which, Greek philosophy was communicated in modern times both to the East and West.

Plotinus.

Of all the disciples of Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, himself also an Egyptian, most completely imbibed the mystical spirit of his master; and most excelled in the profundity of his speculations, and in the efficacy of his *theurgic* works. Having frequented for ten years the school of Ammonius even to the death of that teacher, Plotinus was seized with the desire of emulating Pythagoras and Apollonius, those great proficients in hidden wisdom, by a new philosophical expedition to the East. The war undertaken by the third Gordian against the Persians[a], gave him an opportunity of following the standard of that unfortunate Emperor to the Euphrates. There, his progress ended with that of the Roman arms; Gordian being slain by conspiracy, and his murderer and successor Philip hastening back to Rome to solemnize the secular games, and confirm his usurpation[b]. The connections,

[a] An. Dom. 242.

[b] An. Dom. 244. Histor. August. p. 162 & seq. Brucker, vol. ii. p. 221. says, "Parthis bellum illaturus;" but the empire of the Parthians had been demolished by Artaxerxes and the Persians, An. Dom. 226. Agathias, l. ii. p. 63.

however, which Plotinus had formed in the imperial army led him, in his fortieth year, to Rome; on which ample theatre, he ſoon diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his lectures, by his writings, and above all, by the ſingular fanaticiſm of his life[c]. Aſpiring to a perfection far exalted above the dependent condition of man, he denied himſelf the uſe of meat and of wine, as well as of the bath and of frictions, then deemed indiſpenſible conveniencies; and he firmly reſiſted the earneſt entreaties of his friends, who longed to poſſeſs his portrait, becauſe, forſooth, he was aſhamed of being exhibited under a human form. Inſtead of indulging his diſciples in the fair purſuit of profit or honour, he warmly recommended to their imitation Rogatianus a Roman ſenator, whoſe underſtanding had been ſo completely ſubverted by his philoſophy, that, in order to attain proficiency in Platoniſm, he had diveſted himſelf of his dignity and office of Praetor which he then held[d], diſcharged his ſplendid houſehold,

[c] Porphyr. in Vit. Plotin.

[d] Reſolving the whole duty of man into monkiſh contemplation, the Platonicians recommended to their diſciples a proud dereliction of the ordinary employments of life, and particularly of all offices of government. They explained literally the ſublime deſcription of the philoſopher in Plato's Theactetus, p. 128 & 129. διο και πειρασθαι χρη ενθενδε εκεισε φευγειν, &c. But that raviſhing writer, when he deſcends from his enthuſiaſm and rapture, maintains that philoſophers, and they only, are qualified for the adminiſtration of government. Men, he obſerves, can never be fitted for that high truſt who know not ſomething ſtill higher: if that is not the caſe, they will over-rate the value of political power, and live in continual ſtrife with each other for the ſake of acquiring, maintaining, recovering, or extending an object that, to them, appears of ineſtimable importance. But if they have once learned that the culture of our intellectual and moral powers in the purſuit of wiſdom and virtue forms the true health and happineſs of

houfehold, and parted with his whole property. In this extraordinary proceeding, indeed, the difinterestednefs of Rogatianus met with an unforefeen reward. By providing for the health of his mind, the lazy voluptuary recovered that of his body; fince he had not long perfevered in the Platonic regimen of one fpare meal in a day, when the fame man, who had formerly been fo much tormented by the gout that he was obliged to pay his fhorteft vifits in a litter, recovered the perfect ufe of his members; began to walk nimbly, and to exercife his arms as vigoroufly as the fturdieft mechanic[e]. Of the *theurgic* works of Plotinus, a fingle example fhall fuffice. Among his fellow-ftudents under Ammonius, a certain Olympius of Alexandria became his rival and enemy. The hoftility of Olympius was exerted in various attempts to hurt Plotinus by theurgy. But the planet of Plotinus had the afcendency; a dæmon of fuperior power was his familiar; and the arts of Olympius were thus made to recoil fo effectually on himfelf, that his body became contracted like a purfe, and retained that decrepitude of form, until he

of man, they will defcend to government as a tafk effential to the public good, and regard this condefcenfion as their bounden duty. Ignorance and taftelefs folly would otherwife be raifed to dignity and armed with power. Governments, as had often happened, would be feized by knaves of vile intrigue and vulgar talents, whofe baftard knowledge was worfe than total ignorance, fince fuch felfifh and fhort-fighted politicians would be continually found wanting on great occafions; they would infallibly miftake main points and controlling principles. Conf. Repub. L. iv. p. 647. L. vi. p. 675. & L. vii. p. 696.

[e] Id. ibid.

ceased contending with a man who greatly surpassed him in occult science[f].

His writings.

Plotinus was an indefatigable writer; but the weakness of his eyes hindered him from revising his voluminous compositions. This was the more unfortunate, because the task of correction could be but ill-performed by others, since Plotinus wrote with scarcely any regard to the form of his letters, and was as careless of orthography as of the purity and perspicuity of his style. All these particulars he regarded as contemptible externals, whereas inward meditation was the only exercise in which a true philosopher ought to delight and excel. The meditations of Plotinus were reluctantly remitted during his short hours of imperfect slumber, and obstinately maintained amidst the salutations and visits of his numerous friends, so that he frequently boasted of being at once alone and in company[g], accustoming himself, at the departure of those who came to compliment or consult him, to join the thoughts that arose in his own mind during the interview, with those which he had put on paper before their admission. His works on the Platonic philosophy were comprised in fifty-four books; which Porphyry his scholar, who performed the office of editor, divided into six *enneads*, conformably with the prevalent superstition concerning Pythagorean numbers, exemplified in the *tetralogies* above-mentioned, into which Thrasyllus had divided

[f] Porphyr. in Vit. Plotin.

[g] συνην και ἑαυτῳ ἁμα και τοις αλλοις. Porphyr. ibid.

vided the Dialogues of Plato. About two centuries after[h] Porphyry, Proclus the Lycian undertook to explain thofe *enneads*, accumulating darknefs on obfcurity; and at the reftoration of letters in the fifteenth century, Marfilius Ficinus the philofopher and friend of Lorenzo de Medici, who had adopted all the vifionary doctrines of the later Platonifts, tranflated Plotinus into latin, and prefixed arguments by way of commentary.[i]

Porphyry. Plotinus was fucceeded by Porphyry; the moft diftinguifhed link in the Platonic chain, by his learning, credulity, inconfiftency, and his implacable animofity to the whole Chriftian name. He was born in Tyre in the earlier part of the 3d century, and in his native tongue called Malchus[k], a word denoting a royal defcent, in allufion to which he received his Greek name of Porphyry from Longinus, under whom he had been fent to profecute his ftudies at Athens. But he afterwards quitted Longinus for Plotinus, and Athens for Rome; where his dark and melancholy mind readily forfook the founder maxims of his youth, to furrender his whole faculties, fubdued and bound, to the authority of his new mafter; who treated Longinus

An.Dom. 233.

[h] An. Dom. 510.

[i] The work of Ficinus appears with different title-pages bearing refpectively the dates of 1580 and 1615. As the fale of the work was flow, this device, which has been frequently employed fince that time, was contrived for the purpofe of alluring readers. Conf. Fabric. Bib. Græc. vol. iv. p. 157. & Brucker, Hift. Philofoph. vol. ii. p. 223.

[k] The root of the word is difcernible in the Nahr-Malka, the *royal* canal between the Tigris and Euphrates. Plin. Nat. Hift. vi. 28. Conf. Rennell's Herodotus, p. 335.

as a philologift indeed of fome merit, but as a fuperficial and contemptible philofopher[l]. As the fruit of confummate proficiency in the ftudies of the Alexandrian fchool, Porphyry was tempted to the defign of deftroying his own life, that his foul might be no longer encumbered or polluted by the body, and was only prevented from effectuating his purpofe by a journey to Sicily, where the conftituent principles of his nature were reconciled to each other, by the agreeable and magnificent fcenery of that delightful ifland, and the cheerful converfation of Probus an elegant and ingenious friend then refiding at Lilybæum. In Sicily he continued during the moft bufy[m] period of his life, fince from thence he fent into the world his numerous writings againft the Chriftian religion; writings of which the lofs[n] ought not furely to occafion much fatisfaction to the one party or any regret to the other; becaufe, if we may fairly appreciate them by the confufion and inconfiftency of his works ftill extant, they are only the more

[l] Φιλολογος μαλλον η φιλοσοφος. Inftead of indignantly repelling this reproach, Longinus with the becoming temper of a philofopher, commends Plotinus' pithinefs and brevity, but laments that he cannot underftand him. Longin. Epift. ad Porphyr. in Vit. Plotin.

[m] Thence he is fometimes called a Sicilian. Auguftin. Retract. ii. 31.

[n] The loft treatifes of Porphyry againft the Chriftians confifted of thirty books. Lactantius Divin. Inft. v. 2 & 3.; and Gibbon, vol. i. c. 16. Speaking on this fubject, Gibbon fays: "They," the Platonicians, "compofed againft the faith of the gofpel many elaborate treatifes, which have fince been committed to the flames by the prudence of orthodox emperors." However laudable may be the orthodoxy of thofe emperors, I am not inclined to commend their prudence.

eminently

eminently conſpicuous[o] becauſe they are no where to be ſeen. At his return to Rome, he ſucceeded to the vacant chair of Plotinus, and wrote the life of that venerated teacher, which may be regarded alſo as a ſatisfactory delineation of his own character. In this piece of biography, the fanaticiſm of both is placed in the ſtrongeſt light, ſince Porphyry tells us that Plotinus, by following the means preſcribed in Plato's Sympoſium, was rapt into divine extaſy, carried out of the body, and intellectually united with the firſt tranſcendent deity; an event which, he ſays, alſo happened to himſelf in his ſixty-eighth year.[p]

Porphyry diſappears from hiſtory towards the cloſe of Diocleſian's reign, and before a third part of the time had elapſed that is occupied by the long ſucceſſion of *divine men* as they are called by their diſciples and by each other. But as the celebrity of the ſect attained its ſummit in this extravagant viſionary, we ſhall not detail the lives of Iamblichus of Chalcis in Cœloſyria, the ſcholar of Porphyry; of Ædeſius and Chryſanthius, philoſophers and oracles of

An.Dom. 303.

[o] Præfulgebant Caſſius atque Brutus, eo ipſo, quod effigies eorum non viſebantur. Tacitus, Annal. iii. 76.

[p] Vit. Plotin. p. 137. The Socratic ſchool uniformly taught that men ſadly miſtake their real intereſt, when they are tempted to prefer the body to the mind, pleaſure to virtue, or time to eternity. But it was the misfortune and peculiar diſgrace of the Platonicians to mix with thoſe noble leſſons, a ſpurious maſs of groſs and palpable error; and thereby unwarily to expoſe them to the ſneer of worldly-minded craft, and the rude ſcoffs of brutiſh ſenſuality. Ariſtotle frequently obſerves, that the cauſe of truth is never more deeply injured than by introducing falſehood in its train; ſince in removing the latter, the former is alſo carried away and loſt.

the

the Emperor Julian; and of the famed ſcholar of Iamblichus, Plutarch the Athenian; by whom the new Platonic ſchool was tranſlated to his native country; and the groves of the Academy, with the hallowed banks of the Iliſſus, thenceforth uſurped by his followers, Syrianus the Egyptian, Proclus the Lycian, Marinus of Naples, Iſidorus of Gaza, and Damaſcius of Damaſcus; all of them once celebrated philoſophers, and all as remote from Athens in lineage and country, as they are unlike to the genuine ornaments of that city in genius and character.

Proclus the Lycian.

After Plotinus and Porphyry, Proclus the Lycian forms the moſt conſpicuous link in the Platonic chain, both for the ſtrength of his powers and his ſtrange miſapplication of them[q]. His life is written in the true ſpirit of the ſect by his ſcholar Marinus, who, in the hope of adorning his fame, deſcribes him by ſtrokes exhibiting alternately the impoſtor Apollonius and the fanatic Porphyry. Damaſcius has indeed an inferior ſubject in the life of his maſter Iſidore of Gaza, but he treats it with nearly equal pre-eminence of myſticiſm and folly[r]. Iſidore and Damaſcius were the laſt teachers in the Platonic academy, whoſe revenues were ſequeſtered and its ſchools ſilenced in the old age of Iſidore[s], by the Emperor Juſtinian; neither the firſt nor the laſt example in hiſtory when

[q] Procli Vita; Scriptore Marino Neapolitano. Hamburg. 1700. Conf. pp. 7. 43. 45. 53. 55. & 69.

[r] Photius, Biblioth. cod. clxxxi. p. 407. & cod. ccxlii. p. 1027.

[s] Conf. Johan. Malala. vol. ii. p. 187. & Aſſeman. Biblioth. Orient. iii. p. 404.

dangerous

dangerous follies have been punifhed under the ufurped name of philofophy.

Specific tenets of the Platonicians.

Having dwelt fo long on the *hiftory* of the Platonicians, I fhall reduce within a narrow compafs what remains to be faid concerning their *fpecific tenets*. Upon a careful analyfis of their writings, the whole of their pretended philofophy will be found to refolve itfelf into the two great doctrines of theurgy and perfectibility; the former of which has loft all credit within the two laft centuries, and the latter has vainly ftruggled for revival under the vifionaries of the prefent times. Taking for their foundation Plato's *Ideas* and his *Dæmon World*, commented and amplified by the philofophical legends through which Greek learning began fhortly after the age of Alexander the Great to be amalgamated with Afiatic fables and Egyptian fuperftition, the later Platonifts raifed a ftrange and motley edifice, bulky without greatnefs, and dazzling without real or fteady fplendour. They invented new and endlefs orders of dæmons and dæmonides [t], with whom they were all of them more converfant than with their defpifed fellow-creatures and miferable embodied brethren. According to their fanciful notions, all things in the univerfe being linked in the invifible chain of fympathies and antipathies,

[t] Jamblich. de Myfter. Egypt. vii. & xi.: Plotin. Ennead. paffim: and Paoclus' commentary on Plato with his Platonic theology; which fcience he confiders as handed down through Pythagoras from the Thracian Orpheus and the Egyptian Hermes. *ἁ γαρ Ορφευς δ' αποῤῥητων λογιων μυςικως παρεδωκε, ταυτα Πυθαγορας εξεμάθεν*, &c. Proclus in Tim. l.v. p.291.

antipathies[u], every object was qualified for operating on another, and might be made powerfully so to operate by men skilled in the theurgic art. Thence the ineffable energies, unobserved by vulgar minds, in certain classes of minerals, plants, and animals; in the various compositions and images of those original productions of nature; above all, in mysterious forms of words, revealed by the gods themselves to pious Barbarians, and which cannot be translated into the smoothness of the Greek tongue, without losing their controlling power and supernatural authority[x]. As all things in the world operated on all, and each agent produced its specific effect, so all things, also, were signs of all and each event predicted its most remote consequence. Thence the various modes of divination, particularly by the stars and by dreams, through which the pious theurgist might obtain complete information concerning the secrets of futurity. He had, moreover, certain orders of dæmons always at his call[y], though he was sometimes disturbed by dæmonides of a different class, and occasionally possessed or inspired by every kind

[u] ἡ συμφωνια των ὁμοιων και ἡ εναντιωσις των ανομοιων, &c. Jamblich. de Myst. iv. 6.

[x] Id. ibid. xi. 12 & 15.

[y] The part of theurgy remained in force towards the end of the 15th century of which we have an example in the famous Hermolaus Barbarus, the admired friend of Lorenzo de' Medicis, ambassador of the Republic of Venice to Innocent VIII.; and by that pope created patriarch of Aquileia. Hermolaus called up a dæmon to explain the meaning of the word εντελεχεια in Aristotle's physics; but the devil disappointed him by answering in too low a voice. Petrus Crinitus de Honest. Disciplin. vi. 11. and xv. 9.; and Bayle's Dictionary, artic. Barbarus.

of

of ſpirit ſave that of plain ſenſe and unclouded reaſon. Even Porphyry, " the learned and enlightened Porphyry," ſpeaks of the workings of evil dæmons in language that would diſgrace the ſillieſt bigot in the darkeſt ages of popiſh ſuperſtition[z]. Conformably with the precept of this great luminary of the ſect, " that the ſage ſhould totally abſtract himſelf from all other concerns to dedicate his whole ſoul to divine contemplations and theurgic works," each member of the Platonic fraternity endeavoured to ſurpaſs his brethren by new and bolder diſcoveries in the ſpiritual world; accumulating gods on gods, and virtues on virtues; gods not only immaterial, but gods clothed in matter, over whom incantation diſplayed its moſt abſolute power; and virtues till then undiſcovered in the ſchools; theoretic, theurgic, ſoul-purifying, contemplative, and divine[a], all of which ſprang

[z] Porphyry, in the beginning and in the end of his letter to Anebo the Egyptian, ſpeaks as if he had ſeen through the cheat: μηπω δαιμων ιδιος μερος τι της ψυχης ειη, &c., and again, αἱ τε λιτανιαι, &c. " Whether each man's dæmon be not merely a part of his ſoul, and that *he* is truly poſſeſſed with a good dæmon, who has a wiſe and well regulated mind." But as this letter of Porphyry was written long before his Life of Plotinus, the doctrine contained there may be conſidered as his laſt word. The progreſs of his inconſiſtent mind was directly the reverſe of that conjectured of Socrates in the following ſplendid but illogical paſſage in Gibbon's Hiſtory, vol. v. p. 250. " From enthuſiaſm to impoſture the ſtep is perilous and ſlippery. The dæmon of Socrates affords a memorable inſtance how a wiſe man may deceive himſelf, how a good man may deceive others, how the conſcience may ſlumber in a mixed and middle ſtate between ſelf-illuſion and voluntary fraud." But if Socrates was deceived himſelf, he could not deceive others, in the ſenſe in which it is remarkable that a good man ſhould practiſe deceit.

[a] ετι δε τας ὑπερ ταυτα καθαρτικας τε και θεωρητικας και τας ἐτι καλουμενας θεουργικας· τας δ' ετι ανωτερω τουτων σιωπησαντες, &c. Marinus in Vit. Procl. p. 4.

up

up with rich luxuriance under the worſt corruptions of imperial deſpotiſm, though even their names had remained unknown during the purity and manly ſimplicity of the ancient commonwealths. But the virtues of the Platonicians are as unſubſtantial as the reſt of their philoſophy, ſince they are founded on diſtinctions that contain not any real difference, and are needleſsly multiplied by vague expreſſions and obſcure circumlocutions, which, when reduced to preciſe terms, preſent exactly the ſame identical ſenſe. The main end of their philoſophy was to attain intellectual union with God[b], and thus to ſee all truths at one glance in the divine underſtanding[c]. Deity, they myſteriouſly deſcribe as every where and no where; penetrating and ſuſtaining all things, yet in nothing preſent and ever totally unmixed: as the unity of unities, the root of being, the perennial fountain of ſpiritual exiſtences; and the more irreverently they ſtrove in this myſtical language to exalt the Creator, the more material became their images, and the wilder the contradictions in which they were inextricably involved[d]. In deſcending from the giddy heights of their incomprehenſible theology to the intellectual and moral powers of man, the Platonicians con-

[b] εν ὁλῳ τῳ δημιουργικῳ Θεῳ την ψυχην εντιθεναι. Lib. De Myſter. p. 177.

[c] ταις νοεραις ενεργειαις θεωμενη τα εν τω θειῳ νῳ παραδειγματα. Marin. in Vit. Procl. p. 53.

[d] ὁ Θεος πανταχȣ και ȣδαμȣ, &c. Porphyr. de non necand. ad epuland. Animal.: ſee ſtill more wild inconſiſtency in his treatiſe περι των προς τα νοητα αφορμων, joined to the laſt cited work, Florence 1548.

fuſedly

fuſedly jumble[e] the Stagirite's clear deductions from patient obſervation with the airy hypotheſes of Plato, whom they denominated his divine maſter. The continual object indeed of the whole ſchool, from Ammonius downwards, was to reconcile[f] Ariſtotle with Plato, and to prove that in all capital ſpeculations, their tenets perfectly coincided; in other words, that the philoſopher of Greece, whoſe rational piety was ſingularly exempt from ſuperſtition, and whoſe ſtrong reaſon oppoſed and curbed fancy with a firm rein, patronized the fond illuſions of an amiable enthuſiaſt, whoſe rich exuberance of wit and learning enabled him deeply to impreſs on others the viſions that floated in his own exalted imagination, and which, however beautiful and charming when arrayed by his plaſtic art, degenerated into nakedneſs and deformity under his unworthy followers.

It was the diſtinction and the ſhame of the Platonicians to carry their ſpeculative follies into the affairs of common life, and to interweave them with their daily habits of converſation and action. Aſpiring beyond the imperfect condition of humanity, Plotinus and Porphyry longed to be diveſted of the body; and fancied, as we have ſeen, that they ſometimes attained to this deſired pitch of exſtatic felicity. Ædeſius,

[e] Examples of this frequently occur in Syrianus' Commentary on Ariſtotle's Metaphyſicks, and in Philoponus' Introduction to his Interpretation of the invaluable treatiſe De Anima.

[f] Thence Proclus was called "utriuſque philoſophi glutinum." I. C. Scaliger in Lib. Ariſtot. de Plantis.

 a favou-

a favourite philoſopher of the emperor Julian, told the royal and credulous apoſtate, that when he had completely imbibed the Platonic doctrines, he would be aſhamed of his birth, and bluſh at being called a man[g]. Proclus, one of the deepeſt of thoſe teachers of darkneſs, profeſſed himſelf an adept in all myſteries; converſed familiarly with Pan and Æſculapius; worſhipped with their appropriate rites the gods of all nations, even of the Arabian Nomades; and undertook by Chaldæan oracles and Orphic hymns

[g] Eunapius in Vit. Chryſanth. Plato ſays divinely, "The two fountains of pleaſure and pain perpetually flow; upon our beſeeming uſe of which, and our ſkill in drawing from them reſpectively, on fit occaſions, and in due meaſure, the happineſs or miſery of life will perpetually depend." De Legib. l. i. p. 776. What do his myſtical followers ſay? "There are two poiſonous and enchanted wells, through which men are rendered forgetful of their paſt ſtate, and regardleſs of their future deſtiny. Through the faſtenings, and as it were the cramps of pain, and ſtill more of pleaſure, the ſoul is riveted to the body, and the material part augmented and invigorated at the expence of the intellectual. Pleaſure therefore is always to be ſhunned; with its firſt emotions our intellectual faculties begin to ſuffer decay, and by any liberal indulgence in it, are irrecoverably loſt. Porphyr. de Abſtinen. i. 30. Synes. de Inſomniis, p. 15. Plotin. & Procl. paſſim. By the ingraftment of ſuch extravagant abſurdities on their maſter's philoſophy, did the Platonicians expoſe themſelves to the reproach of weakening the cauſe of truth by a crude admixture of palpable error. The ſame unnatural ſpeculations were carried to an extravagant pitch by the Jewiſh ſect of the Eſſenes. (Joſephus de Bell. Judaic. ii. 8 and Antiq. xviii. 1.) whoſe falſe philoſophy St. Paul condemns in the ivth chapter of the Philippians and 2d of the Coloſſians. The 23d and 24th verſes of Coloſſ. ii. are not clearly tranſlated in our Bibles. The words mean "that the ordinances with regard to meat and drink, &c. are according to the doctrines of men, bearing a ſhew of wiſdom, humility, and *voluntary worſhip*, (or, in the language of later times, "of works of ſupererogation,") but denying due honour to the body by withholding the things requiſite to its ſupport." A ſpurious Platoniſm had in conſequence of the Macedonian dominion in the Eaſt been early introduced among the Jews. In the apocryphal book intitled "the Wiſdom of Solomon," we find even the technical expreſſions employed by the Greek adepts in that myſtic philoſophy.

hymns to avert or cure the numerous infirmities of mind and body.[h]

Style of the Platonicians.

The ſtyle of the Platonicians muſt be acknowledged an expreſs image of their thoughts; intricate, loaded, deformed by the monſtrous coinage of new words, or the ſtrange miſapplication of old ones. In the whole of the golden chain there is not one luminous link. Porphyry's famous work againſt eating animal food, and both his and Iamblicus' life of Pythagoras contain indeed ſome leſs exceptionable paſſages patched and joined together from the fabulous writers above mentioned under the Ptolemies. But where themſelves are the ſole authors, few pages will be found in any of the Platonicians, which are not either diſgraced by palpable contradictions or involved in impenetrable darkneſs[i]. In the dialogues of Plato their pretended maſter, as well as in the various writings of his more legitimate diſciples, Cicero, and Seneca, and Plutarch, philoſophy is enlivened by hiſtory, and the dryneſs of abſtract ſpeculation perpetually relieved by references to the momentous concerns of public or private life. But the Platonicians ſhut their eyes to the tranſactions of the times, and even to the objects immediately

[h] Proclus uſed often to ſay that if it depended on him, theſe (counterfeit) hymns and (ſpurious) oracles, together with Plato's Timæus, ſhould be the only works of the ancients freely permitted to the uſe of the public; becauſe forſooth, other writings hurt ſome people who read them unadviſedly, Ειωθει δε πολλακις λεγειν, &c. Marinus, p. 94.—A paſſage worthy of the Caliph Omar!

[i] Eunapius acknowledges that Porphyry's writings tranſcend human thought, yet he extols his ſtyle as perſpicuous compared with that of Plotinus. Eunap. in Vit. Sophiſt. pp. 17, & 18.

 around

around them. In proud difdain of the inferior powers of our nature, they fcorn to be at all indebted to the fenfes or the fancy. Their inharmonious and diftorted compofitions are without colour to allure, or form to fix, or grace to captivate; and therefore, were their matter even praifeworthy, their manner only would expofe them to the cenfure which Cicero paffes on authors[k] of an oppofite fect, but fimilar in point of ftyle, that they grofsly abufed the benefits both of learning and of leifure.

The Platonicians coeval with the decrepitude of Reafon and Manhood.

It may feem extraordinary that a fucceffion of men, deferving only of ridicule or of pity, fhould have been held in great eftimation by their contemporaries for upwards of three centuries. But the Platonicians were coeval with the decrepitude of reafon as well as manhood, fince they began and flourifhed amidft the corruptions that enfued after the Roman world had been deformed by conflicting ufurpers, overwhelmed by defolating barbarians, and remained in every province a prey to a brutal foldiery, as formidable to the tyrants whom they alternately exalted and debafed, as thofe tyrants themfelves were terrible to cowardly flaves or vanquifhed rivals. Through the peftilent intrigues of courts, or the acclamations of venal multitudes, men deftitute of talent obtained power, and men devoid of tafte acquired vogue and fafhion. The

[k] The firft Epicurean writers among the Romans. See Tufculan. Quæft. i. 3. "Sed mandare quemquam literis cogitationes fuas, qui eas nec difponere nec illuftrare poffit, nec delectatione aliquâ allicere lectorem, hominis eft intemperanter abutentis et otio et literis." Tufculan. Quæft. i. 3.

roftrum, which Cicero had ennobled, was occupied by brawling advocates equally repulfive in ftyle, and abject in fentiment. Contemptible fophifts filled the gardens and porticoes, ftill adorned by the names of ancient fages. In the narrative of even recent events, truth and probability were moft impudently violated, and the rules of juft compofition as completely difregarded as if they had never been eftablifhed; the fole object of the difgufting romances given as hiftories of the times, being to flatter princes unworthy to reign, minifters incapable of deliberation, and generals unfit for execution. Such is the faithful picture[l] of Grecian and Roman degeneracy towards the clofe of the fecond century; a picture which continually affumed darker fhades, until the total eclipfe of fenfe and reafon in the *theurgic* myfteries of the Platonic fchool.

The Platonicians, after the abolition of their fchools by Juftinian, remove to the Eaft.

This fchool, having reigned upwards of three hundred years in Alexandria, in Rome, and in Athens, was filenced, as we have feen, by Juftinian towards the middle of the fixth century[m]. To avoid the farther perfecution of this intolerant emperor, Damafcius and Ifidore, the laft Platonic teachers in Athens, with five other philofophers of their fect, fought refuge in the court of Chofroes king of Perfia, expecting to be received with ftill higher honours in that

[l] See the works of Lucian throughout. He was the only writer of tafte in his age; and the juftnefs of his fatire is confirmed by every monument of the times.

[m] Johan. Malala, vol. ii. p. 404.

country under the revived authority of the Magi, than their precurſor Apollonius[n] had been five centuries before, while thoſe wiſe men of the Eaſt, the ſuppoſed maſters of Pythagoras and Plato, ſtill groaned under the deſpotiſm of the Parthians. But here their illuſion ended. The Magi were not thoſe profound philoſophers that they had been taught to believe. The Platonicians were offended at their impious cuſtom, which had prevailed before the days of Herodotus[o], of expoſing their dead bodies to dogs and vultures. They were diſguſted alſo with the inceſtuous marriages of the Perſians, their plurality of wives and concubines; the pride of their nobles, the ſervility of their courtiers; and determined therefore, with one conſent, to return and die on the frontiers of the Roman Empire, rather than longer behold the odious manners of ſuch abominable barbarians[p]. Yet Choſroes gave a leſſon of true wiſdom, far ſurpaſſing all their philoſophy. At his powerful interpoſition, expreſſed in a formal treaty with Juſtinian, the Platonicians were reſcued from the penal ſtatutes enacted againſt Paganiſm by that magnificent but ill-adviſed emperor, and permitted to end their days in peaceful obſcurity[q]. In that condition their names alſo might remain, did not one of the number, Simplicius the Cilician, form a noble exception to the

Reception there.

Simplicius the Cilician.

[n] Philoſtrat. Vit. Apollon. p. 28—41.

[o] Herodot. i. 140.

[p] Agathias, l. ii. p. 69, & ſeq.

[q] Id. ibid.

myſticiſm

myſticiſm and folly of his brethren. But Simplicius, though connected with the Platonicians by his age and fortune, daily nouriſhed his mind with the works of ancient and more genuine philoſophers. In explaining, indeed, Ariſtotle's abſtruſer doctrines on phyſicks and theology, he is often betrayed by the whims of the eclectics and the faſhion of the times[r]; but in his excellent comment on the morals of Epictetus, we perpetually ſee the paradoxical roughneſs of ſtoiciſm ſmoothed into plain and ſound ſenſe by the *ſure* concluſions of the Stagirite, becauſe flowing ſpontaneouſly from a copious and pure ſource of well-digeſted experience.

Adoption of Greek philoſophy by the Arabs.

The abolition of the Platonic academy by Juſtinian, did not deſtroy the credit of the ſect itſelf. The wildeſt viſions of the Platonicians were greedily adopted by the credulous Greeks of the declining empire of Conſtantinople, and by them frequently combined[s] with the ſpurious Chriſtianity long prevalent in that gloomy and corrupt capital. While the Abaſſides held the Caliphat of the Saracens in the eighth century, they failed not to obſerve the ſuperiority of their

[r] Vid. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. vol. viii. p. 622. That he gave into the mode of allegorical interpretation, appears from the following ſhort ſentence, containing the juſt praiſe of Ariſtotle's perſpicuity: ουδε μυθοις ουδε συμβολικοις αινιγμασι ὡς των προ αυτου τινες εχρησαντο, αλλ' αντι παντος αλλου παραπετασματος την σαφειαν προετιμησε. Simplic. in Procem. Lib. των κατηγοριων. "He made not any uſe of fables, or dark ſymbols, like ſome philoſophers before him, but preferred perſpicuity to every other ornament."

[s] A remarkable ſpecimen of this mixture may be ſeen in the elaborate work of Michael Pſellus περι ενεργειας δαιμονων, "concerning the operation of devils." Pſellus was the favourite of the emperor Conſtantine Ducas about the middle of the eleventh century.

Greek ſubjects in learning above the other inhabitants of their vaſt empire. In the year eight hundred and twenty, the caliph Almanon demanded publicly from the Greek emperor Leo V. the moſt inſtructive and moſt precious writings of his countrymen. In the opinion of the Arab, theſe epithets belonged excluſively to works of ſcience or philoſophy, for the idolatry of Greek poets would have ſhocked his pious ears, and the liberty of hiſtorians and orators was incompatible with the ſpirit of his government and the genius of his people, who, as Giannone[t] in relating this paſſage of hiſtory obſerves, never opened their mouths but to praiſe their tyrants. Of all the writings of the ancients, the works of Ariſtotle, as leaſt infected with polytheiſm, moſt delighted the Arabs, after they had become their own through the labours of Honain a Greek phyſician at Bagdad[u], who with the aſſiſtance of his ſons and diſciples carried on there a ſort of manufacture of tranſlations during a conſiderable part of the ninth century.

By them communicated in a corrupt ſtate to the ſcholaſtics.

Thoſe Arabic verſions expreſſed the letter of Greek philoſophy without its ſpirit. In explaining Ariſtotle in particular, the interpreters were entirely guided by the fanciful gloſſes of their Alexandrian predeceſſors, as appears ſufficiently from their copiers and imitators, the German Albertus Magnus, the Italian Thomas Aquinas,

[t] Hiſtoria del Regno de Napoli, vol. ii. p. 93. Edit. Venez. 1766.

[u] Honain died in that city A.D. 876. D'Herbelot Biblioth. Orient. Artic. Honain.

and

and other European ſcholaſtics of the thirteenth century. Thoſe tranſlations of tranſlations gave birth to that ſtrange compound of Gothic and Saracenic darkneſs, brightened occaſionally by a few ſparks of falſe ſubtlety, which long enſlaved the Catholic world under the arrogated title of Ariſtotelian philoſophy[x]; but which, when compared with the genuine works of the great man whoſe name it diſgraced, will be found to contain the huſk of ſcience without the kernel.

Revival of letters in Italy by Greek ambaſſadors and fugitives.

During the intellectual ſlumber of the Weſtern world, Conſtantinople, after being long threatened, was finally conquered by the Turks. The danger and diſtreſs of that city filled Europe with Greeks ſucceſſively craving public aſſiſtance and private protection, but whether they appeared as ambaſſadors or as fugitives, always ready to aſſume the character of profeſſors, and to teach the language and learning of their country in the ſchools of Florence, Rome, and other great cities of Italy[y]. In that country, Manuel Chryſaloras, the Cardinal Beſſarion, and the venerated maſter of both, Gemiſtus Pletho, together with many contemporary Greeks of inferior renown, are

[x] The proſperity of Ariſtoteliſm was not always unclouded. Launoy enumerates eight different revolutions of its authority in the univerſity of Paris. In the year 1209, Ariſtotle's writings were cenſured as the peſtilent ſources of hereſy, and condemned to the flames. In the reign of Francis I. A.D. 1542, the ſame writings were held in ſuch veneration that whoever denied their orthodoxy was perſecuted as an infidel. Launoij de Var. Fortun. Ariſtot. in Academ. Pariſ. Oper. tom. iv. p. 206. Ariſtotle was not concerned either in the glory or diſgrace; the attachment or diſlike was merely to a name.

[y] Hodius de Græcis Illuſtribus, p. 25, & ſeq.

celebrated

celebrated as the revivers of letters in the fifteenth century, and particularly for ſubſtituting, inſtead of the ſcholaſtic philoſophy which then reigned in Chriſtendom, one more graceful and liberal, as well as more accurate and more profound[z]. Without examining minutely how far they are juſtly entitled to this comparative praiſe, it may be obſerved that the new doctrines were warmly embraced by the great and learned in Italy, and by none more zealouſly than the illuſtrious Coſmo de Medici, the conſtant hearer of Gemiſtus Pletho, and the eſtabliſher of the Platonic academy in his native city of Florence; which after enriching it by commerce, he was ambitious to adorn by learning. Of this academy, Marſilius Ficinus continued during four ſucceſſive generations of the Medici to be the ornament, or rather the oracle, having addicted himſelf from early youth to the ſtudy of the new ſcience, and perſevered in it unremittingly through life, uniting and concentrating all the ſcattered rays of the Greek teachers in his tranſlations of Plato and Plotinus, and his elaborate comments on thoſe authors. From the admired writings of Ficinus a juſt eſtimate may be formed of the merits of his Grecian contemporaries; and a very ſlight examination will ſuffice to convince us, that both he and they viewed ancient philoſophy through the deluſive optics of the Alexandrian ſchool. The writings of this learned Italian are deformed by the myſ-

Their philoſophy concentrated by Ficinus;—his errors.

[z] Tiraboſchi, Hiſtor. Litterar. vol. vi. p. 259. & ſeq.

tical

tical virtues of words and numbers, the dreams of aſtrology, the doctrines of perfectibility and theurgy, above all, the corruption of religion by falſe philoſophy, and of philoſophy by falſe religion[a]. The reveries of the Platonicians, thus embodied by Ficinus with Plato's genuine doctrines, found their way into the ſubſequent edition of the works of that philoſopher by Serranus, publiſhed an hundred years afterwards[b] under the auſpices of Henry IV. of France, when better things might have been expected both from the reformation in religion and the advancement of learning. But that which time has conjoined, it is a hard taſk for reaſon to diſſever.

Platonicians wiſhed to revive the exploded ſuperſtitions of Greece.

The tenets of the Alexandrian ſchool, as we have ſeen, were ſometimes interwoven with the ſpurious Chriſtianity of Conſtantinople. The logic of the Weſtern ſcholaſtics, pretended followers of Ariſtotle, long upheld the ſuperſtitious hierarchy of Rome. Thus by a ſtrange fatality, hitherto little remarked, the two great maſters of Socratic philoſophy, whoſe works, properly underſtood, lead men, as it were, to the very threſhold of the goſpel[c], being miſinterpreted, perverted,

[a] Vid. Ficin. de Vitâ cœlitùs comparand. The chapters de virtute verborum ad beneficium cœleſte captandum, &c. breathe the ſpirit of Plotinus' Enneads, not of Plato's Dialogues.

[b] A.D. 1578.

[c] Plato abounds in the rapturous yet rational enforcement of the ſelf-denying, as well as of the more preſumptuous virtues. From this circumſtance chiefly, he is confidently oppoſed to the divine author of our religion by the firſt learned adverſaries of the goſpel, who ſometimes conſider Chriſtianity as a peculiar ſpecies merely of that Oriental or Pythagorean philoſophy, which had been tranſlated, embelliſhed,

perverted, and corrupted, were called in as auxiliaries to ftifle confcience which they had laboured to awake, and to cloud reafon which they were admirably fitted to illumine. But the perverfions of Platonifm, taking their rife, as we have explained, in the incongruous mixture of philofophy and mythology, always continued favourable to the childifh fables of antiquity. As the Platonicians under the Ptolemies exerted themfelves to rivet the chains of paganifm, fo the Platonicians under the Roman emperors combated furioufly to defend it, and the Platonicians, under the Medici, hoped to fee the world refume that exploded fuperftition. Gemiftus Pletho, who affifted at the council of Florence in 1438, maintained in the learned conferences held there, that all mankind would in a few years become of one religion; and being afked "whether the Chriftian or Mahometan?" replied "neither of thefe, but a religion nearly akin to that of the Gentiles:" meaning thereby the mythology of the Greeks improved by the conceits and allegories of the Platonicians.[d]

Hopes of Gemiftus Pletho.

---

embellifhed, and purified in the works of Plato. At the fame time, he is the only heathen philofopher that many Chriftian fathers, after lopping off certain redundancies, were inclined to admit within the pale of the church. But before he could be entitled to this benefit, Plato muft have fubmitted to a dreadful moral circumcifion; and a decifive paffage in his Phædrus (p. 1218. edit. Ficin.), equally unremarked by his admirers and his detractors, will prove how far below the blamelefs purity of the gofpel are the higheft attainments of human reafon, ever liable to be influenced by cuftom, inftitution, and the moft abominable examples of the times.

[d] Leo Allatius de Georgiis apud Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. tom. x. p. 751.

In

Strange letter of Cardinal Beſſarion.

In the popedom of Paul II. ſeveral members of the Platonic academy of Rome were perſecuted for impiety and paganiſm[e]. Perſecution of all kinds is inconſiſtent with Chriſtianity as well as with good policy: but that the charges againſt thoſe Platonicians were not altogether groundleſs, appears from a letter, ſtill extant, of an illuſtrious member of the ſacred college during the reign of Paul II. and four preceding pontiffs. Cardinal Beſſarion, to whom I allude, has been already mentioned as the pupil of Gemiſtus Pletho, and a zealous propagator of his opinions in Italy. Upon the death of this venerated preceptor, the Chriſtian Cardinal thus addreſſes his ſurviving ſons Demetrius and Andronicus: "I have juſt learned that the common father and inſtructor of us all has thrown off his earthly covering, and taken flight to the pure regions of heaven, to join in the myſtic dance of Bacchus with the Olympian Gods. I rejoice in having been the friend and companion of ſuch a man, than whom, after Plato himſelf, Greece cannot boaſt a wiſer. To thoſe who embrace the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the perpetual aſcent and deſcent of ſouls, I ſhould not heſitate to affirm that the ſoul of Plato, bound by the reſiſtleſs laws of fate, had fulfilled the ſtated return of earthly pilgrimage in the body of Pletho, as its fitteſt terreſtrial manſion. You will not act worthily unleſs you rejoice and clap your hands; for it would be

[e] Tiraboſchi, ubi ſupra.

impious

impious to lament ſuch a man; a man who confers glory on Greece, and whoſe glory will never periſh with poſterity."[f]

Roger Bacon.

It may be aſked with juſt ſurprize, whether no voice was raiſed in favour of genuine philoſophy amidſt the groſs corruptions which aſſumed its name, and uſurped its honours? A voice indeed was raiſed, but ſtifled by the barbariſm of the times. The calumniated, perſecuted, and oppreſſed life of Roger Bacon embraced nearly the full extent of the thirteenth century. The greateſt, or rather the only aſtronomer of his age, the reformer of the calendar, the inventor of gunpowder, the contriver of various ſorts of glaſſes, to magnify or diminiſh objects; his diſcoveries inſtead of enlightening, dazzled the weaker eyes of his contemporaries, by whom they were referred to magic and other abominable infernal arts. Of this great man, the real glory of England, the name was afterwards borne by an illuſtrious philoſopher, who rivals his fame, without poſſeſſing any ſhare of his candour. The Chancellor Bacon is continually copying Ariſtotle, and continually abuſing him for the errors of his interpreters and commenters. The more equitable friar maintained that Ariſtotle, rightly underſtood, was the fountain of all knowledge; but aſſerted with equal firmneſs, that thoſe who had undertaken to tranſlate him were totally unequal to the taſk.[g]

[f] Fabricius, tom. x. p. 757.

[g] Vid. Opus Majus, London, 1723. Conf. pp. 45. 262. & 420.

The

Scholaſtics, Nominaliſts and Realiſts.

The juſtneſs of ſuch obſervations will not be diſputed by thoſe who know both the invaluable writings of the Stagirite himſelf, and the vile logomachy which paſſed for ſcience under his venerated name. During the five centuries and a half that the ſcholaſtic philoſophy prevailed, thoſe called the learned, obſtinately ſhut their eyes to the two only genuine ſources of knowledge, nature and antiquity, of both which the works of Ariſtotle contained an unrivalled and exhauſtleſs treaſury. They ſtopped ſhort at his logic, and thus ſtuck as it were at the very threſhold of the noble edifice which he had prepared for the reception of worthy and liberal followers. From the time of Roſcellinus canon of Compiegne in the eleventh century, and his more famous ſcholar Abelard, immortalized by his amorous follies and misfortunes, the ſcholaſtics were divided into the two ſects of Nominaliſts and Realiſts; the former of whom were ſo called becauſe they held the doctrine of univerſals in logic to depend ſolely on *names* or words, and treated the Platonic ideas of the Realiſts as mere illuſions of the fancy. Thenceforward the whole ſucceſſion of ſcholaſtic doctors enliſted under the adverſe ſtandards of Roſcellinus, the reputed founder of the Nominaliſts; and of Anſelm, archbiſhop of Canterbury, who eſpouſed the cauſe of *ideas*, whoſe champions received the correlative appellation of Realiſts. In their fierce and ſcandalous diſputes, which, proceeding from words to blows, often ended in the mutilation and death of the combatants, the name of

of Ariſtotle was continually invoked on both ſides, though both of them moſt flagrantly violated his authority: the Realiſts animating and embodying wild creations of the fancy under the name of ſubſtantial forms, while the Nominaliſts ſubtiliſed all knowledge, even theology itſelf, into ſhadowy notion and mere empty ſound.[h]

Extravagancies of the former traced up to Alexander Aphrodiſienſis.

In theſe two extremes of oppoſite abſurdity, the ſcholaſtics had not the merit or diſgrace of originality. The extravagances of the Realiſts flowed naturally from the Platonic viſions, above explained; and the falſe ſubtleties of the Nominaliſts may be traced more immediately to Alexander Aphrodiſienſis a Greek commentator of Ariſtotle in the time of Septimius Severus and Caracalla, towards the commencement of the third century. Alexander derived the epithet affixed to his name from Aphrodiſias a city of Caria in which he was born, but flouriſhed at Rome and Alexandria as a diſtinguiſhed teacher of Peripatetic philoſophy, until, by the emperor Severus, he was placed at the head of the Lycæum in Athens. By the few who rejected the fanciful gloſſes with which the Platonicians had loaded Ariſtotle's philoſophy, Alexander was called *the Interpreter*, by way of excellence; although he only avoided one extreme, to fall into another equally erroneous and ſtill more dangerous. The reader, who is not poſſeſſed of the works of this famed commentator, may ſee

[h] Vid. Brucker, Hiſtor. Philoſoph. vol. iii. p. 709. His Section de Scholaſticis is one of the leaſt faulty of all thoſe parts of his work which bear any relation to Ariſtotle.

a ſhort

a short and faithful account of them in the Greek library of Fabricius[i]; and he will not proceed far in examining their contents, without perceiving that, with respect to many important questions, the Aphrodisian dogmatises in a manner altogether unwarranted by the text of his admired original. As an example of this audacity, I shall adduce his execrable doctrine concerning the human soul! Alexander on this subject patronises the *fallacious* notion (because contrary to the surest of all things, divine justice) of eternal sleep; asserting with the rash pedantry of an unfeeling scholastic, that those who maintained the soul's immortality lied as manifestly as if they affirmed that two and two made five.

He denies the soul's immortality.

It is not impossible to explain precisely how Alexander came to hold this impious language, at complete variance with the sentiments of his acknowledged master. The Aphrodisian was a decided enemy, as already observed, to *Platonic ideas*, or what the schoolmen afterwards called *substantial forms*; in other words, he denied that general terms had any general corresponding archetypes. In this, he defended genuine philosophy against the Platonicians, since Aristotle continually repeats that, from their agreement in characterizing qualities, various individuals are gathered[k], as it were, and ranged by the

How led into that error in opposition to Aristotle.

[i] L. iv. c. 25.

[k] ὁ λογος ειδος τȢ πραγματος . . και ὁ λογος συγκειται εξ ονοματων. Aristot. de Anima, l. i. c. 1. p. 618. & de Sensu, c. 1. p. 663. The word λογος, here denoting "definition," is derived from the word λεγειν, signifying primarily to gather.

underftanding under one common term, which term has not any feparate archetype or model befide what is found in the different individuals fo marked or named. According to this doctrine, thofe fpecific powers of mind by which man is denominated and diftinguifhed from other animals, have not any feparate archetype or model befide what is found in the different individuals collected under the term " man." Ariftotle fays farther, " that the characterizing qualities, or forms, of many phyfical objects are infeparably combined with matter, becaufe independently of it they could not anfwer any poffible end. Of what ufe would be the nutritive principle in plants, were it not contained in a material fubftance to be nourifhed? To what purpofe would the fierce inftincts of the lion ferve, if feparated from his fangs, his paws, and his brawny members? It is therefore," he obferves, " unreafonable to admit the Pythagorean and Platonic notion concerning the feparate exiftence of fuch forms or fouls, and their perpetual migration from one body to another. The feveral arts can only make ufe of their appropriate inftruments; and in the fame manner different fouls muft have bodies refpectively adapted to them[1]. To interchange them at random, would be not lefs abfurd than to implant the power of building into a flute." Thefe juft obfervations, directed againft the fanciful but popular doctrine of " tranfmigration," which the Greeks with other follies borrowed from the Eaft, bear

[1] Ariftot. de Anima, L. i. c. 3. p. 624.

not,

not, when properly underftood, any relation to the queftion concerning the immortality of the human foul; fince, in Ariftotle's philofophy, the terms "fpecies or form" are applied to whatever ferves to characterize and clafs objects, whether that be merely a fpecific and principal quality; or whether it be a fubftance infeparable from matter becaufe feparately unfit for any end or ufe; or whether it be a fubftance capable of actions and pleafures peculiar to itfelf, and fo totally different from thofe of grofs matter, and any of its variable affections, that, when feparated from this mortal corporeal frame, it will then, and then only, affume its native activity, perfection, and dignity.[m]

Errors in explaining Ariftotle, originating in Greek commentators,

I have thus written a *fhort* account (thinking fuch only would be acceptable) of Ariftotle's *Greek* commentators. The *Arabic* and *Latin* Mr. T. abandons generally to my juft cenfure[n]: but with regard to my opinion of the Greek interpreters, he exclaims, "What! after a period of more than two thoufand years, after the abolition of the Academic and Peripatetic fchools, when philofophy has retired into deep folitude, and even echo no longer anfwers to her lyre, fhall one who is no native of Greece, and who

[m] See the texts cited in my Analyfis, p. 153. The error of Alexander Aphrodifienfis was early feen through. Hence the refpectable obfervation, cafually preferved amidft many reveries; ὅτι Πλατων, φησι, και Αριστοτελης αθανατον ὁμοιως λεγουσι την ψυχην· κἂν τινες εις τον Αριστοτελους νουν ουκ εμβαθυνοντες, θνητην νομιζουσι αυτον λεγειν.—"That Plato and Ariftotle agreed as to the foul's immortality: though fome men, not founding the depths of the Stagirite's philofophy, made him hold a contrary opinion."—Photius, Biblioth. cod. cclix. p. 1318.

[n] Taylor, p. 42., Introduction.

is totally unſkilled, as we have ſeen and ſhall ſtill farther ſee, in the ſublimer parts of Ariſtotle's works, preſume to vilify the writings of men of exalted genius, who devoted their lives to the ſtudy of the Peripatetic and Platonic philoſophy, of which they had a traditional knowledge, and had the felicity of having the Greek for their native tongue, and of being able to conſult books written by the immediate diſciples of Ariſtotle and Plato, and which are now irrecoverably loſt[o]?" If my time was miſpent in peruſing ſuch writers, my adverſary aſſures the public, "that it was becauſe I did not underſtand them[p]." Concerning this accuſation, the reader will decide: I ſhall only obſerve that, if my "Analyſis of Ariſtotle is more conſiſtent and ſatisfactory[q]" than other accounts of his philoſophy, it derives theſe advantages ſolely from my rejecting foreign aid, and making this ineſtimable writer a perpetual commentary on himſelf. How far Mr. T. has enlightened the world by purſuing an oppoſite courſe, will appear from his work throughout, and may be diſcerned even in the firſt page of his Tranſlation. Under the guidance of his *divine Plotinus*, he

[o] Taylor, p.43, Introduction.

[p] Ibid.

[q] I arrogate not thoſe epithets to my own performance, but refer to the general voice of public criticiſm in the years 1798 and 1799: the Monthly, Critical, and Analytical Reviews, the Antijacobin and the Britiſh Critic. Mr. T. will perhaps ſcorn this verdict of "Reviewers," whoſe "dull impertinence and ſavage malevolence" he bitterly complains of, p.51. Naughty Reviewers! whoſe *dullneſs*, *impertinence*, and *malevolence*, could inſult ſo *lively*, *modeſt*, and *candid* a writer, as Mr. Taylor muſt by this time appear to be!

maintains at the outset, a propofition contradictory both to the spirit and the letter of the whole of Ariftotle's philofophy. His propofition is, "that no action is defirable for its own fake;" adding, "that Plotinus beautifully proves that all things defire contemplation, and verge to this as their end; not only rational, but alfo irrational animals, plants, and whatever participates of life, however debile and obfcure[r]." Sublime truths! far exalted above ordinary comprehenfion, which the bright intellect of Plotinus alone could produce and hatch, and the congenial underftanding of Mr. T. adopt and cherifh!

and in Latin tranfla-tions.

If that tranflator of "the Metaphyficks" had been as fkilful in Greek as he is profound in philofophy, he would not have recommended, as effential[s] to the right underftanding of Ariftotle, the commentary of Alexander Aphrodifienfis. Alexander's commentary on the Metaphyficks now exifts only in a Latin verfion; and cannot therefore afford much affiftance to a man capable of reading the Greek original, and who wifhes to convey its fenfe clearly, to his countrymen, in their native tongue. For it has often been truly obferved, "that Latin tranflations from the Greek are feldom intelligible, except where their affiftance is fuperfluous to a Greek fcholar: they glide over difficulties with impunity; when they cannot refolve, they elude them; enfolding their ænigmas in plaufible founds, which often

[r] Taylor's Metaphyfics, p. 1.
[s] Introduction, pp. 24. 54. & paffim.

fail to convey any determinate meaning[t]."
This criticiſm applies with peculiar force to the Latin commentary of Alexander Aphrodiſienſis, as well as to all the other Latin interpretations of Ariſtotle, that I have ever happened to examine.

Concluſion in anſwer to Mr. Taylor's ſtrictures.

The nature and ſcope of my literary labours are ſo totally different from thoſe of Mr. Taylor, that it is not eaſy to underſtand how our roads could croſs, or why he ſhould ſtep forth as my determined antagoniſt. Utility, common and vulgar utility, above which that ſublime author proudly ſoars, was my great or rather ſole aim. Ariſtotle's Ethics to Nicomachus had long appeared to me, and to far ſuperior judges, the moſt inſtructive and moſt perſuaſive ſyſtem of practical morality which the world had ever received from an uninſpired pen: his Politics, alſo, are not leſs advantageouſly diſtinguiſhed, ſince they contain excluſively the correct and genuine elements of a ſcience, often cramped by the narrowneſs of ſyſtem, and often perverted by its wildneſs; above all, recently poiſoned by doctrines dangerous in every age, but, taken in conjunction with the events of the preſent, fraught with unſpeakable miſchief to our own and ſucceeding generations. In hope of being uſeful to my country by ſeaſonable ſervice, I ſuſpended a literary undertaking of far more allurement, in which having ſpent a dozen years of my life, I am ſtill diligently employed; and endeavoured to tranſlate for the firſt time the Sta-

[t] See preface to my tranſlations of Lyſias and Iſocrates.

girite's

girite's two moſt valuable treatiſes, popularly, to obtain readers, and faithfully, to deſerve them.

But before offering my work to the public, it occurred to me that ethics, and ſtill more, politics, belong not to that claſs of ſciences, which contain their evidence ſo completely in themſelves, as to diſdain all ſupport from authority. To the ſtudent in Euclid's Elements, it is not material to know under what condition of ſociety and among what ſort of men that mathematician lived, and in what degree of eſteem his talents or his virtues were held by his contemporaries. To the reader of Ariſtotle's Politics, the ſame queſtions are not unimportant. Beſides a tranſlation of thoſe practical works in which my author's intellectual exertions are ſtill unrivalled, I therefore thought proper to give a general account of his life and writings, (not omitting his Phyſics and Metaphyſics,) that his undeviating worth of character and real preeminence in abſtract ſcience might appear in a ſtriking light; and thereby his moral and political leſſons, inſtead of being invalidated by the trifling ſubtleties or glaring abſurdities erroneouſly aſcribed to him, might derive due weight from his virtues as a man, and his attainments as a philoſopher. Amidſt the unparalleled multitude of books, of which my author has been the ſubject, had I known of any thing in any language anſwering the deſign of the "Analyſis" which has provoked Mr. Taylor's ſtrictures, I ſhould moſt willingly have referred to it, and

 thus

thus have ſpared myſelf an unpromiſing and very difficult taſk. But, in the want of better performances from others, I endeavoured, with as much brevity as the ſubject would admit, to explain the nature and end of Ariſtotle's *ſpeculative philoſophy;* an undertaking eſſential to my main purpoſe of impreſſing with full force *momentous practical truths.*

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK I.

THE poet Gray writes thus in a letter to a friend: "For my part I read Ariftotle, his poetics, politics, and morals; though I do not know well, which is which. In the firft place, he is the hardeft author by far I ever meddled with. Then he has a dry concifenefs, that makes one imagine one is perufing a table of contents rather than a book: it taftes for all the world like chopped hay, or rather like chopped logic; for he has a violent affection for that art, being in fome fort his own invention; fo that he often lofes himfelf in little trifling diftinctions and verbal niceties; and what is worfe, leaves you to extricate him as well as you can. Thirdly, he has fuffered vaftly from the tranfcribers, as all authors of great brevity neceffarily muft. Fourthly and laftly, he has abundance of fine uncommon things, which make him well worth the pains he gives one." See Gray's Letters.

In

In this firſt book, our author ſays "abundance of fine uncommon things," on the ſubjects of human nature, virtue, and happineſs. His mode of compoſition, however, is ſo totally different from that to which the caprice of faſhion has given its temporary ſanction, that much labour and much ſkill muſt be employed, to adapt the form of his work to the taſte of modern readers; to whom both his method and his ſtyle, which formerly appeared to deſerve admiration[a], may now ſeem to demand apology. His method requires, that every ſubject of diſcuſſion ſhould be accurately defined, and completely divided; and that, how complex ſoever its nature may be, the compound ſhould be reſolved into its conſtituent elements; viewed in its birth and origin; and examined, in all its various modifications and changes, intenſions or remiſſions, augmentations or diminutions. This mode of proceeding appeared to him peculiarly uſeful in moral and political queſtions, whoſe connections and relations are ſo intimate and ſo extenſive, that erroneous concluſions, on ſuch ſubjects, proceed far more frequently from narrowneſs of ſurvey, than from inaccuracy of reaſoning. In practical matters above all, this full and comprehenſive examination ſeemed indiſpenſably neceſſary, to prevent haſty deciſion, to inſpire cautious diſtruſt; and thus to arreſt the progreſs of paſſion and frenzy in a mad career which, longer indulged in, might leave them without retreat.

[a] Cicero, Topic. c. i. p. 171. edit. Olivet. & paſſim.

But,

But, with whatever other advantages a treatife written with this ftrictnefs and feverity of method may be accompanied, it certainly is not calculated to afford *gratuitous* information. To apprehend its meaning diftinctly, and to perceive its full fcope, demands much attention and much reflection on the part even of the reader. His patience is likely to be foon exhaufted by the too painful tafk; efpecially if his tafte has been corrupted by thofe flowery and fallacious productions of the times, whofe authors (men of narrow views and felfifh minds, and fo long habituated to party politics, that they have loft all relifh, and almoft all perception of truth,) are contented to confound and darken a whole region of fcience, provided they can throw a falfe glare on one favourite and fafhionable fpot. This darling topic they exert themfelves to beautify and illumine; adorning with all the tinfel of rhetoric, and all the embroidery of declamation, the dangerous inference that is drawn from their erroneous, becaufe imperfect, argument. Nothing can be more fmooth or more eafily followed by the reader, than the whole progrefs of their difcourfe. But the very circumftance which renders it fo eafy and fo popular, alfo makes it of no value. The fubject has been confidered under one partial afpect; a different view of it is taken; the incomplete theory is attacked by another equally imperfect; and both of them fo flimfy and cloud-built, that they are unable to withftand even the foft mutual affaults of their adverfe debility.

Yet

Yet each party triumphs for a while in the bubble of its own creating, and vainly deems it irrefiftible; a falfe confidence, that often gives birth to the greateft practical errors. Ariftotle's method is directly the reverfe: his works require attention, but they repay it: they will fully compenfate, in folid inftruction, for their defect (if it may be called one) in point of delufive entertainment.

The Stagirite's ftyle is not lefs unfafhionable than his method. It difplays not any allurements to catch the reader's fancy; it difdains every attempt to excite furprife, to provoke mirth, to inflame, footh, or gratify paffion. The thirft for knowledge is the only want which the author profeffes to fupply; and this thirft, he was of opinion, will ever be beft quenched in the clear ftream of unadorned reafon; as that water is the pureft and moft falutary, which has neither tafte nor colour.

Ariftotle did not, like his mafter Plato, banifh poets from his Republic. He himfelf courted the Lyric mufe, and reached her loftieft flights. But he never underftood by what perverfity of purpofe the agreeable illufions of poetry could be affociated and mixed with the fober fcience of politics. In all practical matters, he knew the danger of faying any thing to the heart and paffions, which would not bear to be examined by the light of the underftanding. In tranflating incomparably the moft valuable part of his works, I have attempted therefore to imitate his precifion and energy, as far as that can be done without

without leaving the fainteſt trace of his obſcurity. My aim throughout is to adhere rigidly to his ſenſe; to omit nothing which he ſays; to ſay nothing which he has omitted; but to endeavour, to the beſt of my abilities, to expreſs his meaning, agreeably as well as forcibly; ſince a mere verbal tranſlation would convey not only an inadequate, but often a very falſe, impreſſion of the Greek original.

Words, as our author teaches, are both the ſigns of things, and the materials in which our compariſons, abſtractions, and concluſions concerning thoſe things are embodied. The words of one language, therefore, will often be very imperfectly expreſſed by thoſe of another; and the more complex their ſignifications are, the diverſities between them will naturally be the wider. To the terms employed in the ſciences of Ethics and Politics, this obſervation is peculiarly applicable. The original term, and that by which it is tranſlated, not comprehending exactly the ſame identical notions, the Engliſh word which correſponds to the Greek in one of its meanings, will often not expreſs it in another. The phraſeology, therefore, muſt be occaſionally varied; and the ambition to attain propriety and excellence will thus ſometimes give to a tranſlation the appearance of looſeneſs and inaccuracy. In many caſes, exact equivalents to ſingle Greek words are not to be found either in Engliſh, or in any other language. One term, therefore, muſt frequently be rendered by ſeveral; and the tranſlation, neceſſarily degenerating

generating into a paraphrafe, will often gain in perfpicuity and popularity, what it lofes in precifion and energy[b]. From the philofophical arrangement of the Greek tongue, and the fingular fondnefs of Greek writers for abftract and univerfal conclufions, words denoting the higher genera or claffes, are employed by them on many occafions, when terms more fpecific would anfwer the purpofe better, and found more gracefully, in Englifh. With regard to this particular, I have fometimes ventured to prefer to ftrictnefs of verfion, a compliance with the genius of modern tongues, and with the tafte of modern readers.

My principal defign and only ambition is to convey, in the prefent ftate of public opinion with refpect to fundamental principles, a clear notion of thofe writings of the Stagirite which he intitled his "Philofophy concerning Human Affairs[c]." His Ethics, I believe, few men will read without becoming the better; and his Politics, I think, no ftatefman can ftudy, without

[b] When the Greek language was more familiarly known than it is at prefent, Ariftotle's ftyle was acknowledged by the beft critics to poffefs the higheft of all merits, that of conveying his deep and various wifdom always in the fitteft terms. Dicendi quoque incredibili quadam cum copia, tum etiam fuavitate. Cicero, Topic. c. i. p. 171. edit. Oliveti. Quintilian fpeaks to the fame purpofe: Quid Ariftotelem? quem dubito fcientiâ rerum, an fcriptorum copiâ, an eloquendi fuavitate, an inventionum acumine, an varietate operum, clariorem puto. "Why need I mention Ariftotle? concerning whom I am in doubt, whether he is rendered more illuftrious by the magnitude and variety of his writings, his univerfal fcience, the acutenefs of his inventions, or the fuavity of his diction." Quintil. Inf. Orat. l. x. c. i. p. 224. edit. Bipont.

[c] ἡ περι τα ανθρωπινα φιλοσοφια.

becoming

becoming the wiser. But the corrupt and mutilated state of his works compelled me, reluctantly, to use some freedom with their form, in order the more completely to preserve their substance. In different books, and even in different chapters of the same book, the same thoughts often recur in nearly the same words. These useless repetitions, proceeding commonly from the fault of unskilful editors, I thought it my duty to retrench; and continually to aim at selecting that expression in which the sense is most fully conveyed. A translation is a portrait; but that the portrait may please, the original should be shown with its most becoming expression, and in its best attitudes.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Human action—Operations and productions—Happiness—Opinions concerning it—It consists in virtuous energies—Proved by induction—Solon's saying concerning it explained—Analysis of our moral powers.

BOOK I. Chap. 1.

Human action terminates either in operations or in productions.

SINCE every art and every kind of knowledge, as well as all the actions and all the deliberations of men constantly aim at something which they call good; good, in general, may be justly defined, "that which all desire." But among the various ends and purposes of our activity and pursuit, there is this important difference, that some consist merely in operations, and others chiefly in productions. Of those arts or actions of which production is the chief end, the work is more valuable than the operation by which it was produced; and, as there is a wide variety of arts and actions, there must be a correspondent variety of ends: of the medical art, health; of ship-building, a vessel; of generalship, victory; of œconomy, riches. It often happens that arts rise one above another in dignity, and that all those of an inferior sort are subservient to one principal, their natural and acknowledged sovereign. Thus bridle-making is subservient to horsemanship; and horsemanship to war; and the

the end of the fubfervient art is plainly lefs valuable than that of the art to which it minifters, becaufe the former is purfued merely for the fake of the latter. This holds univerfally, whether the ends of human action confift in operations or in productions.

Chap. 2.

It belongs to politics to inveftigate the chief end of man.

But if there be an ultimate end of all human purfuit, an end defirable merely in itfelf, (and unlefs there be fuch an end, defire, proceeding to infinity, will terminate in a bafelefs vifion,) this ultimate end muft be what is called good; and of goods, the beft. The knowledge of it, alfo, muft greatly contribute to the benefit of life; ferving, as a butt to bowmen, for the direction of our views and actions. Let us, therefore, endeavour to delineate it carefully, firft premifing that the inveftigation of it belongs to that mafter-fcience called politics; a fcience which regulates and appoints what are the other fciences, as well as what are the arts that ought to be introduced into cities, what kinds of them the different claffes of citizens ought refpectively to learn, and to what extent each in particular ought to be known and cultivated. The moft honourable functions of a civil or military nature; thofe of the orator, financier, or general, are but inftruments employed by politics for promoting human happinefs; which, if precifely one and the fame in ftates and individuals, muft, with regard to the former, be more difficult both to produce and to maintain. How delightful is it to make individuals happy! but to effect the happinefs of ftates is an employment ftill more divine.

BOOK I.

divine. Such then is the aim of this work, which is entirely of a political nature.[d]

Chap. 3.

The proper method of treating moral and political philosophy, and the fit character of its hearers.

It will be our endeavour to attain that accuracy which the nature of the ſubject admits; for perfection is not required in all the labours of the mind, any more than in all the works of the hand. Political juſtice or virtue ſeems liable to this uncertainty, that it depends rather on law than on nature. The good, or end, at which this virtue aims, ſeems to be not leſs doubtful; ſince much evil is frequently its reſult. Many are ruined by their wealth, and many by their courage. In matters ſo little ſtable we muſt be contented, therefore, with catching the general features of truth; and our concluſions will deſerve to be approved, if in moſt caſes they are found to be uſeful and applicable; for it is the part of wiſdom to be ſatisfied in each ſubject with that kind of evidence which the nature of the ſubject allows; it not being leſs abſurd to require demonſtrations from an orator, than to be contented with probabilities from a mathematician. Of performances in each ſcience, thoſe only can appreciate the merit by whom that ſcience has been ſtudied. From a work on politics, therefore, thoſe alone can derive much benefit who have acquired a general and practical knowledge of human nature. Youth is not

[d] In the Magna Moralia, l. i. c. i. p. 145. the following reaſon is given why Ethics ſhould be conſidered as a part of politics, ἐστι δὲ ἠθῶν ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς δυνατὸν πρᾶξαι ἄνευ τοῦ ποιόν τινα εἶναι, &c. "That it is impoſſible to do any thing in politics, without having men endowed with certain habits; wherefore Ethics," he obſerves, "are likely to be a part, as well as the principle and ſource, of politics."

the

the ſeaſon for ſuch a ſtudy; for youth is unexperienced in the buſineſs of life, which is both the ſource and the object of all ſound political reaſoning. It makes not any difference whether a man is young in point of years, or in point of character; for his inaptitude ariſes entirely from his boyiſh purſuits, and childiſh opinions. But to thoſe whoſe paſſions have been diſciplined by the maturity of years and reaſon, this kind of knowledge will afford both pleaſure and profit. Thus much concerning our ſubject, the mode of treating it, and the character of thoſe to whom our diſcourſe is addreſſed.

Chap. 4. — Different opinions concerning happineſs.

Let us reſume, therefore, by inquiring, ſince all our thoughts and deſires aim at ſome kind of good, what is the end of the ſcience called politics: or, in other words, what is the principal of all thoſe goods reſulting from the proper direction of human action? Its name is univerſally[e] acknowledged; both the learned and the multitude call it happineſs[f]. But as to the thing itſelf, there is a wide diverſity of opinion between philoſophers and the vulgar. The latter place happineſs in things viſible and palpable: in pleaſure, wealth, honour; and, often changing their minds, they place it, when ſick, in health; when poor, in riches; and when they reflect on their own ignorance, they deem thoſe

[e] σχεδον ὑπο των πλειςων ὁμολογειται. "Almoſt acknowledged by the moſt," which ſeems merely a modeſt way of ſpeaking, not tolerable in Engliſh.

[f] το δε ευ ζην και ευ πραττειν ταὐτον ὑπολαμβανον τῳ ευδαιμονειν. "To live well and to act well, they reckon ſynonymous with being happy." This ſentence is omitted.

BOOK I. most happy who can boast their attainments in science. Some philosophers again think, that, besides all these particular and relative goods, there is a good in itself absolutely, the cause of this quality in other things, which deserve to be called good merely because they participate of this absolute goodness. It would be useless to enumerate all the variety of opinions; let it suffice to mention and afterwards to examine, the most prevalent, or the most reasonable; premising that in all our inquiries, we may either proceed from principles, or mount up towards them. Plato, therefore, doubted which of the two was the best mode of investigation; as, in the Olympic Stadium, whether the proper course proceeded from the judges to the goal, or from the goal to the judges[f]. In other sciences, we ought to begin from the things best known; either absolutely in themselves, from the simplicity and stability of their nature; or relatively to the inquirer, because most familiar to his senses, his observation, and experience[g]. But in politics, we ought to begin by operating on the moral nature of man, since the first requisite is to have disciples habituated to the practice of virtue. Such persons either know, or will soon understand, principles[h]. But for those of a different character, let them hearken to Hesiod.

The

[f] See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. v. p. 228.

[g] For the sake of perspicuity, I have here expanded Aristotle's thought by borrowing expressions frequently repeated in his Analytics and Metaphysics.

[h] Aristotle says, they know that the thing is, and therefore need not be taught its cause; they have a practical knowledge of virtue, which is

The beſt and nobleſt of the human kind,
Are thoſe endow'd with a deep-thinking mind;
Nor are *they* uſeleſs, who ſuch men obey,
Submitting ſtill to wiſdom's lawful ſway;
But he, who though unfit his ways to rule,
Yet will not to a wiſer go to ſchool,
That man is, ſure, a good-for-nothing fool.[i]

Chap. 5. Thoſe opinions examined.

To return from this digreſſion; men's notions of happineſs may eaſily be conjectured from the lives which they lead. The groſs vulgar of mankind think of nothing but pleaſure, and therefore purſue a life of mere ſenſual enjoyment; conſtrained like ſlaves, and ſtupid as cattle. Their error is excuſable, ſince many of the great ſet them an example which themſelves ſeem to have copied from the ſottiſh Sardanapalus. A ſecond plan of life is that preferred by men of activity and enterpriſe, who eagerly engage in the public concerns of their country, and have honour for their object. But this honour is a thing too ſuperficial and flimſy to be the happineſs of which we are in queſt. It ſeems to depend, not leſs on thoſe who confer honours, than on thoſe who purſue them. But of happineſs, we augur that muſt be ſomething independent and permanent. Beſides, theſe troubleſome honours

---

is better than its theory; and this practical knowledge is itſelf a principle inſtilled and confirmed by experience and cuſtom. See the end of chapter vii. It may be further obſerved, that our author, with his uſual modeſty, ſays, *perhaps* we ought to begin with the things beſt known to ourſelves; and *therefore* thoſe only are qualified to ſtudy politics with advantage, who have been previouſly trained to good morals. I have inverted the order, becauſe the latter is proved in chapter iii.

[i] Heſiod, Εργων, l. 293.

are courted chiefly for the purpoſe of flattering ſelf-love, for removing juſt ſuſpicions of our own unworthineſs, and for rendering us in our own conceit virtuous and happy. For this reaſon we take moſt pride in being honoured by men of ſenſe, by thoſe who beſt know us, and for meritorious actions. Virtue, therefore, is plainly more valuable than honour, even in the eſtimation of thoſe by whom honour is moſt coveted; ſince the latter is purſued merely as the ſign and ſhadow of the former. But virtue alone does not conſtitute happineſs. A man poſſeſſed of virtue may be aſleep or inactive; he may never, through life, have an opportunity of exhibiting his good qualities; and notwithſtanding theſe qualities, he may frequently be involved in the greateſt diſaſters. Such a man was never, except for argument's ſake, pronounced happy. But enough on this ſubject, which has been already treated in our popular diſcourſes. A third plan of life is that of the ſpeculative philoſopher, which ſhall be examined in the ſequel. A life of money-making and commerce is plainly a ſtate of toil and trouble; and riches cannot be the good inquired after, becauſe they are deſired, not on their own account, but for the purpoſes which they anſwer; and are valuable, not as ends, but merely as inſtruments. The other ſchemes of happineſs are, therefore, preferable to that of the money-maker; but even thoſe, it appears, are defective; in confirmation of which, many arguments may be produced, which we ſhall not at preſent urge.

BOOK I. Chap. 6.

Examination of Plato's opinion concerning the chief good; and refutation of the doctrine of ideas.

It may, perhaps, be better to consider good, absolute and universal; which, according to some philosophers, is the only real good, by the participation of which alone, other things can be entitled to this epithet. To me the task of examining this opinion is unpleasant and irksome, because the doctrine of universals and ideas was introduced by those for whom I have the greatest friendship[k]. Yet even his own systems a philosopher will be the first to demolish, when they stand in the way of truth; nor ought the sacred name of friendship ever to obstruct a thing still more sacred than itself. Those who introduced the doctrine of ideas allow that it is not applicable to things prior in order the one to the other[l], and therefore not applicable to number. But the word "good" applies equally to substances, to modes, and to relations; although substances are certainly prior in order to modes and relations, which are the affections or appendages of substances. The word "good" therefore when applied to both, is not taken in the same sense; and therefore it does not denote

[k] The author means Plato. He says, in his Magna Moralia, p. 145, that Pythagoras first treated of virtue, but improperly; since he explained the science of Ethics by that of numbers, confounding speculations altogether heterogeneous. Socrates spoke better and more perspicuously: but his theory is imperfect, because he makes the virtues matters of science; for science belongs only to the intellect or rational part of the soul, whereas the virtues belong not only to that, but (as will be fully explained hereafter) to the irrational part, consisting in the passions and appetites. Plato followed, well distinguishing the rational and irrational principles, but perplexing and darkening the subject of Ethics, by mixing with it the doctrine of ideas. See Analysis, p. 59, & seq.

[l] Eudem, Ethic. l.i. c.viii. p.201.—See also Analysis, p. 68, & seq.

any common idea. Good, indeed, is ſaid in as many ways as being: thus, it is applied to God, and the human mind, which are ſubſtances; to the virtues, which are qualities; to utility, which is a relation; to mediocrity, which is quantity; to the critical moment, which is time; and to a fit reſidence, which is place[m]. It is plain, therefore, that the word "good" applied to things ſo different, does not denote any one idea common to all thoſe claſſes or categories. If it did, all kinds of good would belong to one and the ſame ſcience. But we find that various ſciences are requiſite for aſcertaining the different kinds of good, even in one and the ſame category. Thus, the critical moment in war is aſcertained by a general; in diſeaſe, by a phyſician. The medical ſcience determines what is mediocrity with reſpect to diet; and the gymnaſtic, what is mediocrity in point of exerciſe. It is difficult to know wherein conſiſts the difference between the idea of a man and a man, ſince both muſt be defined by the ſame terms. The ſame obſervation applies to good, and the idea of good. The eternity aſcribed to the latter, does not make any difference; for that which is white now, is as much white, as what has continued white for an indefinite length of time. The Pythagoreans reaſon better when they diſtinguiſh various kinds of good and evil[n]; in which they ſeem to be fol-

[m] Ariſtotle ſays, ετερα τοιαυτα, meaning the other categories. See above, p. 68.

[n] Ariſtotle ſays, they placed one in the co-arrangement of good. See above, p. 129.

lowed

lowed by Speusippus°. But of this subject we shall treat hereafter. Some uncertainty seems still to adhere to the observations above made, because we have not sufficiently distinguished the two kinds of goods; those which are loved and pursued for their own sake only, and those which are loved and pursued merely because they are fitted to produce or preserve the former, or to ward off the contrary evils. Let us separate, therefore, from things merely useful to some further end, things called good in themselves, and consider whether this epithet is bestowed on all of them precisely in the same sense. What are these intrinsic goods, unless such things as we wish to obtain and enjoy for their own sake only; pleasures, honours, the exercise of our sight or understanding? Such things may be useful, but they are not merely useful, since, independently of any purpose which they answer, they are desired on their own account. Are all such things then called good, for the same reason that snow and ceruse are both called white, because they excite one and the same simple perception of whiteness? This is not so; for pleasure is good in one sense, honour in another, intellection in a third; in each of the three, the word "good" has a different meaning; which would not be the case if the idea of good

° Aristotle is supposed to have taken it amiss that Plato should have preferred to him his own nephew Speusippus as his successor in the academy; and this private pique is thought to have influenced him in his philosophical opposition to his master's doctrines. Were this true, it might be expected that his opposition would not have been less marked to Speusippus, whom he here goes out of his way to commend.

BOOK I.

was as simple and uniform as that of white; a doctrine that totally confounds the specific distinctions of things. Why then is the same appellation applied to such different objects? Not surely by chance; but because those objects are somehow related to each other, as proceeding from one cause, tending to one end, or connected by some analogy; as the understanding is called the eye of the mind, having the same relation to it, which the eye has to the body. But such nice speculations belong not to the present subject[p]; for if there be a general idea of goodness, common to all things called good, and separable from them, it is plain that this separate goodness cannot be an object of human attainment, and therefore need not be an object of human pursuit. None of the arts or sciences contemplate this general idea as their example or pattern[q]; or consider it as affording the smallest assistance for attaining the different ends at which they respectively aim. Of what benefit would such a contemplation be to the embroiderer or the architect? The physician does not consider good in general, but the good, or health of man, or rather of that particular man who happens to be his patient; for with individuals only he has to do.

[p] Aristotle says, that it is not necessary at present accurately to ascertain why different things are called good, any more than to treat accurately concerning the general idea of goodness.

[q] The author says, that though this general good be neither πρακτον nor κτητον: neither an object of human practice nor human attainment, yet it may be thought to serve as a παραδειγμα, or pattern; and therefore removes this objection, which he had proposed to him self. See Analysis, p. 69. and *note*.

Let

A delineation of the fupreme good;

Let us return again to the fought-for good, and try to find out what it can be. We fee that it is a different thing in different arts and actions: one thing, for example, in the art of phyfic; another in the art of war. What then is the good peculiar to each? Is it not that for the fake of which all the other operations of the art are performed; as in phyfic, health; in war, victory; in architecture, a houfe; and in all our actions and deliberations, the end at which they aim? If then there is an end or purpofe in life itfelf, the good fought for muft confift in this; and if more ends than one, in thefe. This inveftigation therefore brings us back to the fame conclufion as before; but we muft endeavour, if poffible, to render the matter ftill more perfpicuous. Since there are various objects of our purfuit, fome of which are defired merely for the fake of other things, and never rationally for their own, fuch as riches, a flute, and whatever comes under the defcription of means or inftruments, it is plain that none of thefe can be the good of which we are in queft, and which muft be fomething complete and perfect in itfelf; for we call that more perfect which is defired on its own account, than that which is defired as a means towards fome further end; and that more perfect which is never defired but as an end, than that which is defired both as a means and as an end. Happinefs is never defired but for its own fake only. Honour, pleafure, intelligence, and every virtue, are defirable furely on their own account, but they are alfo defirable as means

BOOK I.

means towards happineſs. But happineſs, we have ſaid, is never deſired as a means, becauſe it is complete and all-ſufficient in itſelf, which the good ſought for ought to be; and all-ſufficient, not merely for the individual, but for his parents, children, family, friends, and fellow-citizens, ſince man is by nature a ſocial being; yet to this ſocial principle limits are aſſigned, for if it diverged to infinity[r], there would be a deſire without an object[s]: but of this we ſhall ſpeak hereafter. That is all-ſufficient, which, taken by itſelf, renders life an object of deſire. Such we ſay is happineſs, which ſeparate and alone, is the moſt deſirable of all things; and therefore united with the leaſt of other goods, ſtill entitled to pre-eminence[t]; complete and perfect in itſelf, and the ultimate end of all our deſigns and actions.

which conſiſts in virtuous energies.

But to call happineſs the beſt thing in the world, (which none will diſpute,) does not clearly explain wherein human happineſs conſiſts. This will beſt appear, if we conſider what is the peculiar work and proper buſineſs of a man. A muſician, a ſculptor, and every other artiſt, has his reſpective operation and work, in the performance of which his main excellence lies; and can it be imagined, while ſhoemakers and carpenters have their proper taſks aſſigned to them, that Nature intended man for idleneſs?

[r] Ariſtotle ſays, to his children's children, and the friends of his friends, in endleſs ſucceſſion.

[s] See above, p. 105.

[t] The good added to happineſs is ὑπεροχη των αγαθων, ſuperabundant.

His

His eyes, and hands, and feet, and all his other parts, have their peculiar functions; and ſhall there be no function different from any, or all, of theſe, belonging to the whole? Wherein does this function conſiſt? To live, is common to him with plants. The mere power of growth and nutrition belongs not therefore to the preſent queſtion. The ſenſitive life follows next, which is common to man with horſes, oxen, and the whole animal kingdom. There remains then a life of rational action; whether he exerciſe reaſon himſelf, or obey the reaſon of another. In ſuch a life his real buſineſs conſiſts; and that man does his buſineſs the beſt[t], who acts moſt rationally through life; the virtue of each individual of a ſpecies, depending on the excellence with which he performs the work peculiar to that ſpecies alone. The proper good of man conſiſts then in virtuous energies[u], that is, in the exerciſe of virtue continued through life; for one ſwallow makes not a ſummer; neither does one day, or a ſhort time, conſtitute happineſs. Let this ſerve for a ſketch of good—that univerſally coveted object, which will afterwards be more fully delineated: for, it ſhould ſeem, that an accurate outline may eaſily be filled up; eſpecially with the aſſiſtance of time, from which

[t] The author illuſtrates this, by ſaying that the buſineſs of a harper, and of a good harper, is the ſame; the difference between them ariſing only from the ſuperior excellence with which the latter performs his work.

[u] Ariſtotle here introduces his diſtinction between virtue and the energy of virtue. See above, p. 154. This ſenſe is expreſſed in the text, in language more familiar to the modern reader.

arts

arts derive their improvement. Let us remember alſo what was before obſerved, that more accuracy ſhould not be expected in a writer, than is conſiſtent with the nature of his ſubject, and his deſign in treating it. Both the bricklayer and the mathematician are converſant about perpendiculars; but the former conſiders them only as uſeful in his work; the latter examines their nature and properties, becauſe abſtract truth is the object of his ſtudy. Unleſs the example of the bricklayer be followed in other matters, the principal ſubject will often be overwhelmed or obſcured by the mere acceſſories. Let it alſo be remembered, that we ought not to be over-curious in the inveſtigation of cauſes; concerning ſome things it is ſufficient to know that they are, without knowing their reaſon. This is the caſe with thoſe firſt principles which reſult from perceptions of ſenſe, from induction, and from cuſtom[x]. We ought carefully to draw them from their reſpective ſources, and exert our utmoſt care that they be correctly aſcertained. This is of the higheſt importance in all our inquiries; in which, that which is begun well, is more than half ended; ſince much light is thereby diffuſed through every ſubſequent part of our ſpeculations.

[x] Our author adds, αλλαι δε αλλως, which may be tranſlated, "and other principles ariſe from other ſources." But this does not appear to me to be his meaning, becauſe I do not find any other ſources mentioned in any part of his works: The αλλαι αλλως must then mean that ſome of thoſe principles ariſe from one of thoſe ſources, and ſome from another, which is implied in the tranſlation.

We

BOOK I. Chap. 8.

This opinion consistent with the properties ascribed to happiness.

We shall examine this chief good or happiness, not merely in its definition, but in the properties rightly ascribed to it. Truth only is consistent; and if our notion of happiness be just, it will not be discordant with those properties. Goods are divided into three kinds: those of the mind, those of the body, and those consisting in externals. We give the preference to the first of the three, which we regard as the sovereign good; placing happiness in mental energy; an opinion ancient and universal among philosophers. We do right also in placing the chief end and main purpose of life in action. From this, it results that happiness is seated in the mind; a truth confirmed by the common sense of mankind embodied in language; "living well," or "doing well" being expressions synonymous with happiness. In all their inquiries on the subject, men seem to have been led to conclusions nearly resembling the notion of happiness above given. Some place it in virtue, others in prudence, others in wisdom; some join pleasure; others add externals; and those different opinions have either been long held by the greater part of mankind, or more recently introduced by most respectable philosophers. It is not credible, that either party should totally mistake the truth. Our notion nearly agrees with theirs who place happiness in virtue; for we say that it consists in the action of virtue; that is, not merely in the possession, but in the use[y]. The mere possession is consistent with a

[y] Aristotle here opposes habit to energy, as well as possession to use.

state

ftate of fleep, or liftlefs apathy, from which no good can refult. But the virtuous man, when he acts, muft act well, and be happy; as, in the Olympic games, the prize is gained only by the combatants; not by thofe, whatever their abilities may be, who decline entering the lifts. To fuch men virtue is the higheft pleafure; for pleafure refides in the mind, and each is moft pleafed with what he moft loves. Thus the lover of horfes is pleafed with horfes; the lover of fhows, with fhows; and the lover of juftice is no lefs pleafed with juftice; and the lover of virtue, with virtue. The multitude, indeed, purfue different pleafures, becaufe they do not rightly apprehend in what true pleafure confifts. But pleafure, ftrictly fo called, is the delight of a virtuous man, whofe life needs not an appendage of falfe joys, containing the perennial fpring of true pleafure in itfelf. For he is not a good man who delights not in good actions; and vain is the praife of juftice, liberality, and other virtues, by thofe who feel no gratification in their practice. In the eftimation of a wife man, virtue is pleafant becaufe it is honourable and good; his happinefs is one regular whole; not broken and disjointed like that in the Delian infcription:

> "The faireft good is juftice; health, the beft;
> "The fweeteft far, to tafte of what we love."

All thefe qualities belong to the beft energies, in which, we fay, happinefs confifts. The opinion of thofe who add externals, is not ill-founded;

founded; ſince, independently of them, it is often impoſſible, at leaſt very difficult, to exhibit virtue in its full luſtre[z]. Many operations muſt be performed by inſtruments; under which name I include friends, wealth, and political power. The want of ſome advantages, for example, of honourable deſcent, of promiſing children, or of dignity of preſence, deprives happineſs of its ſplendour: and the man ſeems leſs qualified for attaining it, who is deformed in body, friendleſs, childleſs, and forlorn[a]. Wherefore ſome place happineſs in external proſperity[b].

Chap. 9.

Which depends on our own exertions.

It comes then to be conſidered, whether happineſs is acquired by inſtruction, cuſtom, or ſome other kind of exerciſe; or merely by the diſpenſation of fortune and the gods. There is not any gift ſurely that might more reaſonably be expected to deſcend from heaven, ſince, of all human poſſeſſions, happineſs is the moſt valuable. But this queſtion will be more fitly examined in another place. For happineſs, even

[z] In the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. ii. p. 196., Ariſtotle makes an important diſtinction between the things in which human happineſs conſiſts, and thoſe without which it cannot be completely enjoyed; εν τινι των ἡμετερων το ζην ευ· και τινων ανευ, τοις ανθρωποις ουκ ενδεχεται ειναι, &c. "Health is different from the things by which it is upheld, and life from thoſe by which it is rendered comfortable. The ſame holds with regard to all the actions and habits of men." The confounding happineſs with the externals, without which, in our dependent ſtate, it cannot be completely enjoyed, is conſidered by our author as one of the great ſources of immoral practice, as well as of erroneous theory.

[a] Ariſtotle adds, "or who, having had good friends and promiſing children, has loſt them."

[b] What is added, ενιοι δε την αρετην, "and ſome place it in virtue," ſeems ſuperfluous.

BOOK I.

though it deſcend not from heaven, but be attained by ſtudy and exerciſe on earth, is yet moſt divine in itſelf; the end and prize of virtue, which all may gain by due exertion, who are not maimed in their minds. The acquiring of happineſs by ourſelves is better than owing it to fortune[c]; it moſt probably therefore is thus acquired; ſince nature always effects her purpoſes by the beſt means; a point aimed at by art, and every intelligent cauſe, and which the beſt cauſe always attains: and to leave happineſs, the faireſt and beſt of things, to the diſpoſal of fortune, would be a mark of negligence not diſcernible in any other of the arrangements of nature[d]. That happineſs is acquired by ourſelves, agrees alſo with its definition, "that it conſiſts in virtuous energies." Other things, we have ſaid, are neceſſary, as a certain length of time; and others are ſerviceable, as inſtruments. The ſame concluſion correſponds with what we ſaid in the beginning, namely, that politics aimed at

[c] For this he aſſigns two reaſons in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. iii. p. 197. ει δ᾽ εν τῳ, αυτον ποιον τινα ειναι, και τας κατ᾽ αυτον πραξεις, κοινοτερον αν ειη το αγαθον και θειοτερον, &c. "If good or happineſs conſiſts in the quality of our actions and characters, it muſt be both more common and more divine; more common, becauſe a greater number may attain it; and more divine, becauſe it will depend upon our own exertions." Idem ibid.

[d] There is, perhaps, an intentional obſcurity in the whole of this paſſage. Ariſtotle does not expreſsly deny the interference of the gods; but afterwards, confounding this interference with fortune, ſays, that it is not reaſonable to believe that nature, or (as explained in other paſſages) the God of nature, ſhould commit ſuch an important object as human happineſs to the direction of ſo blind a guide as fortune. But in the ſtrict philoſophical ſenſe, happineſs, as well as all other things, is ultimately to be referred to the Deity as its cauſe. Metaphyſ. l. i. c. ii. p. 841.

promoting

promoting the higheſt felicity of man; the principal care, therefore, of all good ſtateſmen has always been, to form their fellow-citizens to virtue. Neither an ox nor a horſe, nor any other animal, is denominated happy; becauſe virtuous energies cannot be aſcribed to them. Nor is this epithet beſtowed on children, whoſe imperfect age affords only a promiſe of happineſs. But many are the viciſſitudes of life; and thoſe who have long been proſperous, may, towards the concluſion of their days, be involved in calamities rivalling the far-famed diſaſters of Priam. None will call thoſe happy, who, after ſuffering ſuch evils in life, die a wretched death.

Chap. 10.

Solon's ſaying, that none can be pronounced happy till dead.

Ought we, then, to adopt the opinion of Solon, "that no man can be called happy while he lives?" Is he therefore happy when he dies? or is not this too abſurd to be ſaid, eſpecially by thoſe who place happineſs in action? It does not appear that Solon had this meaning, but only that a man might, at death, be congratulated upon his eſcape from the evils and calamities of life. Yet this opinion is liable to contradiction; for a man, when dead, is, with regard to proſperity and adverſity, in the ſame ſtate with a man who meets with either of them when alive, without being ſenſible of them; and is in this manner ſtill within the reach of the good or bad fortune which befals his children and their deſcendants. And how unſtable is the proſperity of families! What vaſt degeneracy in the ſons of happy and illuſtrious fathers! Yet it ſeems abſurd to ſuppoſe the ſtate of the dead

BOOK I.

dead affected and altered by these revolutions, and not less absurd to suppose that the happiness of children should not be shared by their parents. But the solution of the question first proposed, will enable us to solve the other difficulties. Solon said that we must look to the end; meaning thereby, that we might then justly say, not that a man was, but that he had been, happy. Is it not therefore absurd to think that, while he actually was happy, this epithet could not be applied to him, because of the vicissitudes of life to which he was exposed? If happiness changes with fortune, it will be as variable as the colours of the cameleon. But this is not true: for propriety of conduct depends, not on our fortune, but on our manner of using it; and virtuous energies are the genuine source of happiness, as the vicious are of misery. This is attested by the question just started concerning the importance of stability to happiness. Of all human things, habitual energies of virtue are the most stable; they are more permanent than even the sciences; and of the virtues themselves, the most valuable are the firmest; forming the continual meditation and delight of those whom they adorn. For this reason, they alone are not liable to be forgotten or lost; but are an immoveable property in the thoughts and life of a good man; who, whatever may befal him, will behave gracefully; approving his conduct exact, square, and blameless. Slight misfortunes are unable to shake his well-balanced happiness; but, in the use of a great prosperity, his excellence

This saying explained.

The peculiar stability of virtuous energies.

lence will ſhine more conſpicuous: and when perſecuted by painful and afflicting calamity, which not only impedes his preſent exertions, but darkens his future proſpects, his worth will irradiate the gloom, while he reſiſts and ſurmounts the ſevereſt ſufferings, not by ſtupid inſenſibility, but by generous magnanimity; for, if our own actions be the ſovereign arbiters of our lot, a virtuous man can never be miſerable; becauſe he will never render himſelf an object either of hatred or contempt. Of the circumſtances in which he is placed, he will always make the beſt and moſt honourable uſe; as a good general, and a good artiſt, employs the forces, and the materials, with which they are reſpectively entruſted, always to the beſt advantage. A happineſs, founded on ſuch a baſis, can never ſink into wretchedneſs; although it muſt be ſhaken by tragic misfortunes, from which it will not ſoon recover its natural ſtate. Yet, in conſequence of virtuous exertions, continued through a ſufficient length of time, a good man, competently furniſhed with the accommodations of life, will reſume his wonted ſerenity; and may be pronounced happy, notwithſtanding the viciſſitudes to which he is ſtill expoſed; at leaſt poſſeſſed of ſuch happineſs as is conſiſtent with the condition of humanity.

Chap. 11. How the dead are affected by the condition of the living.

We are not therefore to aſcribe happineſs only to the dead, (for thus Solon's ſentiment is commonly underſtood,) eſpecially ſince to ſuppoſe that the dead are totally inſenſible to the misfortunes of their kinſmen and friends on

 earth,

BOOK I.

earth, is neither conformable to common opinion, nor confiftent with the focial principles belonging to human nature. It would be endlefs to enumerate and defcribe the various forms of calamity and woe, by the differences of which even the living are very differently affected; but the fympathy of the dead with fuch miferies, bears lefs proportion to that of the living, than the fympathy of fpectators at the theatre bears to that of fpectators in the real tragedies of life. It may deferve confideration, whether the dead at all participate in the good or bad fortune of their living friends; but if they do, it is reafonable to think that the events of this world affect them too flightly, to render fuch of them as are miferable happy, or thofe that are happy miferable.

Chap. 12.

That happinefs is above praife.

Let us proceed then to determine whether happinefs be the object of praife, or rather of honour; for it is plain that its nature is not doubtful, and that it never can be blamed or defpifed. That only is an object of praife which is endowed with certain qualities or habits, that naturally terminate in fome falutary effect. For this reafon we commend juftice and courage, as well as ftrength and fwiftnefs, and every virtue; but the praifes which belong to men, are ridiculous when applied to the gods, whofe perfections are the objects of nobler emotions, and more lofty eulogy; we blefs and honour and magnify them; and even thofe things which, from fome refemblance to them, are called divine. Happinefs, therefore, is exalted above praife, by the

 excel-

excellence and divinity of its nature. Wherefore Eudoxus[e] ingeniouſly defended the pretenſions of pleaſure to be called the ſovereign good; ſaying, that it was confeſſedly not the object of praiſe, and therefore ſomething better. But praiſe properly belongs to virtue, the only ſource of thoſe exertions of mind or body on which juſt encomiums are beſtowed; to examine which particularly belongs to the ſubject of Rhetoric. This, then, is clear, that the value of happineſs is not relative, but abſolute; it is complete and perfect intrinſically; and, being the ultimate end to which all praiſe-worthy things are referred, is itſelf the object, not of praiſe, but of veneration and honour.[f]

Chap. 13.

The knowledge of the mind a neceſſary preparation for moral ſcience.

But ſince happineſs reſults from virtuous energies, by examining the nature of virtue, we ſhall be more likely to underſtand that of happineſs. The true ſtateſman is chiefly ſolicitous about virtue, exerting himſelf to the utmoſt to inſpire his fellow-citizens with a reſpectful deference for good laws. Such were the legiſlators of Crete and of Sparta; and others, perhaps, who were animated by the ſame enlightened principles of public ſpirit. To inveſtigate

[e] Eudoxus, the ſcholar of Plato, and legiſlator of his countrymen, the Cnidians.—He is again mentioned by our author in the tenth book of his Ethics.

[f] This ſubject is explained more clearly in the Ethics to Eudemus, b. i. c. i. p. 203. The author diſcriminates the words εγκωμιον επαινος and ευδαιμονισμος: the firſt of which applies to particular actions; the ſecond to habits; and the third to the ends and enjoyments which are thereby accompliſhed or attained. The Engliſh language does not admit of ſuch nice diſtinctions; and ευδαιμονισμος, "beatification," is an appropriate term in the Romiſh church, which could not, without doing violence, be diſtorted to a philoſophical ſenſe.

BOOK I.

the nature of virtue, belongs to every liberal ſyſtem of politics, and therefore to our preſent ſubject, of which human happineſs is the end, and human virtue the means; underſtanding, thereby, the virtue of the mind, in the exerciſe of which happineſs conſiſts. The true ſtateſman therefore ought to know the mind, as much, or rather more, (becauſe his purſuit is ſtill more excellent,) than the phyſician does the body; and we ſee that the more liberal ſort of phyſicians beſtow no ſmall pains in gaining an accurate knowledge of the latter. To enter into ſpeculations, not connected with practice, is beſide our preſent purpoſe. We ſhall make uſe of that diſtinction between powers rational and irrational, which is ſufficiently explained in our popular diſcourſes, without inquiring whether theſe two are ſeparable from each other, like the parts of the body and every thing diviſible, or whether they be two merely to the intellectual eye, though as incapable of corporeal diviſion as are the convexity and concavity of the ſame circle[s]. The irrational powers of the ſoul are diſtinguiſhable into different kinds. Thoſe which contribute to nutrition and growth are

[s] διαφερει δε ουδεν ουδε ει μεριστη ἡ ψυχη, ουδε ει αμερης· εχει μεντοι δυναμεις διαφορους, Eudem. l. ii. c. i. p. 204. Ariſtotle ſays, that it makes not any difference as to the preſent ſubject, whether the ſoul be diviſible or indiviſible; it is ſufficient that it have diſtinct powers or faculties; to which, as principles and ſources, all the complicated operations of the mind, and all the wide variety of human action, may be traced. It will not be eaſy to point out what improvement has been made ſince the days of Ariſtotle, either in the inveſtigation of thoſe principles from the phenomena, or in the application of them when diſcovered, to explain the highly-diverſified operations obſervable in the intellectual and moral world.

the

the ſame in man arrived at maturity, and in the child unborn, and even in plants. Any virtue belonging to them cannot be dignified with the epithet of human, ſince their energies are moſt perfect in ſleep, during the total inactivity of thoſe higher powers, by which men are peculiarly characteriſed and individually diſtinguiſhed; wherefore it is ſaid, that for nearly one half of their lives, the ſame lot befals the good and the bad, the happy and the miſerable; except that, in conſequence of ſome remains of wakeful motions, the dreams of the former will commonly be more agreeable. But enough of this, which is foreign to our preſent ſubject. There is another part of the ſoul, which, though irrational itſelf, is capable of combining with reaſon; and, when thus combined, is virtuous and praiſe-worthy. This appears in perſons endowed with ſelf-command, but not completely confirmed in that habit. Reaſon exhorts them to prefer the better part, but another power impels them to the contrary ſide, and violently reſiſts reaſon; in the ſame manner as limbs affected by the palſy refuſe obedience to our determinations, and aſſume one direction when we wiſh them to move in another. A ſimilar reſiſting power exiſts in the mind, though the falſe motion impreſſed by it is not perceptible to the ſenſes. This power, though irrational[h], is capable of combining with reaſon, and ſubmitting to its control, as appears in men

Our moral powers compounded of the rational and irrational principles of our nature.

[h] This power, he ſays, is ſomething different from reaſon, but how different it is unneceſſary to inquire: which relates to what is explained above.

endowed

BOOK I.

endowed with ſelf-command[1] or continency, and ſtill more in thoſe whoſe minds are harmoniſed by temperance. The appetites therefore are of a higher order than the mere powers of growth and nutrition, becauſe they are capable of liſtening to reaſon, as children do to their parents, whoſe admonitions they underſtand and obey, in a ſenſe quite different from that in which they afterwards underſtand and know mathematical truths. If we chooſe to call alſo this part of the ſoul rational, there will then be two different principles of reaſon in the mind, the firſt of which poſſeſſes reaſon abſolutely in itſelf, whereas the ſecond is only capable of hearkening to the reaſon of another. On this diſtinction, the diviſion of the virtues into the intellectual and moral, is founded. Wiſdom, intelligence, and prudence belong to the former claſs; liberality and temperance to the latter. In reference to morals, we do not ſay that a man is wiſe or intelligent, but that he is meek or temperate. Good men are praiſed for good habits; and all praiſe-worthy habits are called virtues.

[1] Self-command or continency, in Greek εγκρατεια, implies that a man is impelled by corrupt appetites, which he has ſtrength of mind ſufficient to reſiſt; temperance, in Greek σωφροσυνη, implies that his appetites have been ſo thoroughly ſubdued by cuſtom and reaſon, that they no longer have any tendency to rebel. This latter, in its higheſt perfection, is that delightful harmony of ſoul in which our moral improvement terminates.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

THE moſt profound as well as the moſt elegant of all modern writers on the ſubject of political Ethics, the immortal Grotius, in his treatiſe on the laws of war and peace, obſerves, that Ariſtotle holds the firſt rank among philoſophers, whether we eſtimate him by the perſpicuity of his method, the acuteneſs of his diſtinctions, or the weight and ſolidity of his arguments[a]. This criticiſm is fully juſtified by the book before us, in which our author treats of the nature of moral virtue, ſhews by what means it is acquired, proves by an accurate induction that it conſiſts in the habit of mediocrity, and lays down three practical rules for its attainment. This part of his work will bear that trial which he himſelf has eſtabliſhed as the teſt of excellence; " it requires not any addition, and it will not admit of retrenchment." The objections made to it, as falling ſhort of the purity and ſublimity of Chriſtian morality, will equally

[a] Grotius in Prolegom.

apply

apply to all the difcoveries of human reafon, when compared with that divine light which, coming into the world, gives, or offers, light to every man in it[b]. But the critics who make objections[c] to Ariftotle, would urge them with lefs confidence, if they attended to two remarks on which our author often infifts; firft, that practical matters admit not of fcientific or logical accuracy; fecondly, that the virtues of which he is in queft, are all of them merely relative to the condition and exigencies of man in political fociety, being thofe habits, acquired by our own exertion, in which, when confirmed, we fhall uniformly act our parts on the theatre of the world, ufefully, agreeably, and gracefully. In Ariftotle's philofophy, man is the judge of man; in Chriftianity, the judge of man is God. Philofophy confines itfelf to the perifhing interefts of the prefent world; Chriftianity, looking beyond thefe interefts, takes a loftier aim, infpires the mind with nobler motives, and promifes to adorn it with perfections, worthy of its ineftimably valuable rewards. Yet to the man of piety, it may be a matter of edification, to compare the virtue of philofophical firmnefs with the grace of Chriftian patience; and to obferve how nearly the rules difcovered by reafon and experience, as moft conducive to the happinefs of our prefent ftate, coincide with thofe precepts which are given in the Gofpel in order to fit us for a better.

[b] John, c. i. v. 9.
[c] See fome of them ftated in Grotii Prolegom. de Jure Belli & Pacis.

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Moral virtues acquired by exercise and custom—Consist in holding the mean between blameable extremes—Test of virtue—The virtues, habits—The nature of these habits ascertained—Why vices mistaken for virtues, and conversely—Practical rules for the attainment of virtue.

BOOK II. Chap. 1.

The moral virtues not implanted by nature.

VIRTUE being twofold, intellectual and moral, the former is produced and increased chiefly by instruction, and therefore requires experience and time; the latter is acquired by repeated acts, or custom, from which, by a small change[d], its name is derived. None of the moral virtues, therefore, are implanted by nature; for properties given by nature, cannot be taken away or altered by custom; thus the gravity of a stone, which naturally carries it downward, cannot be changed into levity, which would carry it upward, were we to throw it in that direction ten thousand times; and fire, which naturally seeks the extremities, cannot be brought by custom to have a tendency towards the center: nor, in a word, can any law of nature be altered by custom. The moral virtues, therefore, are neither natural nor preternatural; we are born with capacities for acquiring them,

[d] ηθος ab εθος.

but

BOOK II.

Proof of this.

but they can only be acquired by our own exertions. Powers, implanted by nature, precede in the order of exiſtence their operations; which is manifeſt with regard to the ſenſes. The powers of ſeeing and hearing are not acquired by repeated operations of thoſe faculties; but, on the contrary, they exiſted in us before we exerciſed them, and continue to exiſt in us, though they ſhould ceaſe to be exerciſed. But the habit of moral virtue, like all other practical arts, can be acquired or preſerved by practice only. By building, we become architects; by harping, muſicians; and, in the ſame manner, by acts of juſtice, we become juſt; and by acts of courage, courageous. This is atteſted by what happens in whole nations; whoſe characters reſult from their conduct. All legiſlators wiſh to make virtuous and happy citizens: but they do not all attain this end; for the virtues are like the arts, acquired by a right, and deſtroyed by a wrong, practice. Architects and muſicians thus become good or bad; and if this were not the caſe, inſtruction would be ſuperfluous. The ſame holds in the virtues. By correctneſs, or the contrary, in our tranſactions with mankind, we become juſt or unjuſt; according to our behaviour in circumſtances of danger, our characters are formed to courage or cowardice; and in proportion as we indulge or reſtrain the excitements to anger and pleaſure, we become adorned with the habits of meekneſs and temperance, or deformed by thoſe of paſſionateneſs and profligacy. In one word, ſuch as

They are acquired by exerciſe and cuſtom.

our

our actions are, ſuch will our habits become. Actions, therefore, ought to be moſt diligently attended to; and it is not a matter of ſmall moment how we are trained from our youth; much depends on this, or rather all.[c]

Chap. 2.

What are the rules by which our actions ought to be ſhaped in order to attain virtue.

Since the preſent treatiſe is not merely a theory, as other parts of our works, (for the inquiry is not "wherein virtue conſiſts," but "how it may beſt be attained," without which the ſpeculative knowledge of it is not of the ſmalleſt value,) we muſt begin by examining, by what rules our actions ought to be ſhaped, becauſe by them our habits and characters are moulded. That our conduct ought to be agreeable to right reaſon, may be here aſſumed as an axiom; but it will afterwards be ſhewn what this right reaſon is, and what reference it has to the other virtues. Let us not forget, what was formerly obſerved, that practical matters admit not of logical preciſion; and that greater accuracy of language ought not to be expected, than is conſiſtent with the nature of the ſubject. The propriety of action admits not of definite rules, any more than the exact quantity of food or exerciſe conducive to health. This obſervation holds true with regard to the ſcience of morals as well as of medicines; but is peculiarly applicable to the particular caſes belonging to both ſciences; which caſes are ſo diſſimilar to each other, that it is impoſſible to include them under any common precept; and the man of morals,

[c] The ſame ſubject is treated in the Magna Moralia, l. i. c. vi.; and in the Eudemian Ethics, l. ii. c. ii.

like

like the pilot and the phyfician, muft comply with the exigencies of the moment, and vary his behaviour with the variation of circumftances. Notwithftanding this inftability in the nature of the fubject, we muft endeavour to give fome affiftance to thofe who aim at virtue. Firft, then, it is worthy of remark, that propriety of conduct always confifts in a mean or middle between two vicious extremes; and as the health and ftrength of our bodies vifibly depend on a due proportion of food and exercife, equally remote from fuperabundance or penury; fo is the health and vigour of our minds deftroyed by fuperabundance or penury of thofe very things or qualities, by the due proportion of which thofe excellencies are acquired, maintained, or augmented. This we may perceive holds true with refpect to courage, temperance, and every other virtue. He who flies from every danger, is a coward; he who rufhes on every danger, is a madman; the man who indulges in every pleafure, is a voluptuary; and the man who, with ruftic aufterity, rejects the moft allowable pleafures, may be juftly charged with an infenfibility mifbecoming his nature. The virtues of courage and temperance, which are deftroyed by excefs or deficiency, are therefore preferved by mediocrity; and, on obferving this golden mean, depend not only the origin and increafe of the virtues[f], but the energy or operation by which

That it confifts in holding the mean between two vicious extremes.

This proved by induction.

[f] Ariftotle adds, "their deftruction," which is produced by a departure from this mean, fo that their energies have the fame caufes with their generation, augmentation, and deftruction; only with regard to the laft, thefe caufes act in a contrary direction.

their

BOOK II.

their proper work is effected; for as a ſtrong conſtitution, which is produced or confirmed by much food and much exerciſe, enables a man to bear with ſafety a great meaſure of either; ſo, by reſiſting the temptations of pleaſure, we acquire temperance; and having become temperate, we can reſiſt ſuch temptations: by reſiſting the emotions of fear amidſt dangers, we acquire courage; and having become courageous, we are able to face dangers.

Chap. 3.

The ſureſt teſt of virtue is the pleaſure felt in exerciſing it.

The pleaſure or pain reſulting from acts of virtue, affords the beſt criterion concerning the confirmation of the habit. He who abſtains from bodily pleaſures, and rejoices in his temperance, is truly poſſeſſed of this virtue; he who grieves at his abſtinence is, on the other hand, a voluptuary. A man of courage faces dangers with pleaſure, at leaſt without pain; a coward is otherwiſe affected. Moral virtue is therefore occupied about regulating our pleaſures and pains; for the love of pleaſure ſtimulates us to profligacy, and fear of pain withholds us from the path of honour. Plato ſays well, that right education conſiſts in teaching us to rejoice, and to grieve, at ſuch things as are the proper objects of thoſe emotions. Virtue is ſeen in affections and actions, all of which are accompanied either with pleaſure or with pain; and therefore virtue is neceſſarily converſant about pains and pleaſures; as is proved, alſo, by the neceſſity of rewards and puniſhments, which are moral medicines; and, like all other medicines, in their nature contrary to the diſeaſes which they are fitted to cure. Beſides, every

habit of the mind is intimately connected with those things by which it is rendered better or worse; which happens to virtue with regard to pleasure and pain; for our morals are vitiated by pursuing or avoiding either of them with undue eagerness, at improper times, in improper places, or on improper occasions. The virtues, therefore, have been supposed to consist in apathy; erroneously indeed, because they consist in the regulation, not in the extinction, of passion; and passion, properly directed, is productive of happiness; improperly, of misery. For, as there are three objects naturally preferred, namely, honour, profit, and pleasure; and three naturally shunned, namely, disgrace, loss, and pain; a virtuous man knows practically how to estimate the value of all those things in their relation to human happiness; a knowledge, of which the man enured to vicious habits is totally unsusceptible. But the two characters are principally distinguished by their various degrees of sensibility to the different kinds of pleasure; the love of which is implanted in all animals, and of which one kind or other necessarily accompanies every object of preference; both profit and honour being pursued as pleasures. Our natures indeed are deeply tinged, and as it were engrained, with the love of pleasure, which, being nourished and growing stronger with our frame, is most difficultly moderated; especially when it has become the standard by which things and actions are appreciated. The great business of morality, therefore, lies in restraining the undue pursuit

pursuit of pleasure, and the undue aversion to pain. As Heracleitus says, it is more difficult to contend with pleasure than with anger; but the most difficult part is that best fitted for shewing the excellence of the performer. The moralist and statesman, therefore, must bend their utmost attention towards regulating the behaviour of those intrusted to their care, in those particulars on which their merit or demerit chiefly depends. But enough has been said to shew, that moral virtue is conversant about pains and pleasures; that the actions from which it originally springs, either augment or destroy it, accordingly as they are well or ill directed; and that the same good works in which it originates, are those in which it delights to be constantly employed.

Chap. 4.

Solution of a difficulty respecting the mode of acquiring virtue.

A doubt arises, why we should say that men acquire justice by doing just actions, or become temperate by observing the rules of temperance; since if they perform such actions and observe such rules, it should seem that they must be already endowed with those virtues; in the same manner as a man who writes or who performs according to the rules of grammar and music, is already a grammarian and a musician. But this does not hold true even with respect to the arts; for a man may write grammar, merely by imitation, by chance, or by the direction of another; but to be a grammarian, he must himself understand the art. Besides this, the perfection of works of art is in themselves; but the whole merit of virtuous actions depends on the dispo-

BOOK II.

Four things requisite to constitute a virtuous character.

fition of the actor: firft, that he performed them with knowledge; fecondly, with deliberation and preference; thirdly, that he preferred and performed them on their own account; and laftly, that he is firm and immoveable in his virtuous refolutions. The firft of thefe requifites only, viz. that of knowledge, is effential to the artift; but in conftituting the character of a virtuous man, mere knowledge is of little avail, and the other three particulars of the greateft: ftability in virtuous practice refults from repeated acts of virtue; in confequence of which, not only thofe acts are fuch as a virtuous man would perform, but he who performs them is rightly difpofed, and virtuoufly affected. It is therefore truly faid, that we acquire juftice and temperance from acting juftly and temperately; fince, independently of our own actions, we never could acquire thefe virtues. But the multitude, neglecting practice, think to acquire virtue by theory; like thofe patients who confult phyficians, but ufe none of their prefcriptions. Such phyfic will not benefit the body; nor fuch philofophy, the mind.

Chap. 5.

That the virtues are neither paffions nor capacities, but habits.

We muft next examine, whether virtue be a paffion, a faculty, or a habit; for thefe are three diftinct principles in the mind. By paffion, I mean every emotion accompanied with pain or pleafure; as love, anger, fear, courage, envy, joy, friendfhip, hatred, tendernefs, emulation, pity. By faculty, I mean, in this place, the capacity of being affected by thofe paffions; by anger, grief, or pity. By habit, I mean the

habitude or relation which our minds bear to those passions; as whether we are affected too much or too little by anger, both which are wrong; or affected by it moderately, on just grounds and proper occasions, which only is right: the same observation applies to all other passions. Neither the virtues nor the vices therefore can be passions; because it is not in reference to the passions that we are denominated good or bad, and are regarded as the objects of praise or of blame. It is not our fear or anger simply, but the degree of those passions, that constitutes the propriety or impropriety of our conduct; and renders us the just objects of commendation or reproach. Besides, fear and anger, and all other passions, are emotions independent of deliberation and preference; but the virtues always imply an act of comparison, and the preference of one sort of conduct to another. Farther, we are said to be moved and impelled by passion, but our characters are disposed and settled by virtue; for which reason the virtues cannot be called capacities; and also, because we are neither praised nor blamed in reference to our being susceptive or capable of passion. These capacities, besides, are implanted by nature; which the virtues, as we have already proved, are not. Since then they are neither passions nor faculties, it remains that they should belong to that class called habits.[s]

[s] The same subject is treated in Magna Moral. l. i. c. v.; and in the Eudemian Ethics, l. ii. c. iii.

BOOK II. Chap. 6.

The nature of this habit afcertained.

It is not enough to fay that virtue is a habit; we muft farther afcertain what is the nature of that habit. Every virtue, then, tends to conftitute the perfection of that object to which it belongs, and to qualify it for performing properly its peculiar functions. Thus, the virtue of the eye conftitutes the perfection of that organ, and qualifies it for feeing diftinctly: and the virtue of a horfe conftitutes the perfection of that animal, and fits him for running fwiftly, for bearing his rider, and for difdaining fear at the approach of an enemy. The virtue of a man, therefore, muft be that habit which conftitutes the perfection of his nature; and fits him for performing properly his peculiar functions. How this habit is to be attained, we have explained already; but the matter will be rendered more perfpicuous by farther examining the nature of virtue. From every thing continuous and divifible, we may take the half, a greater part, or a leffer. The half may be confidered as the mean proportional between the extremes of too much and too little, from which it is equally remote; and confidered in relation to the object itfelf, this mean proportional is always one and the fame; but confidered in relation to man, this juft mean continually varies, becaufe the middle between the two vicious extremes of too much or too little is, in reference to him, that which is neither more nor lefs than propriety requires. Thus, if ten be the greater extreme, and two the leffer, fix muft be the arithmetical mean, becaufe it exceeds the leffer, as much as it is exceeded by the

the greater. But in regulating human actions, which, like all other motions, are things continuous and divisible[h], the same simple rule will not apply: for two pounds may be too small an allowance, and ten too large; yet he who directs the regimen of the wrestlers, will not therefore prescribe universally six pounds, which might be too little for Milo the wrestler, though far too much for one beginning his exercises: the same thing holds as to the quantity of labour which he enjoins to be performed, in running, wrestling, and the other branches of the gymnastic. Thus, he who is skilful in directing all such actions and operations, will carefully avoid excess or defect, but find out and prefer the golden mean; which is the object that every good artist always keeps in view, since the highest commendation of works of art consists in saying that they admit neither of addition nor retrenchment.

That the virtues do not admit of excess or of defect, nor the vices of mediocrity.

But virtue, which is the perfection of nature itself, is far superior to art, which only imitates her operations, in aiming at the just mean between two vicious extremes. I speak here of moral virtue, which is conversant about passions and actions, all of which admit of mediocrity, as well as of excess or defect. Thus we may be too much or too little affected, with desire or aversion, courage or fear, anger or pity, pain or pleasure. Both extremes are bad; and the passion is then only proper and correct, when we are affected suitably to its causes, its objects, and

[h] ἡ μεν γαρ κινησις συνεχης· ἡ δε πραξις κινησις, Eudem. l. ii. c. iii. p. 205.

BOOK II.

its ends: when this is the cafe, both the paffion, and the action proceeding from it, are juftly praifed as virtuous; becaufe they do not deviate from the mark at which they ought to aim. The Pythagoreans, therefore, did well in affigning "definite" to the co-arrangement of good, and "indefinite" to that of evil[h]; for there is only one right road; but the ways of error are innumerable. The former is as difficult as the latter is eafy; it is difficult to hit the mark, but eafy to mifs it;

"Virtue is ftill the fame, but vice has various forms."

The former, therefore, is the habit of preferring and obferving mediocrity in our paffions and actions, agreeably to the rules of right reafon: virtue, then, in its effence, is mediocrity; in its effect, it is excellence, and the higheft excellence[i].

[h] See Analyfis, p. 129.

[i] This is the cleareft meaning I can affix to κατα το ευ ακροτης. But Ariftotle when he calls virtue, in one fenfe, an extreme, feems to allude to what is faid in his fecond Analytics concerning the ὁροι συμπεραςματικοι, the termini conclufórii, and the difference between them and definitions, fhewing the effence, that is, the caufe which makes any thing to be what it is. Thus, What is it to fquare an oblong? This queftion may be anfwered, or in other words, the fquaring may be defined by faying, either that it is to find a fquare equal to an oblong; or, that is to find a line which is a geometrical mean between the fides of the oblong. The former definition is called συμπεραςματικος, becaufe when the mathematician demonftrates, that the fquare conftructed on a line, which is the mean proportional between the fides of the oblong, is equal to that oblong, he draws the conclufion, "a fquare, therefore, is found equal to an oblong:" but the fecond definition tells, not only that the fquare is equal to the oblong, but the caufe which makes it to be fo. In the fame manner, when we call virtue the higheft excellence or perfection of any object, we only tell, in other words, what is meant by virtue; but when we call it mediocrity, we define it by its effence, and fhew the caufe which makes it to be the higheft excellence.

But

But neither all paſſions nor all actions admit of mediocrity; for there are many whoſe very names infer exceſs and blame; as the paſſions of impudence, malice, and envy; and the actions of adultery, theft, and murder. Such paſſions and ſuch actions are in themſelves deteſtable exceſſes: and for the ſame reaſon, there cannot be any mediocrity in cowardice, injuſtice, or intemperance; nor any exceſs or defect in the virtues of courage or wiſdom; nor univerſally can mediocrity or virtue admit of exceſs or defect; nor the vices, which are all of them extremes, admit of a virtuous mediocrity.

Chap. 7.

That all the virtues conſiſt in mediocrity proved by induction.

In practical morality, general principles are of little uſe, unleſs they be applied to particulars, in which all practice conſiſts, and by which all general principles muſt, if true, be confirmed. Let the various paſſions or emotions therefore be arranged in a diagram[k], and we ſhall ſee that the degree of them conſiſtent with propriety always lies in the middle between two blameable extremes. Thus, in encountering or avoiding dangers, courage holds the middle place between raſhneſs and timidity: in obeying or reſiſting ſolicitations to pleaſure, temperance holds the middle place between voluptuouſneſs, and a vice which, being uncommon, is nameleſs, but which we ſhall call unfeeling apathy. In pecuniary matters, liberality is the mean between extravagance and parſimony. The prodigal is too

[k] The diagram, or delineation, which is here wanting, may be partly ſupplied from Ethic. Eudem. l. ii. c. iii. for even there it is extremely incomplete.

careleſs

careless in throwing away money, and at too little pains to acquire it. The miser pays excessive attention to the acquisition of money, and excessive attention to the keeping of it. There are other qualities relating to money, as magnificence, with its contrary extremes of niggardliness and wasteful profusion; which distinctions will be afterwards explained[l]. As to honour and dishonour, magnanimity is the middle term between boastful pride and mean-spirited abasement; and there is another quality or habit which bears the same proportion to magnanimity which liberality does to magnificence, consisting in the propriety of our affection with respect to small and ordinary marks of honour, whereas magnanimity consists in the propriety of our affection with respect to those which are great and extraordinary. In the common intercourse of life, men are distinguished by too much or too little desire of honour; the excess and the defect are both marked by names[m], but the intermediate and praise-worthy degree of the affection is nameless; wherefore the extremes contend with each other about the middle place; and, as either happens to obtain it, we praise a decent pride or a becoming humility. The reason of this incongruity in our judgments will be afterwards explained: we proceed at present according to our proposed method. With regard

[l] In the first chapters of the Fourth Book.

[m] The persons distinguished by the excess and defect, were called φιλοτιμοι and αφιλοτιμοι: but there was only one of these adjectives, which afforded an abstract φιλοτιμια, denoting the disposition or habit.

to

to anger, ſome men are too ſuſceptible, and others too unſuſceptible of this paſſion; and others commonly indulge it only in that degree which is laudable. Theſe different diſpoſitions or habits are not accurately diſtinguiſhed by names. We ſhall call the intermediate and proper degree of the affection, meekneſs; which inclines, however, more to the extreme of phlegmatic endurance, than to that of immoderate iraſcibility. There are three other virtues or proprieties, which, though different, are yet nearly allied to each other, and all of them diſtinguiſhable in the ordinary intercourſe of words and actions; bearing different relations, the one to truth, and the other to pleaſure; and that which relates to pleaſure, either confined to matters of paſtime and amuſement only, or comprehending all the complicated buſineſſes of life, whether they be gay or ſerious. Neither theſe proprieties themſelves, nor the various and contrary deviations from them, are accurately diſtinguiſhed by names; but it is neceſſary that they ſhould here be conſidered, in order to ſhew that the praiſe-worthy habit in trivial as well as in important actions, always lies in the middle between two blameable extremes; and as names are wanting, we muſt, as in other caſes, take the liberty of making them, both for the ſake of perſpicuity, and to keep unbroken the connexion of our diſcourſe. In the habit or diſpoſition relative to the true exhibition of our characters in word and action, let the propriety or virtue which lies in the middle be called plain-dealing;

and

and the impropriety or vice, by which we aſſume good qualities which do not belong to us, be called oſtentation; and that, by which we diveſt ourſelves of the good qualities with which we are really endowed, be called diſſimulation or irony. In matters relating to pleaſure and merriment, there is a virtue in facetiouſneſs; buffoonery is the impropriety on the one ſide, and ruſtic ſimplicity on the other. In the more ſerious concerns of life, but which have ſtill pleaſure for their object, the virtue of companionable friendlineſs is diſtinguiſhed, on the one hand, from quarrelſome moroſeneſs; and, on the other, both from unmeaning officiouſneſs, and intereſted flattery. Even in mere affections which do not exert themſelves either in words or deeds, modeſty is praiſed as holding the middle place between baſhful timidity, and frontleſs aſſurance. An honeſt indignation at the proſperity of the worthleſs is eaſily diſtinguiſhable, both from envy which pines at the proſperity of all alike, and from that depraved pleaſure which none but the moſt vicious can receive from beholding the unmerited ſucceſs of artful villany or ruffian violence[n]. But concerning thoſe habits,

[n] επιχαιρεκακια in the Latin verſions is tranſlated *malevolentia*, which does not at all expreſs Ariſtotle's meaning: malevolence wiſhes ill to all mankind, even to the good, and therefore is grieved at their proſperity: but the vice here ſpoken of is that depraved pleaſure which wicked men take in beholding the ſucceſs of arts like to their own. In this ſenſe only, Ariſtotle could ſay νεμεσις εστι μεσοτης φθονου και επιχαιρεκακιας, that indignation was the middle between envy and the vice here ſpecified: for envy grieves at proſperity well merited, but επιχαιρεκακια rejoices at proſperity unmerited; which are

habits, we ſhall treat more fully hereafter, and alſo concerning juſtice, which muſt be divided into two kinds, before we can diſtinguiſh wherein the propriety of each kind conſiſts; and likewiſe concerning the intellectual virtues.

Chap. 8.

Why vices are often miſtaken for virtues; and converſely.

Of thoſe three diſpoſitions or habits, of which that in the middle is only right, the extremes are contrary to, and at variance with, each other, and alſo with the virtue which lies between them. For, as in a line divided into equal, and alſo unequal, parts, the half is great when compared with the ſmaller diviſion, but ſmall when compared with the greater; ſo of human paſſions and actions, their proper and moderate degree appears an exceſs or defect juſt as it happens to be compared with either extreme. To the fool-hardy, courage appears cowardice; and to the coward, raſhneſs[o]. The voluptuary deems temperance, inſenſibility; and the ſpendthrift calls liberality, avarice; each puſhing the extreme, which happens to form part of his own character, into the place of honour. It is worthy of remark, that the extremes are not only more contrary to each other than either of them is to the middle, but alſo that one of them often bears a falſe reſemblance to this middle, and is frequently miſtaken for it. Thus raſhneſs

are two extremes equally remote from that affection by which we rejoice at the proſperity of good men, and grieve at the proſperity of the wicked.

[o] Ariſtotle ſays, that the courageous man, compared with the coward, ſeems fool-hardy, and therefore the coward calls him raſh.

BOOK II. neſs often paſſes for bravery, and profuſion for liberality; but cowardice is never miſtaken for courage, nor voluptuouſneſs for temperance; although temperance is ſometimes called inſenſibility, and inſenſibility, temperance. This irregularity proceeds from two cauſes; firſt, the one extreme is really nearer than the other to that proper affection which lies between them. Raſhneſs is nearer than cowardice to the virtue of courage; and therefore cowardice, the moſt diſtant extreme, is moſt properly oppoſed to courage. The ſecond cauſe is, that, mankind in general being more inclined to one extreme than the other, thoſe vices, to which we are naturally moſt prone, are moſt the objects of our blame as well as of our attention. Thus, with regard to pleaſure, moſt men are prone to err rather on the ſide of indulgence, than on that of abſtinence. Voluptuouſneſs therefore is the vice naturally oppoſed to temperance.[p]

Chap. 9. — Practical rules for the attainment of propriety of affection and action.

Enough has been ſaid to ſhew that virtue conſiſts in mediocrity. But this middle point, either in paſſions or actions, it is not eaſy to hit; for, as a man muſt have ſome knowledge in geometry to find the centre of a circle, ſo it belongs not to thoſe ignorant of Ethics to obſerve the rules of propriety[q]. Every one is capable of being angry, or of giving away money; but how much, when, to whom, in what manner, and for what

[p] The ſame thoughts are expreſſed in other words, and illuſtrated by other examples, in the Ethics to Eudemus, l. ii. c. v.

[q] Non prætoris erat ſtultis dare tenuia rerum
Officia, atque uſum rapidæ permittere vitæ. Perſius, v. 93.

what end or purpose, are questions which it is not easy for every one to resolve; and of which, as the proper solution is extremely rare, so is it highly praise-worthy. He therefore, who would not err widely from the point of propriety, must make it his first care to keep at a distance from the most blameable extreme; and, as Calypso advises,

> "Steer by the higher rock; lest whirl'd around
> We sink, beneath the circling eddy drown'd."[r]

In doing this we shall imitate the skilful pilot who, when he cannot hold the direct course sails the nearest to it possible; and of two evils prefers the least. We ought next to consider to which of the two extremes or faults we are most prone; for different men are more or less easily beset by different faults or vices, and what these are by which each is most liable to be entangled, he will best discover by attending to the pleasure which he has in indulging, or the pain in restraining them. In order to correct his character, he must bend it, in a contrary direction, as we straighten a crooked stick; but, above all, he must beware of the blandishments of pleasure, of which we are seldom impartial or uncorrupt judges: treating this fair enchantress, as the aged senators in Homer did the beautiful Helen: his words on this occasion cannot be too often repeated, nor their lesson too earnestly inculcated.

[r] Pope's Iliad, b. xii. v. 263, 264. But Ulysses, and not Calypso, says this, Il. xii. v. 108.

"They

"They cry'd, No wonder, ſuch celeſtial charms
For nine long years have ſet the world in arms;
What winning graces! what majeſtic mien!
She moves a goddeſs, and ſhe looks a queen!
Yet hence, O Heaven! convey that fatal face,
And from deſtruction ſave the Trojan race."[s]

By thus baniſhing pleaſure, we ſhall be leſs liable to error. Such, briefly, are the precepts by which propriety of affection and action may be attained; a thing for which it is extremely difficult to lay down general rules, which are at all applicable to the indefinite variety of particular caſes; and to aſcertain, for inſtance, with whom we ought to be angry, how long, to what degree, and for what reaſons or purpoſes. Sometimes we praiſe the defect, and call inſenſibility, meekneſs; ſometimes we praiſe the exceſs, and call iraſcibility, manhood. He who deviates but a little from the middle point, commonly eſcapes blame; great deviations become perceptible, but the preciſe degrees of blame which they reſpectively merit cannot be accurately expreſſed in words; and in ſuch practical matters[t], common ſenſe is the ſole and ultimate judge. This only is certain, that mediocrity is always praiſe-worthy; and that, in order to attain it, we muſt, for the reaſons above given, incline ourſelves, according to circumſtances, ſometimes to the one extreme, and ſometimes to the other.

[s] Iliad, iii. v. 203, &c.

[t] In things perceptible by ſenſe, or objects of ſenſation, as contradiſtinguiſhed from objects of intellection; in which latter only, accuracy is attainable. See above, p. 163.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Book, Ariſtotle examines the ſpecific diſtinctions between moral virtue and other habits of the mind. The habit of moral virtue implies the deliberate preference of one kind of conduct to another; and deliberate preference implies freedom of choice. Thoſe actions are voluntary, which have their principle in ourſelves; thoſe are involuntary, which proceed from an external cauſe. Building on accurate definitions and ſolid diſtinctions, the philoſopher proves, with equal perſpicuity and energy, that our moral conduct is the proper object of praiſe or blame, of reward or puniſhment. His reaſonings and ſpeculations ſoar above and ſuperſede the abſtruſe, or rather the frivolous queſtion, introduced by his perverters the ſchoolmen, concerning the freedom of the human will; a queſtion which continued to be agitated long after their other ſubtleties were condemned to oblivion. With Ariſtotle, all will is free-will; ſince nothing can be more free than that which is voluntary: and although ſome actions originating

nating in ourſelves are conſidered as of a mixed nature, becauſe they are performed reluctantly, though ſpontaneouſly, this happens merely becauſe, of two evils, we naturally chooſe the leaſt: ſuch actions, how contrary ſoever to our will in their own nature, being nevertheleſs voluntary in reference to the unfortunate circumſtances in which we happen to be placed.

His work, hitherto, proceeds with great regularity. He began by proving that the happineſs of man conſiſts in the exerciſe of the moral and intellectual virtues; or, in his own technical language, "that happineſs is energy directed in the line of virtue." As his definition of happineſs implies an acquaintance with the nature of virtue, and the knowledge of virtue implies that of the mind in which this habit reſides, he explains the different parts or principles of the mind, whether rational or irrational; ſhewing that both principles neceſſarily co-operate in the acquirement of good moral habits, as well as in the approbation of good moral characters. This ſyſtem is totally different from that which regards morality as founded ſolely or ultimately on feeling; whether a moral ſenſe, ſympathy, or any other modification of merely ſenſitive nature; an abſurd doctrine, liable to groſs and dangerous perverſion; and which has often been employed to juſtify, and even to produce the wildeſt practical errors. Having explained his theory of Ethics, the Author proceeds to the practice; and concludes this Book with the examination of courage and temperance.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

Moral election and preference — Our habits voluntary — Courage — Its different kinds diſtinguiſhed — Temperance — Natural and adventitious wants — Compariſon of intemperance and cowardice.

BOOK III. Chap. 1.

What is meant by the epithet voluntary as applied to human actions.

VIRTUE is relative to paſſions and actions; of which thoſe only which are voluntary, are the objects of praiſe or blame; and thoſe which are involuntary, are the objects always of pardon, and ſometimes of pity. In treating of virtue, therefore, it is neceſſary clearly to explain what is meant by the epithets *voluntary* and *involuntary*; the force of which words ought to be fully underſtood by legiſlators, when they eſtabliſh rewards and puniſhments. Thoſe actions and thoſe crimes, then, are involuntary, which are either done by compulſion or committed through ignorance. We are ſaid to act or move by compulſion, when the principle of action or motion is not in ourſelves, but external; as when we are driven before the force of the wind, or impelled by ſtrength greater than our own. But it is doubtful whether thoſe evils are voluntary which we either encounter through motives of honour, or endure through the fear of greater calamities. Thus, if a tyrant com-

mands us to commit fome act of bafenefs, having in his power our parents and children, whofe fate depends on our obedience; and when failors or merchants in a ftorm throw their goods overboard to fave their lives; fuch actions are of a mixed nature, but rather voluntary, becaufe, at the moment of doing them, they are matters of choice; and the true motive to any action is that by which we are actuated at the time of performing it. Befides, the principle of motion is in ourfelves, and may be exerted or not at pleafure. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary in reference to the unfortunate circumftances in which we are placed, though independently of thofe circumftances they are much againft our will; and therefore, confidered abfolutely, are involuntary.

Actions of this mixed kind are fometimes the objects of high panegyric, when we boldly encounter pain and difgrace for the fake of great and honourable advantages: and when we decline this conflict, we often render ourfelves the objects of reproach. But to encounter difficulties and difgrace without the expectancy of honour or advantage, is the part only of a fool. On other occafions, though we receive not any praife, yet we meet with pardon, when our virtue yields to terrors too powerful for the weaknefs of humanity: but the degree in which it yields, is ftill in our power; for there are fome criminal acts to which neither threats nor violence can ever compel thofe who, rather than commit them, would fuffer the moft wretched death. In

Euripides'

Euripides' Alcmæon, the reaſons for which that hero ſays he is forced to commit matricide are worthy only of ridicule.

It is difficult to determine what goods are to be preferred, and what evils are to be encountered; and ſtill more difficult in time of action and danger, to adhere firmly to our predetermined reſolutions. For the moſt part, men are forced to ſuffer diſgrace, only for the ſake of avoiding pain; and as theſe evils are of a different kind, it is not eaſy fairly to compare, and exactly to appreciate them: but when pain is preferred to diſgrace, our manlineſs is praiſed; when diſgrace is preferred to pain, our daſtardy is blamed. On the whole then, what actions are compulſory? Are they thoſe only whoſe principle is external, and in which the immediate agent has not any voluntary ſhare? Or, ſhall we call thoſe actions compulſory, which, though matters of choice relatively to the unfortunate circumſtances in which we are placed, are yet, when conſidered in themſelves, abſolutely againſt our will? We ſay, that ſuch acts ought to be conſidered rather as voluntary, becauſe all actions, being converſant about particulars only, muſt depend on circumſtances, and leave room for the preference of one motive to another. If it ſhould be ſaid, that pleaſures and honours conſiſting in things external to ourſelves, the actions performed for their attainment are alſo compulſory, all actions whatever would then deſerve this epithet, becauſe all proceed from ſuch motives. But it is abſurd to

 accuſe

accufe pleafure, which cannot be the object either of punifhment or blame; and not ourfelves, who are too eafily feduced by it; and equally abfurd to confider ourfelves as the caufe of our good actions, and pleafure as the caufe of our bad ones. Thofe actions only, therefore, are properly compulfory, whofe principle lies without, and which are totally independent of our own voluntary co-operation.

We faid that crimes committed through ignorance are involuntary. But this affertion is not univerfally true; for thofe only are involuntary, which produce pain and repentance. He who has committed wickednefs through ignorance, and feels no compunction for the act, cannot be faid indeed to have done voluntarily what he did not intend; nor, on the other hand, is his evil deed involuntary, fince he feels not any uneafinefs for the commiffion of it. But as *his* action is *involuntary* who repents; *his*, who repents not, may be called *not voluntary:* that things of different natures may be expreffed by different names. A diftinction is alfo to be made between, acting *through* ignorance and *with* ignorance. A man drunk, or in a paffion, is guilty of violence *through* intoxication or anger, not *through* ignorance, though ignorantly; and every bad man is ignorant of what things it is his duty either to do or to avoid; an ignorance profound and univerfal, infeparably connected with his pravity of will and purpofe, and therefore inexcufable. But in the particular actions, which,

which, becaufe committed through ignorance, feem entitled to pardon or pity, it will often be ufeful to diftinguifh, between the agent and the action, its fubject, end, the manner how, and the inftrument with which it is performed. None but a madman can be ignorant with regard to all thefe particulars. In whatever he has done, every one in his fenfes muft know that he himfelf was the agent; but he may not know that he was doing wrong; as thofe who blab in fpeaking, beg pardon for words which efcaped them unintentionally; or, as Æfchylus[t] profaned the myftical terms, not knowing them to be fuch; and, in actions, a man fhowing a catapult, difcharged that formidable engine; and Meropé would have flain her own fon, taking him for an enemy: poifons have been given inftead of remedies: fome perfons have been killed by thofe who inftructed them in their exercifes; and others have been flain with fpears thought to be blunted, or with ftones miftaken for pumice. The refult of fuch actions being totally different from what the agents intended, they are juftly deemed involuntary, when accompanied with pain and repentance; whereas thofe actions feem moft voluntary, which not only proceed from our own movements, but which are begun, carried on, and terminated with a clear perception or knowledge of their

[t] Æfchylus was acquitted by the Areopagus for divulging fome expreffions ufed in the myfteries, having proved that he was not initiated, and therefore did not know what he faid. Clemens Alexandrin. ftrom. ii.

BOOK III.

real nature and end. To which of the two classes then shall we ascribe things done through anger or appetite? If we call them involuntary, brute animals, and children, who are yet incapable of reason, can never act voluntarily. But appetite and anger are principles of human nature, as well as reason itself; and when they prompt us to act amiss, are not less voluntary than when they prompt us to act rightly; to repel injuries, and to defend our persons; to gratify hunger which prevents death, or to gratify curiosity which promotes knowledge. That which is involuntary is painful, but the gratification of our natural appetites is highly pleasing. Besides, what does it import us to say, that things done in passion are less voluntary than those done on reflection, since guilty transports of passion ought to be as carefully avoided and shunned as deliberate villainy? The actions of man too often proceed from fretfulness or concupiscence; which irrational impulses, being moving principles in the human frame, cannot, without absurdity, be considered as involuntary.[u]

Chap. 2. Of moral election and preference.

Having thus distinguished actions and passions as voluntary and involuntary, we next proceed to treat of that intentional election or preference of one plan of conduct to another, which seems, still more than actions themselves, to compose the nature and essence of virtue, and to constitute the distinction of characters. This election

[u] See Magna Moralia, b. i. c. xiii.; and Ethic. Eudem. b. ii. c. vii.

or

or preference is not only voluntary, but something more[x]; for it belongs not to brute animals and children, whose actions are voluntary; nor to voluntary acts done suddenly, with such precipitate haste as leaves not any time for comparison, election, or choice. Those who name it inclination, passion, or opinion, seem to mistake its nature. For the passions, whether originating in anger or pleasure, are common to man with the brute creation; but this election or preference is peculiar to himself. The intemperate man acts from passion, without election; but the man of true temperance acts from election, without passion[y]. The calm motive, by which he is actuated, is a thing so different from passion or desire, that it is frequently set in direct opposition to them: but desire cannot be opposed to desire, nor any one passion to itself. Pleasure and pain are the ultimate moving principles which set all the desires and passions to work; but the actions of good men, depending on a higher cause, do not obey their impulse. Neither ought this intentional preference or

[x] επι πλειον το εκουσιον. "Voluntary" is an epithet of more extensive application. It applies to actions that are not "deliberate." Moral election therefore implies something more than merely what is "voluntary."

[y] ὁ ακρατης επιθυμων μεν πραττει, προαιρουμενος δε ου· ὁ εγκρατης δ' αναπαλιν, προαιρουμενος μεν, επιθυμων δ' ου. "The intemperate man acts desiring, not preferring; the temperate man (quite the reverse) acts preferring, not desiring." The full sense of this passage will appear hereafter, when we come to treat of the important distinctions between temperance and self-command on the one side, and, of those between intemperance and confirmed profligacy on the other: distinctions, generally overlooked, though essential to a complete theory of Ethics.

election

BOOK III. election to be confounded with mere inclinations or wishes, though it appears to be nearly connected with them. We may wish for things impossible, as immortality; or things not depending on ourselves, as that such a player or wrestler may gain the prize. But to prefer impossibilities, is the part only of a madman; and moral election or choice implies, that the goods preferred may be obtained by our own exertions. Besides, our wishes relate principally to ends; our preferences, to means: we wish for health, we prefer the means necessary for attaining it; "to wish for happiness," is correct language; "to prefer happiness," is an expression highly inaccurate: our preferences seem universally to relate to things within our own power. Moral preferences therefore, are not merely opinions: which latter may relate to things impossible, eternal, and unchangeable; and which are characterised by the epithets "true" and "false," not by those of "good" and "bad;" which apply only to our preferences or elections. These last differ not only from opinion in general, but from every opinion in particular; for by no opinion whatever, and which is merely an opinion, are our characters marked as good or bad. Our preferences ascertain the morality of our actions and habits. But our opinions merely tell us what it is that we choose or reject; wherein it may be useful or hurtful; and how it may prove either the one or the other. Our opinions are estimated by their truth, our preferences by their propriety; the former are unstable like their

their caufes, the latter are regulated by our own experience; and what opinion tells us to be the beft road, is not always that which we choofe to follow, our vices dragging us in an oppofite direction[a]. To determine whether this moral preference is either preceded by, or accompanied with, opinion, belongs not to the prefent queftion, which confifts only in deciding whether thefe two be one and the fame. We fee that they are not. What then can this moral preference be, fince it belongs not to any of the claffes above mentioned? It plainly is voluntary, but alfo fomething more, fince it implies deliberation and reafon; and, as its name indicates, is that which, after due comparifons made by the underftanding, the will prefers as beft.[a]

Chap. 3. — About what objects it is converfant.

But it is worthy of confideration, whether all queftions be the objects of fuch deliberations and comparifons, or fome queftions only. There are fome points concerning which none but a fool or a madman would hefitate a moment; and we are not faid to deliberate concerning things eternal and unalterable, as the exiftence of the univerfe, or the incommenfurability of the fides of a fquare with its diagonal. Neither do we deliberate concerning things merely fortuitous, as the finding of a treafure; nor concerning thofe which either naturally or neceffarily always happen after the fame manner, as the feafons of droughts

[a] ——— Video meliora proboque;
Deteriora fequor. HOR.

[a] See Ethics to Eudemus, b. ii. c. vii, viii, ix, x.; and Magn. Moral. b. i. c. xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii.

droughts and rains; the rising, setting, and motions of the planets. Nor do all human affairs, that is, all those depending on the exertions of man, form a fit subject for our deliberation. The Lacedæmonians do not deliberate what is the constitution of government most suitable to the Scythians; because the conduct of the Lacedæmonians cannot have any efficacy in establishing it. The proper object of deliberation, therefore, consists in those practical matters, which depend on our own exertions; since these are the only things that remain unmentioned. Nature, necessity, fortune, intellect, are all of them considered as causes; but our deliberations bear a reference to those causes only which it is in our own power to influence and control. Things subjected to strict rules, admit not of deliberation; for example, in writing the letters of the alphabet, we have only to follow the practice prescribed. But the great field for deliberation lies in those practical arts which are uncertain and doubtful; in physic, œconomy; and in navigation rather than in the gymnastic; because the more precarious their operations are, the more patient deliberation is requisite: it is more necessary therefore in arts than in sciences; and must be constantly exercised about those things which, as they are not fortuitous, happen, for the most part, after the same manner; but concerning which, it is not easy for human wisdom to foresee how they will, in any given case, fall out. In matters of this kind, which are of high moment, we do not choose to

act without the advice of counſellors, miſtruſting our own ſagacity. It was before obſerved, that we do not deliberate concerning ends, but concerning the means by which they may be attained. A phyſician never examines, whether hé ſhall cure his patient; nor an orator, whether he ſhall perſuade his audience; nor a ſtateſman, whether he ſhall promote public proſperity. But the means through which theſe ſeveral purpoſes may be beſt attained, are the proper objects of their reſpective deliberations; which often extend to a long ſeries of reaſoning: for the immediate inſtruments, or agents, through which their deſigns may be effected, muſt often be procured by means of others more remote, and thoſe, by others naturally prior; until they arrive finally at the firſt efficient cauſe, which, as in a mathematical inveſtigation or analyſis, is frequently the laſt in the order of diſcovery. The ſtateſman, too, as well as the mathematician, when he comes to an impoſſibility, there ſtops; and tries ſome other road, which may lead to the end in view: as for example, if money be wanted, and cannot poſſibly be found, his ſchemes, which muſt be ineffectual, without it, are immediately laid aſide; but he does not deſiſt from his purpoſe until he has examined not only his own reſources but thoſe of his friends; for what may be done by our friends, is in our own power, ſince they may be ſet to work by a principle in ourſelves. Our deliberations, therefore, relate to inſtruments, to agents, to materials, and to means; and not only to the cauſes

BOOK III. causes by which, but to the manner in which, our actions are to be performed, our conduct regulated, and our purposes effected. On the other hand, our ends and purposes themselves are never subjects of deliberation; neither are we said to deliberate concerning those particulars, which are merely perceptions of sense[a]. Neither can our deliberations be indefinite or endless, because this would imply a desire without an object. Moral preference, then, is not deliberation, but that which, after mature deliberation, is preferred as most agreeable to the commanding principles in our nature. In this perference, deliberation terminates; and from it, action commences. This natural progress appears in the Heroic Polities, faithfully delineated by Homer. The wisdom of the senate deliberates and prefers, and declares its resolves to the people; who immediately carry them into execution. Moral preference, then, relates to those things only, which may be accomplished by our own exertions; it is appetite or affection, combined with and modified by reason[b]; and, as

[a] He says, whether this bit of bread, for instance, be well baked: the example seems superfluous.

[b] The sagacious Polybius analyses with Aristotle the moral principle or faculty into reason or intellect, operating on the social and sympathetic nature of man. The passage is in the part of Polybius translated by Hampton, in whose words I shall give it. "From the union of the two sexes, to which all are naturally inclined, children are born. When any of these therefore, being arrived at perfect age, instead of yielding suitable returns of gratitude and assistance to those by whom they have been bred, on the contrary, attempt to injure them by words or actions, it is manifest that those who behold the wrong, after having also seen the sufferings and the anxious cares that were sustained by

as above obſerved, converſant, not about ends, but about the beſt means by which they may be attained.

BOOK III.

Volition, on the contrary, is, as above ſaid, converſant only about ends; which conſiſt, according to ſome, in real, and, according to

Chap. 4.

The cauſes which move the will.

by the parents in the nouriſhment and education of their children, muſt be greatly offended and diſpleaſed at ſuch proceeding. For man, who, among all the various kinds of animals, is alone endowed with the faculty of reaſon, cannot, like the reſt, paſs over ſuch actions with indifference: but will make reflection on what he ſees; and comparing likewiſe the future with the preſent, will not fail to expreſs his indignation at this injurious treatment; to which, as he foreſees, he may alſo at ſome time be expoſed. Thus again, when any one who has been ſuccoured by another in the time of danger, inſtead of ſhewing the like kindneſs to this benefactor, endeavours at any time to deſtroy or hurt him; it is certain that all men muſt be ſhocked by ſuch ingratitude, through ſympathy with the reſentment of their neighbour; and from an apprehenſion alſo, that the caſe may be their own. And from hence ariſes, in the mind of every man, a certain *notion* of the nature and force of duty, in which conſiſts both the beginning and the end of juſtice. In like manner, the man, who in defence of others, is ſeen to throw himſelf the foremoſt into every danger, and even to ſuſtain the fury of the fierceſt animals, never fails to obtain the loudeſt acclamations of applauſe and veneration from all the multitude; while he who ſhews a different conduct is purſued with cenſure and reproach. And thus it is that the people begin to diſcern the nature of things honourable and baſe, and in what conſiſts the difference between them; and to perceive that the former, on account of the advantage that attends them, are fit to be admired and imitated, and the latter to be deteſted and avoided." Polybius, l. vi. c. 6. The doctrine contained in this paſſage is expanded by Dr. Adam Smith into a theory of moral ſentiments. But he departs from Polybius in placing the perception of right and wrong in ſentiment or feeling ultimately and ſimply. This alſo was the doctrine of Hutcheſon, who aſcribes our notions of virtue and vice to what he calls a moral ſenſe*. Polybius, on the contrary, maintains with Ariſtotle, that theſe notions ariſe from reaſon or intellect operating on affection or appetite; or, in other words, that the moral faculty is a compound, and may be reſolved into two ſimpler principles of the mind.

* Hutcheſon's Moral Philoſophy.

others,

BOOK III.

others, in feeming, good. The opinion of thofe who think that the will is moved only by what is really good, involves this contradiction, that the volitions of a bad man are not voluntary; and the opinion of thofe who think that the will is moved only by feeming good, deftroys all natural motives to volition, and makes it dependent merely on human caprice. If fuch opinions muft at firft fight be rejected, let us, then, fay, that real good is the natural caufe of volition, but that each individual prefers what feems good to himfelf; a good man, what is truly good; and a bad man, what he happens to think fo; juft as we fee, in different habits and conftitutions of body, the fame things are not equally conducive to the health of all alike, but wholefome things agree with healthy conftitutions, whereas the fickly often delight moft in things naturally unwholefome. In the fame manner the moral conftitution of a virtuous man, being congenial with truth, appreciates things by their real worth; for fuch as our habits are, fuch will be the eftimates which we form of honour, pleafure, and every object of defire. This perhaps is the chief excellence of virtue, that it enables us to fee the true value of things, and to meafure them by a correct ftandard. But the multitude, deceived by appearances, purfue pleafures as the only good, and fhun pain as the only evil.

Chap. 5.

That our habits are voluntary.

Ends are, then, the objects of volition; and the means of attaining them are the objects of deliberation and preference; which, being conferfant

verſant only about ſuch things as are in our own power, the virtues immediately proceeding from them muſt alſo be in our own power, and voluntary, as well as the contrary vices. The poet's ſentiment therefore is but partially true:

"None covets wretchedneſs, or ſpurns delight[c]."

The latter clauſe cannot be diſputed; but the former muſt be denied, otherwiſe we muſt reject the doctrine juſt eſtabliſhed, that man is the author of his own actions; and that thoſe things, whoſe principles or cauſes are in ourſelves, are alſo in our own power. Yet theſe truths are atteſted by common ſenſe and univerſal experience. Criminal actions are puniſhed by law, when not committed either through compulſion or ignorance; in which caſes they are pardoned, as not proceeding from ourſelves. Praiſe-worthy actions, on the other hand, are encouraged and honoured; that as men are deterred from vice by the dread of puniſhment, they may be excited to virtue by the hope of reward. But were not our conduct voluntary, ſuch perſuaſives to virtue would be uſeleſs and abſurd; and there would be no more ſenſe in exhorting a man to his duty, than in perſuading him not to feel cold

[c] ουδεις ἑκων πονηρος ουδ' ακων μακαρ. "Nobody is willingly wicked, or happy againſt his will." The ſentiment is aſcribed to an ancient tragedian. Ethic. Nicom. edit. Oxford, p. 108. and to Heſiod, "Εν ταις μεγαλαις." Euſtrat. in Moral. Ariſtot. p. 62. The verſe originally meant that nobody was willingly *miſerable*, &c., that ſenſe being given to the word πονηρος in Heſiod. Suidas ſays, that Heſiod wrote a catalogue of illuſtrious women, in five books, from which work Euſtratius conjectures this verſe may be copied.

or heat, thirſt or hunger. Crimes committed through ignorance are only excuſable when the ignorance is involuntary; for when the cauſe of it lies in ourſelves, it is then juſtly puniſhable; as in that ancient law which inflicts a double penalty on crimes done in drunkenneſs[d]. The ignorance of thoſe laws, which all may know if they will, does not excuſe the breach of them; and neglect is not pardonable, where attention ought to have been beſtowed. But perhaps we are incapable of attention. This however is our own fault; ſince the incapacity has been contracted by our continual careleſſneſs; as the evils of injuſtice and intemperance are contracted by the daily commiſſion of iniquity, and the daily indulgence in voluptuouſneſs. For ſuch as our actions are, ſuch muſt our habits become; a truth confirmed by ſuch univerſal experience, that to be ignorant of it betrays the groſſeſt ſtupidity. It is plain therefore that our vices are voluntary; ſince we voluntarily do thoſe things which we know muſt create them. But does it depend merely on our own wills to correct and reform our bad habits? It certainly does not; neither does it depend on the will of a patient, who has deſpiſed the advice of his phyſician, to recover that health which is loſt by his own profligacy. When we have thrown a ſtone, we cannot reſtrain its flight; but it depended entirely on ourſelves, whether we ſhould

[d] This, and other laws of the ſame tendency, will be conſidered in the "Politics."

throw

throw it or not. The villain and the voluptuary are therefore voluntarily ſuch; becauſe the cauſe of their turpitude lies ſolely in themſelves. Not only the vices of the mind, but even the imperfections of the body, are juſt ſubjects for reproach, when they are not natural, but produced through our own indolence or neglect. We pity blindneſs, lameneſs, or deformity, when they proceed from cauſes independent on thoſe afflicted with them; but they are juſt objects of reproach, when contracted through drunkenneſs or any other ſpecies of debauchery; and, in the ſame manner, all vices and imperfections are blameable which originate in ourſelves.[e]

Objections anſwered.

But ſhould any endeavour to excuſe their wickedneſs, by ſaying that all men aſpire after apparent good, but that the appearances or phantaſms which make us aſſign to things this important epithet, ariſe not from our own ſuggeſtion, but depend on our conſtitution and character, it may be anſwered, that in as far as we ourſelves are the cauſes of this conſtitution and character, we alſo muſt be the cauſes of theſe phantaſms or appearances. But if the two former depend not at all on ourſelves, and villains, when they commit wickedneſs, do it merely through ignorance of the ends at which they ought to aim; and virtuous men, on the contrary, when they perform virtuous actions, do them merely through Nature's bounty in furniſhing them with a moral or intellectual eye, which enables them to diſcern what is truly good; this ſurely would, in

[e] The Magna Moralia, and Ethics to Eudemus, as above.

BOOK III.

the latter, be the beſt and faireſt of pre-eminences, a prerogative not adventitious but innate[f], not acquired by inſtruction or example, but growing up ſpontaneouſly with the admirable frame of their natural conſtitution. Firſt of all, if this were the caſe, virtue would not be voluntary any more than vice, ſince both would ſolely depend on the original organization of our minds. But if we ourſelves are in any degree the artificers of our own characters; and, if it depends on our own voluntary acts, what ſort of habits we ſhall form; and, if not entirely what ends we ſhall purſue, at leaſt what means we ſhall uſe for their attainment; then both our virtues and our vices muſt be voluntary; and, as ſuch, the former will be the objects of praiſe and reward, and the latter of blame and puniſhment.

Tranſition to the conſideration of each virtue in particular.

We have thus given a ſketch of the virtues in general, ſhewing that they are practical habits, conſiſting in mediocrity, dependent on ourſelves, voluntary, and agreeable to right reaſon. Actions and habits are not preciſely in the ſame ſenſe voluntary; the former are voluntary throughout, from beginning to end; but the beginnings only of habits, which gain force,

[f] This word is uſed in other parts of Ariſtotle's works to diſtinguiſh natural powers from thoſe acquired by our own exertions. Thus in his Metaph. l ix. c. v. Απασων δε των δυναμεων ουσων, των μεν συγγενων, ὅιον των αισθησεων των δε εθει, ὅιον της τȣ αυλειν, των δε μαθησει ὅιον της των τεχνων. "The moſt general diviſion of powers is into three, which are innate, like the ſenſes; thoſe acquired by cuſtom like the power of playing on the flute; and thoſe acquired by inſtruction, like many of the arts."

like

like maladies, by degrees, until they become irresistible; even these however are also voluntary, since their causes were such, namely, the actions by which they were formed.—We now proceed to consider the several virtues in particular; wherein each consists, to what object it relates, and in what manner it relates to them; whence their number will be manifest:—and first, concerning courage.

Chap. 6.

The definition and nature of courage.

This virtue, as we formerly observed, consists in the moderation and propriety of our affections and actions in reference to those causes and circumstances which either excite fear, or inspire confidence. Since whatever is evil is in some degree formidable[g], fear is defined "the dread of evil," and of evil of every kind, infamy, poverty, disease, friendlessness, and death. But courage is not displayed in universal fearlessness; for not to fear infamy is the part of impudence and baseness; whereas the worthy and respectable character has always the keenest sense of shame, and the greatest abhorrence of disgrace. Yet impudence sometimes passes for courage; and may be so called, by a metaphor; since it resembles that virtue in being equally fearless. Neither poverty nor disease, nor any evil that proceeds not from voluntary turpitude, ought, perhaps, to be much dreaded by those who aspire to the dignity of virtue; yet fearlessness, as to such objects, does not constitute what is pro-

[g] φοβουμεθα δε δηλονοτι τα φοβερα· ταυτα δ' εστι, ως απλως ειπειν, κακα. "We fear things formidable, which, to express them in one word, are evils."

BOOK III.

perly called courage, though it ſometimes receives metaphorically that name: for thoſe who tremble at the ſound of war, may be liberal of their money, and fearleſs of poverty; thoſe, ſurely, are not cowards, who dread the inſults likely to fall on their wives or children; nor are thoſe to be dignified with the epithet of courageous, who, with the calm intrepidity of ſlaves, endure the proſpect of diſgaceful ſtripes. To what kind of terrors, then, does courage render us ſuperior? To the greateſt of all,—the fear of death; for death ſeems of all things the moſt formidable; being in vulgar eſtimation the ultimate limit of all our pains and pleaſures, beyond which there is neither good nor evil. Yet courage is not alike ſhewn in contempt for every form of death. This virtue appears not conſpicuous in diſeaſe or ſhipwreck, but in an honourable death in the field of battle, which is, of all, the faireſt and moſt illuſtrious, as is atteſted by the honours with which it is rewarded, both by republics and kings. Courage, therefore, is peculiarly diſplayed in encountering death in battle, and in ſetting warlike dangers at defiance: not but that a brave man will be fearleſs during a ſtorm at ſea, or on a ſick-bed; but his fortitude is different from that of ſailors, who are rendered fearleſs through experience and cuſtom; whereas he, perceiving no means of ſafety, ſubmits with indignant[h] intrepidity

[h] εν ταις τοιαυταις δε φθοραις αθετερον υπαρχει. Both Ulyſſes and Eneas thought with our author:

With

trepidity to a death, from which no honour can be reaped, and in which no exertion of manhood can be difplayed.

The fame evils which terrify one perfon are not formidable to another; though there are fome of fuch an irrefiftible nature, as to fhake the firmeft minds, and to infpire fear into all endowed with underftanding. But thofe objects of terror which furpafs not the ftrength of human nature, differing from each other in magnitude, as well as do the grounds of confidence, courage will difcriminate between real and apparent dangers; and make us meet the former, as brave men ought, unfhaken and dauntlefs, fubjecting the inftinctive emotions of fear to the dictates of reafon and of honour. For we betray our weaknefs, not only when we fear things really not formidable, but when we are affected in an undue degree, or at an improper time, by objects of real danger. A brave man avoids fuch errors; and, eftimating things by their real worth, prefers the grace and beauty of habitual fortitude to the delufive fecurity of

---

With what a cloud the brows of Heaven are crown'd?
What raging winds? What roaring waters round?
'Tis Jove himfelf the fwelling tempeft rears;
Death, prefent death, on every fide appears.
Happy! thrice happy, who, in battle flain,
Prefs'd, in Atrides' caufe, the Trojan plain! &c.

ODYSS. V. v. 390.

And Æneas,

O ter quaterque beati,
Queis ante ora patrum, Trojæ fub mœnibus altis,
Contigit oppetere, &c. ÆNEIS, l. i. v. 98.

deformed cowardice. Yet he is not leſs careful to avoid that exceſs of intrepidity, which, being rarely met with, is, like many other vices, without a name; though nothing but madneſs, or a moſt ſtupid inſenſibility, can make any man preſerve, amidſt earthquakes and inundations, that unſhaken compoſure, which has been aſcribed to the Celts[i]. An overweening eſtimate of the cauſes of confidence, and a conſequent exceſs of courage, is called audacity; a boaſtful ſpecies of bravery, and the mere ape of true manhood. What the brave man *is*, the raſh and audacious man wiſhes to *appear;* he courts and provokes unneceſſary dangers, but fails in the hour of trial; and is, for the moſt part, a bluſtering bully, who, under a ſemblance of pretended courage, conceals no inconſiderable portion of cowardice. But the complete and genuine coward eaſily betrays himſelf, by fearing either things not formidable, or things formidable, in an undue degree; and his failing is the more manifeſt, becauſe it is accompanied with plain indications of pain: he lives in continual alarm, and is therefore ſpiritleſs and dejected; whereas courage warms our breaſts, and animates our hopes. Such then is the character of true courage, as oppoſed to audacity on one hand, and cowardice on the other. It holds the middle place between theſe vicious extremes; it is calm and ſedate; and though it never provokes

[i] Alexander, who perhaps knew them better than his preceptor, conſidered the "Κελται or Καλαται, or Γαλαται," the Celts or Gauls, as an arrogant and boaſtful nation. ὁι Κελτοι αιει αλαζονες. The Gauls are always braggarts. Arrian. Exped. Alexand. l. i. p. 5.

danger,

danger, is always ready to meet even death in an honourable cauſe. But to die, rather than endure manfully the preſſure of poverty, or the ſtings of love, or any other cruel ſuffering, is the part of a coward; who baſely flies from an enemy that he has not ſpirit to encounter; and ignominiouſly quits the field, where he might have ſuſtained a ſtrenuous and honourable conflict.

Chap. 8.

There are five kinds of courage, beſides that properly ſo called. The firſt kind is the political, which moſt reſembles that above deſcribed; becauſe it is inſpired by legal honours and rewards, and upheld by legal puniſhments and infamy. Courage therefore chiefly prevails, where cowardice is moſt ſtigmatiſed. Homer will ſupply us with examples; hear thoſe of Hector and Diomed:

> Shall proud Polydamas before the gate
> Proclaim, his counſels are obeyed too late;
> Which timely follow'd but the former night,
> What numbers had been ſav'd by Hector's flight?[k]

And Diomed,

> But, ah! what grief, ſhould haughty Hector boaſt,
> I fled inglorious to the guarded coaſt![l]

This political courage moſt reſembles genuine valour, becauſe it originates in the love of glory and the ſhame of reproach, which are virtuous and honourable motives. Nearly alike to it, is that bravery which is inſpired into ſoldiers by

[k] Il. xxii. v. 140, & ſeq. [l] Il. viii. v. 179, & ſeq.

their

BOOK III. their generals; but inferior in merit, ſince engendered not by ſhame, but by fear; and by the dread not of diſgrace but of puniſhment. For generals compel by threats; as Hector:

> On ruſhed bold Hector, gloomy as the night;
> Forbids to plunder, animates the fight,
> Points to the fleet; for, by the Gods! who flies,
> Who dares but linger, by this hand he dies;
> No weeping ſiſter his cold eye ſhall cloſe,
> No friendly hand his funeral pile compoſe!
> Who ſtops to plunder at this ſignal hour,
> The birds ſhall tear him, and the dogs devour.[m]

Thoſe who advance, fearful of ſtripes, ſhould they retreat; and thoſe who ſtand their ground, in conſequence of obſtacles to their flight;—all ſuch loſe the merit of bravery, becauſe they are brave on compulſion. Experience and cuſtom may produce likewiſe an artificial bravery; wherefore Socrates thought that courage was a matter of ſcience. Each is moſt courageous in what he beſt underſtands; and therefore ſoldiers in battle; ſince they know the emptineſs of many of the terrors with which the parade of war is accompanied. To the ignorant, therefore, they appear truly valiant; beſides, their experience has taught them ſkilfully to employ their weapons, and by what means they may beſt defend themſelves, and moſt effectually aſſault their enemies. They contend therefore with all the advantage which a practiſed prize-fighter enjoys over an ignorant ruſtic; or that men completely armed enjoy over naked troops; for in ſuch

[m] Il. xv. v. 194, & ſeq.

combats,

combats, ſpirit and manhood yield to armed dexterity. But when the odds are againſt them, the courage of diſciplined mercenaries ſpeedily fails, and they are the firſt to fly; whereas the national troops remain and are ſlain; which recently happened at the Hermæus, where the Theban citizens preferred death to an ignominious ſafety, while their auxiliaries, though they behaved valiantly in the beginning of the action, no ſooner diſcovered their inferiority in ſtrength, than they baſely betook themſelves to flight; fearing death more than diſgrace. Anger is often called to the aſſiſtance of manhood; and men ſeem courageous through paſſion, like wild beaſts which turn, when wounded, and attack their purſuers; for both valour and anger make us regardleſs of danger.—Whence Homer ſays:

> Inflaming thus the rage of all their hoſts;[n]

And

> Each Trojan boſom with new warmth he fires.[o]

Theſe paſſages imply, that the excitement of anger is auxiliary to courage; which, however, in man, ought to originate in a ſenſe of honour, whereas, in beaſts, it ſprings only from the ſmart of pain; for they turn on their purſuers, only when they are afraid or hurt; but, in their native woods or marſhes, they venture not to approach human kind. Manly courage, therefore, cannot reſult from the irritation of pain, or from that blind

[n] Il. xvi. v. 658.

[o] Il. vi. v. 626.

BOOK III. blind paſſion which ruſhes, improvident, on unknown dangers. Even the unfeeling aſs, when hungry, does not, through the fear of blows, forſake his paſture; and adulterers, impelled by luſt, have exhibited ſignal examples of boldneſs; but ſuch things are far remote from true courage. Yet, of all paſſions, anger is the moſt nearly allied to this virtue, and would entirely accord with it, if directed by mature deliberation, and controlled by maxims of honour. Even in men, anger is painful, and revenge is ſweet: yet, acting under the impulſe of ſuch paſſions, they are not courageous but quarrelſome; for neither reaſon nor moral principle has any ſhare in their behaviour; which has ſomething in it reſembling courage, but is not that virtue. Nor are perſons buoyed up by hope, courageous; for they are confident of ſucceſs, only becauſe they have often conquered. This confidence, indeed, reſembles that of true courage; but it proceeds from a different principle, the opinion of ſuperiority, and the conſequent ſenſe of ſafety; and, like the ſpurious valour of drunkards (who are brave while ſucceſsful), fails them under the ſlighteſt reverſe of fortune. But true courage ſurmounts real and known dangers, becauſe it is honourable to reſiſt them, and baſe to ſink under them. It is beſt ſeen in ſudden emergencies, becauſe, on ſuch occaſions, undiſturbed firmneſs cannot be aſſumed, but muſt be the reſult of confirmed manly habits. Perſons ignorant of the dangers which they encounter, have alſo a falſe ſemblance of courage; they are ſomewhat allied to

to thofe buoyed up by hope, but are of a ftamp ftill inferior, their boldnefs being founded on miftake, and therefore deftitute of merit: for when they either know or fufpect the truth, they betake themfelves to fhameful flight; as the Argives did, after encountering the Lacedæmonians, whom they miftook for Sicyonians. We have now defcribed who are truly courageous, and who only feem to be fo.

Chap. 9.

Though the office of courage confifts in moderating the impulfe of rafh boldnefs, as well as the excefs of cautious timidity, yet its principal bufinefs is employed about the latter; becaufe it is more difficult, and therefore more praifeworthy, to endure pain, than to refift pleafure; and we endure pain when we filence the dictates of fear, and encounter real dangers with manly fortitude. Yet the end and effence of courage are truly pleafant, though the pleafure difappears amidft the crowd of painful circumftances with which it is accompanied. In the Gymnaftic games, the prize-fighters contemplate with pleafure the crowns and honours with which their victories are rewarded: but their laborious exertions, and repeated wounds, are uneafy and painful, and the fplendour of the prize, which is fmall, is obfcured and loft in the gloomy magnitude of furrounding circumftances. In like manner death and wounds are painful to a brave man, and reluctantly encountered; yet he meets and defies them, becaufe it is honourable to do fo; and although the more diftinguifhed he is in virtue, and therefore in happinefs, he may regard

BOOK III.

gard his loſs in death as the greater, and the more deeply regret the dangers to which he is expoſed; yet, on this account, his courage is only the more conſpicuous in preferring a glorious death to a happy life. The exerciſe therefore of laborious virtue is painful in its progreſs, and delightful chiefly as it approaches the goal. But there are mercenary ruffians, who, though endowed with little true courage, are ready, for their miſerable hire, to throw away their lives, which are of ſtill leſs value. Thus much concerning courage; of which we may delineate the nature, from the obſervations above made.[p]

Chap. 10.

Of the definition and nature of temperance.

We now proceed to ſpeak of temperance, which, as well as courage, is employed in regulating the irrational, and merely animal part of our conſtitution. Temperance, we have ſaid, is the habit of mediocrity in our affections with reſpect to objects affording pleaſure; and alſo (though in a different manner, and an inferior degree) with reſpect to thoſe which give pain. Ungoverned voluptuouſneſs is the reverſe of temperance. We farther proceed to examine what kinds of pleaſure it is the office of temperance to regulate. Pleaſures are commonly diſtinguiſhed, as either corporeal or mental. Of the latter kind is the pleaſure which we derive from virtue or from knowledge; with both of which we are delighted, becauſe we love them; and that, without any bodily ſenſation, but merely through mental affection. Neither

[p] Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xiii.; and Eudem. l. iii. c. i.

tempe-

temperance nor voluptuoufnefs are converfant about fuch pleafures, nor about any others not originating in the body. Men fond of the marvellous, and who delight in relating idle ftories from morning to night, are called prattlers, not profligates: nor are thofe guilty of intemperance who indulge exceffive grief for the lofs of their fortunes or of their friends. Temperance relates therefore to bodily pleafures only, but not even to them univerfally. It reftrains not the gratification which the eye receives from colours, figures, and pictures, nor that given to the ear by declamation or mufic. There is a propriety, doubtlefs, in the affection with which we defire, and the degree in which we indulge, thofe pleafures; but they who act properly in fuch particulars, are not denominated temperate; nor thofe who act improperly, intemperate. Nor do temperance and intemperance apply to our reftraint or indulgence with regard to the pleafures derived from the fenfe of fmell, except by way of acceffion, that is, when grateful odours are confidered as an acceffory to agreeable fenfations derived from the tafte or touch. To be delighted with the fragrancy of flowers and fruits, and of thofe aromatics which perfume the altars of the gods, is never regarded as fenfuality; but a propenfity to vicious indulgence may appear in the pleafures received from thofe artificial fcents which are employed for heightening perfonal allurements, and from the odour of thofe delicacies which form the luxury of our tables; becaufe, in thefe cafes, the perceptions of one fenfe

BOOK III.

ſenſe naturally bring into our thoughts the perceptions of other ſenſes, which are too often indulged with groſs and beaſtly intemperance. The inferior animals, when hungry, are delighted with the ſmell of their food; but this delight in them happens alſo, as above explained, by way of acceſſion; dogs are pleaſed with the ſcent of the hare, becauſe they delight in eating that animal; and lions are pleaſed not with the bellowing of the bull, but with devouring him: and the bellowing only pleaſes them, becauſe it is a proof that their prey is near to them. The ſight of the deer or wild goat alſo delights them, becauſe it affords the expectation of ſoon taſting their fleſh. Temperance, therefore, is converſant about thoſe pleaſures only, which are common to us with beaſts; and in which an exceſſive indulgence is therefore juſtly deemed the loweſt depravity. Thoſe pleaſures depend entirely on the touch and taſte, but far more on the former; the taſte being properly that ſenſe which diſcriminates different flavours, as is done by thoſe who critically examine wines and ſauces. But the beaſtly ſenſualiſt has little or no pleaſure in any thing except mere corporeal contact in eating and drinking, as well as in venery. Wherefore the voluptuary Philoxenus wiſhed his neck as long as a crane's, that his gratification in the act of ſwallowing might be the more durable. Temperance, therefore, is chiefly converſant about regulating the pleaſures of that ſenſe, of which, as it is of all the moſt common, the improper indulgence is the moſt blameable

10 and

and moſt debaſing; ſince it belongs to us, not as men, but as mere animals. To love and take delight in ſuch gratifications, is to diveſt ourſelves of the man, and to put on the wild beaſt: for the more liberal pleaſures of the touch, ſuch as the warmth produced by friction and exerciſe in the *gymnaſia*, fall not under this head; intemperate voluptuouſneſs in contact not extending to the whole body, but centering in particular parts of it.

Chap. II. Natural and adventitious deſires.

Of our deſires and appetites, ſome are common and natural; others, peculiar and adventitious. Every animal needs and deſires nouriſhment, either dry or moiſt; and ſometimes both; and in the vigour of life, every man, as Homer ſays, wiſhes for a mate. But all do not deſire either the ſame objects; nor is every particular object alike neceſſary to the happineſs of every individual; the deſire of particular objects, therefore, is often conſidered as peculiar and adventitious. This deſire may nevertheleſs be natural to him who feels it, ſince different men have different inclinations; and one perſon may receive much delight from that which cannot afford any gratification to another. In our natural deſires, there are few improprieties: the ſole error conſiſting in exceſſive indulgence. Gluttony, which, inſtead of ſatisfying, overloads the ſtomach, is the vice only of the moſt abject of the human kind. But in adventitious and unnatural pleaſures, there is ſcope for the wildeſt and moſt various errors; which reſult, not only from the exceſſive degree, but from the improper

BOOK III.

and even odious objects, of our desires; as well as from the unbecoming manner and unseasonable occasions on which they are indulged. Intemperance, then, is an excess with regard to pleasure; and justly reprobated. With regard to pain, the office of temperance is different from that of fortitude. The intemperate man is grieved at missing pleasure; which, by his perversity and folly, is thus absurdly converted into a perpetual source of pain; since he desires it with distressing anxiety, and both abuses it when present, and sorrows after it when it is gone. But temperance, which is not to be seduced by pleasures within its power, cannot grieve at the loss of those which are placed beyond its reach. Extreme insensibility to pleasure is not the lot of human nature; even brute beasts prefer one kind of food to another. The fault therefore of being too little affected by pleasure, as it seldom or never occurs, is not distinguished by a name. But temperance holds the middle place between this nameless vice and the opposite extreme. The man endowed with temperance is so far from delighting in, or enjoying, the pleasures of the voluptuary, that he beholds them with detestation and disgust. He indulges in none but lawful pleasures, and in them seasonably and soberly; and not being intoxicated by them when present, does not painfully long for them when absent. His health, his fortune, and, above all, his honour and his duty, prescribe laws to his appetites. The profligate prefers sensual pleasures to all things beside: the man of

BOOK III. Chap. 12.

of temperance eſtimates them at their true value, and that a low one.[q]

Compariſon of intemperance and cowardice.

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice: the former proceeding from the deſire of pleaſure, the latter from the averſion to pain: and ſuch is the nature of pain that it diſturbs and deſtroys the frame of mind of thoſe who behold its approach, and anticipate its pangs. Pleaſure not producing theſe effects, the intemperate indulgence in it is therefore more voluntary, and conſequently more blameable; eſpecially ſince there are innumerable opportunities in life for reſtraining our purſuit of unlawful or improper pleaſures, and thereby acquiring a confirmed habit of temperance, the ſeveral acts of which are unattended with danger. The reverſe of this happens as to cowardice; the opportunities for correcting it are much fewer in number, and the experiment is dangerous. But though particular inſtances of cowardice are in ſome meaſure involuntary, through the invincible terror which produces them, and which impels thoſe affected with it to throw away their ſhields, and to commit other ſhameful actions, yet the frame and habit of mind from which ſuch actions flow, ſeems to be more a matter of choice; whereas the frame and habit of mind from which intemperance flows, ſeems leſs voluntary than the particular inſtances of it; for no one can will or chooſe, that by his internal conſtitution he ſhould be the ſport of vicious propenſities,

[q] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxii. Eudem. l. iii. c. ii.

 and

and ungovernable appetites. The word denoting intemperance in Greek is applicable to the wanton and unchaſtiſed petulance of boys, which bears a near analogy to what is called intemperance in men. Which of the two was the primary meaning of the word, it is not material to inquire; for the tranſition is extremely natural from the one ſignification to the other, nothing ſtanding more in need of chaſtiſement than depravities which increaſe by indulgence; to which depravities, paſſions as well as boys are peculiarly liable. For boys are actuated almoſt ſolely by paſſion, pleaſure being their ruling purſuit; the deſire of which, unleſs it be reſtrained by higher principles and controlled by authority, will tranſgreſs all reaſonable bounds; and gaining ſtrength by repeated acts of indulgence, will finally deſtroy and extinguiſh the light of reaſon itſelf. Our deſires therefore ought to be few and moderate, and as obedient to the dictates of reaſon, as boys to the commands of their maſter. By ſuch habitual regulation, they will gradually harmoniſe with the higher powers of our nature, and at length terminate in the ſame excellent and honourable end; exhibiting the ſteady luſtre of virtue; and exactly conforming, as to their object, degree, time, and all other circumſtances, to the ſtrict rules of propriety. So much concerning temperance.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING treated of the virtues of courage and temperance, which, how different soever in many reſpects from each other, agree in this particular, that both of them conſiſt in the proper government of the irrational or merely ſenſitive part of our nature, the author proceeds, in the fourth book, to aſcertain the limits of liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, meekneſs, courteſy, plain-dealing, and facetiouſneſs. As things are beſt underſtood by compariſon, he points out and defines the blameable extremes (for example, of niggardlineſs and profuſion) which ſtand in direct oppoſition to each other; and which are both of them contrary, though not always in a like degree, to the praiſeworthy habit which lies between them. He ſhows that there is an intermediate, but anonymous habit, highly deſerving of approbation, between the extremes of ambition and blameable inſenſibility

to honour: obferving on this and other occafions, that many of the virtues, as well as of the vices, are not accurately diftinguifhed by names; and that from this imperfection of language, much confufion refults; for when the intermediate and praifeworthy habit is namelefs, each of the extremes will ftrive to thruft itfelf into the middle place, which is the poft of honour; and that habit which is approved as virtue by one clafs of men, will be condemned as vice by another. He examines whether fhame can be claffed with the virtues, fince it feems rather a paffion than a habit. He explains what is meant by a conditional virtue, in oppofition to virtue fimply and abfolutely; and proves that fhame is at beft only a virtue of the conditional and imperfect kind.

BOOK IV.

ARGUMENT.

Liberality; vices oppoſite thereto.—Magnificence; its contraries.—Magnanimity.—Meekneſs; its contraries.—Courteſy; its contraries.—Plain-dealing; its contraries.—Facetiouſneſs; its contraries.—Shame.

BOOK IV. Chap. I. Liberality, and the vices contrary to it.

WE proceed to ſpeak of liberality, which ſeems to be that virtue which bears a peculiar relation to property. For the praiſe of liberality is not acquired by courage in war, moderation in pleaſure, or juſtice in judgment, but by the propriety of our behaviour in receiving or beſtowing money, or whatever things can be meaſured by money; and principally in beſtowing them. Of the propriety of our conduct in relation to property, prodigality and niggardlineſs are the two contrary and blameable extremes. Niggardlineſs always refers to thoſe who ſet more than a juſt value on money: but prodigality is ſometimes employed to expreſs extravagant profuſion joined with inordinate intemperance; for thoſe are called prodigals, who waſte their fortunes in ruinous pleaſures, and thus ſignally debaſe themſelves by complicated worthleſſneſs. Yet prodigality more properly ſignifies one ſimple vice, that of ruining ourſelves by our own fault; for he ruins himſelf by his own fault;

who waftefully confumes his property, that is, the means by which his life is fupported; and in this acceptation we take the word. Property falls under the defcription of things ufeful; which may either be ufed rightly or abufed; and he only can ufe them rightly who is adorned with the virtue appertaining to them; namely, liberality. The ufe of money confifts in expending or beftowing it: for the taking or keeping of money relates to poffeffion rather than to ufe. The virtue of liberality therefore is more confpicuous in beftowing handfomely, than either in receiving what is our due, or in refufing what we ought not to accept. For virtue confifts rather in acting our part well, than in avoiding what is amifs. This active virtue alone is the proper object of praife and gratitude; for it is more meritorious to part with what is our own, than to abftain from what belongs to another; which latter may be praifed indeed as juftice, but not as liberality; and to accept what is ftrictly due to us, is not entitled to any degree of praife. None are more beloved than the liberal, becaufe their virtue is extenfively ufeful, diffufing itfelf in benefits. But the motive from which their actions proceed, is what chiefly conftitutes their excellence; for liberality, like every other virtue, muft keep the beauty of propriety in view; felecting its objects, and proportioning its extent, according to thofe rules which right reafon prefcribes. In conferring favours the critical moment muft alfo be carefully ftudied; and they muft be conferred cheerfully, at leaft not

not painfully: and when any one of these conditions is wanting, whatever acts of bounty a man may perform, he will not carry off the palm of virtuous and graceful liberality. If the gifts bestowed on others occasion pain to ourselves, it is a proof that we prefer money to the beauty of generous actions; and if we are rapacious in acquiring money, we cannot be truly liberal in employing it. A man of real beneficence will not be importunate in solicitation. He will be delicate as to accepting favours; but will enrich himself by the diligent management of his own affairs, that he may acquire materials for his bounty, which will be distributed with caution, that it may never fail the deserving. It belongs to his character to be more provident for others than for himself; and to extend the measure of his beneficence far beyond those limits which the prudence of selfishness would prescribe. But our liberality is relative to our wealth; it consists, not in the value of our gifts, but in the temper and habit of the giver; and he who gives the least of all, may be the most liberal of all, if what he gives bears the highest proportion to his substance[r]. Men of hereditary estates are more inclined to liberality, than those whose fortunes are their own work; the former have never known the severities of want; and all men are disposed to love and cherish their own works, as parents and poets. It is not easy for

[r] Verily I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast more in than all they which have cast into the treasury. St. Mark, c. xii. v. 43.

a liberal

a liberal man to be rich, fince he is nice in receiving money, not retentive in keeping it; and always ready to give it away, on no other account than that of the proper or beneficent purpofes to which it may be applied. Fortune, therefore, is continually accufed of enriching thofe who are leaft worthy of her favours. But this happens naturally, without the interference of fortune; fince wealth cannot well be poffeffed by thofe who employ not the ordinary means by which it is acquired and accumulated. Yet true liberality avoids unneceffary and fuperfluous expence, left the fource fhould be dried up, from which only its falutary ftreams can plenteoufly flow. Whoever lives beyond his income, is ftrictly a prodigal, and he only; for kings, how great foever their expenditure may be, are never branded with this appellation; becaufe it feems difficult for their munificence to exceed the meafure of their refources. The liberal man, both in great and in fmall matters, and both in giving and receiving, behaves with cheerful ferenity, becaufe his behaviour is always proper, and always confiftent with his character. As propriety, in giving and receiving, depends on the fame principle of moderation in our defires with regard to money, he who gives properly, will not improperly receive; fince contraries cannot refult from the fame principle, nor fubfift in the fame fubject. Should it happen that a liberal man confumes more than he ought, and on an improper occafion, he will doubtlefs lament it, but with that calm and moderate compofure which

which becomes his character; for it is the part of virtue not only to joy and grieve from fit motives, but to assign proper limits to those emotions. The liberal man is, in matters of interest, of an accommodating temper; he is open to imposition and injury, because he does not value money beyond its real worth, and is more uneasy at having omitted to do what he ought, than at doing too much; living in direct opposition to the sordid maxims of Simonides[s]. The prodigal, again, is directly the reverse; both his joy and his grief spring from improper motives, and both shew themselves in unseemly and immoderate degrees; which will be more manifest in the sequel. Prodigality and avarice are both of them excesses, and both of them defects. Prodigality is excessive in giving, and defective in receiving; avarice is defective in giving, and excessive in receiving; scraping together the meanest and vilest gains. The qualities which compose and support prodigality, are not easily united: it is difficult for him who is careless of receiving, to continue lavish in bestowing; for his funds, if he is a private man, will soon be exhausted. The prodigal, therefore, is better than the miser, because his malady is

[s] A poet of the Isle of Ceos, and the first on record who prostituted his mercenary muse for the declared purpose of gain. He was born 558 years before Christ, and lived ninety years; the companion and favourite of many of the princes and grandees of his time. As his avarice increased with his age, he endeavoured to extenuate it by saying that the pursuit of money was the only delight which time had left to him. Conf. Fragment. Callimac. apud Spanheim. V. i. p. 264 and 333. Plutarch. An seni capiend. Respublica, V. ii. p. 786. Athen. xiv. c. xxi. Fabric. Biblioth. Græc. V. i. p. 591.

more

BOOK IV.

more curable. Age, and the experience of want, will correct his extravagance; and, as he ftill fhows a generofity of nature, though unwifely and unfeafonably, cuftom and good example will convert his thoughtlefs profufion into decent and graceful liberality; fince his deviations from the right path proceed rather from folly than from depravity and turpitude. For this reafon fuch a prodigal is preferable to the mifer; and alfo, becaufe the former benefits many, and the latter, no one; not even himfelf. But thofe who are prodigal of their own, are for the moft part rapacious of what belongs to others; and finding it impoffible to fupply their wild extravagance by honourable means, abftain from no fource of gain, however impure and polluted it may be; fo that even their bounties have nothing liberal in them, being withheld from virtue in diftrefs, and lavifhed on parafites, flatterers, and on the idle retinue of vice and folly. For the greater part of prodigals unite profligacy with prodigality; and, infenfible to the beauty of virtue, fall victims to the allurement of pleafure. But though this happens to the undifciplined prodigal, yet, under proper management, he may be brought into the middle and right path; whereas avarice is incorrigible; for it is increafed by old age and every kind of infirmity; and it feems more congenial to human nature than the contrary vice, there being in every country more hoarders than fpendthrifts. It alfo extends to extraordinary lengths, and affumes a variety of forms; the immoderate love of money leading

ſome men to daring rapacity, and others to ſordid parſimony; for there are niggardly miſers, and tenacious ſcrape-pennies, who either through a ſenſe of juſtice, or through fear, are careful in abſtaining from ſhameful gains, and meanly ſparing of their property, leſt they ſhould be forced, as they ſay, on diſhoneſt expedients for ſubſiſtence. Their maxim is, neither to borrow nor to lend, neither to give nor to receive; becauſe, ſhould they accept any thing from others, they think it will be difficult always to avoid giving to others ſomething in return. But rapacious avarice ſticks at no expedient by which money may be acquired; ſubmits to the baſeſt drudgery, practiſes pimping or uſury, and thinks no profit too infamous or too minute, which, by frequent repetitions, may accumulate into a great gain. Both kinds are alike diſgraced by their falſe eſtimate, and inordinate love of money; ſince, to obtain a profit, and that a ſmall one, they encounter and endure a burdenſome load of infamy; which is an evil that even the greateſt profits cannot poſſibly compenſate. Thoſe who aſpire to great and ſudden acquiſitions of wealth, ſuch as tyrants who ſtorm cities and plunder temples, are not branded with the reproach of avarice, but of impiety and villainy. The pirate, the pickpocket, and the gameſter, are guilty of illiberal rapacity; ſince the two firſt encounter, for the ſake of gain, not only danger but diſgrace; and the laſt plunders and ruins his friends and acquaintances, whom a man of liberal principles wiſhes always to benefit. They are

BOOK IV. are all equally debased by a shameless preference of wealth to worth; and by bartering things incomparably more valuable, for unjust and illiberal gains. Illiberality, therefore, is the vice most properly opposed to the virtue of liberality; for it is a greater, more extensive, and more universal evil, than the vice of prodigality, which holds the contrary extreme. So much concerning mediocrity in our passions and actions with regard to money, and whatever money can purchase, as well as concerning the vicious extremes which are inconsistent with this praiseworthy and meritorious habit.[t]

Chap. 2.

Magnificence, and its contraries.

We proceed next to treat of magnificence; for that likewise seems to be a virtue respecting money; but differs from liberality in this, that it relates to money in one view only, namely, the spending of it; and in this, it exceeds the measure which mere liberality would prescribe. The very name of magnificence indicates a certain magnitude, joined with propriety, in expence; and the magnitude or splendour of our expence is estimated by the occasion on which it is employed; for that might be great in a trierarch[u], which would be small in an ambassador[w] to the public solemnities of Greece; and the propriety depends both on the object of the

[t] Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxiv.; et Eudem. l. iii. c. iv.

[u] The rich citizens of Athens were liable to the burden of equipping gallies for the public service; in which they often vied with each other in displaying their patriotism to the ruin of their fortunes. Lys. Orat. passim.

[w] αρχιθεωρος. He headed the sacred deputations to Olympia, &c. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vi.

expence,

expence, and on the character and ſituation of the perſon who incurs it. He is not called magnificent who ſpends his money with propriety on ſmall or ordinary occaſions, like him

"Who often gave the hungry beggar bread:"

For magnificence is not ſimply liberality, but ſomething more; the former implying the latter, though the latter does not imply the former. Magnificence holds the middle place between two blameable extremes, of which the one, in matters of expence, falls ſhort of what is ſuitable to our circumſtances or to the occaſion, and the other oſtentatiouſly exceeds them. To be truly magnificent requires no ſmall degree of judgment; ſince it infers a graceful theory of moral propriety, and a ſkilful harmony in great expenditure; for, as we ſaid in the beginning, habits are characteriſed by the acts and energies from which they ſpring, and which, in a man of real magnificence, muſt be great and decorous; the work worthy the expence, and the expence ſuiting and rather exceeding the work. A man truly magnificent, is actuated by the love of moral beauty, which is the principle of all the virtues. His generoſity is large and liberal, without ſtrictneſs of accounts; his conſideration being, not how much any thing will coſt him, but how it may be done moſt handſomely. For the magnificence is not in the expence, but in the manner of employing it; which muſt be ſuch, not merely as propriety would dictate, for this belongs to liberality, but ſuch as will ſtrike the

the ſpectators with wonder. It is moſt conſpicuous in temples, dedications, ſacrifices, and whatever concerns the gods; and in thoſe honourable benefactions which generous patriots confer on the community; the equipment of gallies, public entertainments, and dramatic exhibitions. As magnificence muſt be conſiſtent with propriety, it can never be the virtue of a poor man, in whom every attempt towards exerciſing it muſt be egregious folly. It becomes thoſe only who poſſeſs great hereditary wealth, or who have enriched themſelves by great and ſplendid exploits; and it is moſt honourably diſplayed on the public occaſions above mentioned. It may be ſhown alſo in matters of private concern, when they are ſuch as occur but once in our lives, as a marriage; or ſuch as intereſt the whole community, or at leaſt the members of the government; as the reception and entertainment of ſtrangers, and the honours and preſents beſtowed on them at their departure: for the expences of a magnificent man are public, not perſonal; and preſents to ſtrangers ſomewhat reſemble dedications to the gods. To build a houſe ſuitable to a great fortune, is a work of magnificence, for it is a public ornament; and works are magnificent in proportion to their durability, provided propriety always be obſerved, for the ſame monuments will not ſuit gods and men, nor the ſame ornaments become tombs and temples. Magnificence, we have ſaid, is not meaſured ſimply by expence, but by the expence in reference to the object on which it is beſtowed.

bestowed. The magnificence, doubtless, rises in proportion to the magnitude of that object; but a beautiful bauble, of little or no value, may be a magnificent present to a child; because, though trifling in itself, yet being considerable with respect to the occasion, it attests the noble liberality of the donor. True magnificence is far remote from unseasonable ostentation, which makes a parade of wealth on ordinary and mean occasions; the ostentatious man receives his guest at a friendly dinner, as if he were celebrating a marriage festival; and when he exhibits dramatic entertainments, decks, after the awkward fashion of the Magareans, his comic actors in the purple trappings of tragedy; catching popular admiration by unseasonable and absurd extravagance; while, on the other hand, he is meanly parsimonious at times when true magnificence might properly be displayed. The vice opposite to magnificence betrays niggardliness throughout, even in the midst of the most profuse expence; for, in some minute particular, an attention to a pitiful saving will be discovered, which ruins the beauty and gracefulness of the whole, as it proves that whatever has been done, was done sparingly and painfully; and that the performance, if great, far surpassed the mind of the performer. These two contrary habits are both of them vices, but not very reproachful ones, since they neither do harm to others, nor evince gross turpitude in the mind which harbours them.[x]

[x] Eudem. l. iii. c. vi.

BOOK IV. Chap. 3.

Magnanimity.

Magnanimity, as the name imports, is conversant about great things: what these are let us first consider; contemplating not the habit itself, but the person actuated by it, which will bring us to precisely the same conclusions. A magnanimous man is he, whose character being of great worth, is estimated by himself at its full value. He who forms a grossly false estimate of himself is a fool; and none of the virtues are consistent with folly: while the man who, conscious of his defects, appreciates his small merits by a fair and just standard, may be praised for his good sense and modesty, but cannot pass for magnanimous; which epithet always implies dignity and excellence; this beauty of the mind requiring, like that of the body, elevation and magnitude; for persons of a diminutive stature are not called beautiful, but neat and elegant. A mean-spirited[7] man under-rates his own merits; and the vain-glorious boaster arrogates to himself merits, of which he is by no means possessed; but the more solid merit he possesses, his vain-glory is the less; whereas mean-spiritedness is the greater, in proportion to the excellence of the worth which is so unfairly appreciated by its possessor; for how contemptible would he be, even to himself, were his real character of little or no value! The magnanimous man estimates himself at the highest rate, yet no higher than he ought; and conscious of his inward worth, thinks himself entitled to whatever is held most pecious; to what the most ex-

[7] Aristotle says "little-minded."

alted

alted of men claim as the higheſt of all rewards; and to what all men confer on the gods as their acknowledged due; in a word, to honour, the greateſt and moſt invaluable of external goods. Magnanimity, therefore, is peculiarly converſant about honour, and its contrary, ignominy; holding the middle place between vain-glory that unfairly courts undue honours, and mean-ſpiritedneſs that improperly rejects even thoſe that are due. But though, in point of propriety, magnanimity holds the middle place, yet, in excellence and dignity, it riſes to the ſummit; for it heightens and enlarges every virtue; and the moſt boaſtful vain-glory never proudly arrogated more than true magnanimity has moſt warrantably claimed. This illuſtrious habit of the mind cannot bear an alliance with any kind of vice. It is moſt oppoſite to cowardice or injuſtice; for, from what motive can he, who thinks of nothing ſo highly as of his own character, exhibit himſelf under ſuch deformities? And if we apply to particular inſtances, or ſurvey individual characters, we ſhall find that thoſe who affect magnanimity without real worth, infallibly expoſe themſelves to ridicule. For, honour, which is the meed of virtue, cannot belong to the worthleſs; and magnanimity forms, as it were, the ornament of the virtues, ſince it cannot ſubſiſt without them, yet heightens, extends, and magnifies them, wherever they are found. True magnanimity, then, is a thing moſt difficult, ſince it implies the perfection of moral rectitude. It delights, moderately, in great

 honours

BOOK IV.

honours beſtowed by the deſerving, as meeting with its due, or leſs: for with perfect virtue no honour can be fully commenſurate. It accepts however ſuch honours, becauſe nothing better can be beſtowed; but of vulgar honours, or from vulgar men, it is altogether diſdainful; and is as inſenſible to their reproach, as careleſs of their applauſe. Wealth, power, good or bad fortune, it will meet and ſuſtain with the ſame dignified compoſure, neither elated with proſperity nor dejected by adverſity; for to a magnanimous man, thoſe things are deſirable chiefly as the ſigns of honour; and, if he bears honour itſelf with moderation, much more muſt he thus bear thoſe things which are only its ſigns, and deſired merely on its account; ſince to him who thinks not too highly of honour, nothing beſides can poſſibly appear great. Magnanimity, therefore, ſometimes paſſes for ſuperciliouſneſs; eſpecially ſince great external proſperity ſeems to heighten and increaſe it; for nobility is honoured; and men of wealth or power, being diſtinguiſhed by great ſuperiority of advantages, will always find perſons ready to do them honour: and though honour belongs properly to virtue alone, yet virtue, adorned with great external proſperity, will ſhine ſtill more brightly. But, in reality, the moſt proſperous fortune, when deſtitute of virtue, affords not any juſt ground for ſelf-applauſe; it gives to us neither a high opinion of ourſelves, nor a fair claim to be highly thought of by others; and, as it is incapable of inſpiring true magnanimity, it too frequently begets inſolence

insolence and superciliousness; since worthless men cannot bear gracefully the gifts of fortune, but abuse their fancied superiority by treating others contumeliously and unjustly; whereas the contempt shown by the truly magnanimous, is just; their opinions being formed on reflection, as those of the multitude are taken up at random. A man of magnanimity neither courts dangers, nor willingly encounters them on slight occasions. But when a worthy occasion requires it, he is unsparing of his life, thinking that to live is not, under all conditions, eligible. He is eager to confer favours, and ashamed of receiving them; because the former is a mark of superiority, the latter the reverse; he therefore repays every kindness with interest, that the person who first obliged him, may become his debtor. He hears with more pleasure a recital of the good offices he has performed, than that of the favours which he has received. Wherefore Thetis does not expatiate on her benefits to Jupiter[y], nor the Lacedæmonians on those which they had conferred on the Athenians[z]; but rather on the kindness which they themselves had received at their hands; for magnanimity, having few wants, seldom needs that assistance which it is always disposed to afford; it is lofty towards the great and prosperous, but behaves modestly towards men in moderate circumstances: to rise above the former, has difficulty and dignity; but to magnify ourselves in com-

[y] Homer. Ilias, l. i. v. 503, & seq.

[z] Xenoph. Hellen. l. vi. p. 609—613. Edit. Leunclav.

pany with the latter, betrays a lownefs and littlenefs of mind, not lefs ungenerous and vulgar, than making a parade of our ftrength or courage amidft weaknefs and cowardice. Magnanimity contemns trivial honours; and difdains, even in great things, to act a fecond part. It is flow in action, and averfe to exertion, except when great honour may be obtained, or great actions are to be performed: not bufied about many things, but confined to thofe which are great and fplendid. A magnanimous man is as open in his hatred as in his friendfhip; for concealment is the part of fear; he regards truth more than opinion, and fhows himfelf manifeftly in his words and actions, declaring his mind with full freedom; which indicates both his own love of truth and his contempt for the opinions of others: but this opennefs of character is liable to one exception, for he is much given to *irony*, diffembling his merits before the vulgar, who are unworthy to appreciate them. He can fhow undue complaifance for no one's humours, except thofe of his friends; for flattery is a low and fervile vice. He is not prone to admire, for he deems nothing great. He is not mindful of injuries, which his magnanimity teaches him to defpife. He is no man's panegyrift or flanderer; he talks not of himfelf, nor does he blame others; not fpeaking ill even of his enemies, except when their infolence excites his indignation. As to things of fmall import, or even daily ufe, he is no petitioner or complainer: for that would fhew too much concern about them. His poffeffions are diftinguifhed for their beauty

 and

and elegance rather than for their fruitfulneſs and utility; becauſe the former qualities are more nearly allied to that independence and all-ſufficiency to which he aſpires. The gait of a magnanimous man is ſlow; his tone of voice grave, his pronunciation firm. Haſte and rapidity betoken an ungraceful anxiety. *He* therefore is ſeldom in haſte, who deems few things worthy of his purſuit; nor is he often eager, who thinks few things deſerving his ſolicitude: quickneſs and ſharpneſs of voice proceeding from earneſtneſs and eagerneſs. Such then are the characteriſtics of magnanimity; of which, mean-ſpiritedneſs is the defect, and vain-glory the exceſs; qualities which, though not very hurtful to others, yet ſhow much imperfection in the minds which harbour them. The little-minded man deprives himſelf of thoſe advantages to which he is entitled. He is ignorant of himſelf and of his own worth, otherwiſe he would aſpire to thoſe advantages which he really deſerves. His fault, however, conſiſts rather in ſluggiſhneſs than folly; he draws back from noble actions and illuſtrious enterpriſes, as things much above him; and even excludes himſelf from that external proſperity which fortune throws in his way. But the vain-glorious man is ignorant of himſelf ſtill more egregiouſly; and even to folly. He engages in undertakings the moſt honourable, but far above his abilities; and in which his ſignal failure manifeſtly convicts him of unworthineſs. He delights in the ornaments of dreſs, and all other ſhowy externals. He makes a

BOOK IV.

parade of his profperity, and boafts of it in the vain hope of being honoured on its account. Yet mean-fpiritednefs is more contrary than vain-glory to true magnanimity; becaufe the former vice is more frequently met with, and is alfo attended with worfe confequences. Such then is the nature of magnanimity, or that virtue which is converfant about great and extraordinary honours.[a]

Chap. 4.

Of the propriety of affection and conduct with regard to honour.

There feems to be another virtue alfo converfant about honour, and bearing the fame proportion to magnanimity, which liberality bears to magnificence. This virtue, as well as liberality, relates, not to what is great and extraordinary, but to what is ordinary and moderate: and as liberality teaches us to behave with propriety in the purfuit of ordinary and moderate profits, fo this namelefs virtue teaches us to behave with propriety in the purfuit of ordinary and moderate honours. A man may either be more or lefs defirous, than he ought, of glory as well as of gain; he may feek both thefe objects on improper occafions, and by undue means. An ambitious man is more fond of honour than he ought; an unambitious man, lefs than he ought; not caring to reap the natural reward even of praifeworthy exploits: the former recommends himfelf by his fpirited manlinefs and emulation of excellence; the latter, by his moderation and modefty; and from the imperfection of language in not affigning diftinct names to the different degrees of our affections, the

[a] Vid. Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxvi.; Eudem. l. iii. c. v.

fame

ſame word excites either praiſe or blame, according to the ſenſe in which it is taken: ambition is a ſubject of commendation, when it denotes a more than vulgar love of honour; it is a term of reproach, when it denotes the ſame affection in an immoderate and unwarrantable degree; and as a term is wanting to denote that middle ſtate of the affection, which is alone conſiſtent with propriety, the contrary extremes contend with each other for the vacant place of pre-eminence. Whatever things admit of exceſs or defect, admit alſo of this middle ſtate, which is alone praiſeworthy. This is the caſe with the deſire of honour, which may be too ſtrong, too weak, or in a moderate and proper degree; a degree not marked by any diſtinct term, and which, by the ambitious, is called low-mindedneſs; and by the low-minded, ambition; thus appearing to either extreme the vice oppoſite to itſelf. This happens with regard to ſome other virtues; each of the extremes uſurping the middle place, becauſe the middle itſelf is not diſtinguiſhed by a name.

Chap. 5.

Meekneſs, with its contraries.

Meekneſs is propriety of affection with regard to the cauſes and circumſtances which naturally provoke anger; or rather, as names are wanting to denote either a mediocrity or the oppoſite extremes of this affection, meekneſs, though verging towards the anonymous extreme, conſiſting in defect, is thruſt into the middle place. The extreme conſiſting in exceſs, may be called iraſcibility; and, anger being a paſſion excited by a variety of different cauſes, and under a variety

variety of different circumftances, it can only be commendable when it refults from a proper caufe, is directed towards proper objects, is feafonable in its commencement, moderate in its degree, and limited in its duration. If meeknefs be a praifeworthy quality, even the meek man muft be affected with anger under the conditions above fpecified. For meeknefs denotes freedom from unreafonable perturbation, and a due refiftance to paffion, in compliance with the higher powers of our nature; inclining, indeed, to the defective extreme; fince a meek man is not refentful of injuries, but always prone to pardon them. The incapacity of feeling juft provocation is certainly a fault; which, when it proceeds beyond a certain pitch, borders on folly; it denotes a ftupid infenfibility of character; and he who does not feel wrongs as he ought, cannot be well qualified to repel them; he will fubmit, with the meannefs of a flave, to infults offered either to himfelf or to his friends. An exceffive propenfity to anger difplays itfelf in a great variety of ways; it is excited by improper caufes, and is determined towards improper objects; it appears in immoderate or exceffive degrees; in fome men it burfts forth fuddenly into intemperate rage; in others, it fettles into unjuftifiable and permanent refentment. All thofe extravagancies of paffion do not take place at once; for multiplied exceffes of vice are deftructive of each other; and fhould they fall with their full weight on one individual, their burden would be intolerable. Irafcible men,

men, though moved to paſſion too ſuddenly, in immoderate degrees, and on improper occaſions, are yet eaſily pacified; if they be ſoon angry, they are alſo ſoon pleaſed, which is the beſt circumſtance attending them; and which happens from this, that they do not reſtrain their paſſion, but give free vent to it; their quickneſs of temper plainly ſhowing their affections and intentions, which they have no ſooner made manifeſt, than they are ready to be appeaſed. The exceſs of this diſpoſition, which takes offence againſt every perſon, and on every the ſlighteſt occaſion, receives its name, in Greek, from two words denoting the ſharpeſt aſperity of choler[a]. The reſentful and implacable temper retains anger long, becauſe it does not give free vent to it; for, to vent anger in vengeance naturally appeaſes it, by ſubſtituting pleaſure in the ſtead of pain; but paſſion reſtrained, gathers ſtrength by compreſſion; and as it remains hid within the breaſt, the gentle power of perſuaſion cannot be applied for its alleviation; it muſt be digeſted by the internal vigour of the conſtitution, which is a work of time. A fell and ſavage temper directs its immediate anger againſt improper objects, and is implacable in its reſentment, until it is fully ſatiated with vengeance. The exceſſes of anger are more oppoſite than its defects to the virtue of meekneſs; becauſe they occur more frequently; becauſe human nature is too prone to be immoderate in its reſentment; and becauſe perſons of iraſcible and

[a] ακροχολοι.

querulous

BOOK IV.

querulous tempers are the moſt troubleſome to live with. From what was above obſerved, it is plain that words cannot accurately expreſs all the conditions, as to time, place, perſon, cauſe, and degree, which render anger praiſeworthy or blameable. He who deviates a little on either ſide from the exact point of propriety, eſcapes blame, becauſe his ſlight error eſcapes obſervation. The incapacity of feeling or reſenting an injury is ſometimes praiſed as meekneſs; too ſtrong a propenſity to anger is ſometimes extolled as manhood, and regarded as indicating a diſpoſition fit for command. The preciſe middle point, in which alone propriety conſiſts, cannot be accurately aſcertained in words, becauſe it is determined only by a perception of ſenſe; and the ſenſes do not perceive minute variations. This however is plain, that the middle habit is laudable, and the extremes blameable, more or leſs, in exact proportion to their greater or leſſer deviations, in point of all, or any, of the conditions above ſpecified. This laudable mediocrity, therefore, ought to be our conſtant aim: and let this much ſuffice concerning the diſpoſitions and habits that have a reference to the cauſes and circumſtances that naturally provoke anger.[b]

Chap. 6.

Courteſy, with its contraries.

In the intercourſe of life and ſociety, there are men of a fawning diſpoſition, ever prone to praiſe, totally averſe to contention, and who think it incumbent on them to give pleaſure to all with whom they converſe. There are others

[b] Vid. Eudem. l. iii. c. iii.

of

of ſo peeviſh a temper, that they are continually contradicting and croſſing all thoſe with whom they have to do; and who feel not the ſmalleſt concern for the pain occaſioned to others by their churliſh aſperity. That both theſe habits are blameable, is manifeſt; and alſo that there is an intermediate habit between fawning flattery and ſavage ſeverity, which is truly laudable, becauſe it diſtributes its approbation and diſapprobation in due meaſure, according to the circumſtances of the caſe. This intermediate habit is not diſtinguiſhed by a name; it moſt reſembles friendſhip, for, ſhould affection be added to the companionable qualities of a man endowed with this habit, he would be a moſt delightful friend: but it differs from friendſhip in this, that it does not include any peculiar affection towards thoſe with whom we converſe; and the perſon adorned with this laudable habit, does not approve from love, nor diſapprove from hatred, but becauſe it is his nature and character to beſtow his approbation and diſapprobation agreeably to thoſe rules which moral propriety preſcribes; whether he has to do with acquaintances or ſtrangers; with familiar friends, or with perſons altogether unknown to him; except, that his behaviour to each of thoſe claſſes of perſons will be marked with ſuch diſtinctions as circumſtances require; for we ought not to teſtify as much pleaſure at the merit of mere ſtrangers as at that of our friends; nor to be equally complaiſant to the follies of the latter, as to thoſe of the former. The man of courteſy and civility (for theſe are the

the words by which the habit in queftion may moft nearly be expreffed) will, in the intercourfe of fociety, behave himfelf invariably as he ought: his aim will be, never needlefsly to offend; but to gratify and pleafe thofe with whom he lives, on all occafions on which it poffibly can be done, confiftently with utility and propriety. But the courteous man will not betray his own intereft or honour, or even thofe of the perfons with whom he converfes, for the fake of affording a fmall and unfeafonable pleafure. He will refift their opinions, when to refift them gives fmall pain; whereas to approve them would be injurious or difgraceful either to others or to himfelf. His behaviour will vary with the rank and dignity, with the degree of his familiarity or connexion, and with a variety of other circumftances belonging to the perfons with whom he converfes, but will be always regulated by propriety. Pleafure, we have faid, will be his aim; but without facrificing intereft or honour to pleafure, or a greater pleafure to a leffer. Such then is this intermediate habit, which is namelefs in Greek; and of which the extremes are, on one hand, univerfal and indifcriminate complaifance, which, when it proceeds from motives of intereft, is called flattery; and, on the other, mercilefs afperity and contentious peevifhnefs. As there is no term to exprefs the intermediate and laudable habit, the extremes only feem to ftand in oppofition to each other, and alternately arrogate the praife of virtue, though in fact they are both vices; and as fuch,

in

in direct oppofition to the praifeworthy habit above defcribed.

Plain-dealing, and its contraries.

The virtue which lies between the extremes of diffembling concealment and arrogant oftentation is converfant about nearly the fame objects with courtefy; except that this has a reference to the pleafure of thofe with whom we live, whereas that has a reference to truth in our words and actions. It is worth while to confider alfo this praifeworthy, though anonymous, habit; becaufe by thus fhewing that each particular virtue confifts in mediocrity, we fhall beft explain the nature of virtue in general, and moft clearly eftablifh the truth of our moral theory. The characteriftics of thofe who give pleafure or pain in the intercourfe of fociety, have already been defcribed; we proceed to fpeak of thofe who are adorned by truth and franknefs, or degraded by falfehood and diffimulation. There are men who arrogate to themfelves good qualities, of which they are entirely deftitute, and who amplify the good qualities of which they are poffeffed, far beyond their real meafure and natural worth. The ironical diffembler, on the other hand, either conceals his advantages; or, if he cannot conceal, endeavours to depreciate their value; whereas the man of franknefs and plain-dealing fhews his character in its natural fize: truth appears in all his words and actions; which reprefent him exactly as he is, without addition and without diminution. Each of thefe three habits difplay themfelves either from the fpontaneous impulfe of our character, or from motives of

of intereft; and when men have not any reafon for acting otherwife, they indulge the bent of their characters, either to plain-dealing on the one hand, or to the oppofite kinds of deceit above fpecified. There is a deformity in falfehood, which renders it odious in itfelf; whereas truth is beautiful and praifeworthy: and plain-dealing is the intermediate habit or virtue between the oppofite extremes or vices of him who would pafs himfelf for more than he is worth, and of him who conceals, or diffembles, his advantages. Of thofe two kinds of deceit, the former is the moft blameable; we fhall treat of both, after having firft fpoken of plain-dealing. By this word we do not mean the faithful performance of contracts or engagements, nor any of thofe things which have a reference to juftice or injuftice in our tranfactions; for fuch matters as thefe belong to another branch of virtue: but we mean the undifguifed truth and downright honefty which are apparent in fome men's behaviour, when no intereft whatever is at ftake, merely becaufe fuch plain-dealing is moft agreeable to their character. Such men will naturally be juft in their tranfactions, fince they who avoid deceit which is harmlefs, will ftill more avoid fraud which is injurious to others and difgraceful to themfelves. This habit is praifeworthy, even when it inclines to the defective extreme of difavowing or concealing advantages that really belong to us; it derives a comelinefs from avoiding to make a parade of invidious diftinctions, and of our own fuperiority, which is always mortify-

mortifying to others. The vice of oftentatious vanity, and falfe arrogation of merit, when it proceeds not from any interefted motive, fhews great weaknefs and levity; but its folly is more confpicuous than its turpitude; when it fprings from a love of honour or praife, which we muft be confcious that we do not deferve, it is indeed highly contemptible, but in this cafe is lefs odious than when it has its fource in the love of money or of any thing by which money may be gained. The virtues and vices juft mentioned depend like all others not on our natural powers or propenfities, but on election and habit: it is from habit that fome delight in plain-dealing, others in deceit; and that fome take a pleafure in practifing deceit for the purpofes of glory, and others for thofe of gain. The former affume the femblance of qualities, of which the reality would entitle them to congratulation and praife: the latter arrogate to themfelves qualities, which, if they really poffeffed them, might be fuccefsfully employed in promoting the pleafure or alleviating the pain of others; and to which qualities it is not eafy to prove that they are only vain pretenders: to this clafs of deceivers belong phyficians, fophifts, and foothfayers. The ironical diffembler has more of the grace of propriety, becaufe he conceals or depreciates his real advantages, in order to avoid the fwelling pomp of oftentatious arrogance. Such men cannot appear to be actuated by motives of intereft: they are fometimes inclined to diffemble even the moft honourable advantages; as happened in

 the

BOOK IV.

the cafe of Socrates. But there is a littlenefs and affectation in diffembling advantages inconfiderable in themfelves, and too manifeft to be concealed; fuch diffemblers are contemptible, and that fometimes in point of vanity and oftentation; witnefs the Lacedæmonians with their fhort beggarly drefs; for an affumed poverty is frequently as oftentatious as the parade of riches. Diffimulation, therefore, to be graceful, muft be ufed with refpect to things not too open and vifible: but the arrogation of advantages which do not belong to us is the vice commonly oppofed to the virtue of plain-dealing; becaufe it is the worft of the two extremes.

Chap. 8.

Facetioufnefs, and its contraries.

As life requires repofe from ferious employment, and this repofe may be enlivened by amufement, there feems to be a virtue relative to the intercourfe of men in their hours of relaxation and merriment, regulating both the matter and the manner of their converfation. The ftrain of this converfation may be more auftere or more ludicrous than it ought, or may flow in that happy medium which is alone confiftent with propriety. He who feeks to raife laughter on all occafions indifcriminately, without regard to decency, or to the pain inflicted on the object of his ridicule, is a low and contemptible buffoon: he who is himfelf totally incapable of exciting mirth, and who is fo far from relifhing, that he is highly offended with the innocent jefts of others, indicates a roughnefs and favagenefs of character, unbending hardnefs, and unfocial aufterity; whereas true

facetiousness consists in graceful flexibility of mind and manners, which can assume all shapes, and which becomes all; for as the habits of the body are known by its motions, so are those of the mind. An immoderate propensity to ridicule being a more prominent and more conspicuous quality than the contrary extreme of sullen and rustic gravity, and the greater part of mankind being inclined to delight in merriment, without anxiously examining whether it originates in a pure and proper source, buffoonery often passes for facetiousness, although there be the greatest difference between the coarseness of the one, and the elegance of the other; for in facetiousness, which is the middle and proper habit, an easy pliance of humour is adorned with a graceful dexterity which skilfully avoids whatever is indecent and illiberal; never debasing the delicate gaiety congenial to the character of well-educated citizens, by the smallest approximation to the wanton raillery of profligates and slaves. The progress of letters and civility has a powerful influence on the refinement of wit and humour; witness the difference between the ancient and modern comedy. In the former, the most shameful reproaches, expressed in the coarsest language, formed a principal source of the public entertainment; in the latter, the audience are taught chiefly to relish the faint insinuation, and the delicate hint: with respect to beauty and gracefulness, the two styles of writing are marked by the strongest differences. But by what circumstance is true facetiousness charac-

characterised? Whether does it consist in saying that only which becomes a well-educated citizen? or, may it be characterised by the avoiding of offence? or, thirdly, by the communication of pleasure? Or rather, is not such a habit in its nature indefinite, since things pleasing to one audience, may be highly offensive to another: for things which we are pleased to do, we will not be much offended to hear; and those which we are pleased to hear, we in some measure seem to do: but persons well-educated prescribe just limits both to their words and actions. The laws prohibit certain reproaches, when made seriously; they should perhaps also prohibit malicious raillery. A man endowed with urbanity and facetiousness is a law unto himself. Such then is this intermediate habit; whereas the extreme of buffoonery renders the mind in which it subsists a slave to low humour; for the buffoon neither spares others nor himself; and provided he can excite laughter, condescends to say what no man of an elegant turn of mind would venture to repeat, or even endure to hear. But the austere and solemn character is, on the other hand, totally unfit for the intercourse of society in hours of relaxation; to the entertainment of which he not only does not contribute any thing himself, but glooms by his unseasonable severity the merriment of others. There are then three laudable habits which have a reference to our behaviour in society; the first consists in a fair exhibition of our own characters; the other two relate to the pleasure of those

thofe with whom we live; and of thefe two, the one confifts in heightening that pleafure in hours of relaxation; the other, in promoting it amidft the ordinary employments of life.[c]

Chap. 9.

Of fhame.

Shame can fcarcely be numbered among the virtues; for it feems to be rather a paffion than a habit. It is defined, the fear of difgrace; and, like another kind of fear, it appears on the countenance; for men, when afhamed, blufh; and when afraid of death, grow pale: both feem to be affections of the body, and therefore more properly to be claffed with paffions than with habits. Shame is not graceful in every period of life; it only becomes youth. Young perfons, we think, ought to be extremely fenfible to fhame; becaufe as they are chiefly actuated by paffion, they would naturally be feduced into many difgraceful exceffes, were they not reftrained by a fenfe of fhame. We praife the blufhing modefty of youth, but nobody would think fhamefacednefs in old age a fit fubject of commendation: for perfons of mature years ought to be incapable of any action, on account of which fhame can be felt; for, as fhame can be felt only for things bafe or blameable, it cannot belong to men of confirmed virtue, who will avoid all fuch actions, whether they be really blameable in themfelves, or only of evil report. Bad men alone can be guilty of bad actions; and it is the wildeft abfurdity to flatter ourfelves, that though we do what is wrong, yet we may

[c] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxviii.; Eudem. l. iii. c. vii.

 efcape

BOOK IV. escape the guilt thereof by being heartily ashamed of our conduct. Shame is caused only by such actions as are voluntary; and base actions a good man will never voluntarily commit. Shame then can at best be considered only as a conditional virtue; that is, it may belong to a good man particularly circumstanced; for on the supposition, that he should have performed a bad action, he certainly would be ashamed of it. But the virtues, properly so called, are things desirable and graceful on their own account, simply and absolutely, independently of any suppositions or conditions whatever. Impudence indeed is a vice; but it does not therefore follow, that its contrary is a virtue; for there is not any room for shame, where nothing shameful is either done or intended. For a similar reason, self-command, which is often so highly commended, is only a conditional virtue, as shall be proved hereafter. We now proceed to speak of justice.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK V.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Fifth Book is entirely dedicated to the important ſubject of juſtice. Ariſtotle explains the different acceptations of the word, and diſtinguiſhes the different kinds of juſtice, ſtrictly ſo called. Political juſtice, again, is either diſtributive or commutative; which latter, for a reaſon given in the text, is called by him corrective. He ſhews wherein theſe kinds of juſtice differ; the one being regulated by proportion, and the other by equality. The difference is pointed out between what our lawyers call the *mala in ſe*, and the *mala prohibita*; and the diſtinction clearly explained between *doing harm* and *committing injury*. Ariſtotle concludes with examining the nature of equity in contradiſtinction to that of juſtice; and illuſtrates his doctrine concerning the latter, by conſidering the queſtion whether a man can be guilty of injury towards himſelf. As the author introduces not any thing ſuperfluous, (for his

BOOK V. account of the origin and uſe of money is eſſentially connected with the ſubject,) he compriſes within a narrow compaſs a diſtinct and ſatisfactory analyſis of thoſe great commanding principles which uphold civil ſociety; an analyſis exempt from thoſe ambiguities and contradictions, which too often occur in the innumerable volumes in which his opinions have been unfaithfully reported, or unſkilfully commented. Yet had ſucceeding writers improved and enriched his doctrines, the preſent Book would have the faireſt claim to attention, as containing the firſt attempt towards a full and clear explanation of the moſt important ſubject on which the pen of any author can poſſibly be employed.

BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

Difference between intellectual and moral habits.—Different acceptations of the word injuftice.—Juftice ftrictly fo called.—Diftributive juftice.—Corrective juftice.—Retaliation.—Natural juftice independent of pofitive inftitution.—Misfortunes.—Errors.—Crimes.—Equity.

BOOK V. Chap. I. Juftice.

IN examining juftice and injuftice, we muft explain to what kind of actions they relate; what kind of virtue juftice is, and what are the extremes or vices between which this virtue may be found. We fhall thus follow the fame method which has been purfued in the preceding parts of this difcourfe. All defcribe juftice as that habit which qualifies men to practife juft actions with inclination and pleafure; injuftice is the reverfe; and this general defcription may fuffice for our prefent purpofe. Juftice, we have faid, is the habit which qualifies men to practife juft actions with pleafure; becaufe the moral habits differ effentially from the intellectual in this, that the latter, as well as mere powers and capacities, may be fubfervient to quite contrary purpofes; and thofe endowed with the intellectual habits, or fciences, may exercife them fpontaneoufly and agreeably in producing directly contrary effects. But the moral virtues, like the different habits of the body, are determined by their nature to one fpecific operation: thus

Difference between intellectual and moral habits.

thus a man in health acts and moves in a manner conformable to his healthy ſtate of body, and never otherwiſe, when his motions are natural and voluntary; and in the ſame manner the habits of juſtice or temperance uniformly determine thoſe adorned by them to act juſtly and temperately. Yet habits of all kinds are often known by their contraries; thus, if a good habit of body conſiſts in denſity and firmneſs of fleſh, a bad habit muſt conſiſt in its ſoftneſs and rarity. When the word denoting any habit is taken in different ſenſes, the word denoting its contrary is likewiſe, for the moſt part, employed with equal latitude: thus the different meanings of injuſtice correſpond with thoſe of juſtice; both thoſe words having reſpectively various ſignifications, which, on account of their near affinity to each other, are ſeldom accurately diſtinguiſhed; for when a word denotes two things totally unlike, its ſeparate meanings are manifeſt; as, for inſtance, in the Greek word[a] which is applied equally to denote the collar-bone, and the key of a door. Let us examine then in how many acceptations the word injuſtice is uſed.

In how many acceptations the word injuſtice is taken.

A man who violates law is called unjuſt, as well as he who aſpires to any undue advantage, and is not contented with equality: ſince what is unlawful or unequal is unjuſt, and juſtice muſt be conformable to the principles of law and of equality. Injuſtice conſiſts in deſiring more than our ſhare, not of all things indiſcriminately which fall under the denomination of good, but

[a] κλεις.

of

of thoſe only which it is ſuppoſed to be good fortune to obtain; and which, though univerſally deemed good in themſelves, are often evils to thoſe who obtain them. Such goods, mankind in general wiſh for and purſue; though, in fact, they ought rather to pray that things abſolutely good may be good in relation to themſelves; and always to prefer and chooſe thoſe only which are likely to be ſo. An unjuſt man does not neceſſarily chooſe the greater ſhare: ſometimes he prefers the leſſer; and that always, when the things in his option are evils. But as the leſſer of two evils is in ſome meaſure a good, he ſeems always to deſire the greater ſhare, and is thence called in Greek an uſurper of more than his due[b]; though, in reality, according to circumſtances, he chooſes ſometimes the greater, and ſometimes the leſſer ſhare, but always an unequal one; ſo that his real turpitude conſiſts in acting contrary to equality or to law; an oppoſition to both of which, is common to every ſpecies of injuſtice. Since, then, whatever is unlawful is unjuſt, juſtice may be ſaid to conſiſt in acting agreeably to the laws of our country. But laws regulate the tranſactions of life, either with a view to the benefit of the public at large, or with a view to the benefit of that portion of the ſtate which is inveſted with ſovereignty, whether this has been acquired by pre-eminence in virtue, or attained by any of thoſe other means through which ſovereign authority is eſtabliſhed. In one ſenſe, therefore,

[b] πλεονεκτης.

juſtice

BOOK V. juſtice comprehends every thing that has a tendency either to produce or to maintain the happineſs of men in political ſociety. The law preſcribes to citizens who are ſoldiers, not to leave their ranks, not to fly, not to throw down their arms; that is, it commands them to behave themſelves with bravery. The law alſo prohibits all thoſe ſubject to its authority from adultery, and every ſpecies of debauchery which is injurious to others; which is nothing elſe than to command its ſubjects to be temperate. It alſo preſcribes meekneſs, in the injunctions, "thou ſhalt not ſtrike," "thou ſhalt not revile:" and in the ſame manner, partly by precepts, and partly by prohibitions, the law more or leſs accurately defines the rules and practice of the other virtues; ſo that juſtice, taken in the ſenſe of conformity to law, comprehends the whole of virtue, not indeed ſimply and abſolutely, but in reference to thoſe with whom we are connected; being another name for the ſtrict performance of all thoſe relative duties which are eſſential to the happineſs of ſocial life[c]. Viewed in this light, juſtice is the firſt and brighteſt of all the virtues; more worthy of admiration than either Heſperus or Lucifer; ſince, according to the proverb,

"Juſtice alone compriſes every virtue."

It is indeed the perfection of virtue, ſince it is not only the beſt conſtitution of our internal frame,

[c] The author takes "law" in that extenſive ſenſe in which it was regarded by the Greek legiſlators. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xiii.

frame, but the external exercise of whatever is praise-worthy in behaviour towards others; and even the whole community, however extensive, of which we are members[d]. There are many capable of acting uprightly within a limited domestic sphere, whose imperfections become manifest on a wider and more exalted theatre. Wherefore Bias well observed, "that government shows the man;" for he who is entrusted with the exercise of power, is placed in multiplied relations with respect to others, and the whole commonwealth. Justice, therefore, seems to contribute to the benefit rather of those towards whom it is exercised, than of those who are endowed with this virtuous habit; because it is the nature of this habit always to bear a reference to our transactions with the world. The worst of men are those whose vices injure themselves and their friends; the best are those, whose virtues benefit not only themselves and their friends, but the community at large, and the whole society of mankind. This, indeed, is

[d] This passage is expanded and adorned by Cicero in language the most glowing and impressive; "Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando à fraude deterreat; quæ tamen neque probos frustra jubet, neque improbos jubendo aut vetando movet. Huic legi nec abrogari fas est, neque derogari ex hac aliquid licet, neque tota abrogari potest. Nec vero aut per Senatum, aut per populum solvi hac lege possumus. Neque est quærendus explanator, aut interpres ejus alius: nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac: sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus ille, legis hujus inventor, disceptator, lator; cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; ac hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur, effugerit." Fragment. de Repub. l. iii.

a noble,

BOOK V.

a noble, becaufe a difficult tafk. Juftice, then, confidered in this view, is not a part, but the whole of virtue; and its contrary, injuftice, is not a part, but the whole of vice. Wherein virtue and juftice differ, is evident from the obfervations above made. They are precifely the fame thing viewed under two different afpects; and denominated virtue when confidered in relation to the mind adorned by this praifeworthy habit; but called juftice when confidered in relation to thofe towards whom it is exercifed.

Chap. 2.

Juftice properly fo called.

But our prefent inquiry is concerning juftice taken in a more limited fenfe, and denoting one virtue in particular; and alfo concerning injuftice as fignifying one particular vice, diftinct from every other. That fuch a fpecific injuftice, as well as juftice, exifts, appears from the following confideration; that he who commits any other bafenefs, is indeed guilty of wrong, but does not thereby benefit his fortune; which is plain, from the examples of him who throws away his fhield through cowardice, who reviles his neighbour through ungovernable afperity of temper, or who refufes, through illiberality, any pecuniary aid to thofe who have claims on his bounty. But a man may benefit his fortune by ufurping more than his due fhare of worldly goods, without incurring the blame of all, or any of thefe vices. His conduct, however, is culpable, and we arraign his injuftice. There is then a particular kind of injuftice differing from that above mentioned, and bearing the relation to it, of a part to the whole: in the firft fenfe, unjuft is fynonimous with unlawful; in the

the ſecond, it implies the breach of a particular claſs of laws, namely, that which prohibits any man from benefiting himſelf at the expence of his neighbour. One man commits adultery for the ſake of gain, another pays dearly for his criminal pleaſure; the vice of the former, is aggravated injuſtice; that of the latter, is profligate intemperance. All other wrongs may always be referred to ſome particular ſpecies of vice; the commiſſion of adultery, to intemperance; the deſertion of our companions in war, to cowardice; an aſſault, to unbridled violence of anger: but that wrong which is committed for the ſake merely of gain, is referred to no other vice but that of injuſtice; not that injuſtice above deſcribed, which is ſynonimous with wrong in general, but a ſpecific vice, bearing the ſame relation to the former, which the ſpecies does to the claſs under which it is included; for injuſtice, both in its large and in its limited ſenſe, has always a reference to our tranſactions with others; its very eſſence conſiſts in our behaving amiſs in thoſe tranſactions: but injuſtice, ſtrictly ſo called, implies that our miſconduct reſults from the deſire of promoting our own profit or honour, or whatever we think gainful to ourſelves[e]; whereas injuſtice, largely taken, comprehends all thoſe improprieties in our behaviour towards others, which are incompatible with the character of a virtuous man. We proceed then to explain the nature and properties of juſtice

[e] Ariſtotle ſays, "for the ſake of honour, money, ſafety, or for that which would include all theſe in one word."

and

BOOK V.

and injuftice, ftrictly fo called. This fpecies of injuftice was faid to confift, not in what is unlawful merely, but in what is alfo unequal; for whatever is unequal is unlawful; fince laws, properly made, affure to each individual his equal fhare, that is his due, in his tranfactions with his fellow-citizens; but many things are unlawful which are not unequal, becaufe laws relate to many other objects befides the diftribution and adjuftment of interefts and honours; enforcing, by authority, the practice of every virtue, and upholding a fyftem of education by which this practice may, through difcipline and cuftom, be rendered eafy and agreeable. Whether fuch an education properly falls under the fcience of politics, will afterwards be examined[f]; for under all forms of government indifcriminately, perhaps the character of the good man will not be found compatible with that of a good citizen. The particular kind of juftice now under confideration, is employed either in diftributing to each citizen his due fhare of honour, wealth, and all other advantages, in the political partnerfhip, or commonwealth, of which he is a member; or in regulating, by the rules of right, thofe tranfactions, whether voluntary or involuntary, which happen between fellow-citizens; and where wrong has on either fide been committed, in correcting this wrong, by again fetting the parties, as far as may be, on a foot of equality with each other. Voluntary tranfactions are thofe in

[f] Ariftotle examines this queftion in his Politics, which work is merely a continuation of his Ethics to Nicomachus.

which

BOOK V.

which both parties voluntarily concur; ſuch as buying, ſelling, borrowing, lending, letting, hiring, pledging, depoſiting. Involuntary tranſactions are either ſecret or open; the ſecret are, theft, adultery, poiſoning, ſeduction of other men's ſlaves, proſtitution for hire of others men's wives, premeditated murder, and the bearing of falſe witneſs. The open but involuntary tranſactions include all violent and manifeſt aggreſſions on the perſons, property, or reputation of others; ſuch as aſſault, maiming, impriſonment, death, robbery, ſlander, inſult.

Chap. 3. Diſtributive juſtice.

Juſtice implies equality; and this equality lies in the middle between two extremes, the greater and the leſſer; for whatever admits of diviſion into two unequal parts, may alſo be equally divided. But equality, being a relative term, always ſuppoſes the compariſon of two things at leaſt. Diſtributive juſtice, therefore, always implies two things, and alſo two perſons between whom thoſe things are divided. If the perſons are exactly equal, ſo ought to be their ſhares; but if the perſons are unequal, the ſhares ought alſo to be unequal in the ſame proportion: for complaints and ſtrife always will ariſe, when either perſons of unequal worth meet with preciſely the ſame treatment; or when perſons of nearly equal worth are diſtinguiſhed from each other by too conſiderable differences. This is univerſally acknowledged; but men's notions of worth vary with their political principles. In democracies, it is meaſured by liberty; in oligarchies, by wealth or birth; in ariſtocracies, by

BOOK V.

by virtue. Juftice, however, plainly confifts in proportion, which is the equality of ratios; and proportion, whether difcrete or continuous, always implies four terms; fince, when continuous, one of the terms muft be taken twice. Diftributive juftice always requiring four terms at leaft, implies that the fhares bear the fame proportion to each other as do the perfons among whom thefe fhares are diftributed; for proportion is applicable to all quantities, and not merely to numbers. If the firft fhare, therefore, be to the firft man, as the fecond fhare to the fecond; then alternately, the firft fhare will be to the fecond fhare, as the firft man to the fecond man; and as each of the antecedents is to its confequent, fo will both the antecedents be to both the confequents. This is what is called by mathematicians geometrical proportion, confifting, as we have faid, in equality of ratios; which equality is the middle between excefs and defect; for if one of the ratios were greater or leffer than the other, the proportion, or, in other words, the juftice of the diftribution, would be deftroyed. In diftributive juftice, the four terms are all of them diftinct, the one from the other; confifting of two perfons, and two fhares, at leaft; none of which can be taken twice in the feries. The proportion therefore is not continuous, but difcrete; and when proportion is violated, injuftice immediately follows. This evidently appears in actions: for the injurious perfon has more, the perfon injured has lefs, than their refpective

fhares

ſhares of good; of evil, the reverſe; for the leſſer evil is conſidered as a good.[g]

Commutative and corrective juſtice.

The remaining ſpecies of juſtice is properly diſtinguiſhed by the epithet of corrective: it applies to the mutual tranſactions between men, whether voluntary or involuntary. It differs from diſtributive juſtice in this, that the latter conſiſts in geometrical proportion, and requires that the ſhares ſhould have the ſame ratio to each other as the perſons among whom they are divided; ſo that each citizen may find himſelf treated according to his deſerts, and thoſe who contribute moſt to the public benefit may meet with proportionally higher remunerations. Corrective juſtice alſo implies equality, but an equality of a different kind, founded not on geometrical, but on arithmetical, proportion; for the law does not make any difference in its correction or puniſhment, whether a good man has injured a bad one, or a bad man a good. It contemplates merely the hurt done or the injury ſuſtained; and endeavours to ſet the two parties, the one of whom is wronged by the other, on the ſame foot of equality on which they formerly ſtood. The words gain and loſs are not indeed applicable in all caſes where one man is injured by another; they can be properly uſed only when the injuries done may be eſtimated in money; but in all caſes whatever, he who has

[g] I thought it unneceſſary to ſubjoin with Ariſtotle, "that the leſſer evil is conſidered as a good becauſe it is to be preferred to the greater; that good is always deſirable, and, of two goods, the more deſirable is the greater."

committed an injury ſhould be compelled, as far as may be, to make reparation, which, when complete, reduces the parties to that condition of equality from which they ſet out, by giving back to the loſer, what had been taken from him, by the gainer. Corrective juſtice, then, holds the middle place between gain and loſs. In their diſputes with each other, men have recourſe to a judge, as to a living fountain of juſtice; who, as it is his buſineſs to adjuſt differences, and mediate between contending parties, is often ſtyled a mediator. This office he performs by finding the middle term between the unequal extremes of gain and loſs; in the ſame manner as if, a line being divided into two unequal parts, he cut from the greater part its exceſs above half the line, and added it to the leſſer. When the whole is divided equally, each party has his due, becauſe the ſhares are alike; and this equality is the middle arithmetical term between the greater and the leſſer extreme. It is the duty of a judge to find this middle term; from which function, he appears in Greek to have derived his appellation; for juſtice in this language means an equal diviſion; and a judge, an equal divider[h]. When, from two equal quantities, a part is taken from the one and added to the other, the latter will exceed by two parts: for it would exceed by one, were the part taken away deſtroyed; it ex-

[h] δικαιον ὅτι διχαι ἐστιν. This will appear philological, and what follows mathematical, trifling, to thoſe careleſs about obtaining correct notions by remounting to their origin.

ceeds

ceeds the middle term therefore by one; and this term exceeds the quantity from which the part was taken away, by one. By this means we may learn, that in order to correct inequality, and thereby to do justice, we must take from the greater extreme that by which it exceeds the middle, and add this excess to the lesser. This plainly appears in geometry by means of a diagram; but the same thing holds in all other arts, which would speedily be subverted, and all human society overturned, unless equality and justice were tolerably well maintained in the actions and intercourse of life; and proper correctives applied where these bonds of society are materially violated. The words gain and loss are introduced by the voluntary transactions of men; in which, he who got more than he gave in exchange, was said to gain by the bargain; and he who got less, to lose; as in buying and selling and all other legal contracts. But when the bargain was equal, each party was said to have his due. Justice, then, even in such transactions as are involuntary, consists in a middle term between a certain kind of gain and loss, and requires that the parties should be reduced, as nearly as may be, to that condition of equality in which they stood with regard to each other, before any such transaction took place.

Chap. 5.

Retaliation does not apply to justice, either distributive or corrective.

Retaliation seems to some to be the whole of justice. This opinion was held by the Pythagoreans; who defined justice to be "reciprocity of doing and suffering." But retaliation will not apply either to distributive or to corrective jus-

tice;

BOOK V.

tice; although the law of Rhadamanthus ſays, "The completeſt juſtice conſiſts in making a man ſuffer the ſame ills that he has committed." This rule, however, is liable to innumerable exceptions. Thus, if a general ſhould ſtrike a ſoldier, the blow muſt not be retorted; but to ſtrike a general, or any other perſon inveſted with authority, requires that the offender ſhould be puniſhed more ſeverely than by mere retaliation. The difference alſo is very great between voluntary and involuntary injuries; to the latter of which Rhadamanthus' rule is totally inapplicable. Yet the commercial intercourſe of nations, and of individuals in the ſame nation, is maintained by a reciprocation, not indeed of the ſame, or ſimilar, but of proportional benefits and injuries. When injuries are offered by one ſet of perſons, and cannot be retorted by another, the latter claſs look on themſelves as nothing better than ſlaves: when benefits, on the other hand, are conferred, but without any proſpect of being returned, there is an end to that interchange of good offices, which is the main pillar of civil ſociety; a truth acknowledged by thoſe commonwealths who have erected temples on the moſt conſpicuous ſituations to the Graces; that men might continually be reminded of the duty of gratitude, the favourite virtue of theſe divinities; and that thoſe who had received and returned favours, might always be ready to renew the laudable contention among themſelves, by mutually provoking each other to works of kindneſs.

The

The nature and use of money.

The comfort of life requires an interchange of different works and exertions. The bricklayer, for example, muſt exchange the production of his labour with the ſhoemaker: and the bargain will be juſt, when the works exchanged bear the ſame proportion to each other, as do the exertions of the artiſans by whom they were produced. If the exertions of the bricklayer be more valuable for their duration, or their difficulty, than thoſe of the ſhoemaker, the works produced by the latter muſt, to render the bargain equal, bear the ſame proportion numerically to thoſe produced by the former: thus, if the bricklayer has conſumed a thouſand times as much labour in making a houſe, as the ſhoemaker has done in making a pair of ſhoes, a thouſand pair of ſhoes muſt be given for one houſe. The ſame thing happens with reſpect to all other arts, which derive their whole utility from the mutual exchange of different ſorts of labour, and which could not long be maintained, unleſs the exertions of one artiſan in one way, were nearly balanced and compenſated by thoſe of another artiſan in another. A community could not ſubſiſt, compoſed wholly of phyſicians or wholly of huſbandmen; it muſt conſiſt of phyſicians and huſbandmen, and other claſſes of individuals employed in different trades and different profeſſions. But that operations and works of ſuch different kinds ſhould be fairly exchanged for each other, it is neceſſary that they ſhould be nearly commenſurate; that is, that all of them ſhould be capable of being eſti-

BOOK V. mated with tolerable accuracy by comparifon with one common meafure. Hence the introduction of money; by means of which all thofe operations and works are compared in value with each other, and their relative exceffes or deficiencies afcertained with fufficient correctnefs for all practical purpofes. In reality, value depends on the mutual wants of men, which form the great bond of fociety; for unlefs their wants were mutual, exchange could not be effected: but money is ufed by convention as the reprefentative of all things wanted; fince it ferves as a pledge and furety, that whenever thofe wants occur, they will be fpeedily gratified; and its name is derived from the word fignifying law, which indicates that it is founded, not on nature, but on convention; and that human laws, which have thought fit to employ it as a meafure of value, may, at pleafure, fet this ufe of it afide, and employ fome other meafure in its ftead. Money, which reprefents the value of all other things, varies in its own; but its variations are lefs confiderable than thofe of moft other fubftances. It ferves therefore to fix their price, and to render them commenfurate with each other, thus performing a function effential to the exiftence of civil fociety: for communities could not fubfift without exchange; nor exchange without equality; nor equality, without a common meafure. The various kinds of labour, and the works thereby effected, cannot indeed be accurately compared, and exactly meafured, either by each other or even by

 money;

money; but they may, by means of the latter, be estimated with sufficient correctness for maintaining that commercial intercourse which is essential to the supply of our numerous exigencies.[h]

From

[h] Aristotle illustrates this subject by shewing how the exchangeable value of a house and a bed are compared with each other, by reducing both to the common measure of a certain number of minas. The text is corrupt, and the example superfluous; but it is of importance to observe how well our author explains the nature of traffic, money, labour, exchangeable value or price, from just notions of which all sound theories of political œconomy must result. In various parts of his works he makes the important distinction between labour consumed in use, and labour employed in production. That of a servant or domestic slave is of the first kind; that of a manufacturer or artisan, of the second. The labour of the artisan or manufacturer is concentrated and fixed in his work; the labour of a builder in a house built, of a weaver in the web. (ἡ ενεργεια εν τῳ ποιουμενῳ, ὁιον ἡ οικοδομησις εν τῳ οικοδομουμενῳ, και ἡ ὑφανσις εν τῳ ὑφαινομενῳ· &c. Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.) Having distinguished between productive and unproductive labour, he observes that every work or production may be employed in two different ways, either in the way of use or that of exchange. Thus a pair of shoes may either be worn or they may be sold (ὁιον ὑποδηματος, ἡ τε ὑποδεσις, και ἡ μεταβλητικη. Politic. l. i. c. ix. p. 305.). Every production or commodity has, therefore, in reference to the wants of human life, two different values, a value in use and a value in exchange. These different values ought to be distinguished, because things that have the greatest value in use, have often very little value in exchange, and things that have a great value in exchange have often very little value in use. The exchangeable value of commodities, according to Aristotle, is always relative to the labour requisite for procuring them; and the quantity of productive labour is exactly measured by the work or production in which this labour is fixed and embodied. (Metaph. l. ix. c. viii. p. 939.). But commodities or productions are so complex in their nature, that they cannot be compared with each other without some common measure. The metals, in consequence of their usefulness and beauty, their facility of division without injury, and of transportation without much labour, above all, their extreme durability, have been adopted by very general consent as the fittest measures of the exchangeable value of all other commodities. But neither the metals in general, nor any one metal in particular, is an exact measure. At different times and places, their own values are found to vary; and therefore they cannot be an exact, that is, an invariable measure, of the value of other things. But

though

BOOK V. Chap. 6.

In what fenfe juftice confifts in mediocrity.

From the explanation given of juftice and injuftice, it is manifeft that a juft action holds the intermediate place between doing and fuffering an injury. The doer has more, the fufferer lefs, than he ought; and juftice is mediocrity, not indeed in the fame fenfe with the other virtues, which lie between two contrary and vicious extremes, but becaufe it is productive of equality in our dealings, and gives to each individual that fhare which truly belongs to him; whereas injuftice contains in it two oppofite faults, giving to the one party more than is due, and robbing the other of his right. The virtue of juftice, then, is that by which a man practifes by preference and with pleafure fairnefs in his dealings, not arrogating to himfelf more than his due proportion of good, nor declining to bear his equal fhare of evil. He treats other men as he would wifh to be treated by them, affigning to each his fair proportion, and following the fame invariable rule, when his own intereft is at ftake, and when he is only adjufting the differences of others. Injuftice is directly the reverfe; it leads men in all their tranfactions to give an undue preference to themfelves: and when

---

though the exchangeable value of the metals varies, Ariftotle maintains that it is lefs variable than that of any other commodity (πασχει μεν ουν και τουτο το αυτο, ου γαρ αιει ισον δυναται· ὁμως δε βουλεται μενειν μαλλον. De Moribus, l. v. c. viii. p. 65.). This opinion is controverted *inconfiftently* (as will be proved hereafter) by Dr. Smith; although that learned and ingenious writer, by adopting Ariftotle's principles on the fubjects of exchangeable value, and of national wealth, has refcued the fcience of political œconomy from many falfe fubtleties and many grofs errors. See Wealth of Nations, b. i. c. 5.

they

they are entrufted with fettling the concerns of others, always to do this unequally, by giving an undue advantage to one of the parties. This much may fuffice concerning the nature of juftice and injuftice.

Chap. 7.

Juftice applied to actions in a fenfe different from that in which it is applicable to perfons.

Since the commiffion of every unjuft action does not neceffarily make an unjuft man, it may be inquired whether, in this refpect, there be any diftinction between particular acts of injuftice, bearing the fame name, fuch as theft, adultery, and robbery; or whether the difference of the external acts is of little or no weight in conftituting the vice of injuftice, even when thefe acts are performed knowingly; for a man may know that the object of his paffion is his neighbour's wife; and yet, if he acts merely from the blind impetuofity of appetite or defire, without deliberate intention, he is not an adulterer. The fame holds in all other cafes in which wrong is done; the mere perpetration of the act does not infer the vicious ftate of mind from which fuch acts naturally flow. The difference between retaliation and juftice was formerly mentioned; but, in our inquiries refpecting the latter, it muft be remembered, that we have in view chiefly that kind of juftice which may be called political, fince it is eftablifhed for the comfort and all-fufficiency of fociety among freemen and equals; whether the government, being democratical, require that each citizen fhould be dealt by alike; or whether it admit of thofe diftinctions of birth, wealth, and abilities, which are allowed their due weight under

under other forms of government. Where fuch equality does not prevail, there is not any room for what is ftrictly called juftice, but only for that virtue, which, on account of its refemblance, receives the fame name. Juftice takes place among thofe who being capable of injuring each other, are reftrained by law from mutual encroachments; and thofe encroachments muft be made, before injuftice can be committed; though, as we formerly obferved, the converfe of the propofition does not hold, that injuftice always is committed, when fuch encroachments are made, becaufe injuftice implies the deliberate purpofe of wronging others for the fake of benefit to ourfelves; a propenfity fo ftrong in human nature, that few men are capable of exercifing power, without fometimes ufing it tyrannically: wherefore law and reafon ought to bear fway, and rulers to be the guardians of equal juftice; contented with thofe rewards and honours which have been affigned to them for upholding the public good by their impartial adminiftration. Their power is of a different kind from that of fathers and defpots, in the exercife of which there is not any room for the virtue of juftice ftrictly fo called, fince no one can, in propriety of language, be faid to commit injuftice againft himfelf, or what entirely belongs to himfelf; becaufe no one ever deliberately propofed to do real harm to either, and could not poffibly do fuch harm for the fake of benefiting himfelf: but flaves, who are a kind of property, and alfo children, until they have attained

attained a certain age, are ſo intimately connected with their maſters and parents, that no ſuch relations as thoſe of political juſtice can ſubſiſt between them; for political juſtice implies laws; and laws ſuppoſe an equality, not indeed of ranks and perſons, but of rights and obligations. Wherefore ſomething more nearly reſembling political juſtice takes place between huſbands and wives; but this, which is called œconomical juſtice, is alſo different from the former.

Natural juſtice independent of poſitive inſtitution.

Political juſtice is founded either on nature or on law. The natural, is that which has every where the ſame force and authority; the legal, is that which depends on human inſtitution, rendering actions juſt or unjuſt, which are in themſelves indifferent; as that no more than one mina ſhould be required for the ranſom of a priſoner; that a goat ſhould be ſacrificed rather than two ſheep; regulations reſpecting individuals, as that Braſidas ſhould be honoured with heroic worſhip; and thoſe that come in the ſhape of decrees or reſolutions. Some are of opinion that all juſtice whatever depends on poſitive inſtitution; which they endeavour to prove by obſerving that the laws of nature remain every where unalterably the ſame: fire, for example, which burns and warms in Greece, has preciſely the ſame powers in Perſia; whereas the rules of juſtice are liable to perpetual variations. This, however, is true only in a certain ſenſe; for though among the gods in heaven, what is natural is, perhaps, unalterable, yet, in this

BOOK V.

this lower world, many inſtitutions of nature are capable of being changed and modified by circumſtances. Yet the diſtinction between what is natural and conventional, is not thereby deſtroyed; unleſs we ſhould infer that, becauſe ſome men are capable of uſing both hands with equal dexterity, it is not natural for mankind in general to uſe one hand more dexterouſly than the other[i]. Men's notions of juſtice are often warped by their intereſts; and this great meaſure of human actions varies like the meaſures of wine and corn, which the dealers in thoſe articles have of different ſizes; uſing the larger when they buy, and the ſmaller when they ſell. Great variations reſult alſo from the different forms of government; although, as we ſhall ſhew hereafter, there is one form of government naturally the beſt. Juſtice is a general term; and differs from an act of injuſtice, as an univerſal does from a particular. That is unjuſt which is contrary to nature or to law; and the ſame thing, when done, is an unjuſt action. An unjuſt action is a wrong; and when we rectify a wrong, we are ſaid to do juſtice. But the import of theſe terms will be afterwards more nicely diſcriminated.

[i] He gives the reaſon more generally in Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 167. το γαρ ὡς επι το πολυ διαμενον, τυτο φυσει δικαιον προφανες· "That which is for the moſt part invariable and conſtant is manifeſtly natural juſtice." Political juſtice, on the other hand, varies with the arrangements and exigencies of men in ſociety. He therefore concludes βελτιον ον δικαιον το κατα φυσιν· "That natural injuſtice is the better of the two;" a concluſion agreeable to his obſervations in the firſt Philoſophy. See Analyſis, p. 92, & paſſim.

Injuſtice,

Distinction of misfortunes, errors, and crimes.

Injuftice, as applicable to actions, confifts in what we have now faid: but it does not belong to perfons, unlefs it be committed voluntarily; for when a man acts without intention, the quality of his action, as good or bad, juft or unjuft, is, in reference to the agent, merely an acceffory, not fpringing effentially from himfelf, and neither entitling him to praife, nor fubjecting him to blame. That, therefore, which is unjuft, is not injuftice in the agent, unlefs it be committed voluntarily; that is, as formerly explained, unlefs the action, with all its circumftances, depend entirely on our own power, and be performed knowingly, with intention and without conftraint. Thus, to make the act of ftriking parricide, we muft know the perfon whom we ftrike, the nature of the inftrument with which the ftroke is inflicted, and the motive through which we are impelled to fuch a horrid crime. The action muft alfo lie entirely within our own power; for in many natural events, we are both agents and patients knowingly, though not voluntarily; witnefs old age and death[k]. The fame happens as to juftice and injuftice. When a man reftores a depofit involuntarily through fear, he cannot be faid to act juftly, fince the juftice of the action is not caufed by himfelf: it is a mere acceffory or appendage, quite foreign to his defign or purpofe. In the fame manner, he cannot be accufed of injuftice, who is conftrained involuntarily not to reftore a depofit. Voluntary

[k] See Analyfis, p. 126.

actions

BOOK V

actions are performed with, or without election; deliberate actions are performed with election; and thofe that are without deliberation are without election. In the intercourfe of life, one perfon may hurt another in three ways; either ignorantly, in which cafe the hurt done is called an error; as when we are miftaken either in the perfon or the inftrument; or when the action turns out to be of quite a different nature from that which we intended: a man may be hurt by a blow meant merely for roufing him; a wound may be given cafually; and one perfon may receive a blow which was intended for another. When the harm is not only done unintentionally, but happens altogether unexpectedly, it is called a misfortune; when the confequences of the action might have been forefeen and expected, the harm done, without any mifchievous purpofe, is properly termed a fault; for a fault is that evil which originates in ourfelves; and a misfortune, that of which the caufe is external. Harm done knowingly, but not deliberately, is an injuftice; as thofe injuries which proceed from anger and other paffions, that are either neceffary, or at leaft natural. Yet the perfons who have committed fuch injuries are not branded with the reproach of injuftice or wickednefs; which falls only on wrong proceeding from wilful pravity. The law, therefore, well diftinguifhes between premeditated crimes, and thofe committed through paffion; for the fource of the latter may be traced up rather to him who provoked the paffion, than to him who yielded

yielded to its violence. In all ſuch caſes, the queſtion is, not whether the deed was done, but whether it was done juſtly; for anger always proceeds from ſome real or ſuppoſed injury. But in all other diſputes, the queſtion turns on ſome fact, which one party affirms, and the other denies; and as to which, either the one or the other, unleſs his memory deceives him, muſt plainly be guilty; for every deliberate wrong is manifeſt injuſtice, whether it conſiſt, as above explained, in violating the law of equality, or in violating that of proportion. The virtue of juſtice, on the other hand, is exerciſed only in ſuch acts as are done voluntarily and deliberately. Involuntary acts are, or are not, entitled to pardon, according to circumſtances. Thoſe are pardonable, which proceed from complete and habitual ignorance; thoſe are not, which proceed from a temporary ignorance, occaſioned by the blind impetuoſity of paſſion, either extravagantly exceſſive in its degree, or highly improper in its object.

Chap. 9. — Solution of doubts reſpecting juſtice.

Doubts may ariſe, whether the doing and the ſuffering of injuſtice have been defined with ſufficient preciſion. Firſt, ſhall we hearken to Euripides? One of his characters reaſons thus:

> I ſlew my mother; the defence is plain,
> She *with her* will, or *'gainſt my* will, was ſlain.

Can any perſon be injured willingly? or muſt every injury be unwillingly ſuffered as it is willingly inflicted? A man, it is ſaid, may be injured willingly; ſince an intemperate man willingly

BOOK V. willingly hurts himſelf. But this argument is not concluſive, for the intemperate man does what he thinks he ought not to do; his paſſion makes him act againſt his deliberate will; for no one can deliberately will what he thinks miſchievous to himſelf. To injure then, is not only to hurt knowingly, but to hurt againſt the will of the ſufferer; for when his will conſents, he may indeed be hurt, but is not injured. Glaucus was not injured by his diſadvantageous exchange of armour with Diomed, becauſe it was voluntary.

> "Brave Glaucus then, each narrow thought reſign'd
> (Jove warm'd his boſom, and enlarg'd his mind),
> For Diomed's braſs arms of mean device,
> For which nine oxen paid (a vulgar price)
> He gave his own of gold divinely wrought,
> A hundred beeves the ſhining purchaſe bought."
>
> ILIAD VI. v. 290, et ſeq.

Secondly, Whether is the injuſtice in him who makes an unfair diſtribution, or in him who receives more than his due? If the former is aſſerted, thoſe perſons diſtinguiſhed by liberality and equity, who are inclined rather to refuſe their full proportion than to arrogate more than their juſt ſhare, will ſometimes injure themſelves. It may be anſwered, that theſe perſons, liberal and equitable as they are as to things of a particular nature, will not decline their full ſhare of goods in general; and of ſome kinds ſuch as praiſe, glory, and whatever is honourable and laudable, will be inclined to arrogate fully as much as belongs to them. But the difficulty is ſolved

ſolved by the obſervation above made, that no one can be the willing victim of injuſtice; ſo that men cannot injure, although they may hurt themſelves. Beſides, the injuſtice is plainly in him who makes the unfair diſtribution; for by him the unjuſt action is begun and completed; whereas he who holds more than his due ſhare, may often do it ignorantly and innocently. The word action is taken in different ſenſes. It is applied to inanimate things. The ſword, or any other warlike inſtrument, is ſaid to ſtrike or kill, as well as the hand of one man moved by that of another; or a ſlave, by the command of his maſter. None of thoſe injure, although they are the inſtruments of injuſtice. Unjuſt judgments may proceed merely from ignorance; but that judge only is unjuſt, who paſſes unjuſt decrees, knowingly, from partiality to one party, or ill-will to the other. Between ſuch a judge and one of the parties, the iniquity, as well as its fruits, are ſometimes divided; the latter gets more land than he ought, and the other gets money to which he is not entitled. Injuſtice, however, in judgment, as well as every other ſpecies of injuſtice, always conſiſts in arrogating to ourſelves more than our due proportion of advantage, whether this conſiſts in benefiting our fortune, indulging our partiality, or gratifying our reſentment. Men think, becauſe injuſtice ſeems to be always in their power, that therefore juſtice is eaſy. The thing, however, is far otherwiſe. To commit vicious actions is indeed always in our power, but to acquire either

Juſtice, a matter of more difficulty than

BOOK V. commonly imagined.

either virtuous or vicious habits is the work of time and cuſtom; and the vice is not in the act, but in the frame of mind and habit of the actor. They think alſo, that to diſtinguiſh between juſt and unjuſt tranſactions, requires but ſmall diſcernment; becauſe it is eaſy to underſtand the laws promulgated on this ſubject. But the juſtice or injuſtice is not in thoſe tranſactions themſelves, except by way of appendage or acceſſion, when, together with the ſimple performance of the act, certain diſpoſitions and affections, and thoſe uniform and habitual, concur in the agent. To know, therefore, what conſtitutes, or contributes to, juſtice, is ſtill more difficult than to know what conſtitutes, and contributes to, health. The medicines of hellebore, honey, and wine, as well as the operations of cutting and burning, are indeed eaſily known; but to underſtand when, how, and to whom, we ought to adminiſter the one and to apply the other, is a thing of no leſs difficulty than to be a ſkilful phyſician. It is alſo a falſe opinion, that a good man is capable of acts of wickedneſs; becauſe, were he inclined to indulge guilty paſſions, he is more likely to do it with impunity than any other. But, as we above obſerved, the vice or wickedneſs is not in the act itſelf, but in the frame or habit of mind of him by whom that act is performed. The art of healing does not conſiſt in performing operations and in adminiſtering medicines; it conſiſts in doing theſe things properly, that is, in the intellectual habit or ſkill of the phyſician. Juſtice takes place only

only among thoſe who are ſharers in that kind of goods, of which a certain proportion contributes to their happineſs; but of which either the exceſs or the defect has a tendency to deſtroy it. The gods, perhaps, cannot have too much power and proſperity; and beings incurably wicked, cannot have too little of either; ſince, by them the means of good, will always be converted into ſources of evil. But men are benefited by a due proportion, and by that only.

Chap. 10.

Of the nature of equity in contradiſtinction to juſtice.

We proceed to ſpeak of equity, and to conſider what relation it bears to juſtice. It is not the ſame thing, nor yet is it different in kind; for it is a praiſeworthy quality as well as juſtice, but is ſpoken of as ſomething better than mere juſtice, and really is ſo, for it is the correction of ſtrict, that is, of legal juſtice; which often needs to be modified by equity, becauſe laws being in their nature general, cannot decide rightly in the indefinite variety of particular caſes. The lawgiver is contented with making a rule, which fairly applies to the greater part of caſes; well knowing that it will not include the whole: and the fault is neither in the law nor the lawgiver, but in the nature of things. When an exception to the rule occurs, which the lawgiver did not foreſee, this exception is admitted in equity, which thus ſupplies the defect of law, as the lawgiver himſelf would do, were he preſent in court, and as he would have done by amending his law, had he been aware of the exception. Equity, then, is better than legal juſtice, being its amendment; and ſupplying

 that

BOOK V.

that defect of laws, which arises from their universality. The variety of human transactions cannot be comprised within general rules. Occasional decrees therefore become requisite; which vary with each variation of circumstances, for the measure of what is indefinite must be indefinite itself; like the leaden ruler in the Lesbian architecture, which changes its own shape according to that of the stones to which it is applied. It is manifest, therefore, that equity is a species of justice, and contrasted with another species, to which it is preferable. A man of equity is he who deliberately and habitually exercises this virtue; who prefers it in all his dealings to the rigour of justice; and who, even when the law is on his side, will not avail himself of this advantage to treat others injuriously or unhandsomely.

Chap. XI.

That a man may hurt, but cannot be guilty of injury towards himself.

Whether justice be taken in its larger sense, of disobeying the laws; or in its stricter acceptation, of depriving others of their property, it is plain, from the observations already made, that no one can be guilty of injustice towards himself. A man may spontaneously and knowingly commit an unprovoked injury; he may even destroy his own life, in direct opposition both to the laws and to right reason[k]. He thereby

[k] The Oxford edition very properly supplies the word λογον of which ορθον is the ordinary epithet, and of which it must here be the adjunct, to render the passage intelligible. Suicide is always spoken of by Aristotle as a base and cowardly crime, as a mean dereliction of all personal dignity, and a gross violation of all social duty. Cicero sometimes (for on this subject he is not consistent) speaks otherwise.

"Atque

thereby certainly does an injury; but to whom? Not to himſelf, becauſe he ſuffers voluntarily. The injury is therefore done to the ſtate; which, on this account, puniſhes ſelf-murder with infamy. As to the other kind of injuſtice, which does not comprehend wickedneſs in general, but which conſiſts, like cowardice, in one ſpecific vice, we cannot, without a total confuſion of thought, ſuppoſe that a man is guilty of it towards himſelf; for in that caſe, the ſame thing would be both added to and taken from the ſame perſon, at the ſame time. Injuſtice, therefore, always implies two perſons at leaſt; and if it did not, the diſtinctions formerly made concerning ſpontaneity, deliberation, retaliation, and aggreſſion, would be totally deſtroyed. Retaliation cannot deſerve the epithet of injurious; but could a man injure himſelf, injury would be conſiſtent with the moſt complete retaliation, namely, the doing and ſuffering preciſely the ſame thing, under preciſely the ſame circumſtances; beſides a man might ſuffer injury voluntarily, which was formerly proved to be impoſſible. Still further, the commiſſion of wrong always implies ſome ſpecific act; but by no ſuch act can a man do wrong to himſelf. He cannot commit adultery with his own wife,

" Atque hæc differentia naturarum tantum habet vim, uti nonnunquam mortem ſibi ipſe conſciſcere alius debeat, alius in eadem cauſſa non debeat." De Officiis, l. i. c. xxxi. Here he ſpeaks of ſuicide as a duty; probably out of deference for his admired Cato. But his language is very different elſewhere. Confer. Tuſc. Diſp. l. i. c. xxx. Somn. Scip. c. iii. Had Ariſtotle's Ethics been equally well known, Cicero's Offices, admirable as they are, would not have been regarded and cited as the beſt ſtandard of heathen morality.

 he

he cannot be guilty of housebreaking with regard to his own house, he cannot steal his own property: universally, therefore, he cannot do an injury to himself. It is an evil to suffer, as well as to do, wrong, but the latter is by far the worst evil of the two, because it is blameable and base. The former, however, may sometimes, by concurring with other circumstances not essentially connected with it, be attended with far more deplorable consequences; in the same manner as a fall, by stumbling, may sometimes have worse effects than a pleurisy, because it may occasion a man's capture by the enemy, and, in consequence thereof, his ignominious death. But the science of Ethics, no more than that of Physics, pays attention to consequences not essentially inherent in the subject, and connected with it merely by way of appendage or accession. It is said metaphorically, not indeed that a man can exercise justice towards himself, but that one part of his frame may exercise justice towards another. This justice, however, resembles, not the political justice above examined, but the justice of fathers and masters towards children and slaves; whose relation to each other bears a near similitude to that of the rational and irrational parts in the human constitution. The passions often rebel against reason, as slaves do against their masters; and as the latter seem guilty of injustice, so do the former. Thus much concerning justice, and the other moral virtues.[1]

[1] The doctrine of justice is explained on the same principles delivered in this Book, Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxxiv.; & Eudem. l. iv.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK VI.

INTRODUCTION.

IF philosophy consist in explaining phænomena, seemingly indefinite in number, by a few distinct principles of action, this Sixth Book affords one of the finest specimens of it ever exhibited. According to Aristotle, moral virtue is appetite or affection disciplined by reason and custom; which, enabling us to make a fair estimate of excellence, teaches us to prefer and pursue it[a]. To explain, therefore, the different acceptations of the word reason; or, in Aristotle's language, to describe the different powers of the understanding, must form an essential part of every complete treatise of Ethics. By modern philosophers indeed these powers are not accurately distinguished; although, according to our author, the powers of intellection differ as widely from each other as those of sensation. Colours, flavours, sounds, and odours,

[a] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxii. p. 161.

and

and other objects about which the fenfes are converfant, are not more diftinguifhable from each other, than the different claffes of fpeculative and practical truths, which are perceptible by what our author calls the demonftrative and deliberative faculties of the underftanding[b]. Reafoning on this principle, that powers muft differ from each other, which exert themfelves in different actions, and effectuate different ends, he treats feparately of art, fcience, prudence, intellect, and wifdom: he explains the nature and functions of each of thofe habits; examines the difference between what are called natural virtues, and thofe which are acquired by exercife and cuftom; and proves that none of the acquired virtues can fubfift without that intellectual habit which he calls prudence.

[b] Magna Moral. l. i. c. xxxv. p. 169.

BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

Senſation, intellect, and appetite.—Their different offices. —The five intellectual habits—Science—Art—Prudence—Common ſenſe—Wiſdom.—Quickneſs of apprehenſion.—Juſtneſs of ſentiment.—Importance of the intellectual habits.—Virtue, natural and acquired.—Their difference.

BOOK VI. Chap. I. — Tranſition to the intellectual virtues.

HAVING formerly ſaid that, in moral matters, mediocrity only ought to be the object of our preference, as being alone conſiſtent with right reaſon, it is proper that this ſubject ſhould be more diſtinctly explained. Whoever exerciſes reaſon has, in all his habitual actions, a certain aim, according to which he regulates his behaviour; moderating his paſſions when too ſtrong, invigorating them when too weak, and always bending them to propriety, as a bow is ſtrung or relaxed by the archer in order to hit the mark. This obſervation is indeed true, but not ſufficiently explicit to be practically uſeful; for, in all other matters in which ſcience is concerned, we ought certainly to do what right reaſon preſcribes, that is, neither too much nor too little. Thus the phyſician ought to act with regard to his patient; but by knowing that this is his duty, he will not be rendered much the wiſer

wiser as to what operations ought to be performed, or what medicines ought to be administered. It is necessary, therefore, to speak more definitely concerning the habits of the mind, to explain what right reason is, and to point out what are the boundaries which it assigns to our passions and actions. The habits or virtues of the mind were formerly divided into the moral and intellectual: concerning the moral we have already treated; it remains to examine the intellectual, having previously spoken of the soul itself. In this, we formerly distinguished two parts, the rational and irrational; and the former may also be divided into two, namely, that faculty by which we understand those sciences whose principles are certain and necessary, and which cannot possibly be otherwise than they are, and that by which we comprehend other branches of knowledge; for if there be any resemblance or affinity between the truths recognised, and the powers which recognise them, it is natural to think that things, so extremely different as are the necessary and contingent, should be perceived and known by different faculties[c]. Knowledge, then, may be divided into that which is demonstrative and scientific, and that which is deliberative and probable; for no one deliberates about things which necessarily exist after one certain manner, and which cannot possibly exist after any other. Let us examine, then, what is the best habit of each of these faculties:

[c] See also Magna Moralia, l. i. c. xxxv. p. 169.

the

the beſt habit of any thing is, in other words, its virtue; and the virtue of each object is aſcertained by its fitneſs for performing its peculiar function.

Chap. 2.

Senſation, intellect, and appetite, their different offices.

There are three principles in man, which, either ſingle or combined, are the ſovereign judges of truth and conduct. Theſe are, ſenſation, intellect, and appetite. Of theſe three, mere ſenſation cannot alone be the foundation of any judgment reſpecting conduct, that is, the propriety of action; for wild beaſts have perception by ſenſe, but are totally unacquainted with propriety. Affirming and denying are the operations of intellect, deſire and averſion are thoſe of appetite; and ſince moral virtue implies the habit of juſt election, and election or preference reſolves itſelf into deliberation and appetite, every act of virtuous preference requires, that there ſhould be accuracy and truth in the compariſon, as well as correctneſs and propriety in the deſire. Of that intellectual faculty which bears not any relation to life and practice, and which is employed, not in deliberation, but in demonſtration, the ſimplicity of abſtract truth is the proper and only object; but deliberative moral wiſdom bears in all its operations a reference to human happineſs; and terminates, not in the diſcoveries of ſpeculation, but in the exertions of action[d]. This latter faculty, then, only attains its end, when well-ordered

[d] In conformity with what is here ſaid, Ariſtotle in his Topics, b. v. c. i. p. 226. diſtinguiſhes ſcience from virtue, by ſaying that the former is in one part of the ſoul, and the latter in more than one.

BOOK VI.

ordered appetite harmonises with sound practical reason; from the combination of which elements, results that moral election or preference, peculiar to man; which may be called either impassioned intelligence, or reflecting appetite; and which is the sole fountain of whatever is laudable and graceful in behaviour and manners[e]. This practical reason is superior to that conversant about production: for production, as we above observed, is imperfect in itself, and continually remains so, until the work, for the sake of which it operated, be produced. But the operation of practical reason terminates in nothing better than the pleasure of its own energies. It is not given to us for the gratification of appetite: but appetite itself is implanted in us for the sake of that virtuous moral action, which constitutes an essential part of human happiness. Such, then, is man, an intellectual but impassioned being, exercising his faculties concerning things contingent and future. The past cannot be an object of deliberation or preference. No one chooses that Troy should not be taken; and Agathon says rightly,

> "All things to God are possible, save one,
> "That to undo, which is already done."

As truth, then, is the object of both our rational faculties, (the speculative and practical,) their excellencies must consist in those habits by which truth is most clearly discerned.

[e] ἡ δε προαιρεσις, κοινον διανοιας και ορεξεως. De Animal. Motu. c. vi. p. 706.

Let

BOOK VI. Chap. 3.

The five intellectual habits. First, science.

Let these habits be the five following; science, art, prudence, wisdom, intellect. In matters of opinion we are liable to be deceived; not so in matters of science. The former relates to things variable in their nature, of whose very existence we may doubt, unless when they are actually perceived; the latter is conversant about things unalterable, necessary, and eternal, incapable of being generated, exempt from corruption; the knowledge of which admits not of degrees between total ignorance and absolute certainty. All science may be taught, and all teaching implies principles, namely, those truths which are previously known by experience or reason. The first principles are acquired by induction, that is, by intellect operating on experience[e]. Science, then, may be defined a demonstrative habit, distinguished by those properties which we have ascribed to it in our Analytics[f]. The principles of science must be perceived with the clearest evidence; for unless they be more evident than the conclusions drawn from them, these conclusions will not form science strictly so called; because their truth does not necessarily proceed from the truth of their premises; with which they are connected, not essentially, but only by way of accession or appendage.[g]

Chap. 4.

Art.

Things in their nature variable, and which might either have never been, which may cease

[e] See Analysis, p. 65. Comp. p. 161.
[f] See Analysis, p. 89.
[g] See above, p. 75. Conf. p. 115.

BOOK VI.

to exist, or whose mode of existence is liable to perpetual alterations, are of two kinds; productions or actions. These things are sufficiently distinguished from each other even in popular discourse; so that a rational habit of action must be different from a rational habit of production. Since building, which is a rational habit of production, is an art, and every other such habit is also an art, and every art is also the habit just mentioned, art may be defined the habit of making or producing a certain work agreeably to the rules of right reason. All art is employed in examining and contriving how it may best form and fashion those productions or works of which the efficient cause is in the maker, not in the materials. Things which exist necessarily, are not the subjects of art; nor those which are produced naturally; for the latter have their efficient cause in themselves[h]. Art, then, is conversant after a certain manner about the same things as fortune. Wherefore Agathon says,

"In friendly ties are art and fortune bound."

Artlessness is the contrary of art; it is the producing of such works awkwardly; according to erroneous principles of reason.

Chap. 5. — Prudence.

In explaining the nature of prudence, let us consider first, who they are to whom this excellence is ascribed. It seems to be the part of a prudent man to deliberate wisely about his good

[h] See Analysis, p. 126.

or

or advantage; not in particular points merely, as health or ſtrength, but as to the general happineſs of life. This is indicated by our calling thoſe men prudent, who take proper means for attaining valuable ends which are not the proper objects of particular arts. Prudence then implies deliberation; and no one deliberates about things invariable in their nature, and which cannot be otherwiſe than they are; nor about things which are not in their own power. Prudence, then, is not ſcience, becauſe the objects of ſcience are things invariable; it is not art, becauſe the object of prudence is action, not production. It remains then, that prudence ſhould be a rational and practical habit, bearing a reference to the happineſs and miſery of human life. The end of production conſiſts always in the work produced; but action is often its own end; for happineſs, which is a kind of action, is perfect in itſelf. Pericles, and other great ſtateſmen, are called prudent on account of their ſingular ability in effecting the good of human kind; the great buſineſs of œconomy, both political and domeſtic. The word, in Greek, denoting the moral virtue of temperance, is compounded of two other words, which may be literally tranſlated, "the preſervative of prudence[h];" for temperance tends to preſerve this intellectual excellence. Pleaſure and pain do not deſtroy every exerciſe of the underſtanding; for inſtance, that which relates to mathematical truth; but that exerciſe only

[h] σωφροσυνη.

BOOK VI.

which relates to the practical concerns of life. For the exceffive love of pleafure, or the exceffive fear of pain, fubftitutes new principles of action quite different from thofe by which wife and good men are actuated. Prudence, then, is a rational and practical habit, effective of human happinefs. We fpeak of excellence in art, but prudence is itfelf excellence. In the arts, voluntary errors are the beft; but, in matters of prudence, they are the worft; as in all the moral virtues. Prudence, then, is not an art but a virtue; and the virtue of that faculty of the mind which is converfant about opinion and probability, difcerning in fuch things truth from falfehood. As it relates to the practice of life, which, with all men, is a conftant object of thought, prudence, when once acquired, is not, like other habits of the underftanding, liable to be forgotten or loft.

Chap. 6. — Intellect.

Since the object of fcience, as above obferved, is univerfal and demonftrable truth, and whatever is demonftrable muft be founded on principles, it is manifeft that there muft be primary principles[1], which are not fcience, any more than they are art or prudence. They are not fcience, becaufe all fcience is demonftrable; they are not art or prudence, becaufe thefe have for their fubject things contingent and variable: neither are they wifdom, becaufe, as we fhall fee hereafter, wifdom, and the higheft wifdom, is converfant about truths capable of proof from reafon. Since then none of the four habits juft

[1] See Analyfis, p. 104, & feq.

mentioned;

mentioned; neither ſcience, nor art, nor prudence, nor wiſdom, can afford thoſe primary principles; and ſince all the habits of the underſtanding are reducible to five, it follows that intellect, operating on experience[k], is the only ſource from which thoſe great and primary truths can be ſuppoſed to flow.

Chap. 7.

Wiſdom.

Wiſdom is ſometimes taken for ſkill in the arts; and applied, for inſtance, to Phidias, who was a ſkilful ſculptor; or Polycleitus, the ſkilful ſtatuary. But there is a wiſdom of a far ſuperior kind, which does not denote excellence in any of thoſe operations or arts to which Homer alludes in ſpeaking of Margites: "The Gods had not formed him for digging or ploughing, nor made him ſkilful in any other work;" but a wiſdom abſolute and univerſal, ſince it relates to the univerſe and its principles; contemplating, not merely, like other ſciences, the qualities or properties of things, but the things themſelves, or ſubſtances[l]; and, therefore, of all ſciences the moſt accurate as well as the moſt ſublime; comprehending both the higheſt demonſtrations and the vindication of thoſe primary truths, on which all demonſtration is built[m]. To ſay that prudence is more valuable than wiſdom, is to prefer man to all other beings in the univerſe. One thing may be ſalutary and good for human kind; and another for fiſhes: but abſtract quali-

[k] See Analyſis, p. 64. Comp. p. 161.

[l] Theſe are God and Intellect,—the beſt ſubſtances, ἐν ουσιᾳ μεν, ὁ θεος και ὁ νȣς, &c. Moral. Eudem. l. i. c. viii. p. 201.

[m] See above, Analyſis, p. 98, & ſeq.

 ties

BOOK VI.

ties remain perpetually the ſame; and in like manner wiſdom is permanent and ſtable, but prudence muſt vary its maxims with each alteration in the ſubjects about which it is converſant. The buſineſs of prudence conſiſts in providing for the good of thoſe peculiarly recommended to its care; and whoever beſt underſtands how to promote the good of each tribe or of each individual, to him we ſhould be moſt inclined to commit their direction and management. Wherefore ſome of the inferior animals ſeem to be endowed with a kind of prudence, in foreſeeing and providing what is neceſſary for the preſervation of their own lives. The unalterable ſtability of wiſdom clearly diſtinguiſhes it from civil policy, which, if it would attain its end, the public good, muſt be guided by circumſtances; and the different tribes of animals require, in health as well as in diſeaſe, different kinds of management, which are reſpectively moſt conducive to their well-being. It will not avail to ſay, that as man is the nobleſt of animals, therefore the virtue of prudence, which is converſant about human happineſs, merits the preference to every other[m]; for that there are many natures more divine

[m] According to Ariſtotle, prudence is, as it were, wiſdom's ſteward, holding a delegated authority in leſſer concerns, that the maſter may have leiſure for more important purſuits: ἡ φρονησις ὡσπερ επιτροπος τις. εστι της σοφιας, και παρασκευαζει ταυτῃ σχολην, και το ποιειν της αυτȣ εργον. Magn. Moral. l. i. c. xxxv. p. 172. Theſe more important purſuits conſiſt in ſpeculations concerning God; in meditating on, and worſhipping him: ει τις δε η δι' ενδειαν, η δι υπερβολην κωλυει τον θεον θεραπευειν και θεωρειν, αυτη δε φαυλη. Moral. Eudem. c. xv. p. 291. This employment is the chief end of man; the natural exerciſe of his nobleſt faculties; ȣτος της ψυχης ὁ ορος αριστος,

divine than man, is attested by those glorious luminaries, and that beautiful arrangement which adorns the universe. Wisdom, then, comprehends both intellect and science, applied to the highest purposes, the discovery of the most valuable truths. Wherefore we call Thales, Anaxagoras, and others of their character, wise, indeed, but surely not prudent, since they manifestly neglect their private concerns and personal advantage, and apply their thoughts to the investigation of subjects as lofty and difficult as they are completely useless for the ordinary purposes of human life. But the virtue of prudence is directed solely to these purposes; and he is justly deemed the most prudent, whose advice is most conducive to public prosperity. This great object is not to be attained by abstract speculations. Prudence must be conversant about particulars; for all practice relates to particulars only; wherefore many men, ignorant of theory, are more useful than those acquainted with it; for instance, empirics, than physicians[a]. What avails it to know that light food is salutary, unless we also know, for instance, that the flesh of birds is light? Prudence, being a practical virtue, essentially includes the knowledge of

αριστος, τα ἡκιστα αισθανεσθαι τε αλλε μερες της ψυχης, ἡ τουτον. The less we are disturbed by bodily passions, or harassed by worldly cares, the more likely we are to approach to this ultimate term of mental enjoyment. Idem ibid. Religion cannot be eradicated from the mind, unless the understanding be destroyed: μηδε τες θεες φοβεισθαι εκ ανδρειος, αλλα μαινομενος. Magna Moral. c. v. p. 151.

[a] That is, those guided in their practice by experience are more useful than those guided in it by the general rules of physical science.

BOOK VI. Chap. 8.

particulars. Yet even here general and superintending principles are not without their use.

Policy, general and particular.

Prudence and policy are the same habits, but applied to different subjects. Policy is general or particular: the general consists in legislation; the particular, in deliberations and decrees; for as decrees apply general principles to particular cases, they immediately precede execution; and therefore those who busy themselves about decrees, in proposing or procuring them, are peculiarly considered as workmen in the trade of politics. Prudence chiefly relates to the management of our private affairs, and while confined to this purpose preserves its proper name; but when our prudence extends to the affairs of others, it is called œconomics, legislation, politics; which last is either deliberative or judicial. Yet politics is sometimes contrasted with prudence; too much concern about other people's affairs seeming unfavourable to our own happiness. Wherefore Euripides says, in the person of Philoctetes,

> "How can the name of wise to me belong
> Who might have mingled in the martial throng,
> Unvex'd with business and exempt from care,
> Taking of spoils my honourable share;
> Yet chose by over anxious thoughts to move
> The direful hate of all commanding Jove?"

But a prudential regard to our own interest requires, perhaps, that we should not be regardless of politics, since our own good is involved in that of the Public; and many are extremely ill fitted to provide even for their own. Young persons

persons may become good geometers, and render themselves skilful in the arts depending on the mathematical sciences. But it is scarcely possible for a youth to have the virtue of prudence, because this virtue is conversant about particulars, the real knowledge of which requires repeated observation and long experience. He may rehearse wise maxims, but he will not feel their importance, or discern their truth. The mathematics, besides, are conversant merely about abstractions formed by ourselves; the notions of which are clear and precise. But the knowledge of nature, and of those causes through which nature subsists, is far more complicated, requiring continually the assistance of that experience in which it originates: and in reasoning on such subjects, errors may arise from mistaking either the general or the particular proposition; for example, that all heavy waters are bad, or that this water is heavy. Prudence is manifestly different from science; being the perception of those particular and practical truths which admit not of demonstration; whereas intellect is employed about those general and primary principles which require not any proof. In the chain of mental faculties, intellect and prudence then form the two extreme links; prudence holding the extreme of individuality, and intellect that of generalization. Prudence then may be called common sense, since it is conversant about objects of sense; but in a manner specifically different from that in which the external senses are re-

BOOK VI. Chap. 9.

refpectively converfant about their particular objects.[o]

Prudence implies deliberation, which word has a lefs extenfive meaning than inveftigation, becaufe deliberation is that fpecies of inveftigation which relates to the practical concerns of life. It is not fcience, nor opinion, nor conjecture; not fcience, becaufe no one deliberates about that which admits of demonftrable proof: not conjecture or gueffing, becaufe thefe are quick and rapid, but deliberation is a work of time; and it is a common maxim, that we ought to be prompt in execution, but flow in deliberation. Deliberation is not prefence of mind, any more than happinefs of conjecture; it is not fcience, which cannot err; nor opinion, the rectitude of which confifts in truth, whereas that of deliberation confifts in utility; fince wrong deliberations are hurtful. Befides, every opinion is a propofition either affirmative or negative; whereas deliberation neither affirms nor denies, but inveftigates and inquires. Good deliberation is rectitude of counfel; but, as rectitude is taken in different fenfes, it is not every kind of rectitude, particularly it is not that by which an intemperate or bad man may contrive right means for attaining his wicked ends. His right deliberations terminate in real mifchief; whereas good deliberation naturally terminates

[o] The obfcurity of this paffage derives not any illuftration from comparing the perceptions of prudence with thofe of the geometer, who fees that all mathematical figures may be refolved into triangles; a comparifon thrown into the text from an early Greek commentator.

in ſolid advantage. This, however, may ſometimes be attained without good deliberation, ſince a right concluſion is ſometimes inferred from wrong premiſes. Good deliberation alſo muſt be ſeaſonable: its reſult muſt be drawn at a right time, muſt proceed from right premiſes, and muſt terminate in ſome valuable attainment, whether that be happineſs in general, or ſomething thereto conducive. *Good counſel*, then, conſiſts in diſcovering proper means for attaining thoſe ends which prudence approves as worthy objects of purſuit.

Chap. 10.

Quickneſs of apprehenſion.

There is a readineſs of apprehenſion in ſome men, which makes them be diſtinguiſhed as intelligent; while others are equally remarkable for their ſlowneſs and ſtupidity. This quickneſs of thought, or acuteneſs in deciſion, is ſomething quite different from ſcience or opinion, ſince all men are capable of learning ſciences and forming opinions; nor does it belong to any ſcience in particular, as phyſic, which is converſant about health, or geometry, which is converſant about magnitude; nor does its proper ſubject conſiſt in things which happen caſually, or in thoſe which are unalterable and eternal; but it is moſt conſpicuous in thoſe things which are matters of deliberation and doubt. It is converſant, then, about the ſame ſubject with prudence, though not preciſely in the ſame manner; for prudence ſpeaks with a voice of authority, commanding one action and prohibiting another; but the intellectual excellence, now under conſideration, is rather critical than

BOOK VI.

than commanding; it does not govern and regulate our actions, but enables us to underſtand the regulations which prudence preſcribes; and follows the dictates of this ſovereign virtue, as an intelligent youth eaſily goes along with and apprehends the leſſons of his teacher.

Chap. II.

Juſtneſs of ſentiment.

That juſtneſs of ſentiment by which ſome men render themſelves ſo commendable, is nothing more than a nice diſcernment of the virtue which we called equity; in proof of which it may be obſerved, that thoſe who are moſt equitable in their tranſactions, are alſo the moſt diſtinguiſhed by their fellow-feeling with others, and the moſt inclinable to excuſe their pardonable errors. Pardon is nothing more than an equitable deciſion; that is, indulgence flowing from right reaſon. The intellectual habits above deſcribed, readineſs of apprehenſion, juſtneſs of ſentiment, prudence, intelligence, or common ſenſe, are all of them converſant about the ſame objects, and all of them conſpire to the ſame great end of making men behave well in the practical concerns of life. Theſe concerns are all of them particular, depending on time and circumſtances; and the habits that have reference to them, muſt therefore be different from thoſe which are converſant about general and abſtract truth. In practical matters, prudence regulates and commands, ſentiment criticiſes and approves, and intelligence, or common ſenſe, operating on obſervation and experience, furniſhes thoſe firſt principles which are equally eſſential to the due ſelection of ends, and the

proper

proper adjuftment of means. As thefe firft principles fpring up in the mind, without teaching or reafoning, merely from obfervation and experience, they feem to be the gift of nature; and juftnefs of fentiment, as well as the other virtues depending on them, feem alfo to be natural, and to belong to men at a certain period of life, who feem then naturally to attain underftanding and fentiment; whereas art, fcience, or wifdom, (as above explained,) never feem to grow up naturally, but always to be the work of application and ftudy. Common fenfe[w], then, that is, intellect operating on experience, being the ultimate judge of whatever is practically good, we ought to refpect the opinions of old and prudent men, not lefs than demonftration itfelf; becaufe they fee with the eye of experience, which alone can difcern right principles of conduct. Such, then, is the nature of prudence in contradiftinction to that of wifdom; virtues which are converfant about different objects, and which refpectively belong to different faculties of the foul.

Chap. 12. The value of the intellectual virtues, how to be eftimated.

Doubts may arife in what refpect thefe intellectual virtues are ufeful; for wifdom, as above explained, has not any reference to mutable and material things, and therefore feems not to have any tendency to promote human happinefs. Prudence, indeed, is converfant about worldly affairs; but wherein confifts its utility, fince it

[w] The word νους is ufed familiarly in Englifh in the fame fenfe in which it is here employed by Ariftotle.

only

only deliberates concerning honourable, juſt, and other actions conducive to happineſs, which a virtuous man has learned to practiſe? If virtue be a habit, how is it to be improved by the reflections of prudence? Perſons poſſeſſed of health or ſtrength would not be more ſtrong or more healthy, though endowed with the ſkill of phyſicians and maſters of exerciſes. But prudence, it will be ſaid, though not neceſſary for the practice, is uſeful to the acquiſition, of virtue. Is ſkill in phyſic neceſſary or uſeful to the acquiſition of health? If this were the caſe, we ought, when ſick, to ſtudy phyſic, inſtead of calling a phyſician. Beſides theſe doubts, it is not eaſy to determine the relative value of wiſdom and prudence; and why the latter, which is inferior in dignity, ſhould preſcribe rules for the exerciſe of the former. Having propoſed theſe difficulties, it is our duty, if poſſible, to ſolve them. Firſt of all, wiſdom and prudence, though they terminated not in any diſtinct and ſeparate end, would be things highly deſirable in themſelves, ſince they are reſpectively the virtues of two mental faculties. But they are productive cauſes of human happineſs, not indeed as phyſic is the cauſe of health, but as health itſelf is the cauſe of a healthy habit. The great buſineſs of human life is performed by the co-operation of prudence with moral virtue. The latter makes us purſue right ends; and the former makes us employ fit means for attaining them. To that power of the ſoul, which diſcovers itſelf in the growth and nutrition of

of the body, no ſuch ſpontaneous function belongs; ſince its operations are carried on altogether independently of our own wills; and it is entirely beſide our power to accelerate or retard them. As to the doubt whether prudence contributes to the practice of juſt and honourable actions, it will be beſt ſolved by tracing thoſe actions to their real ſource. Acts of virtue, in general, may be performed by thoſe who are not virtuous men, involuntarily, ignorantly, through fear of the law, or through any other motive which does not imply the habitual love of virtue, and the deliberate preference of it merely for its own ſake. This habit, then, makes our ends right and good; but how to attain thoſe ends, is the work, not of moral virtue, but of another principle. There is a power of the mind, call it cleverneſs, keenneſs, or ſagacity, of which the nature conſiſts in enabling us to accompliſh our purpoſes; and which, when the purpoſes are good, is praiſeworthy; when they are bad, this cleverneſs changes its name, being juſtly reproached as villainy. Prudence, though not the ſame thing, (ſince a villain cannot be called prudent,) yet requires for its foundation this natural dexterity, which is determined to the ſide of honour and propriety by habitual acts of virtue. For reaſonings alone cannot ſupply correct principles of conduct. The ends beſt to be purſued, appear ſuch to good men only. Vice diſtorts the judgment; and even in men of naturally keen minds, produces the greateſt practical errors: wherefore

Their utility in practice.

BOOK VI. Chap. 13.

fore it is impoſſible to be prudent without being morally virtuous.

Natural virtue different from virtue properly ſo called.

It is neceſſary to ſpeak farther of virtue; for, as natural ſagacity, though ſimilar, is not the ſame with prudence, ſo natural virtue, though ſimilar, is not the ſame with virtue properly ſo called. Our capacities and diſpoſitions are the work of nature; and therefore, in ſome ſort, our morals are ſo likewiſe; men being born with propenſities to juſtice, temperance, and fortitude. But this natural aptitude is not the virtue of which we are in queſt. Strong natural propenſities, and ſtriking differences of manners, appear in children, and even in wild beaſts; and this native vigour, being unenlightened by reaſon, has a tendency to do much miſchief, like the irregular motions of giants when deprived of their eye-ſight. But when the intellectual eye opens, and affection is diſciplined by reaſon, then that moral virtue diſplays itſelf, which bears the ſame relation to the natural, which prudence bears to that doubtful quality above mentioned, which, though ſomewhat reſembling it, is yet ſpecifically different. As virtue properly ſo called implies prudence, ſome have reſolved all the virtues into modifications, of this intellectual excellence. Socrates did this; ſaying, rightly, that none of the virtues could ſubſiſt without prudence; which is nothing elſe but right reaſon, (which all philoſophers now add to the definition of virtue,) applied to the ſubject of morals; but he erred in thinking that the whole of moral rectitude depended ſolely on the

the underftanding, and in calling the virtues fciences. Virtuous men, indeed, muft act, not only according to right reafon, but with right reafon; that is, the right reafon which regulates their conduct, muft be a principle in themfelves. The virtues, then, though not fciences, cannot fubfift without that principle of reafon from which all the fciences fpring; in other words, prudence is requifite for conftituting the character of the truly good man. The queftion therefore may be anfwered, whether the virtues can exift feparately. It fhould feem that they may; becaufe the fame perfon not being born with equal aptitude to them all, he may poffefs fome of them, though greatly deficient in others. This indeed is true with regard to the natural virtues; but with regard to thofe which conftitute the character of the truly good man, it is impoffible; for none fuch can be exercifed without prudence, and with this fingle intellectual excellence, all the moral virtues neceffarily coexift; fince prudence not only fhews us how beft to obtain our ends, but always implies that the ends themfelves are good. Yet prudence, extenfive and dignified as is its function, ought not to be preferred to wifdom, which is converfant about ftill higher fubjects, and is the virtue of a nobler faculty[x]. Phyfic is not better than health; though it prefcribes rules by which health may be attained[y]. To fet prudence

[x] See above, p. 393.

[y] The art of phyfic does not make ufe of health, it only contrives how health may be preferved or reftored. It is for the fake of health, and therefore lefs valuable. See above, p. 240, & feq.

above

above wisdom, is the same absurdity as to set policy above the Gods; because policy regulates the national religion, as well as all other public concerns.[a]

[a] The intellectual virtues are treated of more briefly in the last chapters of the first, and first chapters of the second Book of the work intituled Magna Moralia; and in the fifth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK VII.

INTRODUCTION.

HAVING examined the virtues and vices, ſtrictly ſo called, the author proceeds to habits which, though often confounded with them, are yet eſſentially different; namely, ſelf-command, and its oppoſite, incontinency; heroic virtue, and its oppoſite, beaſtly depravity; which ſometimes ſhews itſelf in ſavageneſs and ferocity, and ſometimes in unnatural perverſions of the concupiſcible appètites. There is not any ſyſtem of Ethics that accounts ſo fully and ſo clearly for the important diſtinction between weakneſs and wickedneſs, as is done in this Seventh Book.

BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

Vice. — Weakneſs. — Ferocity. — Self-command, and its contrary. — Unnatural depravities, different from vices. — Voluptuouſneſs more deteſtable than iraſcibility — Reaſons of this. — Intemperance and incontinency — Their difference.

BOOK VII. Chap. I.

In morals three things to be avoided.

WE now proceed, making a new diviſion, to obſerve, that in morals three things ought to be avoided; vice, weakneſs, and ferocity: the oppoſites to the two firſt are manifeſt, namely, virtue and ſelf-command; and to the third, we may ſet in oppoſition a virtue more than human, ſomething heroic and divine, ſuch as Homer makes Priam aſcribe to Hector;

> "And laſt great Hector, more than man divine,
> For ſure he ſeemed not of terreſtrial line."[a]

Ferocity, and its oppoſites.

So that, ſhould we believe what is ſaid of the deification of illuſtrious men, their pre-eminent worth might be properly oppoſed to ſavageneſs and ferocity: for virtue belongs not to gods, any more than vice to beaſts; the excellencies of gods are above virtue, and the depravities of beaſts are ſpecifically different from vice. The Lacedæmonians, when they admire any one exceedingly, ſay, "you are a divine man;"

[a] Iliad, b. xxiv. v. 223, & ſeq.

but

but as ſuch men are ſeldom to be met with, ſo beaſtly depravities are ſeldom to be found in the human race; they occur rarely, and chiefly among Barbarians. They are ſometimes produced by diſeaſes or wounds; and the exceſſes of human vice are reproached as beaſtly. But concerning ſuch enormous depravities, we ſhall afterwards have occaſion to ſpeak; and we have already conſidered vice properly ſo called. It remains, therefore, that we now treat of incontinency, and its oppoſite, ſelf-command; which ſeem not to be entirely the ſame with the habits of vice and virtue, nor yet altogether different from them. We ſhall firſt mention the prevailing opinions on this ſubject, and next ſtate our own doubts: when difficulties are removed, and probabilities eſtabliſhed, the theory will be ſufficiently correct for all practical purpoſes. Firmneſs and ſelf-command appear then to be reſpectable and praiſeworthy habits; and their contraries, weakneſs and yielding ſoftneſs, appear to be, in the ſame proportion, both blameable and contemptible. The man of ſelf-command is ſteady to the deciſions of his reaſon; the weak man is eaſily moved from them. The latter, knowing that his actions are bad, yet commits them through paſſion; the former, knowing that his appetites are bad, yet reſtrains them through reaſon. Some confound ſelf-command with temperance, and the want of it with intemperance; others think that thoſe habits are widely different from each other. Prudence appears to ſome to be totally incom-

 patible

BOOK VII.

patible with the want of ſelf-command; others think, that men, highly diſtinguiſhed by their prudence and abilities, are often extremely deficient in this particular. A man is ſaid to loſe the command of himſelf, and to be maſtered, not only by pleaſure, but by anger, honour, and gain. Such are the prevailing opinions on this ſubject.[b]

Chap. 2.

Concerning ſelf-command, and its contrary.

It ſeems difficult to explain how a man, who entertains juſt conceptions of things, ſhould voluntarily reſign his independence; and how he who, as Socrates obſerved, has ſcience to direct him, ſhould allow himſelf to be domineered over by inferior principles, and dragged in captivity like a ſlave. Socrates, indeed, maintained, that this could not happen to him who poſſeſſed real ſcience, and that none acted amiſs but through ignorance only. But this opinion is manifeſtly at variance with the phænomena; for if paſſion were cauſed by ignorance, the ignorance ought to precede the paſſion, which is plainly not the caſe; for the man who errs through want of ſelf-command, only does ſo when ſtimulated by paſſion; well knowing, before his paſſion is excited, that the actions to which it moves him are wrong. Some philoſophers maintain that none can err againſt demonſtrative knowledge, but that many daily err againſt that which is only probable; and that the love of pleaſure, though it cannot prevail

[b] The ſubjects treated in this Book are explained nearly in the ſame words in the ſixth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus.

over

Difficulties concerning this quality.

over ſcience ſtrictly ſo called, may yet be too ſtrong for opinion. But if opinion merely, that is a faint and wavering impreſſion of truth, is the only power that makes reſiſtance to the ſtrength of appetite, it is not wonderful that the latter ſhould obtain the victory; nor ought thoſe to be blamed, in whom the ſtronger principle prevails. But this does not really happen; for men are highly blamed for indulging their corrupt appetites. If neither ſcience nor opinion can take part in this mental conflict, prudence remains as the only antagoniſt. But this is abſurd; for to be wanting in ſelf-command is incompatible with the poſſeſſion of prudence; a prudent man will not voluntarily commit bad actions; and prudence, as we have above ſhewn, is a practical principle, implying the exiſtence of all other virtues[c]. Self-command ſuppoſes the preſence of ſtrong paſſions, and thoſe blameable either in their nature or in their degree: if they were not blameable, they ought not to be reſiſted; and if they were not ſtrong, there would be little praiſe in reſiſting them. Temperance, as above explained, is inconſiſtent with the preſence of any ſuch paſſions. Temperance and ſelf-command cannot therefore belong to the ſame character. If ſelf-command implied an immoveable adherence to every concluſion of the underſtanding, it would, when this concluſion happened to be falſe, be nothing better than obſtinacy; and if the imperfection oppoſite to

[c] See p. 414.

ſelf-command conſiſted in eaſily departing from certain opinions or reſolutions, it would ſometimes be a very reſpectable quality; as in the caſe of Neoptolemus, who is repreſented in Sophocles' tragedy as eaſily departing from the reſolution which he had taken, by the advice of Ulyſſes, becauſe he could not bear to tell a lie; and thoſe who, having once yielded to the ſeductions of ſophiſtry, continue pertinaciouſly to adhere to them, are ſurely not commendable on that account. Great weakneſs of reſolution, when accompanied with great ſtupidity, might ſometimes be a virtue; becauſe through extreme irreſolution, a man might be tempted to do directly the reverſe of what he fooliſhly intended. Beſides, he who led a life of voluptuouſneſs through deliberate choice, and on conviction of its being the beſt kind of life that he could purſue, would not be in a condition ſo totally hopeleſs, as he who followed the ſame plan through want of ſelf-command, in direct oppoſition to the dictates of his own reaſon. The former, having been corrupted by argument, might alſo by argument be reformed; but the latter, reſiſting the perſuaſion of his own mind, would be totally incurable; and obnoxious to the proverb,

"Of drinking ſtill, e'en when the water chok'd."

Beſides, wherein does ſelf-command, and the weakneſs oppoſite to it, properly conſiſt? Are the objects to which theſe habits relate, limited to a certain claſs? Such are the doubts of which

which we muſt endeavour to find the probable ſolution.

BOOK VII. Chap. 3. Whether perſons deficient in ſelf-command err knowingly.

We proceed firſt to examine whether a man gives up the command of himſelf knowingly; and, if ſo, how that can happen: we ſhall alſo inquire, whether ſelf-command, and the inability to reſtrain our appetites, have a reference to all pleaſures and pains indiſcriminately, or to certain definite kinds of them; and whether it belongs to the ſame habit of mind to reſiſt pleaſure, and to encounter pain; with ſeveral other queſtions naturally connected with the preſent ſpeculation. Does inability to reſtrain our appetites appear in the improper pleaſures that we purſue, or in the improper manner in which we purſue them, or in both theſe united? Self-command, and its oppoſite, incontinency, when taken in the ſtricteſt acceptation, have a reference to the ſame things about which temperance and intemperance were formerly proved to be converſant[d]; but the kind of relation which they bear to theſe things is exceedingly different. The intemperate man obeys his appetites knowingly and deliberately, thinking that he ought always to follow the impulſe of preſent pleaſure; the man, merely weak and incontinent, alſo obeys his appetites, but without thinking that he is thereby acting the part which becomes him. Whether the perceived impropriety of his conduct be the reſult of certain or only probable knowledge, makes not any material alteration;

[d] See above, p. 318, & ſeq.

fince fome opinions, as Heraclitus proves, hold as firm poffeffion of the mind, as if they were conclufions of fcience. But a man is faid to underftand, either when he actually exercifes this faculty, or when he is barely poffeffed of it. It is exceedingly difficult to conceive how he fhould act againft his underftanding in the former cafe, though not at all extraordinary that he fhould do fo in the latter. He may underftand both the general precept, and the particular cafe to which it is applicable; but if he does not actually make the application, his knowledge will not avail him. In practical matters, there are general propofitions which relate to the agent, and others which relate to the object of his action; and each of thefe have particular propofitions which naturally fall under them. A man may be poffeffed of the knowledge of all the general propofitions, and alfo of the knowledge of all the particular ones; and yet, if there be any one of the latter, concerning which his underftanding does not, at the fit moment, exert its operation or energy, it is not wonderful that he fhould fall into the greateft practical errors. This operation or energy is manifeftly fufpended in the cafe of perfons afleep, drunk, or mad; whofe condition nearly refembles that of men under the influence of paffion. Anger and luft plainly alter the bodily frame, and fometimes produce madnefs. Such is the ftate of thofe unable to reftrain their appetites. It is no proof of the contrary, that fuch perfons talk reafonably; for fome madmen will repeat

repeat the verfes and reafonings of Empedocles; and boys may be taught to ftring together demonftrations, although they know not what they fay; for to appropriate truth to ourfelves, it muft be rendered congenial to the mind; which is the work of time. Such perfons no more underftand the conclufions which they pronounce, than comedians feel the paffions which they fictitioufly exhibit. There is alfo a philofophical caufe refulting from the phyfical nature of man, which may explain why he often through paffion acts contrary to the dictates of his underftanding. In all practical morality, there is to be confidered, befides the general precept or propofition, alfo the particular one, which refults from a perception of fenfe. When thefe two propofitions coalefce, there is not merely an affent of the mind, but, in practical matters, action muft immediately and neceffarily enfue. Thus, if the general propofition be, "fweet things are pleafant;" and the particular, "this before me is fweet;" it is neceffary that, unlefs reftrained by fome obftacle or argument, I fhould immediately tafte what is before me. Although the mind, therefore, may have the knowledge of fome general propofition which ought to prevent tafting, yet, if appetite confpires with the two propofitions above mentioned, appetite will, in thofe deftitute of felf-command, be indulged, in oppofition to right reafon; and thefe propofitions will be alleged by them in excufe for their infirmity. They will appear therefore to act licentioufly on argument;

BOOK VII. ment; but, in fact, argument is not in itſelf contrary to right reaſon, but only by way of acceſſion or appendage to appetite, which has the power of moving and changing the whole frame of the body, and thereby diſtorting the intellects. Beaſts, therefore, cannot be blamed for this want of ſelf-command, becauſe they have not any perception of general precepts, their higheſt powers conſiſting in imagination and memory. How men enſlaved by their appetites reſume the exerciſe of their underſtandings, needs not here be explained; this change has nothing in it peculiar; ſince it entirely reſembles what happens to all mankind when they awake from ſleep, or to drunkards, when they recover from a fit of intoxication; ſubjects which belong to the province of the phyſiologiſt. Socrates then ſaid truly, that ſcience, properly ſo called, could not be overcome by appetite, which only diſturbs our perception of particular and practical truths.

Whether incontinency be a ſpecific imperfection, denoting, without any addition to it, infirmities of a peculiar kind, comes next to be inquired. It is manifeſtly converſant about pleaſures and pains; and as pleaſures are either neceſſary, namely, ſuch as are eſſential to the health of the body and the preſervation of the ſpecies; or though not neceſſary, yet in themſelves eligible, ſuch as victory, honour, wealth, and ſuch other external advantages, it is to be remarked that we do not call thoſe incontinent who are too eaſily maſtered by the latter plea-

ſures, and who are inclined to indulge them in a degree not warranted by right reaſon, without adding the particular cauſe or object which overſets them, ſuch as gain, honour, anger. They are incontinent, that is, wanting in ſelf-command, not ſimply and abſolutely, but as to gain, honour, anger; and the definition of incontinency in general no more applies to them, than the general definition of a man to an Olympic victor. It is doubtleſs an imperfection in a man's character that he is actuated by too eager a deſire of honour or of wealth; but incontinency taken abſolutely, is blamed, not merely as an imperfection, but either as general depravity, or at leaſt as a particular vice; which conſiſts in purſuing with too much eagerneſs the pleaſures of the taſte and touch; or in avoiding, ſoftly and weakly, the pains originating in thoſe ſenſes; cold and heat, hunger and thirſt. Continency and incontinency, taken ſimply and ſtrictly, are converſant therefore about preciſely the ſame objects with temperance and intemperance; though the relation which they bear to thoſe objects be extremely different. The intemperate man purſues pleaſure wilfully and deliberately, thinking it always the proper object of his preference; wherefore his intemperance is more odious in proportion to the debility of his deſires; for what exceſſes might he be expected to commit, were he ſtimulated by the warmth of youthful paſſions? Deſires and pleaſures, as we have already explained, are either natural, (of which ſome are even highly reſpec-

respectable and honourable,) or unnatural; or thirdly, they hold an intermediate rank, being natural under certain conditions, and unnatural under others; in which last class we may place the desires of gain, glory, or victory. Desires of the first and last kind do not subject those who gratify them to blame, provided they do not indulge them to excess; so that those who delight in their own honours and advantages, or in the honour and advantage of their parents or children, and take proper means to promote objects naturally so dear to them, are justly respected on this account; although even here, extremes are dangerous; as was exemplified in the case of Niobé, whose pride in her children made her contend with the gods; and in that of Satyrus, surnamed Philopater, whose zeal for the honour of his father proceeded to the extravagance of folly. But such desires, being highly natural in themselves, have nothing in them of wickedness or turpitude, only their excesses being hurtful or useless, ought to be carefully avoided. In indulging such desires beyond the limits prescribed by right reason, we are indeed guilty of an error which ought to be shunned, but which is not culpable, like that want of self-command, properly called incontinence. These errors, bearing some analogy to each other, fall under the common denomination of weakness; but that word, when applied to the one, does not mean the same thing, as when it is applied to the other, any more than the epithet bad, applied to a player or a physician, means the same thing,

thing, as when it is applied to a man. Self-command then, and its oppofite weaknefs, are converfant about the fame fubjects with temperance and intemperance. When the words are applied to other fubjects, they are extended by way of fimile beyond their ftrict acceptation, and therefore other words muft be added to them in order clearly to exprefs our meaning. To fay fimply that a man is wanting in felf-command, denotes that he is liable to be overcome by the feductions of fenfual pleafure, but does not immediately fuggeft to us that he is liable to be overcome by anger, honour, or gain.

Chap. 5.

Unnatural depravities, their difference from vices.

Some things naturally pleafe all animals; others are naturally pleafant only to certain tribes; and a third clafs, though not congenial to any fpecies of animals in their found and natural ftate, are yet agreeable to fome individuals of the fpecies, either through certain bodily defects, through perverfe habits, or through pravity of nature. From this laft kind refult the fierce and beaftly propenfities incident to fome individuals of the human fpecies; witnefs that favage female who delighted in tearing to pieces women with child, and in devouring their young; and thofe Barbarians around Pontus, who feaft, fome of them on raw, others on human flefh, and who make mutual prefents of their children to eke out their horrid entertainments; witnefs alfo the fhocking ftories told of the tyrant Phalaris. Thefe are beaftly depravities, and others, not lefs abominable, are fometimes

times produced through diseases and madness, as was exemplified in that wretch who sacrificed and eat his mother; and in the slave who killed his companion that he might devour his liver. Some persons, through disease or custom, delight in plucking out their hair, in biting off their nails, in eating coals or earth. In nearly the same class, we may place pæderasty. Such depravities, whether originating in natural corruption, custom, or malady, exceed the limits of vice, and cannot be reproached with epithets characteristic of merely human pravity, except by way of metaphor or similitude. Thus he who should fear even the buzzing of a fly, would be degraded by cowardice more than human, and brutish. A man was afflicted with a malady which made him tremble at the sight of a cat; and there are some nations of distant barbarians who have so little use of their reason, and who are so completely guided by their sensations, that they are scarcely distinguishable from brutes. Madness, epilepsy, and other diseases also subject those afflicted by them to strange perversities of desire; and from the same source of rational nature vitiated and changed, either by malady or custom, we see spring those excesses of folly, cowardice, intemperance, and savageness, which transcend the boundaries of merely human wickedness. We may suppose a man stimulated by brutal appetites, and yet restraining them; Phalaris for instance, restraining his desire to eat a boy, or to abuse him as the instrument of an absurd venereal pleasure; and

and it may happen on the other hand, that a monſter in a human ſhape may not only feel ſuch propenſities, but want ſelf-command to reſtrain them. In ſpeaking of men, ſuch abominations cannot be called vices ſimply and properly; they are ſomething worſe: depravities originating in diſeaſe or brutiſhneſs, not ſpringing from the improper indulgence of natural appetite. It is manifeſt then, that ſelf-command and weakneſs, continency and incontinency, are converſant about the ſame ſubjects with temperance and intemperance, and that there is another ſpecies of continency, ſo called metaphorically, though converſant about different objects.

Chap. 6.

Reaſons why voluptuouſneſs is more deteſtable than iraſcibility.

Incontinency of anger appears a leſſer deformity than incontinency as to pleaſure. The reaſons of this are, that anger ſeems to liſten to reaſon, though it does not hear it diſtinctly; like officious ſervants, who before they have received their orders fully, are in too great a hurry to execute them, and therefore often do it wrong; and dogs which bark at the leaſt noiſe, before they know whether it proceeds from a friend or an enemy. In the ſame manner anger, without waiting for reaſon's laſt commands, is precipitated through the warmth and quickneſs of its nature, into over-haſty acts of inconſiderate vengeance; concluding, at every real or ſuppoſed inſult, that the author of it is worthy of indignation and puniſhment. The concluſions of anger are indeed often erroneous; but ſenſuality, without ſtopping to draw any concluſions

at

BOOK VII. at all, at the firſt proſpect of pleaſure, ruſhes to enjoyment; it is therefore the more degrading imperfection of the two, ſince the ſenſualiſt yields to mere appetite, whereas the angry man is led aſtray by the appearance at leaſt of reaſon. Beſides this, it is to be obſerved, that all our faults ſeem to be more or leſs entitled to indulgence and pardon, in proportion as they are more or leſs natural, or more or leſs common. But tranſports of anger are far more natural than exceſſes in criminal pleaſure: the former ſeem to be congenial to ſome races of men; as in the family of him who apologized for beating his father by ſaying, that *he* beat my grandfather, and my grandfather, the father before him; and this little boy, pointing to his ſon will beat me when he is able; the fault runs in our blood. Another, when dragged by his ſon to the door, deſired him to ſtop there, becauſe he had only dragged his own father thither. Anger beſides is open and undeſigning; but the paſſion of voluptuouſneſs is artful, and therefore unjuſt. The ceſtus of Venus is pregnant with wiles.

> "In this was every art and every charm
> To win the wiſeſt and the coldeſt warm;
> Fond love, the gentle vow, the gay deſire,
> The kind deceit, the ſtill reviving fire,
> Perſuaſive ſpeech and more perſuaſive ſighs,
> Silence that ſpoke, and eloquence of eyes."*

The incontinency of voluptuouſneſs is therefore worſe than that of anger; ſince it more

* Iliad, xiv. v. 247, & ſeq.

nearly

nearly approaches to deliberate wickedneſs. It may be obſerved to the ſame purpoſe, that no perſon while afflicted with pain is addicted to inſolence; for to inſult is attended with pleaſure, but anger is always accompanied with pain; wherefore inſolence, which is of all things the moſt provoking, is incompatible with anger. The different kinds of incontinency have now been ſufficiently explained, the human, the brutiſh, and that originating in diſeaſe; the firſt kind only is converſant about the ſame objects with the vice of intemperance; a thing never aſcribed to brutes, except metaphorically, or comparatively; when any claſs of animals is remarked as peculiarly obnoxious for its luſt, voracity, or miſchief. For brutes, being incapable of deliberation and election, cannot be deformed by vice ſtrictly ſo called; their ferocity, how formidable ſoever it may be, is a leſs evil than human vice; ſince they are deſtitute of that beſt principle of man, which, by corruption, becomes the worſt; and bad effects flowing from a principle, are thereby rendered more dangerous. A bad man is capable of doing ten thouſand times more miſchief than a beaſt.

Chap. 7.

With reſpect to the pleaſures and pains of the touch and taſte, which it falls within the province of temperance to regulate, we may be ſo conſtituted as either to conquer thoſe by which the greater part of mankind are ſubdued, or to be conquered by thoſe over which the greater part are victorious. The terms, ſelf-command, or continency, and its oppoſite, incontinency,

BOOK VII. are moſt properly applied in ſpeaking of pleaſures; the terms, firmneſs and ſoftneſs, are reſpectively moſt applicable to thoſe who ſhew more than an ordinary ſtrength of mind in reſiſting pain, or more than an ordinary weakneſs in yielding to this adverſary. The greater proportion of mankind float between the oppoſite extremes of firmneſs and ſoftneſs, continency and incontinency; verging, however, for the moſt part, rather to the imperfections of incontinency and ſoftneſs. Since ſome pleaſures are altogether unneceſſary, and of theſe which are neceſſary, the exceſſes are carefully to be ſhunned, he who purſues unneceſſary or immoderate pleaſures, with deliberate election, and merely for their own ſake, is guilty of intemperance; a vice the more incurable, becauſe thoſe who harbour it are not liable to repentance. The vice oppoſite to intemperance conſiſts in rejecting, through inſenſibility, even neceſſary or commendable pleaſures: the virtue of temperance lies in the middle between theſe blameable extremes. With regard to bodily pains, a man may fly from and avoid, even thoſe which ought to be encountered, either through deliberate election, or through mere weakneſs and infirmity of nature; and as one perſon is led captive by pleaſure, another may be overcome by the painful irritation of deſire. Bad actions are aggravated, when they are committed without impulſe from any violent paſſion. To ſtrike in anger is an extenuation of the aſſault; and, in like manner, baſe actions, done without tempta-

tion, are rendered ſtill baſer; for, in what ſhameful exceſſes would he who commits them be likely to indulge, were he ſtimulated by fierce deſires and headſtrong appetites? Intemperance, then, properly ſo called, is more odious than that weakneſs which we have called incontinency; and continency, which enables us to conquer pleaſures, is preferable to that reſiſting firmneſs, which merely prevents us from being ſubdued by pain. Softneſs, or effeminacy, conſiſts in yielding to ſlight pains; and is illuſtrated in him who trails his flowing garments on the ground, rather than ſubmit to the paltry exertion of tucking them up; thus exhibiting, without neceſſity, a picture of diſeaſe and infirmity, and thinking that there is no miſery in reſembling the miſerable. That a man ſhould be overcome by great pleaſures or great pains, is not a matter of wonder; and his defeat is entitled to pardon, provided his reſiſtance has been vigorous; as is exemplified in the Philoctetes of Theodectes, when bit by the ſnake, and in the character of Cercyon in Cercinus' play of Alopè. The burſts of agoniſing pain are as natural on ſuch occaſions as thoſe of laughter, when long and earneſtly ſuppreſſed; an inſtance of which was ſeen in Zenophantus. But a man is truly contemptible, when he ſoftly yields to ſlight and inconſiderable ſufferings, unleſs this happens through diſeaſe, or through ſome natural infirmity in his race. In the kings of Perſia, effeminacy is hereditary; and manly firmneſs is not expected in women. A playful character is more allied to ſoftneſs than to intemperance;

 for

for playfulneſs is the repoſe and relaxation of the mind. The want of ſelf-command originates, either in raſhneſs or in debility. Weak men deliberate, but want ſtrength of mind to perſevere in their reſolutions; raſh men are hurried away by paſſion, without deliberating at all. Our own preparations and exertions have great power over even our bodily feelings; a man may accuſtom himſelf to bear tickling without ſuffering the uneaſy ſenſation which it excites; and, in the ſame manner, by calling up pains and pleaſures to the mind, by rendering them objects of perception and examination, and moderating by reaſon the affections which they naturally ſtir up in us, we may acquire the power of reſiſting and conquering theſe formidable enemies, whenever we are obliged actually to contend with them in real life. Men of quick tempers, and thoſe diſordered by melancholy, are peculiarly deficient in ſelf-command; the former, through their mobility; and the latter, through that vehemence and impetuoſity which renders them ſlaves to their fancies, how wild ſoever they may be.

Chap. 8. He that is properly intemperate, is not given to repentance; becauſe, acting with deliberate election, he remains firm in his perverſe purpoſes. He, on the other hand, who ſees the right path, but, through weakneſs of character, does not purſue it, is liable to repent of his miſconduct. His faults therefore are curable[f];

[f] Ariſtotle ſays, "contrary to what was ſtated in our doubts;" he doubted how a man who knowingly erred, could ever be cured of his errors. See above, p. 422.

and

and the mental malady under which he labours, resembles rather the epilepsy, which comes by fits, than the consumption or dropsy, which are unremitting and continual. His weakness, indeed, is specifically different from vice; for the latter can conceal itself, and even assume the mask of virtue; but the former is always undisguised and open. This infirmity of nature is the less inexcusable in proportion to the strength of passion, and the total absence of reflection; and the persons disgraced by it resemble those who are speedily intoxicated by such a small quantity of wine as would produce no perceptible effects on ordinary constitutions. Yet mere weakness of character is attended with as bad consequences as vice itself; and is chargeable with the reproach which Demodocus made to the Milesians, that though they were not a stupid people, yet they acted stupidly. In like manner, the weak man acts viciously; but does not, like the intemperate man, give a deliberate preference to vice. His mind, therefore, is still open to persuasion, and his life capable of reformation, since his character is not so totally depraved as to make vice his end and aim. In the affairs of life, this end and aim forms a practical principle, which cannot be taught any more than the axioms and postulates of geometry; and the perception of which results entirely from virtue, either natural or acquired. The temperate man pursues right ends, from which he feels no inclination to deviate; the character of the intemperate man is directly the reverse. Between these two, an interme-

BOOK VII.

diate place is held by him, who is hurried into bad actions by the impetuous ſtrength of paſſion; but whoſe mind is not ſo totally vitiated as to make the gratification of ſenſual appetites the deliberate object of his purſuit. Perſons of this deſcription do bad actions; but as the principle of action itſelf, which is the main thing, ſtill remains ſound, their condition is not hopeleſs. They are indeed better than thoſe who are intemperate on principle; but ſtill they are the objects of great diſapprobation; whereas thoſe who, though liable to be moved by corrupt deſires, have yet ſufficient ſtrength of mind to reſtrain and curb them, are held praiſeworthy; notwithſtanding their characters fall far ſhort of that perfect temperance, with which no improper deſire is compatible.

Chap. 9.

Difference between incontinency and intemperance is that between weakneſs and wickedneſs.

That firmneſs of mind called continency, implies a reſolute adherence to right opinions in oppoſition to the ſeductions of appetite: it is totally different from obſtinacy, which often yields to paſſion, but perverſely reſiſts the dictates of reaſon. Obſtinacy bears the ſame analogy to true firmneſs, that prodigality bears to liberality; and raſhneſs to courage. It is inſeparably connected with ſelf-conceit, ignorance, and clowniſhneſs. An obſtinate man takes pleaſure in reſiſting conviction; victory, not truth, is his aim; and, as if his opinions were laws, he is mortified and provoked by their rejection or reverſal. His character, therefore, ſo far from implying firmneſs and ſelf-command, is rather a-kin to incontinency; ſince he is diverted from propriety of thought and action, by the

the allurements of falſe pleaſure. A man may want ſtedfaſtneſs in his purpoſes, without being chargeable with incontinency or weakneſs. Of this we have an example in the character of Neoptolemus in Sophocles' Philoctetes. Pleaſure made that young hero change his reſolution; but an honourable pleaſure, the love of truth, after he had been perſuaded by Ulyſſes to conſent to be made an accomplice in falſehood; for incontinency and intemperance do not originate in pleaſure ſimply and abſolutely, but in that kind of ſenſual pleaſure which is blameable and baſe. Men, as we have ſaid before, may be diverted from propriety of conduct by being too little, as well as by being too much affected by bodily pleaſures. Both extremes are bad; but as the former is obſerved in few perſons, and on few occaſions, it is not diſtinguiſhed by a name; and the praiſeworthy habit of continency is contraſted with that blameable diſpoſition which conſiſts in being too ſtrongly affected with the deſire of ſenſual gratifications. Temperance and ſelf-command are in common diſcourſe often confounded, from the reſemblance which they bear to each other; but the man deſerving the praiſe of true temperance is above ſelf-command, becauſe his character is ſuch, that he could not derive any enjoyment from baſe or blameable pleaſures. The man endowed with continency or ſelf-command, reſiſts, indeed, and overcomes ſuch pleaſures; but ſtill to him they ſeem to be pleaſures, and he occaſionally feels an inclination to enjoy them. In like manner, intem-

BOOK VII.

intemperance and incontinency are often confounded, for both lead to the same voluptuous kind of life; but the former prefers pleasure on principle; the latter pursues it against principle.

Chap. 10.

Additional proofs thereof.

Men deficient in self-command may have cleverness, but cannot have prudence; which latter is a practical principle, implying not only that we know, but that we do, what is right. In reference to the understanding, wit or cleverness are nearly the same with prudence; but in reference to the will they are very different from it, because prudence always implies a rectitude of moral election; it is therefore absolutely incompatible with the dominion of vicious passions. How such passions should be indulged knowingly, has been explained by shewing that the knowledge of those who indulge in them, is confined to mere speculations which are not applied; that it is knowledge not roused to energy, but lying in a sluggish state of mere capacity, like the knowledge of persons asleep or intoxicated. The incontinent man is only wicked by halves, because he is not wicked on principle; as he acts without design, he is not chargeable with injustice. He either does not deliberate at all; or if he deliberates, is like a state which has good laws, but does not obey them; as Anaxandrides reproached the Athenians,

> "The state consults how to make void the law."

The real profligate, on the other hand, obeys laws, and those bad ones. A man is praised for his

his ſelf-command, when he excels moſt others in this habit; he is blamed for incontinency, when he yields to temptations, to which moſt men are ſuperior. The incontinency of thoſe who deliberate rightly, but have not firmneſs to perſiſt in their reſolutions, is more curable than that originating in melancholy; which, through its quickneſs and vehemence, impels thoſe affected by it to act without deliberation: and an incontinency depending on cuſtom, is more curable than that which ſprings from nature. For cuſtom is more moveable than nature; ſince the difficulty of changing the former depends on its reſemblance to the latter.—As the poet Euenus ſays,

> " Habits by long continued care impreſt,
> Are ſtrong as nature in the human breaſt."

Let this much ſuffice for a deſcription of the habits of continency and firmneſs on the one hand; of incontinency and ſoftneſs on the other; and on the relations which thoſe habits bear to each other.[c]

[c] The four chapters which follow in the original of this work, are mere tranſcripts from the Sixth Book of the Ethics to Eudemus; they treat of pleaſure; a ſubject more fully and more philoſophically explained in the Tenth Book of the Ethics to Nicomachus; of which the reader will find the tranſlation in its proper place.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK VIII.

INTRODUCTION TO BOOKS VIII. AND IX.

BOOK VIII.

IN these Books Ariſtotle treats of friendſhip, a ſubject, he obſerves, intimately connected with morals; "ſince friendſhip, if not ſpecifically a virtue, at leaſt ſhines moſt conſpicuouſly in the virtuous." He explains the nature of friendſhip, and reſolves the doubts concerning it. He divides it into different kinds, according to the principles in which it originates; and ſhows how the beſt kind of friendſhip may be acquired, maintained, and uninterruptedly enjoyed. Friendſhips differ, not only according to the ſources from which they ſpring, but according to the condition of the perſons by whom they are cultivated. Our author examines the friendſhips between equals, and the friendſhips of inferiors with the great; he explains the relations which friendſhip bears to juſtice, and how both are modified by political inſtitutions. The rules of friendſhip are not preciſe like thoſe of juſtice,

juſtice, becauſe the ſubject to which they apply is highly indefinite; ſcarcely any two caſes being exactly alike. The author explains what is meant by loving our friends as ourſelves, and wherein true ſelf-love conſiſts, in oppoſition to blameable ſelfiſhneſs. He expatiates on the exquiſite delight of virtuous friendſhip, like a man who (as appears from the hiſtory of his life) had warmly felt its charms. The whole treatiſe, indeed, compriſed in the following two Books, is diſtinguiſhed by juſt ſentiment as much as by ſolid argument; it is equally full and perſpicuous, rejecting paradox, diſdaining declamation, and ſhewing, by an illuſtrious example, how an important moral ſubject may be unfolded with ſcientific accuracy, and impreſſed with practical energy.

BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Utility and beauty of friendſhip.—Qualities by which it is generated.—Three kinds of friendſhip.—Theſe kinds compared.—Characters moſt ſuſceptible of friendſhip.—Unequal friendſhips.—Their limits.—Friendſhips founded on propinquity.

BOOK VIII. Chap. 1.

Utility and beauty of friendſhip.

WE proceed next to treat of friendſhip, which is either a particular virtue, or which at leaſt ſhines moſt conſpicuouſly in the virtuous. It is alſo moſt eſſential to the enjoyment of life, for without friends no one would choofe to live, though poſſeſſed of all other advantages[a]. The rich and powerful ſtand moſt in need of friends, without whom their proſperity could neither be preſerved nor enjoyed; for wherein conſiſts the pre-eminence of power and wealth, but in the pleaſures of beneficence,

[a] Si quis in cœlum adſcendiſſet, naturamque mundi, et pulchritudinem ſiderum perſpexiſſet, inſuavem illam admirationem, &c. "To aſcend to heaven, and behold the nature of the univerſe and the beauty of the ſtars, would afford an admiration barren of delight, unleſs we had ſome one with whom we might talk of thoſe wonders." Cicero de Amicitia, c. 23. Cicero's Treatiſe on Friendſhip abounds with ſparkling paſſages: he has often expanded and embelliſhed Ariſtotle's remarks; but, conſidered as a philoſophical work, it neither ſhews that deep inſight into human nature, nor takes that comprehenſive view of the ſubject, which form the principal merit of the Greek original.

which

which is moſt laudably exerciſed towards friends? And how could this precarious pre-eminence be maintained without the ſteady aſſiſtance of friendly adherents? In poverty and other diſtreſſes, friendſhip ſeems our beſt, or rather our ſole, refuge. It is neceſſary in youth as the preſervative againſt irreparable errors; it is neceſſary in old age, as the conſolation amidſt unavoidable infirmities; it is neceſſary in the vigour of manhood, as the beſt auxiliary in the execution of illuſtrious enterpriſes, both ſharpening our thoughts and animating our exertions.

> "By mutual confidence and mutual aid,
> Great deeds are done and great diſcoveries made:
> The wiſe new prudence from the wiſe acquire,
> And one brave hero fans another's fire."[b]

Friendſhip is implanted by nature in parents towards their children, as appears manifeſtly, not only in the human race, but in the various tribes of birds, and in moſt animals; it prevails alſo among thoſe of the ſame claſs or family, but chiefly among men; whence philanthropy is ſo often the juſt ſubject of praiſe. During long and dreary journeys, the traveller, in every human countenance, beholds the face of a friend; ſuch congenial ſympathy ſubſiſts among the human race! Friendſhip holds mankind together in communities and cities; and lawgivers ſtudy more earneſtly how to promote friendſhip than how to maintain even juſtice

[b] Iliad, X. v. 265, & ſeq.

itſelf;

BOOK VIII.

itſelf; for concord, which is a-kin to friendſhip, is the perpetual aim of all wiſe legiſlation, which unceaſingly ſtrives to extirpate the ſeeds of diſſenſion and ſedition, as of all things the moſt hoſtile to its views. When concord ripens into friendſhip, the rules of juſtice are ſuperfluous, but juſtice without friendſhip is inſufficient for happineſs; and the moſt perfect and moſt comprehenſive juſtice is that which moſt reſembles friendſhip in its operations and effects. Friendſhip unites beauty with utility, it is not only neceſſary but ornamental; we praiſe it as a virtue; we deſire it as adding luſtre to our characters; and to be a good friend ſeems to many ſynonymous with being a good man. Yet various doubts may be ſtarted concerning the nature of friendſhip. Some think that it reſults from ſimilarity of character and purſuits, and cite the vulgar proverb, "that fowls of a feather flock together." Others maintain that this ſimilarity more naturally begets emulation and hatred; quoting from Heſiod,

Doubts concerning the nature of friendſhip.

> "Potters hate potters; bards quarrel with bards."

They ſeek the principles of friendſhip in the high philoſophy of nature, ſaying either with Euripides,

> "The parched earth longs for refreſhing ſhowers;
> The ſkies, heavy with rain, ſeek to unload
> Their weight of waters on the ſolid earth."

or with Heraclitus, "that each nature requires and ſeeks its counterpart:" thus the beſt harmony reſults from differences, and thus all things

things proceed from contrary elements. Other philosophers, particularly Empedocles, assert directly the reverse, "that like draws to like." The consideration of these physical difficulties we at present omit, because they are beside the purpose of this discourse, which is confined to the examination of such questions only as have a reference to life and manners; as whether friendship can subsist among all sorts of persons, or only among the virtuous; whether there are various kinds of friendship specifically different; for those who think there is but one kind, because friendship admits of different degrees of warmth and intensity, trust to a fallacious proof, since other general terms as well as friendship comprehend divisions of things specifically different from each other, and yet partaking more or less, in a stronger or weaker degree, of the characteristic quality which the general term denotes. But of this subject we have formerly treated.[c]

Chap. 2.

The proper objects of friendship, or the qualities by which it is produced.

To illustrate the nature of friendship, we must examine what are the qualities by which it is excited or produced. Whatever is an object of our friendship, must promote either our good, our pleasure, or our utility; and as utility is desirable merely as the cause of what is either good or pleasant, the causes of friendship ultimately resolve themselves into goodness and pleasure; considered, not absolutely in themselves, but in reference to the person in whom the friendship

[c] See Analysis, p. 72, & seq.

is

BOOK VIII. is generated; whether that perſon has juſt notions of what is good and pleaſant, or takes thoſe for *real* goods, which are only *apparent*. The qualities by which friendſhip is excited are not, when abſtractedly conſidered, able to produce this amiable diſpoſition; for that which is an object of friendſhip is loved on its own account; and it is neceſſary that between friends there ſhould ſubſiſt a reciprocity of affection. Things inanimate therefore cannot be the object of friendſhip. A drunkard indeed loves wine; but it would be ridiculous to ſay that he deſires its good, although he indeed wiſhes for its ſafety, that he himſelf may drink it. Mere good-will may ſubſiſt on one ſide, without meeting a return; and perſons who have not any opportunity of being acquainted, may mutually bear to each other much good-will; but friendſhip not only implies a reciprocity of affection, but requires that this reciprocity ſhould be known to both parties.

Chap. 3.

Three kinds of friendſhip.

Friendſhip may be diſtinguiſhed into three kinds, according to the three qualities by which it is produced; and in each of the three there muſt be a known reciprocity of affection depending on the cauſe in which the friendſhip originates. When this cauſe is utility, men love each other as long as mutual advantage reſults from their friendſhip: a ſimilar obſervation is applicable, when their affection is founded on pleaſure. Neither the utility nor the pleaſure which any man affords, conſtitute an eſſential and unalterable part of his character; and when, on

on account of thofe circumftances, he himfelf becomes an object of friendfhip, he is fo, merely by way of acceffion or appendage to qualities not infeparably connected with him, and which being actually removed, he himfelf ceafes to be an object of friendfhip. Friendfhips founded on utility prevail moft among perfons advanced in years; for intereft, not pleafure, is their aim. Manhood, and even youth, often imitate too faithfully the felfifh manners of age; choofing their friends according to views of intereft. Perfons of this character delight but little in each other's fociety. Even their convivial hofpitality has perfonal advantage for its object. Youthful friendfhips, however, for the moft part, are founded on pleafure; for youth is the age of paffion, which purfues and prefers prefent and immediate gratification. But as our pleafures change with our years, youthful friendfhips are as eafily diffolved as they were fpeedily contracted. Befides, youth is much addicted to love, which is full of mutability, its principal ingredients being pleafure and paffion, fo that it varies many times in a day. Youthful attachments, while they laft, produce clofe and habitual intimacy, becaufe fuch friendfhips have no other foundation than the delight refulting from mutual intercourfe. The only perfect friendfhip fubfifts among thofe who refemble each other in virtue, becaufe thofe who love their friends for their virtue, love them for what is not a temporary appendage, but a permanent effential in their characters. The worth of a

 virtuous

BOOK VIII.

virtuous friend is not relative to circumſtances, but univerſal and abſolute, comprehending both pleaſure and utility, and uniting all thoſe qualities which either produce friendſhip or render it unalterable; but his ineſtimable value cannot be fairly appreciated, except by thoſe who reſemble him in moral or intellectual excellence; for men delight chiefly in thoſe qualities which are congenial to their own. Such friendſhips are rare, becauſe virtuous men are rare; and even *they* cannot perfectly know each other, until, according to the proverb, they have conſumed many buſhels of ſalt together. Time and familiarity are requiſite for proving mutual affection, and for creating that ſteady confidence which cements friendſhip. Friendly acts produce rather an inclination to friendſhip than the thing itſelf, which muſt be the effect of time and habit operating on excellencies reciprocally exerted, and mutually experienced, in thoſe who are reſpectively conſcious of being the objects of love and affection the one to the other.

Chap. 4.

The different kinds of friendſhip compared with reſpect to their durability.

Friendſhips founded on utility and on pleaſure bear a reſemblance to that founded on virtue; for virtuous men afford both pleaſure and utility to their friends. But friendſhips of the former kind are the more durable in proportion as they originate on both ſides in nearly the ſame principle, that is, in nearly the ſame kind of pleaſure or utility. Thus, they naturally laſt long between men recommended to each other by their companionable qualities, their wit and pleaſantry; they are leſs durable among lovers, when, as for

the moſt part happens, the love on the one ſide ariſes from an admiration of beauty, and on the other from the attentions beſtowed by the lover. When beauty is impaired by years, the admiration ceaſes, the attentions are withheld, and the friendſhip founded on this kind of love is often at an end; but many times alſo it laſts, when cemented by congenial manners, ſtrengthened and confirmed by long habits of familiar intercourſe. Friendſhips founded on the love of gain are of all the moſt unſtable; for perſons governed by this principle are not friends to each other, but both to their reſpective intereſts. All perſons promiſcuouſly, the good, the bad, and thoſe of an intermediate character, may feel towards each other that kind of friendſhip which originates in pleaſure or utility; but good men only can be the objects of friendſhip properly ſo called, independent of circumſtances, and reſulting from what is moſt eſſential and moſt unalterable in the character itſelf. The friendſhips of the virtuous are not to be deſtroyed by fortune, nor ſhaken by calumny. What accident or event can change or diſturb confirmed habits of virtue? What calumny can prevail againſt known and approved worth? The friendſhip formed from intereſt, therefore, like alliances between ſtates, and thoſe formed from pleaſure, like the friendſhips of our boyiſh years, are called friendſhips only by way of ſimilitude or metaphor; and thoſe metaphorical friendſhips reſemble other metaphors in this, that they do not naturally mingle, or eaſily blend and unite; for how

 ſeldom

BOOK VIII.

feldom do we fee the fame perfons friends to each other on the combined principles of profit and of pleafure? Such then are the different kinds of friendfhip. That formed by the virtuous, alone deferves the name, the others are fo called merely by a figure of fpeech.

Chap. 5.

The characters moft fufceptible of friendfhip.

Men procure the denomination of friendly as they do that of virtuous, either from their actions or from their habits. Friendly actions can take place only among thofe who are members of the fame fociety; but the habit of friendfhip may fubfift among perfons widely feparated from each other, though when their feparation continues long, their friendfhip is apt to languifh; whence it is faid,

"Long abfence often is the bane of friendfhip."

Old perfons, and thofe of auftere characters, are, from this principle, but little difpofed to friendfhip; becaufe in them both the love of pleafure, and the power of communicating it, is commonly fo much weakened, that they have not any great inducement to keep company with each other; for as pleafure is the great aim of nature, the fociety of thofe who are capable neither of affording nor relifhing it, cannot poffibly be defired; and if they occafion real and pofitive uneafinefs, will not long be endured. Thofe who, without delighting in each other's fociety, are however refpectively the objects of mutual approbation, may have great good-will towards each other with very little friendfhip; for nothing is fo productive of friendfhip as the habitual

habitual intercourfe of life. The wretched feek fuccour in fociety, but the happy feek fociety for itfelf, and can leaft of all men bear folitude; but the love of fociety itfelf is founded on the pleafure afforded by thofe with whom we live; which pleafure implies that their characters be agreeable, and much of the fame ftamp with our own. Friendfhip, therefore, as has been often faid, prevails chiefly among the virtuous, to whom only that is good and pleafant, which is good and pleafant abfolutely and effentially, independently of any circumftances that may concur, or of any confequences that may follow; and to whom the mutual enjoyment of their correfpondent excellencies is of all things the moft delightful.

Chap. 6.

Friendfhip cannot at once comprehend many objects.

Aged perfons and thofe of auftere characters are unfit for friendfhip in proportion to their aufterity, and to their averfion to fociety. Young people, therefore, fooner form friendfhips than the old and auftere; who, though they may often bear great good-will to each other, and fhew much readinefs in mutually conferring the moft effential fervices, are yet flow and cold in fentimental attachment, becaufe they are averfe to that focial intercourfe in which chiefly it originates. Friendfhip, in its higheft perfection, cannot extend to many; and for a fimilar reafon that it is impoffible for us to feel the paffion of love for many perfons at once. There is an intenfity in friendfhip as well as in love, which naturally confines it to one object. Men have different taftes, each of which has

 fome-

fomething in it too peculiar to be alike pleafed with many; and it is right that it fhould be fo. Friendfhip, befides, requires long and intimate knowledge, which is not eafily obtained of many characters by one perfon, who cannot live in equal and clofe familiarity with them all. Friendfhips of intereft or pleafure are indeed fpeedily contracted, becaufe their offices may be fpeedily performed, and many are able to fulfil them. Of the two, thofe of pleafure moft refemble true friendfhip, efpecially when the pleafure is mutual, and refulting from the fame objects and purfuits. Such are the friendfhips of youth, which are of a warmer and more liberal kind than thofe formed among money-getting men on the cold principle of intereft. Men profperous in their circumftances prefer pleafure to utility; they choofe the fociety of agreeable friends, fince worth itfelf, joined with harfhnefs and aufterity, foon becomes offenfive and irkfome; but if they loved and preferred, as right reafon would direct, agreeable qualities only when ennobled by virtue, they would find in their friends all advantages united. Men invefted with power have two diftinct claffes of friends; the one chofen from tafte, the other from intereft. The friends calculated to pleafe, are not qualified to benefit them; for as they feek pleafure diftinct from virtue, and purfue intereft diftinct from honour, merry buffoons are beft qualified for the firft purpofe, and dextrous knaves beft adapted to the fecond; the man of virtue alone anfwering the double end of plea-

The great have two diftinct claffes of friends.

fure

fure and utility. But a virtuous man cannot live in friendfhip with the great, unlefs *they* be as much difpofed to refpect his fuperiority of virtue, as he is difpofed to honour their fuperiority of fortune, becaufe the law of equality, which is the foul of friendfhip, would otherwife be violated; and as men in power are generally too much intoxicated with their profperity[c] to make this juft facrifice, they feldom enjoy the ineftimable benefit of virtuous friendfhip. Such then are thofe kinds of friendfhip in which men interchange either pleafures or utilities on both fides, or exchange pleafure on the one fide for utility on the other. They refemble true friendfhip in this, that they are productive of pleafure or profit; but they differ from it in many other refpects, and particularly in being eafily fhaken by calumny, and eafily fubverted by a change in the external circumftances of thofe between whom they prevailed.

Chap. 7.

Unequal friendfhips: their limits.

Friendfhip, ftrictly fo called, requires, as we obferved, equality; but there is alfo a fpecies of friendfhip which fubfifts between perfons of extremely unequal conditions; namely, that, between fathers (or thofe who hold the place of fathers) and children; hufbands and wives; rulers and thofe fubject to their authority. This fpecies of friendfhip admits of many fubdivifions: the friendfhip of a father towards his fon differs

[c] Non enim folum ipfa fortuna cæca eft, fed eos etiam plerumque efficit cæcos, quos complexa eft. "Fortune is not only herfelf blind, but fhe, for the moft part, renders thofe alfo blind whom fhe embraces." Cicero de Amicitia, c. xv.

 from

BOOK VIII.

from that of a hufband towards his wife, and that of a king towards his people; it differs alfo from that of a fon towards his father; for the parties ftanding in this and other relations, have each of them their refpective offices and their refpective duties; the habitual performance of which can alone give ftability to their friendfhip. When the pre-eminence is greatly on one fide, whether in the power of beftowing profit or pleafure, the friendfhip ought to be greater on the other, in nearly the fame proportion, that the rules of equal juftice may thus be maintained. But equality in point of juftice confifts primarily in this, that each man fhould have his due: that the fhares fhould be nearly equal in quantity, is only a confequence that fometimes follows from this rule; for when the perfons are equal in worth, then only their fhares fhould be equal in value. But in point of friendfhip, equality in quantity or worth is a primary confideration; for between perfons extremely unequal as to virtue, power, wealth, and other caufes productive of diftinction, friendfhip cannot eafily fubfift. The gods are the great benefactors of mankind, but they are far too exalted for our friendfhip. Kings do not choofe their friends among the loweft claffes of their people: nor do men eminently diftinguifhed by virtue and wifdom, affociate with perfons of no confideration or merit. It is impoffible accurately to afcertain the precife limits beyond which the elevation of the one party becomes too great to admit of friendfhip with his inferior. The

friendſhip may ſtill ſubſiſt, after many advantages are taken from the one and accumulated on the other. But with the exaltation of the latter to divinity, the relation of friendſhip would unqueſtionably ceaſe[d]; wherefore it is doubted whether a man can wiſh for the deification of his friend, ſince this would be to wiſh for the deſtruction of their friendſhip. Perhaps he does not even wiſh for him all human advantages; for a man deſires that every good thing may happen to his friend, provided only what is a good to his friend be not an evil to himſelf; and it would be a great evil to himſelf to loſe a good friend.

Chap. 8.

The ordinary foundations of unequal friendſhips.

Moſt people, through vanity, wiſh rather to be beloved than to love. They are therefore fond of flatterers; who are, or rather pretend to be, a kind of unequal friends, that love more than they are loved. Love is near akin to honour, which moſt men deſire, not indeed for its own ſake, but for the advantages which accrue from it. They delight in marks of diſtinction from the great, which they regard as pledges of future and more ſolid bounties. Thoſe who are ambitious of honour from perſons well acquainted with them, and noted for diſcernment and equity, wiſh thereby to confirm their good opinion of themſelves. They delight in thinking favourably of their own characters, in conſequence of this impartial verdict in their favour; and the pleaſure which they take in being the

[d] Does this bear any reference to the friendſhip between Ariſtotle and his pupil Alexander?

objects

BOOK VIII. objects of love and approbation, is the caufe for which they defire external marks of honour and refpect. To be loved, therefore, is better than to be honoured; and friendfhip is, ftill more than honour, ultimately defirable. The former however confifts more in loving than in being loved; in proof of which we may allege the behaviour of mothers who give out their children to nurfe, pleafed with loving them and knowing that they are well, without expecting or defiring any return of affection. To love one's friends is a common topic of praife; and the *virtue* of friendfhip depends on the ftrength and propriety of our affection, which can alone render it permanent, levelling all thofe inequalities, and removing all thofe obftacles which might interrupt its duration. Such is the friendfhip of virtuous men, who, being ftable in themfelves, remain ftable in their relations to each other; neither requiring nor admitting any affociation with the worthlefs. Thefe laft are inconftant in all their ways, maintaining no ftability in their relations to each other, fince none of them acts uniformly or confiftently, nor remains long like unto himfelf. Their friendfhip is but a league in villainy, which for the moft part ends when it ceafes to be profitable: when pleafure confpires with profit, it is naturally more durable. The friendfhips refulting from contraries refolve themfelves into the principle of utility; as thofe between the poor and rich, the learned and ignorant; for a man is always ready to give fomething in exchange for that of which he ftands in need.

In

In the same class we may place, without much violence, the handsome and the ugly, the lover and the object of his affection. Wherefore some lovers justly incur ridicule when they expect to meet with a return of love similar to their own. Were their persons calculated to inspire a mutual passion, their expectation would be reasonable; but being totally the reverse, their pretensions are ridiculous. Perhaps contraries do not primarily affect each other, but both of them are fond of that intermediate condition which is preferable to either. Thus what is dry loves moisture, only that it may attain an intermediate state; and that which is warm, affects cold, only that it may be reduced to a due temperature[e]. But such questions may be omitted, as beside the purpose of the present discourse.

Chap. 9.

Of the relation which friendship bears to justice.

Justice and friendship, as we already observed, seem to belong to the same persons, and to be conversant about the same objects. They are both found in every partnership or community, even among those who sail in the same vessel, and those who fight under the same standard; and in proportion to the closeness of the partnership or community, the more closely and intimately is the friendship cemented. The proverb says rightly, "that all things are common among friends;" for friendship results from the community of goods, advantages, and pleasures; it is most perfect among brothers and companions; and in the same proportion as the ties of the

[e] See Analysis, p. 127, & seq.

partner-

partnerſhip or connection are looſened, and fewer things are common, the friendſhip becomes leſs intimate, and even the rules of juſtice ſeem leſs binding. It is a more heinous crime to rob our friends than our fellow-citizens, and our fellow-citizens than ſtrangers. Not to ſuccour a brother in diſtreſs, is more odious than to refuſe ſimilar aſſiſtance to a ſtranger; and to ſtrike a father is the moſt enormous of crimes. Friendſhip and juſtice thus march hand in hand, and the vigour of the one is followed by equal intenſity in the other. But all other connexions and partnerſhips are but parts of the great partnerſhips of political ſociety, which utility firſt collected and ſtill holds together. Public utility therefore is that chief and ultimate aim of which wiſe legiſlators never loſe ſight. To promote particular branches of this utility, all inferior aſſociations are formed; fleets ſail, armies march; their aim is wealth or victory; to invade, conquer, and plunder; to ſubdue provinces and ſtorm cities. Even the peaceful communities of tribes and wards, and thoſe mirthful aſſemblies which meet to feaſt, to drink, and to dance, depend on the ſame principle; for legiſlators have not merely preſent and temporary advantage in view; they look farther, to the permanent comfort and ſure enjoyment of life, and therefore eſtabliſh ſolemnities during which human induſtry may repoſe from paſt labours, and prepare for future exertions, by which the gods are honoured, and the heart of man is gladdened. The ancient ſolem-

ſolemnities of this kind were held towards the end of autumn, the ſeaſon of greateſt leiſure, when men having gathered in the earth's productions, might offer the firſt fruits to the gods. Political ſociety, then, comprehends all other partnerſhips or aſſociations; from the varieties of which the different kinds of friendſhip reſult.

Chap. 10.

Of the different forms of government.

There are three juſt models of government, each of which is liable to deviate into a corrupt form, bearing only a counterfeit reſemblance to it. The juſt forms are royalty, ariſtocracy, and what may be called timocracy, becauſe all men enjoying a certain income are entitled to a ſhare in the government. This laſt, moſt writers diſtinguiſh by the general name of polity, or a republic. It is the worſt of all legal governments, as royalty is the beſt. Tyranny is the corrupt reſemblance of royalty, for both forms are monarchical; but they differ moſt widely, a tyrant conſulting only his own advantage, a king only that of his people; for the latter does not deſerve the name, if he be not in all things pre-eminent, independent, and all-ſufficient in himſelf; ſo that with him perſonal conſiderations being ſuperfluous, he can have no other reaſonable purſuit but that of the public good. If kings are not of this deſcription, they might as well be choſen by lot. Tyrants, on the other hand, purſue only their own intereſt, and their government is the worſt of all, ſince it ſtands in direct oppoſition to royalty, which is of all the beſt. As kings may be corrupted into tyrants,

ſo

fo ariftocracies degenerate into oligarchies, through the corruption of the magiftrates, who make an unjuft diftribution of honours and emoluments, of which they ufurp and retain the greater part for themfelves, accumulating enormous wealth as the inftrument of exorbitant power, and continually narrowing, through felfifhnefs, the bafis of the government. Timocracy naturally degenerates into democracy, which is nearly akin to it; fince whenever men of limited fortunes are entitled to fhare the government, power will have a natural tendency to fall into the hands of the people. Democracy therefore is a lefs deviation from what is called a republic, than tyranny is from royalty, or oligarchy from ariftocracy; and in this particular circumftance, it is lefs depraved and odious than the other two vicious forms of government. Of political revolutions, we find the refemblances and, as it were, the patterns in what paffes in families. The paternal authority is the model for that of kings, for children are their fathers' deareft concern. Whence Homer addreffes Jupiter by the appellation of father, denoting the near affinity between royal and paternal power. But in Perfia fathers are tyrants, treating their fons as flaves; and flaves are treated merely as beft fuits the intereft of their mafters. This may be agreeable to the nature and principles of fervitude: but the Perfian fyftem, in extending thefe principles to children, is vicious in the extreme; for different defcriptions of perfons require different modes of governance.

vernance. Domeſtic authority is the beſt model for ariſtocracy, being the authority of a huſband founded on the ſuperiority of his abilities and his virtues. He exerciſes thoſe functions which this ſuperiority enables him beſt to perform, leaving to female care thoſe offices which women are beſt qualified to fulfil; ſince if he uſurped all management to himſelf, his equitable ariſtocracy would degenerate into an unlawful and rigid oligarchy. When women, being rich heireſſes, acquire thereby more than their due ſhare of power, their authority alſo originates in an unjuſt oligarchical principle, ſince, in their prepoſterous pre-eminence, wealth is preferred to worth: the gifts of fortune, to the diſtinctions of nature. Timocracy reſembles the equal commonwealth of brothers, among whom there is no other diſtinction than that made by a ſlight difference of age; for when this difference is very great, brotherly friendſhip cannot eaſily ſubſiſt. Democracy reſembles thoſe families which are without a head; or in which all avail themſelves of the maſter's weakneſs, to aſſert equality, and to defy controul.

Chap. II.

Of the variations thereby occaſioned in the nature and intenſity of friendſhip.

Friendſhip, as well as juſtice, varies with the different forms of polity; ſince both ultimately depend on the different relations in which men ſtand to each other in ſociety. The relation of a king to his ſubjects, is that of a benefactor to thoſe benefited by his care. He provides for the welfare of his people, as a ſhepherd does for that of his flock: whence Homer calls Agamemnon the ſhepherd of the people. Of a ſimilar

ſimilar kind is the relation of a father to his children, but pre-eminent in the magnitude of benefits, ſince he is the cauſe of their exiſtence itſelf, which ſeems of the utmoſt moment, as well as of their education and nurture. A father is naturally a king in his own family; and the ſame holds with regard to more remote anceſtors and their deſcendants, the former of whom are entitled to honour from the latter, and therefore the friendſhip between them is not that of equals, but is modified by the natural and indelible ſuperiority on the ſide of the aged. The relation of huſband to wife is ſimilar to that which prevails in ariſtocracies between the magiſtrates and citizens. The honours and advantages belonging to the former, reſult from the ſuperiority of their abilities and virtues. The huſband's honour is pre-eminent, not abſolute; he has his duties as well as his rights; both parties have their allotted functions, namely, thoſe which are beſt adapted to their reſpective characters. The relation of brothers is that of equal companions, reſulting from the near ſimilitude of their ſtrength and ſtature, their common education, and ſimilar manners. They reſemble a republic, ſtrictly ſo called, in which the citizens are treated juſtly, when they are all treated alike; and as they cannot all rule at once, the government is managed by rotation. Their juſtice conſiſts in equality, and their friendſhip is that of equals. In corrupt governments there is little juſtice, and therefore but little friendſhip. Tyranny, which

which is the greateſt corruption of all, ſcarcely admits of any friendſhip at all. Since there is nothing common between the ſovereign and ſubject, there is not any room for juſtice, nor therefore for friendſhip. The relation of a tyrant to his ſubjects is that of an artiſt to an inſtrument, of the ſoul to the body, of a maſter to a ſlave. The intereſt and ſafety of all theſe ſubſervient things are conſulted by thoſe who make uſe of them; but there cannot be any friendſhip nor any juſtice between living and inanimate objects, becauſe they cannot enjoy any thing in common. Neither can men have friendſhips with horſes, cattle, or ſlaves, conſidered merely as ſuch; for a ſlave is a living inſtrument, and an inſtrument a lifeleſs ſlave. Yet conſidered as a man, a ſlave may be an object of friendſhip; for certain rights ſeem to belong to all thoſe capable of participating in law and engagement. A ſlave then, conſidered as a man, may be treated juſtly or unjuſtly, and therefore may be a friend or an enemy. There is little friendſhip and little juſtice in tyrannies; but moſt of both in republics, becauſe, among equals there are moſt common rights, and moſt common enjoyments.

Chap. 12.

Of friendſhips founded on propinquity of blood.

Friendſhip, then, reſults from the community of rights and enjoyments among perſons living in the ſame commonwealth, belonging to the ſame tribe or diſtrict, ſailing in the ſame veſſel; in which, and all ſimilar caſes, the parties ſeem mutually engaged to each other to maintain and uphold their reciprocal advantages. The friend-

ſhip ariſing from hoſpitality is of the ſame nature; but that depending on propinquity in blood, or congeniality of character, may perhaps be referred to a different principle. Friendſhips between relations, though they branch out into many kinds, may be all traced to one ſource, namely, the affection between parents and children. Parents love their children as parts of themſelves, and children love their parents as the ſource from which they ſpring. The love of the former is the ſtrongeſt, becauſe they better know their children for their own, than the children can know them for their parents; becauſe the production more belongs to its author, than the author to his work; and becauſe parents know and love their children for a longer time; that is, immediately from their birth; whereas children cannot begin to love their parents till they become capable of perception and intelligence. The love of parents for their children is merely an expanſion of ſelf-love, for they ſtill regard their children as parts of themſelves; but children have, in their own minds, a ſeparate and independent perſonality, diſtinct from that of their parents, which they are inclined, however, to revere as the fountain of their blood. From the common relationſhip of brothers to the ſame father, they become mutually related to each other; wherefore they are ſaid to come from the ſame blood, which flows in different ſtreams, or from the ſame ſtock, which ſpreads into different branches. Their friend-

friendſhip is confirmed by nearneſs of age, ſameneſs of education, and ſimilarity of purſuits. They are companions as well as brothers, and therefore warmed with all that affection for each other, which conſort and ſociety is calculated to inſpire. The connexion between other relations originates in the ſame principle, and is more or leſs intimate in proportion to their proximity to the common ſource. Children ſhould love their parents as men do the gods, ſince they are to them the authors of the greateſt benefits; their life, nurture, and education; and the friendſhip between them, from their continual intercourſe of life, contains far more than any other, whatever is ſweeteſt and moſt ſalutary. Brothers, we have ſaid, are companions, whoſe fellowſhip will be the more intimate, in proportion to the ſimilarity of their virtuous characters and honourable purſuits, and to the confirmation which the affection of their early years derives from confidence approved by time and experience. The friendſhip between more diſtant kinſmen depends on the ſame circumſtances, according to which it will either invigorate or decay. That between huſband and wife is moſt ſtrongly prompted and enforced by nature itſelf; for domeſtic ſociety is more natural than even the political; ſince it is prior and more neceſſary, being eſſential to the preſervation of the ſpecies, and common to all kinds of animals. But with the inferior tribes, this ſociety is limited by the ſole end of re-production; in man it extends to all the offices of life,

Between huſband and wife.

BOOK VIII.

which naturally divide themſelves between huſband and wife, each ſupplying what their reſpective qualities beſt enable them to furniſh for the accommodation and comfort of the other. The induſtry and excellencies of each are thus brought into the common ſtock of domeſtic happineſs, which their diſtinctive virtues are calculated wonderfully to augment, ſo that this kind of friendſhip is recommended and ſtrengthened by every circumſtance of pleaſure as well as of utility. Their children too form a new and powerful tie, being a common good, in which they mutually ſhare; and which has the ſtrongeſt effect in binding them indiſſolubly together. The varieties of friendſhip thus depend on the various kinds of juſtice, which themſelves reſult from the multiplied relations of men in civil ſociety. For very different rights and very different duties have place between friends, ſtrictly ſo called, and thoſe who are partners in the ſame concern, companions in the ſame ſtudies, or who are mere ſtrangers the one to the other.

Chap. 13.

Diſputes between friends, how they ought to be adjuſted.

There are then three kinds of friendſhip, each of which depends on a different principle, and in each of which the friendſhip may ſubſiſt either between equals, or between perſons extremely unequal, not only as to their reſpective worth and dignity, but as to the relative importance of their friendſhip to each other. When the friendſhip ſubſiſts between equals, equal attentions and an equal degree of affection ought, as much as poſſible, to be aimed at; but when the

the pre-eminence is greatly on one ſide, the affection and attentions of the inferior ought to riſe in the ſame proportion. The friendſhip founded on utility is that which is by far the moſt likely to produce between the parties mutual altercation, and often mutual reproach. When the connecting principle is virtue, friends are eager to benefit each other; the only rivalſhip between them is, who ſhall do to the other moſt good, and he who gains the victory in this amicable conteſt, is ſo far from creating ill-will in his friend, that he only provokes him to new works of kindneſs. Nor are mutual accuſations frequent, where the ſole end of the friendſhip is pleaſure. While this purpoſe is attained, the parties keep company with each other; and when it is not, a mutual ſeparation is ſo eaſy, that complaint would be ridiculous. But when utility is the principle, refuſals on one ſide muſt be as frequent as exactions on the other, and both parties will think themſelves ill-treated, becauſe each expects more than his due. As law is either written or unwritten, ſo friendſhip founded on utility is either legal or moral; the firſt is where exact returns are ſpecified, as if you give to me that, I will give to you this; or where the agreement is more liberal than merely from hand to hand, and allowing a ſpace of time to be interpoſed before the ſervice performed on the one ſide is requited by an equal ſervice on the other. When friendly confidence is repoſed by one party in the other, an action at law is not granted by ſome nations, for the fulfilling even of

BOOK VIII.

of conditions, the reality of which admits not of any uncertainty; for to them it ſeems equitable, that he who has imprudently truſted to the good faith of another, ſhould not be entitled to correct by law the error of his own credulity. The moral friendſhip founded on utility takes place, where ſomething is given or ſome ſervice is rendered, without the ſpecification of any thing, or of any ſervice to be given or done in return. Yet, by the party who has conferred the benefit, an equal, or even more than equal return is on many occaſions expected; and when this is not made, he complains of ill-treatment. His complaint is occaſioned by what occaſions almoſt all other complaints of breach of friendſhip, his unſteadineſs of principle, giving liberally, but craving like a niggard: affecting the praiſe of generoſity in the firſt part of the tranſaction, but ſhewing in the laſt that he is guided merely by intereſt; for moſt men, though they love what is honourable, prefer what is uſeful. It is honourable to do good without expecting a return; it is uſeful to have every good action repaid with intereſt. Yet thoſe who have received favours ought to requite them according to their ability, when ſuch requital is deſired by their benefactors, for no man's friendſhip can be obtained againſt his will; ſo that when we have met with an act of generous friendſhip, from one who afterwards appears not to entertain for us any friendly diſpoſition, we ought doubtleſs, when able, to make a ſuitable return; when this return is not in our power, even the

interefted benefactor himfelf would not be fo unreafonable as either to require or expect it. When favours are conferred, we muft confider, therefore, both the man and his motives, in order to determine whether they ought to be returned, and in what manner the return fhould be made. It is fometimes a matter of doubt by what ftandard this return fhould be meafured, whether by the benefactor's good will, or by the advantage therefrom refulting to the perfon benefited. The latter is often inclined to extenuate his obligations, and to think the favours he has received both flight in themfelves, and fuch as many others would have been ready to beftow on him. The benefactor, on the other hand, reprefents them as the greateft favours that could poffibly have been done, fuch as none other would have conferred, and enhanced too by being beftowed in a moment of danger, or fome other exigency. Since utility is the fole bafis of fuch friendfhips, and of the actions proceeding from them, ought not the advantage accruing to the perfon obliged to be regarded as the juft ftandard of the obligation incurred, and of the return to be made? For *his* exigency required relief; a relief afforded to him in expectation of an equal return; and the affiftance beftowed on the one hand is exactly meafured by the benefit received on the other. His return therefore ought to be equal to this benefit, or greater, which will make his conduct laudable and honourable. In virtuous friendfhips there is not any room for fuch complaints.

 In

BOOK VIII.

In them intentions, not confequences, form the ftandard of obligation; for, as we have often obferved, the deliberate election of the will is the principle by which all queftions concerning virtue and morals muft be determined.

Chap. 14.

The fame fubject continued.

Unequal friendfhips are extremely productive of altercations and differences, each party defiring to have more than his due, which has a tendency to difturb, and finally diffolve concord. He who is pre-eminent in virtue and ability, claims a proportional fhare of regard and affection; thinking that men fhould always be confidered fuitably to their characters. In the fame manner, he who is moft ufeful, expects to be loved and regarded in proportion to his utility; faying, that friendfhip would be a burden if it were not returned on the one fide proportionally to the benefits conferred on the other. They think that the fame rule is applicable to friendfhip which holds in a partnerfhip in trade, where he who employs moft ftock alfo receives moft profit. The needy man holds a very different language, faying, that it is the duty of a friend to affift his friend in diftrefs; and afking what benefit could otherwife refult from the fo much envied friendfhip of the good and great. Both parties are partly in the right, fince both ought to have the advantage; the good and great in point of honour, the inferior and indigent in point of gain; for honour is the meed of beneficent virtue, and gain is the cure of diftreffing poverty. This rule obtains in ftates. Thofe who benefit the public, are honoured by the public,

public, for honour is a public reward; but to expect from the public both great honours and great gains, is highly unreafonable; fince the public would thereby fubmit to an inferiority of advantage in both points at once; a difgraceful inferiority which every individual would fpurn. For reciprocal and proportional favours equalife and preferve friendfhip, the good and great benefiting their friends as to their characters or their fortunes, the needy inferior giving in return the only thing he can give, honour, and even of this not always a full proportion; fince it is impoffible fufficiently to honour the gods and our parents: but thofe are commended who do it to the beft of their power; for the returns of friendfhip muft be limited by poffibility. Wherefore it is not allowable for a fon to renounce his father, though the latter may renounce the former. For the fon has to pay obligations, which are too great for him ever to difcharge; he muft always therefore remain a debtor. But the father, on the other hand, to whom the debt is due, may difcard and abandon a worthlefs fon, though he will feldom do it, but for excefs of wickednefs; fince both paternal affection and natural humanity ftrongly oppofe fo cruel a meafure.[e]

[e] The fubject of this and the following Book is lefs fully treated in the feven laft chapters of the fecond book of the Magna Moralia; and in the thirteen firft chapters of the feventh book of the Ethics to Eudemus.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK IX.

ARGUMENT.

Friendſhip does not admit of preciſe rules.—Diſſolution of friendſhip, when juſtifiable.—Analogy between our duties to ourſelves, and thoſe to our friends.—Happineſs of virtue.—Wretchedneſs of vice.—Good-will.—Concord.—Exquiſite delight of virtuous friendſhip.

BOOK IX.

Chap. I.

According to what rules the returns of friendſhip may be beſt eſtimated.

WHERE friends poſſeſs qualities totally diſſimilar, and extremely different in value, their friendſhip, as we have ſaid, muſt be equaliſed and maintained by a due obſervance of thoſe rules of proportion which obtain in the commercial intercourſe of ſociety; where the ſhoemaker and weaver, and other artizans, exchange the productions of their ſeveral manufactures according to their reſpective values. That this might be done conveniently, the uſe of money was eſtabliſhed, which ſerved as a common meaſure, with which all other things were compared, and by which their relative worth was eſtimated. Lovers often accuſe the objects of their affection, that they do not meet their warmth of love with equal

equal ardour, when perhaps there is nothing in themſelves that is at all lovely. The perſons beloved, on the other hand, often accuſe their admirers, that they once made to them the moſt magnificent promiſes, but now totally deceive them. The origin of theſe complaints is, that the friendſhip of the one party is founded on pleaſure; that of the other on utility: on delight which the one has no longer the power to afford, and benefit which the other has no longer the will to confer; ſo that as the cauſes of ſuch friendſhips are variable and inconſtant, the friendſhips themſelves muſt be deſtitute of ſtability; which is the caſe with all others, except thoſe ſubſiſting between virtuous men in conſequence of their congeniality of characters. Thoſe who are friends through intereſt, are likely to diſagree, when either of them ceaſes to meet with a return, or when the return is not ſuch as might reaſonably have been expected; for an improper return is conſidered as none at all. We have an example of this in him who promiſed a muſician to pay him according to his performance, and being aſked next day for the reward which he had promiſed, ſaid that it had already been beſtowed, ſince he had given one pleaſure in return for another. But profit, not pleaſure, was the return which the muſician expected; for, in order to obtain what they want, men willingly part with that which is either ſuperfluous, or which they can moſt eaſily ſpare; which is the baſis of all commercial intercourſe. It is aſked, who ought to aſcertain the meaſure of

BOOK IX. of the return, he who has performed the ſervice, or he who has received it? The former ſeems to commit his intereſt to the diſcretion of the latter: as Protagoras is ſaid to have done, for he deſired his diſciples to eſtimate the value of what they had learned, and to pay him accordingly. In ſuch caſes, ſome approve the rule, "clear bargains make ſure friends." Thoſe who receive payment in advance, and then perform nothing worthy of the magnificence of their promiſes, are liable to the reproach of injuſtice; a reproach which perhaps the ſophiſts neceſſarily incur, ſince, unleſs they received their payment in advance, nobody would think their labours worthy of pecuniary remuneration. In virtuous friendſhips, there is not any room for complaint, becauſe each party deſires only the heart and affections of his friend; and the only contention between them is, which ſhall be productive of moſt good to the other. Such is the friendſhip that ought to ſubſiſt between thoſe who teach and thoſe who ſtudy philoſophy, the value of which cannot be appreciated in money; and to the teachers of which no adequate honours can be aſſigned. Their ſcholars muſt honour them as they do their parents and the gods; not ſufficiently, for that is impoſſible; but in proportion to the extent of their ability; ſhewing to them all the reſpect that is poſſible, ſince *they* can never ſhew to them enough. In thoſe friendſhips where certain and full returns are expected, it is deſirable that they ſhould prove ſatisfactory to both parties; but when this cannot

not take place, it ſeems juſt as well as neceſſary, that he who has received the favour ſhould determine the return moſt proper to be made; becauſe he is the beſt judge of the value of the advantage which he has received, and of the value of the pleaſure which he has enjoyed. It is thus in thoſe bargains where confidence is repoſed by the one party in the other; for the fulfilment of which, the party diſappointed is not entitled in ſome countries to any legal redreſs; his cauſe muſt ſtand or fall according to the good faith or diſhoneſty of him in whom he voluntarily confided. This rule is founded on the principle, that he who has received a favour is better qualified to aſcertain its value, than he who conferred it: for men eſtimate too highly the favours which they beſtow, as they are apt to do all good things proceeding from themſelves. The perſon firſt benefited decides therefore what return he ſhould make, becauſe he beſt knows the value of the benefit which he has received; but this benefit is perhaps more juſtly eſtimated by the value which he ſet on it, while it was ſtill an object of his deſire, than by that which he continues to ſet on it after it has been put into his poſſeſſion.

Chap. 2.

That it is impoſſible to aſſign preciſe rules for the proper exerciſe of friendſhip.

A doubt may be ſtarted as to filial friendſhip, whether fathers ought in all things to be obeyed? In matters reſpecting health, ought a ſon to follow the advice of his father or his phyſician? In electing a general, ought he to prefer to him a perſon ſkilled in war? In the ſame manner it may be doubted, whether favours are beſt beſtowed

ftowed on friends, or on men of merit; and whether we ought to be grateful to our benefactors or liberal to our friends, when we have not the means of exercifing both gratitude and liberality. All thefe queftions are too indefinite to admit of fuch general folutions as may be practically ufeful; becaufe there is not any one cafe exactly fimilar to another, but each is marked by circumftances peculiar to itfelf, and diftinguifhable in their degrees of magnitude, as well as of propriety or neceffity. It is manifeft in general, that all advantages ought not to be accumulated on any one individual, and that before we are liberal to our friends, our debts of gratitude ought to be difcharged towards our benefactors. Yet this rule will not always hold, as in the cafe of a man ranfomed from robbers, and whofe ranfomer, perhaps a perfon of no value, fhould afterwards ftand in need of the fame favour, or, at leaft, fhould demand back his money. In both cafes, the man ranfomed, if his own father happens alfo to be in captivity, will prefer ranfoming his father, if his fortune does not enable him to acquit both obligations at once. Though it is faid in general, therefore, that every kindnefs ought to meet with its due return, yet cafes may be propofed in which generofity is, in point of propriety or neceffity, a paramount duty even to gratitude itfelf. Sometimes the fame favours, done by different perfons, are of very different values; and the benefactor therefore has not always a right to expect a precifely fimilar return. When a bad man

man obliges a good one, or a knave lends money to a man of property and probity, the persons obliged may, with propriety, decline to return exactly similar favours; since those favours are, in different circumstances, of very different values. The knave, by lending, runs no risk of losing his money, but the honest man would run this risk by lending to a knave; nay, should he only suspect him of being either a knave or a spendthrift, he will not act absurdly in refusing to return his favour in kind. It is evident therefore, as we have often observed, that all rules concerning the passions and actions of men are precise, only in proportion as the subjects to which they relate are definite. We ought not (to answer the question first started) to have deference, in all particulars, even to our fathers, since all kinds of sacrifices are not offered to Jupiter. Our parents, brethren, companions, and benefactors, are severally entitled to their respective marks of kindness and regard. This is sufficiently indicated by general practice; for relations, most commonly, are invited to assist at marriages and funerals, as things essentially interesting to the whole family, and all its branches. To provide for the subsistence of our parents, who are the causes of our being, is a duty as indispensable, and still more honourable, than even that of providing for our own. We ought to honour them too, as we honour the gods; but each parent is entitled to distinctive marks of our respect, a respect different in kind from that bestowed on persons unrelated to us, but

BOOK IX.

but eminently conſpicuous for their abilities or virtues. Our ſeniors, in proportion to their years, ought to be treated with more or leſs deference. With companions, familiarity and full freedom of ſpeech is allowable; with kinſmen, neighbours, fellow-citizens, in a word, with every deſcription of perſons with whom we are connected, it is incumbent on us to behave ſuitably to the relations of affinity or utility in which thoſe perſons ſtand to ourſelves, as well as to their own perſonal merit and inherent virtues. When the relations between others and ourſelves are ſtrong and intimate, the rules of our behaviour towards them are more eaſily defined; the ſtrict limits of our duty are with more difficulty aſcertained towards perſons remotely and faintly connected with us. Yet we muſt not be deterred by this difficulty from inveſtigating thoſe rules of conduct which will enable us to behave towards all men with propriety.

Chap. 3.

Juſtifiable grounds for the diſſolution of friendſhips.

Doubts are ſtarted concerning the diſſolution of friendſhip between perſons whoſe characters no longer remain the ſame, or at leaſt no longer continue to bear the ſame relation to each other. Where friendſhips are contracted for the ſake of pleaſure or utility, it is not wonderful that when neither utility accrues to the one party, nor pleaſure to the other, ſuch friendſhips ſhould of courſe be ſubverted; for the foundations are deſtroyed on which only they ſtood. But a man may juſtly complain of bad faith in him who affected to cheriſh his character and his virtues, while intereſt or pleaſure were at bottom the

ſole

sole grounds of his regard; for differences between friends chiefly proceed from this, that they think their friendship founded on one principle, when it is really founded on another. When therefore a man is deceived, and thinks without reason that he is loved for his character and his virtues, he has himself only to complain of; but he may complain of the duplicity of his pretended friend, when the hypocrisy of the latter is the source of his own mistake; and he may complain of him more justly than men do of coiners and clippers, since he is defrauded by him in an object more valuable than money. But when our friend changes his manners, and contracts by evil communication a depravity of character, ought we still to regard him with affection? Or, is it impossible to love that which ceases to be amiable? "Like," we have said, "draws to like;" and a good man neither can nor ought to love a bad one. Are we then instantly to renounce and forsake him? Not unless he has unalterably renounced and forsaken his character; for while he is not totally incorrigible, it is our duty to endeavour to reform his morals, a thing incomparably more important than alleviating his pecuniary distress, and also more peculiarly the work of friendship. To detach ourselves entirely from a friend who becomes worthless, has nothing in it unreasonable; since he is not in fact the same man with whom we contracted the friendship; and when we find that there is not any hope of his ever again becoming such, we naturally wish to have done with

BOOK IX.

with him. But what ſhall we ſay when one of the friends remains what he was, and the other changes for the better. Can their friendſhip continue to ſubſiſt? Or is this alſo impoſſible? The queſtion will be beſt anſwered by propoſing a caſe where the difference is great in the extreme. Of two perſons who are friends in their early years, the one may remain a child in underſtanding through life, and the other may become a man of the moſt diſtinguiſhed abilities. What friendſhip can ſubſiſt between ſuch different characters, who can neither take any pleaſure in each other's ſociety, nor have any occupations and purſuits in common? As all congeniality of mind is at an end between them, their friendſhip, it ſhould ſeem, muſt ceaſe. Yet will the ſuperior, if he is a man of humanity, treat the friend of his youth very differently from what he would do an abſolute ſtranger. The remembrance of his early affection will ſtill cling to his heart; and he will never entirely abandon an ancient attachment, unleſs on account of extreme worthleſſneſs in him who was its object.

Chap. 4.

The analogy between the duties which we owe to ourſelves, and thoſe which we owe to our friends.

The duties which we owe to our friends, ſeem to be deduced from thoſe which each individual willingly performs towards himſelf. We ought, it is ſaid, to wiſh their good, or what appears to us to be ſuch, and to promote it to our beſt ability, merely on their own account. With this kind of diſintereſted affection, mothers are animated towards their children, and thoſe friends towards each other, between whom ſome diſguſt

 has

has arifen which, though it interrupts their intercourfe, does not deftroy their mutual kindnefs. Others fay, that friends muft fpend much of their time together, have the fame inclinations and purfuits, and fympathize with each other in their joy as well as in their forrow. On whichever or how many foever of thefe conditions friendfhip principally depends, we fhall find that all of them are analogous to the affections by which a good man is animated towards himfelf; and by which all men are animated in proportion as they either approximate, or only think they approximate, to an honourable and praifeworthy character; which, in queftions concerning human nature, is juftly confidered as the fole unerring ftandard. The virtuous man only is at peace within himfelf, fince, all the powers of his mind are actuated by the fame motives, and confpire to the fame end: always aiming at good, real and intrinfic, the good of his intellectual part. To him exiftence is a benefit, which he earneftly wifhes may be preferved, efpecially the exiftence of the thinking principle within him, which is peculiarly himfelf; for every individual ftrives after its own good, real or apparent; which, only in virtuous men, coincide: but could an individual love its change into fomething quite different from itfelf, the good of the latter would be to the former a matter of flight concern. In Deity all goods are accumulated, becaufe he is ever and invariably that which he is; and in man the thinking principle is the part that is properly

The happinefs of virtue.

BOOK IX.

and permanently himſelf. He who purſues the good of his mind, is pleaſed in his own company, being gratified with the recollection of the paſt, and delighted with the proſpect of the future; and having ever at command innumerable ſpeculations, in which he exerciſes himſelf with the moſt exquiſite pleaſure. Both his joys and his ſorrows are reſpectively conſiſtent with themſelves, ſince they invariably proceed from fixed uniform cauſes; for he does not delight at one time in what will excite his repentance at another; and thus harmonized within his own breaſt, he is ſimilarly affected towards his friend, whom he conſiders as a ſecond ſelf; and his ſympathy for whom, when it reaches the higheſt perfection, reſembles that internal concord which is experienced in his own mind, when the various principles of his nature coaleſce into one regular movement, and flow in the ſame homogeneous ſtream of virtuous energy. Yet many men of very irregular lives ſeem to be highly ſatisfied with themſelves. Is this becauſe they miſtake their own characters? It ſhould ſeem ſo, ſince the complete villain is always viſibly at variance with himſelf; and all others are ſimilarly affected in proportion to their progreſs in wickedneſs; willing one thing, yet deſiring and preferring another; as thoſe who allow themſelves to be ſubdued by vicious pleaſure, and who may be ſaid, with their eyes open, to ruſh into voluntary deſtruction. In the ſame manner others, through lazineſs or cowardice, avoid that conduct which they know moſt likely to promote their happineſs.

The wretchedneſs of vice.

When

When men proceed to the laſt ſtage of depravity, they become as odious to themſelves as they are deteſtable to others, and therefore often deſtroy their own lives; and even before they arrive at this deplorable condition, they fly from and avoid themſelves; preferring any kind of ſociety to that of their own reflections; the paſt crimes which haunt their memory, and the meditated guilt which is continually occurring to their fancy. As they have nothing in them that is amiable, they cannot be the objects of their own love. Neither their joys nor their ſorrows are conſiſtent. Their whole ſoul is in ſedition, diſtracted between contending principles, the pleaſure of one giving pain to another; and when the worſt principle prevails, a foundation is laid for the bittereſt remorſe. If ſuch be the wretchedneſs of wickedneſs, how ſtrenuouſly ought we to exert ourſelves to become good men, that we may live in friendſhip with ourſelves, and deſerve the friendſhip of others!

Chap. 5. Of good-will.

Good-will reſembles friendſhip, but is not the ſame thing. Good-will we may entertain for thoſe not perſonally known to us, and without being ourſelves conſcious of it. This cannot happen with regard to friendſhip, as we formerly obſerved. Beſides, every act of friendſhip implies an affection and expanſion of the ſoul, it is alſo much connected with cuſtom; whereas mere good-will ariſes ſuddenly, as towards the combatants in the public games, to one or other of whom we immediately wiſh well, though we would not make any great exertion in order to promote his

BOOK IX.

his victory. Good-will, then, is but a sudden and superficial emotion; and at best but an element of friendship, as the first element or beginning of love is the pleasure received by the eye; without which, though the passion of love cannot commence, yet that pleasure does not by any means constitute this passion, to which it is necessary that we should not only delight in the object when present, but exceedingly long for it when absent. Speaking metaphorically, we may call good-will an incipient and indolent friendship; which, through time and custom, naturally improves into friendship strictly so called; not that founded on pleasure or utility, which have but little to do with good-will, since he who has received a favour ought in justice to return it; and he who does a kindness in expectation of meeting with a greater, has good-will only to himself. Good-will, in one word, is always excited by some laudable quality, such as generosity, or courage: witness the manner in which we are affected by the prize-fighters, abovementioned.

Chap. 6.

Of that kind of concord which friendship implies.

Friendship implies concord, which is not merely agreement in opinion. This latter may prevail among persons totally unknown to each other; and what connection has friendship with sameness of opinion concerning the heavenly motions, and other such subjects? Concord prevails among cities and commonwealths, when they conceive the same designs to be conducive to the common interest, and agree in the same measures for promoting them. It relates therefore

fore to practical ſubjects only, and thoſe of a certain magnitude in themſelves, and bearing an important relation to the parties concerned; for example, that the magiſtracies ſhould be elective; that an alliance ſhould be made with the Lacedæmonians; that Pittacus ſhould be archon, when he himſelf is willing to diſcharge that honourable office[s]. When each party wiſhes the ſame thing for himſelf, then diſſenſion enſues, becauſe the factions in the ſtate, though they agree in the object, yet differ as to the perſon. But genuine concord requires that each party and each individual ſhould obtain his wiſh; as when both the people and the better ſort agree in chooſing virtuous men for their magiſtrates. This concord is, as we have ſaid, the baſis of political friendſhip. It is converſant about matters eſſentially uſeful to the comfortable ſubſiſtence of men in ſociety; and can only be found among men of virtue, who being firm in their purpoſes, and not variable like the Euripus, are alone qualified to maintain the relations of concord and amity with themſelves and others. As juſtice and utility have long regulated their private behaviour, they carry the ſame principles along with them into their public adminiſtration. But neither concord nor friendſhip can durably ſubſiſt among diſhoneſt men, who will be continually ſtriving to engroſs every advantage, and to ſhift off every burden;

[s] Diogenes Laertius, l. i. ſect. 75. tells us, that Pittacus laid down the archonſhip after he had held it ten years; to which tranſaction Ariſtotle ſeems here to allude.

 and

BOOK IX.

and who must soon fall into sedition by their endeavours to compel others to comply with those rules of justice which they themselves disdain to practise.

Chap. 7.

Why there is more love in those who confer benefits than in those who receive them.

How comes it that men love those to whom they have done good, better than these love their benefactors? Most are of opinion that this happens because creditors are more concerned about the safety of their debtors than the debtors are about theirs, and that merely from motives of interest; which Epicharmus[b], perhaps, would say, is judging of mankind by the worst examples among them. The accusation, however, is certainly too just, for with regard to the services which they have received, the greater part are of weak memories, and more willing to receive benefits than inclined either to confer or to return them. Yet the question just started must be solved on deeper principles than those of debtor and creditor, which imply nothing of love or friendship, but depend entirely on dull considerations of interest. Those to whom we have done good, are objects of our love and affection, though they neither return, nor should ever be expected to return, the obligation: for we are naturally disposed towards them as artists are towards their works; and particularly poets towards their poems; which they love as parents do their children; that is, much more than their

[b] A disciple of Pythagoras, who seems to have had juster notions of morality, than he is said to have entertained of religion. Vid. Cicer. de Natur. Deorum, l. i. and Menag. ad Diogen. Laert. l. iii. sect. 9, & seq.

pro-

productions, were they endowed with life and perception, would love them. For each individual loves every excellence proceeding from himself in proportion as he desires and loves his own existence, the energies of which are concentrated and preserved in his works. Besides, our own good actions are more pleasing subjects of reflection, than any past benefits that we may have received; for the first are honourable, and the second only useful; and utility, however delightful in prospect, is often forgotten with the occasion which required it; whereas honour is permanent and unalterable; and every praiseworthy deed is not only pleasing in prospect, but delightful on remembrance, above all most transporting when actually exercised; giving to us a consciousness of that kind of existence which is most peculiarly agreeable to our nature, the happiness of which results not from passive sensations, but from active exertions. Besides, whatever is obtained with much labour, is naturally rewarded with much affection. Those who have acquired their fortunes, delight in them far more than those who succeed to hereditary wealth; and for a similar reason, maternal tenderness often rises to the highest pitch. On such principles we may explain why the affection of those who confer benefits, which is commonly a work of some exertion, should be stronger than that of those who receive them, which requires no exertion at all.

Chap. 8.

Of the different

It is doubted which we ought to love most, ourselves or our friends. Selfishness is branded as

Senses in which a man is said to love himself.

as a vice of the blackeſt die, and thought to ſink deeper into each individual, in exact proportion to the worthleſſneſs of his character. A bad man has in view nothing but himſelf; while a good one loſes ſight of himſelf, and aims chiefly at friendly or honourable actions; and this the more in proportion to his progreſs in virtue. Yet theſe obſervations ill accord with what is commonly ſaid, that a friend wiſhes to promote our good for our own ſakes, and though we ſhould ever remain ignorant of his good offices; which is ſurely the diſpoſition of each individual towards himſelf, and conformable to this diſpoſition are all the other circumſtances, and all the proverbial expreſſions by which friendſhip is indicated and aſcertained; as, that friends have but one ſoul, that all things are common between them, that friendſhip is equality, and that the knee is nearer than the foot. But a man ſtands in all thoſe relations to himſelf, and being moſt his own friend, ought moſt to love himſelf. Theſe contradictions cannot be reconciled but by diſtinguiſhing the different ſenſes in which a man is ſaid to love himſelf. Thoſe who reproach ſelf-love as a vice, conſider it only as it appears in worldlings and voluptuaries, who arrogate to themſelves more than their due ſhare of wealth, power, or pleaſure. Such things are to the multitude, the objects of earneſt concern and eager contention, becauſe the multitude regards them as prizes of the higheſt value; and in endeavouring to attain them, ſtrives to gratify its paſſion at the expence

Self-love, well understood, wherein it consists.

expence of its reason. This kind of self-love, which belongs to the contemptible multitude, is doubtless obnoxious to blame; and in this acceptation, the word is usually taken. But should a man assume a pre-eminence in exercising justice, temperance, and other virtues, though such a man has really more true self-love than the multitude, he would not be held culpable for this pretension. Yet he takes to himself the fairest and greatest of all goods, and those the most acceptable to the ruling principle in his nature, which is properly himself, in the same manner as the sovereignty in every community is that which most properly constitutes the state. He is said, also, to have, or not to have, the command of himself, just as this principle bears sway, or as it is obnoxious to controul; and those acts are considered as most voluntary which proceed from this legislative and sovereign power. Whoever cherishes and gratifies this ruling part of his nature, is strictly and peculiarly a lover of himself, but in a quite different sense from that in which self-love is regarded as a matter of reproach; for all men approve and praise an affection calculated to produce the greatest private and the greatest public happiness; whereas they disapprove and blame the vulgar kind of self-love as often hurtful to others, and always ruinous to those who indulge it. A bad man, we have said, is really at variance with himself; pursuing a conduct directly opposite to what his own duty and his own interest most powerfully

BOOK IX. powerfully recommend. But the man of morals obeys and follows the dictates of his intellect; and every intellect, when free and uncircumscribed, neceſſarily prefers and purſues its own individual good. The virtuous man indeed ſtrenuouſly exerts himſelf in the cauſe of his friends and his country; and readily lays down his life for their ſake. He willingly reſigns honours and emoluments; but firmly defends the firſt ſhare of generoſity and probity. The tranſports of one glorious day, he would not exchange for a whole life of liſtleſs ſloth; one year ſpent in honourable exertion, he prefers to ages vulgarly and caſually conſumed; nay, a ſingle effort of ſplendid virtue is more valuable in his eyes than an indefinite ſeries of ſmall and ordinary actions; and, on ſuch principles, he is ready to lay down his life in the cauſe of his friends or country. He is ready alſo to employ his fortune in their ſervice; ſo that, while they are enriched at his expence, he may acquire an unrivalled ſhare of well-merited applauſe. As to offices and honours, he is ſimilarly affected, eaſily relinquiſhing them all; nay, even the fame of illuſtrious actions, when it appears to him more praiſe-worthy, to give an opportunity to others of performing them, than to effect them by his own agency. Thus, amidſt all his liberalities, he is ſtill more ſelfiſh, ſince he ſtill claims for himſelf what is incomparably moſt valuable, that internal delight ariſing from the conſciouſneſs of merit.

It

It is difputed whether or not happy men need friends. Happinefs feems all-fufficient in itfelf without fuch auxiliaries; whence they fay,

"When Fortune's goods abound, what boots a friend?"

Whether friendfhip be the greateft good in profperity or in adverfity.

Yet, on the other hand, it appears abfurd, if happinefs includes all good things, to deprive it of friendfhip, which of external goods is the greateft. Befides, if friendfhip, as we above proved, confifts rather in conferring favours, than in receiving them, and it is honourable to do good to thofe who are peculiarly recommended to our love in preference to all others, profperous and happy men muft ftand in need of fit objects, towards whom they may exercife their beneficence. It is difputed, therefore, in which of the two ftates men require friends the moft, the ftate of profperity, or that of adverfity; the former needing favourites as much as the latter does benefactors. It is alfo abfurd to think that happinefs can be enjoyed in folitude; man being a focial and political animal by the conftitution of his nature itfelf; without conforming to which, human happinefs cannot be attained; nor fo completely attained in cafual or indifferent fociety, as in that of amiable and virtuous friends. What is the meaning then of the obfervation firft made, or by what arguments can it be juftified? The many regard only thofe as their friends who promote their utility, and friends of this kind a profperous man does not need; nor does he feem greatly to need thofe who may adminifter

to

BOOK IX.

to his pleaſure, ſince, his life being delightful in itſelf, he is not in much want of adventitious enjoyment. Theſe two claſſes of friends being excluded as unneceſſary, it is too haſtily inferred that he needs not any friends at all.

The exquiſite pleaſure of virtuous friendſhip.

For we ſaid in the beginning, that happineſs is energy, that is, a thing conſiſting in our own exertions, not reſulting from our acquirements or poſſeſſions; and the life of a good man conſiſts in a ſeries of virtuous and delightful energies, which will be far more unbroken and uninterrupted, if he contemplates them not only in himſelf, but in thoſe who are around him; whoſe behaviour he is able to view more attentively and more ſteadily than he can poſſibly do his own[i]. Friends of this deſcription, therefore, he requires, that he may ſympathize with their ſentiments, and participate in their actions; for a good man is charmed with good actions more than a ſkilful muſician with the fineſt melody; and as the latter is provoked by diſſonance, ſo is the former grieved by depravity. Beſides, as Theognis[k] ſays, virtuous friends exerciſe, improve, and perfect each other. But if we examine the matter more deeply, we ſhall find that one good man is naturally

[i] ωσπερ ουν όταν θελωμεν αυτοι αυτων τον προσωπον ιδειν, εις τον κατοπτρον εμβλεψαντες ιδωμεν, όμοιως και όταν αυτοι αυτους βουληθωμεν γνωναι, εις τον φιλον ιδοντες, γνωρισαιμεν αν, &c. "As, when we wiſh to ſee our own countenance, we muſt view it in a looking-glaſs; in the ſame manner, when we wiſh to know our own characters and virtues, we muſt contemplate thoſe of our friend; for a friend, as we ſay, is another ſelf." Magn. Moral l. ii. c. xv. p. 194.

[k] The gnomic poet of Megara, ſome of whoſe ſententious verſes are ſtill preſerved.

turally

turally an object ultimately desirable to another; for a good man delights in what is naturally delightful, and values what is really and absolutely valuable; and as the life of animals consists barely in sensation, but that of man both in sensation and intellection, and that not merely in the capacities, but principally in the exercise of those powers, for the sake of which the capacities are given to us, it is plain that the more widely we extend the sphere of our energies, our happiness will be the more complete; provided these energies be, like every thing that is good, definite in their nature, not variable and undetermined, like the lives of bad men, which appear under innumerable forms of wretchedness. But neither such lives, nor those overwhelmed by an accumulation of pains and sorrows, (of which we shall speak hereafter,) are calculated to make us rightly appreciate the value of existence, which to wise and good men is an object so truly desirable. For when we see or hear, we are conscious of these perceptions; and when we think and theorize, we are conscious of these intellections; and the higher and nobler our thoughts are, the more pleasure we derive from the consciousness of entertaining them. This consciousness makes us feel the pleasure of existence; for the energy of life itself, which is of all things most delightful, consists in nothing else but perceiving and thinking. But a good man, being affected towards his friend nearly as towards himself, derives therefore the highest gratification from communicating

BOOK IX.

nicating his thoughts and reflections with others like himfelf, and living with them in a perpetual participation of intellectual and moral enjoyments; fince he thereby attains nearly as clear a perception of their pleafurable exiftence as he has of his own. This indeed is human fociety properly fo called, in contradiftinction to that of cattle, which confifts in feeding at the fame ftall. Since then his own life is, to a good man, a thing naturally fweet and ultimately defirable; for a fimilar reafon, is the life of his friend agreeable to him, and delightful merely on its own account, and without reference to any object beyond it; and to live without friends is to be deftitute of a good, unconditional, abfolute, and ultimately defirable; and therefore to be deprived of one of the moft folid and moft fubftantial of all human enjoyments.

Chap. 10.

Different kinds of friendfhip require different limitations as to number.

Ought this reafoning to make us defirous of multiplying the number of our friends? Or ought we to adopt as to friendfhip what feems to be well faid with regard to hofpitality,

"Be not a churl, nor have too many guefts."

In the fame manner ought the number of our friends to be limited? Of friends chofen from motives of utility or convenience, it undoubtedly ought; for more than ferve our purpofe, are only obftacles and hindrances; and it is impoffible for us to return the fervices or civilities of too numerous a lift. Neither need thefe chofen from motives of pleafure to be many; for too much feafoning is pernicious in diet.

 But

But as to friendſhips ſtrictly ſo called, originating in ſympathy of minds and congeniality of characters, ought there to be defined limits, beyond which their number muſt not be augmented; any more than the populouſneſs of a city, which, for the ſupply of mutual wants, requires more than ten, but, for the ſake of wiſe regulation and good morals, ought not perhaps to exceed ten myriads of inhabitants? The number of friends, even virtuous friends, muſt be limited by the extent of human activity, which is incapable of cultivating beyond a certain proportion, who muſt all likewiſe be friends to each other, on the ſuppoſition (which is neceſſary) that they ſhould ſpend their time together in amicable concord. This cannot eaſily happen to a great multitude, eſpecially ſuch being the inſtability of human affairs, that we cannot cordially ſympathize with many perſons at once, for if we have cauſe to rejoice with one, it will too often happen that we ought to grieve with another. Many friends, therefore, are neither to be deſired nor expected, and their number will be the ſmaller in proportion to the cloſeneſs of the intimacy; for intimate friendſhip is almoſt as excluſive as love, which admits but one only object. Experience juſtifies this obſervation, for the friendſhips moſt celebrated have ſubſiſted between two only. In political life we ſee popular men, who ſeem to have innumerable friends. They are often flatterers of the multitude. But a public character without flattery, may, by his real worth, recommend himſelf to the

BOOK IX.

the gratitude of many who are his friends politically. But friends, ftrictly fo called, cannot be numerous. Happy is the man who finds only a few fuch!

Chap. 11.

Whether the company of our friends is moft defirable in our profperity or in our adverfity.

Whether are friends moft defirable in profperity or in adverfity? Both conditions of life peculiarly require them; the profperous, that they may have objects towards whom to exercife their beneficence; the unfortunate, that they may have fources from which to derive confolation. The neceffity for friends is greateft in the latter, who therefore feek perfons who may be ufeful to them; but the luftre of friendfhip fhines moft confpicuous in the former, who feek perfons with whom they may fpend their time agreeably, and whom it is a real pleafure to benefit. The company of friends is delightful both in profperity and adverfity. In the latter, our grief is alleviated by their fympathy; whether it be that they difburden us of part of our fufferings, or that their fympathy is itfelf delightful. Both caufes feem to concur; for in misfortune the prefence of a friend affords a mixed pleafure. The very fight of him cheers our minds; and if he has any dexterity, he knows how to adminifter to us that kind of comfort of which our tempers and characters are moft fufceptible. Befides, we ourfelves, in his prefence, endeavour to moderate our forrow, that we may not caufe fuffering to our friend; and perfons of firm minds are careful how they impart their fecret misfortunes, and reject all excefs of commiferation as unfuitable to the dignity

nity of their characters; whereas women, and womaniſh men, delight in re-echoed groans and ſympathetic lamentations. In all things the beſt characters are the fit models for imitation; and as amidſt proſperity the beſt men delight in the preſence and congratulation of their friends, which is agreeable to the benevolence of their nature, we ought therefore to be forward in calling thoſe who love us to participate in our joy, but very backward in calling them to participate in our ſorrow; remembering,

"Their own misfortunes are enough to bear."

Above all, we muſt ſummon their preſence when, without giving much trouble to ourſelves, we may greatly benefit *them.* But, on the other hand, to act with laudable propriety, we muſt go readily and uninvited to the houſe of mourning; for it is as honourable as delightful to aſſiſt our friends in diſtreſs, eſpecially without any ſolicitation on their part, which might leſſen them in our eſteem. It is our duty ſtrenuouſly to cooperate with fortune in promoting the proſperity of our friend; but to be ſlow and modeſt in craving his aſſiſtance; yet without too faſtidiouſly rejecting his beneficence; which has ſometimes made a breach in very ſolid friendſhips.

Chap. 12. Concluſion.

As love enters firſt by the eye, ſo friendſhip is produced by the habitual intercourſe of life; and as the ſenſe of ſight is that which lovers would be moſt unwilling to loſe, ſo habitual intercourſe is the advantage which friends would be moſt unwilling to reſign. Friendſhip is a

BOOK IX.

community of enjoyments; and as a man delights in the energies of his own exiſtence, ſo he alſo does in thoſe of his friend; wherefore, in whatever thoſe energies principally conſiſt, their chief enjoyment reſults from exerting them in company; ſome drinking and playing dice together, while others make parties of hunting, practiſe their exerciſes, or cultivate philoſophy. The friendſhip of bad men is as corrupt and unſtable as themſelves; and is ſo far from being advantageous to either party, that it tends only to plunge them both ſtill deeper in depravity and wretchedneſs: whereas virtuous friendſhips grow continually more firm and more intimate, the example and admonitions of good men mutually improving and perfecting each other[1]. Thus much concerning friendſhip. It remains that we ſhould next treat of pleaſure.

[1] Ariſtotle quotes a few words from Theognis which have this meaning.

ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

BOOK X.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book treats of pleafure and happinefs. It is too concife to admit of abridgement, and fufficiently perfpicuous not to require elucidation. In the concluding chapter, Ariftotle fhews the infeparable connection between Ethics and Politics; and prepares the reader for an eafy tranfition from the former to the latter. By way of conclufion to thefe fhort introductions, I fhall obferve, that Ariftotle's Moral Philofophy is, perhaps, of all others the leaft liable to the following objection, which has been often made by thinking men to the too fafhionable philofophy of the times: "A profeffed fceptic can be guided by nothing but his prefent paffions; and to be mafters of his philofophy, we need not his books or advice, for every child is capable of the fame thing without any ftudy at all."—GRAY.

BOOK X.

ARGUMENT.

Pleafure—Its ambiguous nature—Defined.—Happinefs—Intellectual—Moral—Compared.—Education.—Laws.—Tranfition to the fubject of Politics.

BOOK X. Chap. 1. The love of pleafure.

WE proceed to treat of pleafure, a thing moft congenial to our nature; and by which, therefore, and its oppofite, pain, the motions of the minds of children are guided as by a rudder. In morals the main point is attained, when our love and hatred, our grief and joy are refpectively excited by natural and worthy caufes; fince thefe affections are as extenfive as the multiplied affairs of life itfelf, and their proper regulation is of the utmoft importance to virtue and happinefs. For we are all prompted by nature to purfue pleafure, and to avoid pain; the confideration of which ought not to be omitted in a treatife of this kind, efpecially as the opinions concerning them are perplexed by much contradiction; fome regarding pleafure as the higheft good, others calling it a thing contemptible in the extreme, whether from the real conviction of their minds, (which perhaps may be the cafe with fome,) or becaufe they think it beft to fpeak of pleafure in terms of reproach, fince

ſince moſt men are tempted to diſgrace themſelves by indulging in it immoderately. Severe moraliſts, therefore, think that they cannot too much ſtigmatiſe pleaſure, that thoſe whom they wiſh to benefit by their diſcourſes may be deterred from exceſs, and confined within the bounds of propriety. They ſhould take care, however, leſt this proceeding be not attended with effects contrary to their expectation; for in practical matters, men pay leſs attention to what is ſaid than to what is done; and when opinions, juſt and reaſonable within certain limits, are carried to a length manifeſtly inconſiſtent with experience, they are rejected diſdainfully and completely; even the truth which they contain being overwhelmed and loſt in the ſurrounding falſehood. Thus, thoſe detractors of pleaſure, when they are obſerved on any occaſion to purſue it with much eagerneſs, appear to the bulk of mankind no better than hypocritical voluptuaries; for the people at large are not capable of making diſtinctions; they conſider things in the groſs, and therefore continually confound them. The truth, therefore, beſt ſerves not only to enlighten our underſtandings, but to improve our morals. For when our doctrines are true, our lives will more naturally be conformable to them; and our precepts being confirmed by examples, will produce conviction, and excite emulation of our virtues, in thoſe with whom we live. But enough on this ſubject: we proceed to enumerate the opinions held concerning pleaſure.

Not to be too ſeverely condemned.

BOOK X.
Chap. 2.

Different opinions concerning it.

Eudoxus[a] thought pleasure the chief good, because he perceived it to be universally desired by all animals, rational and irrational; that every thing is good in the same proportion as it is desirable: that animals find out, each tribe, what is best for themselves, as they do their proper food; and that therefore the supreme good must consist in that which is universally and most eagerly desired by them all. The regularity of his life added great weight to his arguments, for he was a man of singular temperance; so that his commendation of pleasure did not appear to proceed from any prejudice in its favour, but rather to be extorted from him by the force of truth. His argument he confirmed, by considering pain; which, being the contrary to pleasure, all animals endeavoured to shun and escape. That is chiefly desirable, he remarked, which is desirable ultimately, and on its own account. This description peculiarly applies to pleasure, which no one desires for the sake of any thing beyond itself, nor finds the necessity of assigning any reason why he should enjoy it; pleasure always carrying its own recommendation along with it, and rendering every object, however valuable, to which it is joined, still more desirable, not excepting virtue itself. As pleasure improves every other good with which it is combined, it is manifestly a good in itself; a good not inferior to that which it heightens. Yet

[a] Eudoxus of Cnidus τυτον αντι Ευδοξυ Ενδοξον εκαλυν δια την λαμπροτητα της φημης. See his life in Laertius, b. viii. sect. 86, &c. By a pun on his name, he was called "Illustrious."

 Plato

Plato employed a ſimilar argument to prove that pleaſure was not the ſupreme good; ſince pleaſure, joined with virtue, is better than alone and ſeparate; which cannot happen to the ſupreme good, a thing incapable of augmentation, and diſdaining admixture. But what is that good or happineſs which mankind, by the conſtitution of their nature, are beſt qualified for enjoying? This only is the queſtion with which we are concerned in the preſent treatiſe. Thoſe who deny that which all deſire, to be a part of this happineſs, ſhould take care leſt they fall into an abſurdity. For *that* we ſay is truth, which to all appears ſuch; and he who is diſſatisfied with this kind of proof will not eaſily meet with a better. If only creatures void of underſtanding purſued pleaſure, much might be plauſibly urged againſt it: but what ſhall we ſay, when we find it an object of deſire with the beſt and wiſeſt of the human race? Nay even irrational animals may afford perhaps a ſtrong argument in favour of it; ſince in purſuit of what is beſt for their nature, they are actuated by a wiſdom far ſuperior to their own[b]. The argument drawn from pain, which is the oppoſite to pleaſure, ſeems not liable to the objection made to it. The objectors ſay, that though pain be an evil, this is not any proof that pleaſure, its contrary, is a good; becauſe both contraries are often bad, and the good is often ſomething intermediate between them. But this obſervation, though true in

[b] See Analyſis, p. 132. and Conf. p. 134, & ſeq.

many

BOOK X.

many cases, is not applicable to the present. For if both were evils, both would be objects of aversion; but the one, we see, is universally pursued as a good, and the other universally shunned as an evil.

Chap. 3.

The ambiguous nature of pleasure.

It forms not any objection to pleasure, that it is not one of those indelible qualities by which things are characterised and distinguished; for neither to this class of qualities can the energies and operations of virtue itself, which are so highly and so justly praised, in strict philosophical language, be ascribed: no, nor happiness itself, which is of all things most valuable. It is farther objected, that pleasure is of a vague indefinite nature, admitting of various degrees of intensity; whereas whatever is truly good, ought to be uniformly perceived, and accurately defined[c]. But justice, fortitude, and the other virtues, admit of various degrees, when considered as attributes of the persons in whom those habits exist: the same is true of health; yet the health of the mind, as well as that of the body, considered abstractedly in themselves, are things sufficiently definite, though they do not, in each individual, reach that state of perfection which properly constitutes their nature[d]. The same thing may possibly hold with regard to pleasure. It is further objected, that pleasure is motion; and that all motions are imperfect, since they are only tendencies to certain ends[e]; whereas whatever is absolutely good, ought to be

[c] See Analysis, p. 129. [d] Ibid. p. 135. [e] Ibid. p. 137.

complete

complete and perfect in itſelf, independently of any ſeparate purpoſe for which it may ſerve. But, that pleaſure is motion, is not likely to be true; for all motion admits of ſlowneſs and celerity; ſince the motion of the univerſe itſelf, though it cannot be called ſwift or ſlow, abſtractedly conſidered, yet deſerves the former of thoſe epithets when compared with the peculiar motions which belong reſpectively to its parts[f]. But pleaſure is not characteriſed by either of theſe qualities. We may indeed be ſpeedily pleaſed, as we are ſpeedily made angry; and as walking, growing, or any other motion, is performed with celerity, in the ſame manner, we may rapidly change from a ſtate of indifference or pain, to a ſtate of pleaſure; but to the energy of pleaſure itſelf, that is, to pleaſure actually enjoyed, the epithets of ſwift or ſlow do not apply. This energy is complete in itſelf in every inſtant; and is not perfected by the accompliſhment of any diſtinct and ſeparate end, in which it terminates. It is therefore a thing totally different from generation or production, or motion of any kind; ſince all of theſe are mere changes of material ſubſtances, paſſing from one place, or one ſtate, to another; not indeed at random, but according to certain and fixed laws of motion and reſt, generation and corruption; ſo that from the ſame materials out of which any compound is generated, into the ſame, that compound is, by corruption, diſ-

[f] Analyſis, p. 138, & ſeq.

ſolved.

ſolved[a]. If pleaſure then be generation, pain muſt be corruption; and that which is generated by pleaſure, muſt by pain be diſſolved into the ſame materials from which it was produced. But to ſpeak thus of pleaſure and pain is to talk unintelligibly; and to confound immaterial with material things. It is ſaid alſo, that pain conſiſts in natural deficiencies or wants, and that pleaſure is nothing elſe but the ſupplying of theſe wants. But deficiency and fulneſs are plainly affections of body; and if pleaſure is the ſupply of corporeal deficiencies, that which receives the ſupply ought to feel the pleaſure, which therefore reſides in the body; a concluſion reſulting from the premiſes, but highly unreaſonable. Pleaſure, therefore, is not the ſupply of bodily wants, though it accompanies this ſupply; as pain, on the contrary, accompanies the laceration or maiming of the body. The opinion ſeems to have ariſen from conſidering the pain of hunger, and the pleaſure of feeding; the latter of which muſt always be preceded by the former. But all pleaſures are not preceded by pain; thoſe, for inſtance, of the intellectual kind; and even thoſe of the ſenſes of ſmelling, hearing, and ſeeing; beſides innumerable enjoyments, reſulting from pleaſing recollections, as well as from agreeable and animating hopes. Of what deficiencies can ſuch pleaſures be the ſupply, ſince previouſly to their exiſtence in us, there was not any thing de-

[a] Analyſis, p. 124, & ſeq.

fective?

fective? With regard to groſs and reproachable pleaſures, which our adverſaries may cite in proof of their erroneous theory, the very name of pleaſures may with propriety be denied to them; ſince they are acknowledged as ſuch, only by men of corrupt minds and perverſe ſentiments. Perſons diſeaſed are not fit judges of the reliſh of wholeſome food; nor is that white, which appears ſuch to thoſe afflicted with an ophthalmy. It may be obſerved alſo, that pleaſure is not deſirable, unleſs it proceed from an honourable, at leaſt an innocent ſource; any more than wealth is a good, when too dearly purchaſed by diſhoneſty. Different pleaſures are adapted to different characters. Juſt men, only, know the pleaſure of juſtice; as thoſe only who have an ear for muſic, enjoy the pleaſure of melody; the ſame differences are obſervable in other particulars. The very diſſimilar gratifications which we derive from friends and flatterers ſhow, that either pleaſure is not in itſelf deſirable, or that there muſt be pleaſures ſpecifically different from each other. A friend aims at promoting our good, a flatterer aims only at giving us pleaſure; and the behaviour of the one is as univerſally and as juſtly praiſed, as that of the other is univerſally and juſtly condemned. None worthy of the name of a man, would chooſe to have the underſtanding of a child, that he might ſpend his life happily in childiſh amuſements; nor would he ſubmit to do baſe actions, whatever pleaſure he might derive from them, and though aſſured that they ſhould never afterwards be followed

BOOK X.

followed by pain or punifhment. But, on the other hand, he would defire moft earneftly to have the ufe of his eye-fight, of his memory, and of his underftanding, as well as to be endowed and adorned with virtuous habits, although no pleafure whatever refulted from the exercife of thofe capacities or powers. That this exercife is neceffarily accompanied with pleafure, makes not any difference, fince it is an object of defire on its own account, and independently of the delight which neceffarily attends it. It feems plain, therefore, that pleafure is not the fupreme good, nor that all kinds of pleafures are defirable; and that whether or no pleafures are defirable ultimately, and on their own account, depends on the fource from whence they fpring. Such are the opinions held concerning pleafure and pain.

Chap. 4.

Pleafure confifts in exercifing the proper energies of our nature, which it improves and perfects.

But what pleafure is in reality, and under what clafs of things it ought to be arranged, will more fully appear from the following induction. The act of feeing is perfect in every inftant of time, needing nothing to give to it the fpecific completion and fulnefs of which its nature is fufceptible. Such alfo is pleafure, a whole, perfect in each inftant, and not more perfect than at the firft inftant, how long foever it may be enjoyed. Pleafure therefore is not motion, becaufe all motion co-exifts with a certain portion of time; and tends to a certain end, in which it terminates, being, from its very nature, imperfect; becaufe, as foon as the end is effected, the motion by which it was attained ceafes to

 exift.

exist[f]. Thus of the art of building, the end is a house; and until the house is made, the building is imperfect: but when the house is built, the action or motion by which it was produced ceases to exist: and the parts of that action or motion are, until the whole is finished, each different from another, and each imperfect in itself; as rearing the walls, chamfering the pillars, building the dome; all of which, as well as laying the foundation and adding the ornaments, are but parts of one action, which, taken together, constitute a whole, when the work is completed. The same holds with regard to that kind of motion which consists in change of place, and its various modes, namely, walking, jumping, flying, and others of that sort; each of which consists of imperfect parts, specifically different from each other, and from the whole collectively. Thus, in the Olympic race, a different part of the stadium is run over in each particle of time, till the goal is attained; and as each part is different from another, so must the motions performed in them be all different; nay, though the same part be run over, yet if the racer proceed, in the one case, from the starting-post to the goal, and in the other, from the goal to the starting-post, a difference in the motions must arise from the difference in their directions. But concerning motion, we have treated accurately in another work[g]. Pleasure is manifestly a thing quite different; since it is complete in each *in-*

[f] Analysis, p. 135, & seq. [g] Ibid. p. 137, & seq.

divisible

divisible now, that is, in each instant; not requiring for its prefection any the smallest portion of time: but motion, as we have elsewhere proved, cannot exist without time or succession. In the same manner, the act of vision, a point, and an unit, are things which have not any connection with generation, nor any kind of motion; every modification of which must belong to things not essentially wholes, but partible; and to them only. Of this kind is pleasure, essentially a whole, since essentially perfect; accompanying the operation of each percipient with regard to the perceptible object, when both the perceiving power is properly constituted, and the perceptible object the fairest and the best on which that specific act of perception can possibly be exercised[h]. To say that the perceiving power exercises its energies, or the substance in which that power resides, makes not any difference as to the present subject. Pleasure accompanies every act of perception by sense in a higher or lower degree, in proportion to the prevalence of the conditions above stated; and also every act of reasoning or intelligence. But as the physician and the medicines which he prescribes, are in different senses the causes of health, so our percipient powers are enlivened and perfected in a different manner by the proper objects of those powers, and by the pleasure attending our perception of them. Each sense has its appropriate pleasure: the eye is delighted

[h] Analysis, p. 58, & seq.

by

by fights; the ear by founds; and in proportion to the foundnefs and vigour of the fenfe itfelf, as well as the beauty and excellence of the object on which it is exercifed, the pleafure will be the greater; but pleafure there always muft be, wherever the agent and the object are naturally adapted to each other. Pleafure does not perfect our energifing powers as a pre-acquired habit, but rather as a fupervenient end; in the fame manner, as beauty accompanies the flower of youth. The powers of man are not capable of unceafing activity, and therefore our pleafures cannot be continuous, for they are infeparably connected with our energies. Things which delight when new, often ceafe to give pleafure, and that becaufe our attention is no longer roufed by their prefence, nor the energies of our mind called forth in contemplating them. They are difregarded as an old and familiar fhow; and in proportion to the weaknefs of our exertions, our pleafure is blunted. It may be fufpected that all love pleafure, becaufe all are fond of life, which confifts in exercifing the energies of our nature. Life then is energy, which each individual exercifes on thofe fubjects in which he moft delights; the mufician, on melodies; the mathematician, on theorems; and others, on other fubjects. Pleafure therefore is naturally defirable, becaufe it perfects our energies, that is, our life, in the continuance of which all delight. But whether life is defired for the fake of pleafure, or pleafure for the fake of life, needs not at prefent be examined; fince thefe

BOOK X.

two seem so intimately combined as not to admit of separation. Pleasure, then, cannot exist without energy; and our energies are strengthened and perfected by the pleasures accompanying them.

Chap. 5.

It seems to follow from these observations, that as energies or actions widely differ from each other, so must also the pleasures by which they are perfected. This holds in the several operations both of nature and of art, the different kinds of which respectively terminate in different and appropriate ends; namely, animals, plants, pictures, statues, houses, and furniture. The action of the senses, or what is called perception by sense, manifestly differs from the action of the understanding; and the pleasures respectively accompanying those operations, bear a near affinity to the operations which they respectively accompany; for each operation or energy is increased, improved, and perfected by a pleasure that is akin to it. Thus the exertions of the geometer, the musician, and the architect, are enlivened and invigorated by the delight which they take in their respective pursuits; and the cultivators of those sciences thereby improve themselves gradually, until they attain the most consummate skill, and most decided pre-eminence. But pleasures, on the other hand, which are not akin to the operations which they accompany, are so far from improving and perfecting them, that, on the contrary, they weaken and obstruct them. Thus, those who are agreeably employed in reading or study,

ftudy, cannot, if they are lovers of mufic, perfevere in applying to their books and meditations, fhould they happen to hear at a diftance an agreeable melody; for the two pleafures not being akin, the ftronger overpowers the weaker. Wherefore, when we are much delighted with one thing, we cannot attend to any other. At a well-acted play, the mind is fixed in delightful tranfport; but when the ftage players are bad, many fpectators amufe themfelves with fweetmeats[1]. Pleafures not akin to the operations which they accompany, have the fame effect (though they produce it differently) with congenial pains; for thefe alfo have a tendency to weaken and deftroy our energies. Thus, thofe to whom it is painful to write or to reafon, have little inclination to do either, and commonly do them incorrectly. Of operations and the pleafures accompanying them, fome are laudable and refpectable; others are blameable and contemptible. The former are to be purfued, and the latter to be avoided. Pleafures are more akin to energies, than even the defires which precede them; for thefe defires are eafily diftinguifhable from the energies which they prompt, both in their own nature and in point of time; whereas pleafures and energies are fo difficultly feparated even in thought, that many fuppofe them to be one and the fame thing. They are indeed intimately connected; but as energies both of fenfe and intellect are often not only

[1] Ariftotle fays, "they do fo moft when the players are bad."

 unpleafant

BOOK X.

unpleafant but painful, it is abfurd to think that pleafure and energy are the fame, though the former cannot fubfift without the latter. But it is of more importance to obferve, that the nature and qualities of our pleafures depend entirely on the nature and qualities of our energies. In this manner, the pleafures of the fight differ in purity from thofe of the touch; and the pleafures of the ear from thofe of the palate; while the intellect affords pleafures totally diffimilar to any refulting from the fenfes. As each animal is endowed with peculiar energies, each having his appropriate work to effect, and his affigned tafk to perform, fo each fpecies is deftined for the enjoyment of congenial and kindred pleafures; thofe of a man differing fpecifically from the pleafures of the horfe or the dog, the animals with which he is moft familiar. As Heraclitus fays, an afs would prefer ftraw to gold, loving food more than money. But among individuals of the fame fpecies it might be expected that the fame effects fhould follow from the fame caufes; and that there fhould be a complete community of pleafures as well as of pains. Yet, in the human race, we find the thing far otherwife; one loving what another moft detefts; and that giving pain to one, which affords the moft exquifite pleafure to another. This however need not appear extraordinary, if we confider that the fame food has a very different relifh to a man in health, and to another in difeafe; and that the warmth agreeable to perfons of weak conftitutions, is unpleafant to

 thofe

thoſe of a firmer temperament. Innumerable other examples to the ſame purpoſe will occur; with regard to all which, we affirm *that* only to be right, which appears ſo to perſons rightly formed and properly conſtituted. Virtue therefore, and the man of virtue as ſuch, is the only natural and correct ſtandard; and thoſe only are true enjoyments, with which he is delighted. That the purſuits which *he* rejects and ſpurns, ſhould to others afford gratification, is not to be wondered at, ſince human nature is liable to corruptions and depravities of many kinds; and each corrupt individual will delight in pleaſures akin to the ſpecific depravity under which he labours[1]; which are pleaſures indeed to him, but to none beſides. But the queſtion is, what are the pleaſures of a man in his natural and moſt perfect ſtate? That they are inſeparably connected with his energies, we have above proved; ſo that if there be peculiar works to be performed by a man, and peculiar taſks aſſigned to him, his proper and natural pleaſures muſt conſiſt in the operations by which his work is done and his taſk accompliſhed. Other pleaſures are only ſecondary, and ſeparated by a wide interval.

Chap. 6. Of happineſs;

Having examined the nature of virtue, friendſhip, and pleaſure, it remains to ſpeak of happineſs, the end, as we obſerved, of all human purſuits. Our diſcourſe will be rendered more conciſe by reſuming ſome concluſions already ſtated.

[1] —— Mala mentis
Gaudia. VIRG. vi. 78.

 Happi-

Happineſs, we ſaid, conſiſts, not in mere capacity unrouſed, or in mere habit unexerciſed; for, were that the caſe, it might belong to a man who ſhould remain for ever aſleep, living the life of a plant, or involved in the greateſt calamities; ſince a man thus circumſtanced might be endowed with the nobleſt capacities, and moſt excellent and moſt honourable habits. Happineſs, then, muſt be claſſed with operations or energies, ſome of which, as we already remarked, are neceſſary for the attainment of farther and diſtinct ends, and others are deſirable merely on their own account; with which laſt, happineſs is manifeſtly to be numbered. Energies terminating in themſelves, and deſirable merely on their own account, include all the amiable and laudable actions which proceed from confirmed habits of virtue: they appear alſo to include thoſe innocent amuſements which are ſought ſo entirely for their own ſake, that men often purſue them to the prejudice of their health or fortune. In ſuch amuſements it is common for the wealthy and powerful to place the principal enjoyment of life, and perſons moſt dexterous in promoting them are not unfrequently the higheſt in eſteem with princes; ſince they are the beſt qualified for ſupplying them with thoſe gratifications, of which they have the ſtrongeſt reliſh. In ſuch amuſements the vulgar, too, are apt to place happineſs, becauſe they ſee them purſued as ſuch by thoſe who, in the gifts of fortune, are greatly their ſuperiors. But neither the vulgar nor the great ought

ought to ferve for models. Virtue, intellect, ardent feelings of the heart, and exalted energies of the mind, are not appendages of greatnefs; and though men invefted with power, but incapable of tafting genuine and liberal pleafure, often feek delight in grofs gratifications of fenfe, this affords not any proof that fuch delufive purfuits are entitled to a juft preference. Children think all things inferior in value to their own childifh amufements; and as different objects pleafe men and children, fo good and bad men might be expected to have very different delights; but, as we have often faid, thofe things only are truly valuable and truly delightful, which are recognifed as fuch by men of virtuous habits; for, as our habits are, fuch will be our pleafures and our purfuits. Happinefs, then, cannot confift in mere recreative paftime; for it is abfurd to think that all our ferious exertions and ftrenuous labours fhould terminate in fo frivolous an end[k]. We do not labour that we may be idle; but, as Anacharfis juftly faid, we are idle that we may labour with more effect; that is, we have recourfe to fports and amufements as refrefhing cordials after contentious exertions, that, having repofed in fuch diverfions for a while, we may awake to our labours with increafed vigour[l]. The weaknefs of human nature requires frequent remiffions of energy; but

[k] Neque enim ita generati à natura fumus, ut ad ludum et jocum facti effe videamur. Cicero de Offic. l. i. c. 29.

[l] Ludo autem et joco, uti illo quidem licet, fed ficut fomno et quietibus cæteris. Ibid.

 thefe

BOOK X.

these rests and pauses are only the better to prepare us for enjoying the pleasures of activity. The amusements of life therefore are but preludes to its business, the place of which they cannot possibly supply; and its happiness, because its business, consists in the exercise of those virtuous energies, which constitute the worth and dignity of our nature. Inferior pleasures may be enjoyed by the fool and the slave, as completely as by the hero or the sage. But who will ascribe the happiness of a man to him, who, by his character and condition, is disqualified for manly pursuits?

Chap. 7.

intellectual;

If happiness consists in virtuous energies, the greatest human happiness must consist in the exercise of the greatest virtue in man; which must be the virtue or perfection of his best part, whether this be intellect, or whatever principle it be, that is destined to command and bear sway; having knowledge of things beautiful and divine, as being either divine itself, or at least that principle in us which most approximates to divinity. The greatest human happiness, then, is theoretic and intellectual; which well accords with the properties which we formerly found, by investigation, to be essentially inherent in that most coveted object. The intellect is the best principle in man; its energies are the strongest, and the objects about which it is conversant are far the most sublime. The energies of intellect are also the longest and most continuous, since we can persevere in theorising and thinking much longer than in performing any

any external action whatever. Pleaſure, it was obſerved, muſt be an ingredient in happineſs; but contemplative wiſdom offers pleaſures the moſt admirable in purity and ſtability, and the pleaſures of knowledge continually increaſe in proportion to our improvement in it; certainty concerning the ſublimeſt truths affording ſtill higher delight in proportion to the intenſe efforts of intellect by which they were diſcovered. That all-ſufficiency, which we remarked as a property of happineſs, belongs to intellectual energies more than to any other; for though the ſage, as well as the moraliſt or the patriot, ſtands in need of bodily accommodations, yet in exerting his higheſt excellencies, he is not like them dependent on fortune, both for his objects and his inſtruments; for objects towards whom he may exerciſe his virtues, and inſtruments which may enable him to effectuate his ends. Even unaſſiſted and alone, though perhaps better with aſſiſtants, he can ſtill think and theorize; poſſeſſing in the energies of his own mind, the pureſt and moſt independent enjoyments. Theſe enjoyments are valuable peculiarly on their own account, ſince they terminate completely in themſelves; whereas all practical virtue has, beſide the practice itſelf, ſome diſtinct and ſeparate end in view. The tranquillity of leiſure is naturally more agreeable than the buſtle of buſineſs; we toil for the ſake of quiet, and make war for the ſake of peace. But the practical virtues are moſt conſpicuouſly exerciſed in political and military functions,

BOOK X. functions, the latter of which none but the most savage and sanguinary minds would exercise from choice, converting friends into enemies for the mere pleasure of fighting with them. Politics, too, forms an operose and troublesome occupation, which would not be undertaken from the sole love of performing political functions, independently of distinct and separate ends; power, wealth, and honour; in one word, prosperity to ourselves, friends, or fellow-citizens. But intellectual energies are complete and perfect in themselves, supplying an exhaustless stream of pure and perennial pleasure, which in its turn invigorates and enlivens the energies, and thus increases and refines the source from which it unceasingly springs; all-sufficient, peaceful, and permanent, as far as is compatible with the condition of humanity. Were unalterable permanency added to such a life, its happiness would be more than human; but even within a limited term, its inestimable delights may be enjoyed by those who attain the perfection of their age and faculties; living not merely as partners with a frail and compound nature, but according to the simple and divine principle within them, whose energies and virtues as far transcend all others, as the intellectual substance in which they reside excels all other substances of which our frame is composed[m]. We ought not, therefore, according to the vulgar exhortation, though mortal, to

[m] Analysis, p. 57, and seq.

to regard only mortal things; but, as far as poſſible, to put on immortality, exerting ourſelves to taſte the joys of the intellectual life. This is living according to the beſt part of what we call ourſelves, which, though ſeemingly ſmall in bulk, is incomparably greater in power and in value than all things beſides[n]. The intellect indeed is the beſt and ſovereign part of our conſtitution, and therefore ſtrictly and properly ourſelves. It is abſurd therefore to prefer any other life to our own. What was above obſerved will apply here. The pleaſure and good of each individual muſt conſiſt in that which is moſt congenial to his nature[o]. The intellectual life, therefore, muſt be the beſt and happieſt for man; ſince the intellect is that which is peculiarly himſelf.

Chap. 8. — and moral.

The moral life follows next, both in fitneſs and in dignity; for juſtice, fortitude, and other virtues, are highly ſuitable to the nature of man, and eſſentially requiſite in ſocial intercourſe, that mutual wants may be ſupplied, and mutual duties may be performed; that individual paſſions may be moulded into propriety, and rendered as ornamental to thoſe affected by them, as

[n] Analyſis, p. 57, & ſeq.

[o] In the third chapter of the third book of the Topics, p. 209, there is an excellent practical rule for diſtinguiſhing real goods from thoſe merely of opinion, και ει το μεν δι' ἑαυτο, το δε, δια την δοξαν, αἱρετον· οιον ὑγιεια καλλους, ὁρος δε του, προς δοξαν, το, μηδενος συνειδοτος, μη αν σπουδασαι ὑπαρχειν. Things deſirable in themſelves are to be preferred to thoſe which are deſired merely on account of the opinion entertained of them, as health to beauty: but we may know what thoſe things are that are good merely in opinion, by the following teſt: "they are thoſe about which we would not give ourſelves much trouble, if no perſon were to know that we poſſeſſed them."

bene-

BOOK X.

beneficial to the public. Moral virtue, then, is intimately connected with the passions and affections, many of which have their origin in the body; and, on the other hand, it is equally connected with the intellectual virtue of prudence; since the first principles of this practical wisdom originate in good moral habits; and those habits only are good which prudence justifies and approves. The moral virtues, therefore, are essential to the well-being of our compound nature; but the virtues and happiness of the intellect are, like the intellect itself, separate and independent: thus much only I shall say concerning it; for to treat more accurately of our intellectual part, belongs not to the subject of the present discourse. The happiness resulting from its energies, requires but few external advantages; fewer by far than are requisite for the exercise of political or moral virtues.

Pre-eminence of the former proved.

The sage indeed, as well as the patriot, must be furnished with the necessaries of life; and although the labours of the latter have more connection with the body and its wants, yet this circumstance need not make any great difference in their personal accommodations; but it will make a difference of the greatest magnitude as to the exercise of their respective energies. For the man of liberality must be furnished with the means of beneficence; and the man of probity or equity, with the means of making, for received favours, fair and reasonable returns; mere intentions are obscure and doubtful; and being often pretended, can only be clearly ascer-

afcertained when carried into effect. In the fame manner, fortitude fhines moft confpicuoufly when armed with power to repel dangers; and temperance difplays its brighteft charms, amidft temptations to voluptuoufnefs. The vulgar controverfy, whether virtue confifts principally in action or intention, proves that both are requifite to its completion. But actions are dependent on external circumftances; and in proportion to their greatnefs and brilliancy, they require for their performance, the greater number of inftruments and auxiliaries. Speculation, on the other hand, is far lefs operofe; it would be rather obftructed than benefited by a cumberfome apparatus of externals; which, how ufeful foever they may be for the difplay of practical virtue, are not at all effential to the exercife of intellectual energy. That the latter compofes the beft and firmeft portion of human felicity may appear alfo from this, that it is difficult to conceive in what operation or energy befides, the felicity of the gods, whom univerfal confent acknowledges moft happy, can poffibly confift. In the exercife of juftice? It would be ridiculous to fuppofe thofe celeftial beings employed in making bargains, reftoring depofits, or in performing any other actions about which the virtue of juftice is converfant. There is, if poffible, ftill lefs room among them for courage. Can it redound to their glory, that they encounter dangers manfully? Liberality cannot be afcribed to them, unlefs we fuppofe, abfurdly, that they make ufe of money, or fomething equiva-

The exercife of intellectual energy, the beft and firmeft portion of human happinefs.

equivalent. The praiſe of temperance is beneath thoſe who have not any unruly appetites to reſtrain. Were we to go through the whole catalogue of the moral virtues, we ſhould find that they are converſant about actions totally unworthy of the grandeur and ſublimity of the gods. Yet we all believe thoſe glorious beings to live exerciſing the energies of their nature, not ſleeping like Endymion. After what manner, then, can they be employed? Not in practical virtue, far leſs in productive induſtry. It remains therefore that they live an intellectual life; which, as eſſentially belonging to the gods, muſt be pre-eminent in happineſs; a happineſs pure and permanent, to which the life of man, in proportion as it is intellectual, will more nearly approximate; and of which inferior animals, as they are deſtitute of the divine principle of intellect, can never in any degree partake. Happineſs is not an acceſſory to the energy of thought. It is connected with it ſubſtantially and indiviſibly; a rich ſtream unceaſingly flowing from an exhauſtleſs ſpring. The ſage indeed requires bodily health and bodily accommodations; but the meaſure of his external advantages needs not be large; for ſuperfluity will neither aſſiſt his own exertions, nor ſharpen his judgment concerning the performances of others. To diſplay the beauty and gracefulneſs even of moral virtue, it is not neceſſary for him to be maſter of the ſea and of the land. A mediocrity of circumſtances is ſufficient for the exhibition of moral excellencies;

cies; which is evident from this, that they appear more frequently in private perſons than in thoſe inveſted with power. This mediocrity, therefore, as it contributes moſt to virtue, is moſt conducive to happineſs. Solon well delineated the condition of thoſe whoſe happineſs he admired; ſaying, "that they had enjoyed a moderate proportion of the goods of fortune, performed moſt illuſtrious actions, and lived correctly and ſoberly[o]." Anaxagoras ſeems not to have thought happineſs an attribute of wealth or power, when he ſaid[p], that it would not ſurpriſe him, ſhould he be deemed a very abſurd perſonage by the multitude; who judge, and who are capable of judging, only by externals. The opinions of wiſe men are likely to be conformable to reaſon; but in practical matters, experience alone can afford conviction; and thoſe opinions only are to be approved, which the lives of thoſe who hold them, confirm. There is ſtill a farther reaſon why thoſe who moſt cultivate their intellectual powers, ſhould alſo be moſt happy; for ſuch perſons not only attain the beſt temper of mind, and the higheſt

[o] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vii. p. 305 and 306.

[p] In the Ethics to Eudemus, l. i. c. iv. p. 197. the circumſtance here alluded to is more fully explained. "Anaxagoras of Clazomené, being aſked who moſt deſerved the epithet of happy? anſwered, not ſuch men as you would imagine, but, on the contrary, ſuch perſons as to you would appear egregious fools. He probably anſwered thus, becauſe he perceived him with whom he was converſing incapable of appreciating happineſs by any other ſtandard than that of mere externals, power, wealth, beauty, &c. whereas he himſelf thought *that* man the happieſt who lived exempt from pain or pertubation, practiſing juſtice, and cultivating his underſtanding."

per-

BOOK X.

perfection of their own nature, but they are also the most pleasing in the sight of the Divinity. If the gods (as they appear to do) concern themselves about human affairs, it is reasonable to conclude that they should most delight in the energies of intellect, which are the best, and brightest, and most congenial to their own; and that they should remunerate and reward those who love and honour those exercises and occupations which they themselves hold dear; and who, in preferring and adorning the intellectual part, act rightly and honourably.[q]

Chap. 9. The efficacy of education.

Having thus delineated virtue, friendship, and pleasure, ought we to consider our undertaking as now finished? Or ought we rather to consider, as has been already said, that in practical matters, practice, and not theory, is the main object; and that, independently of good actions, the mere speculative knowledge of virtue is not of any avail. The important question then is, How men may be rendered virtuous? If moral discourses sufficed for this purpose, they could not be purchased, as Theognis says, at too high a price. But the influence of such lessons extends only over the liberal minds of ingenuous and well-disciplined youths, who may thereby be retained within the paths of honour and duty: they are too feeble to

[q] The highest energy of intellect consists in contemplating the Divinity; and when any inferior principle in man, through its rebellion and irregularity, restrains him from thus meditating on and worshipping God, that principle is destructive of human happiness. Eudem. l. vii. c. ult.

controul

controul the multitude, whose wickedness is to be restrained, not through the dread of shame, but through the fear of punishment; since the many, being enslaved by their appetites, make it the business of their lives to pursue sensual pleasures, and to avoid bodily pains; having no taste nor perception of refined and laudable enjoyments. What eloquence can persuade, what words can transform men thus brutified? It is impossible, at least hardly possible, for reasoning to extract the evils which custom has riveted; and when all favourable circumstances concur, the felicity of those is still worthy of envy, who, through the combined energy of conspiring causes, are retained and confirmed in the practice of virtue. This inestimable possession, some ascribe to the bounty of nature; others think that it is to be acquired only by custom; and a third class acknowledge themselves indebted for it to instruction. The virtue bestowed by nature evidently depends not on our own exertions; it is given by a certain divine disposal, to those whose lot is surely beyond that of all other men most fortunate. Instruction and reasoning will not succeed, unless the mind is previously wrought on by custom, as a field is ploughed and prepared for receiving and nourishing the good seed: for those who are not habituated to love what is amiable, and to detest what is odious, would neither listen to, nor understand, exhortations to virtue; because their affections lead them not beyond the pursuit of coarse animal gratifications, the inordi-

BOOK X.

inordinate appetite for which is of too ſtubborn a nature to yield to mere reaſon; and which, when no contrary paſſion intervenes, can be checked only by force. Before virtue, therefore, can be acquired, affections congenial to it muſt be implanted; the love of beauty and excellence, the hatred of baſeneſs and deformity; which preparatory diſcipline cannot take place, except in thoſe ſtates which are governed by good laws; for a life of ſoberneſs and ſelf-command is irkſome to the multitude, and peculiarly unpleaſing to the headſtrong impetuoſity of youthful paſſions, which muſt therefore be bridled by the authority of law; that what is painful by nature, may become pleaſant through cuſtom. The ſuperintending aid of diſcipline ought not to be confined to children, but muſt extend to adoleſcence and manhood; the greater portion of human kind remaining through life rather ſlaves to neceſſity, than ſubjects of reaſon; and more ſuſceptible of the fear of puniſhment, than ſenſible to the charms of moral excellence. Legiſlators, therefore, it is ſaid, ought to employ admonitions and chaſtiſements, as well as puniſhments that are final; admonitions, for thoſe whoſe character and morals render them open to conviction; chaſtiſements, for thoſe whoſe immoderate and beaſtly paſſion for ſelfiſh pleaſures muſt be ſubdued and corrected by coarſe bodily pains; (the pains inflicted on them ſtanding as nearly as poſſible in direct oppoſition to the pleaſures which they unlawfully purſued;) and total extermination, or perpetual baniſhment,

Of laws.

ment, for the extreme evils of incurable profligacy and incorrigible villany. Since then the condition of the greater proportion of mankind is ſuch, that to be kept within the bounds of propriety and virtue, they require not only the benefits of early inſtitution, but the watchfulneſs of perpetual diſcipline through life, good laws become eſſentially neceſſary for upholding this diſcipline by their coercive authority. The influence of fathers over their children is too feeble for this purpoſe; or indeed the influence of any individuals not inveſted with public authority. Law has a compulſive and neceſſary force, ſince it is acknowledged as the commanding voice of prudence and reaſon; and its power is not invidious, like that of men, who are apt to offend us, when they oppoſe, even moſt juſtly, our favourite propenſities. In Lacedæmon, the legiſlator, with the aſſiſtance of a few friends, eſtabliſhed a regular plan of public education and moral diſcipline; things neglected in the greater part of ſtates, where men, in theſe particulars, live like the Cyclops—

> By whom no ſtatutes and no rights are known,
> No council held, no monarch fills the throne;
> Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care,
> Heedleſs of others, to his own ſevere.
>
> ILIAD, ix. v. 127, & ſeq.

A public education, when good, is doubtleſs preferable to a private one; but what is omitted by the public, individuals ought, as far as poſſible, to ſupply; inſtructing and benefiting their

 children

BOOK X.

children and friends; which taſk they will be the better qualified to perform, if they are acquainted with thoſe principles of legiſlation from which public happineſs flows; for the ſame principles that operate conſpicuouſly on nations, will alſo have their due weight within a narrow domeſtic ſphere, eſpecially ſince the ties of blood, and the remembrance of benefits, will recommend paternal examples, and enforce paternal admonitions. Private education enjoys this peculiar advantage, that it may be adapted to the diſpoſition and character of each individual. Beſides this, phyſicians who have few patients, and maſters of exerciſes who have few pupils, are moſt likely to be attentive to thoſe intruſted to their care. But their power of being uſeful to them depends on their ſkill in their reſpective profeſſions; and although ſome, from experience merely, without ſcience, may learn to be good phyſicians to themſelves, while they are incapable of curing any beſides, yet it is always moſt deſirable, whether it be our buſineſs to benefit one or many, to inſtruct one or many, that we ſhould underſtand thoſe general theorems from which the particular rules of practice flow. A teacher of morality therefore ought to be acquainted with the ſcience of legiſlation, that he may apply to the improvement of individuals the ſame maxims which have been found beneficial to communities. But how is this ſcience to be acquired? It ſeems to be a branch of politics, and ought there-

The ſcience of legiſlation, how to be acquired.

therefore to be learned from ſtateſmen. Yet do not ſtateſmen differ from phyſicians, painters, and all thoſe employed in other liberal arts, or other learned profeſſions, in this important particular, that all the reſt not only exerciſe, but teach, their reſpective vocations? Whereas ſtateſmen are never the teachers of politics, nor are the teachers of politics often employed in affairs of ſtate. The ſophiſts who profeſs politics, take not any ſhare in the public adminiſtration; and the ſtateſmen, who adminiſter public affairs, do not profeſs politics; they neither give lectures on the ſubject, nor write treatiſes concerning it; although this employment would be more uſeful and more dignified than that of poliſhing their pleadings and embelliſhing their ſpeeches. Neither do they tranſmit their political knowledge to their children and friends, which they certainly would, if they were able, ſince they could not bequeath to them a nobler preſent, nor one more beneficial to their country. It is plain, therefore, that the knowledge of ſtateſmen is a matter, not of ſcience (which always may be taught), but of experience merely; and this experience, which is ſufficient to form politicians, muſt be eſſentially neceſſary to thoſe who would underſtand politics as a ſcience. The ſophiſts who pretend to teach this ſcience, deviate widely from the mark. They neither know what is the nature of politics, nor what are its objects; otherwiſe they could not regard it as a ſubordinate branch of rhetoric, nor think it an eaſy matter to copy

 good

good laws from one ſtate, that may be ſafely adopted by another[r]; as if it were not a work of the utmoſt delicacy, and requiring much reach of thought, and much experience, to adapt laws and inſtitutions to occaſions and exigencies, and to change and vary them according to each variation of circumſtance. In muſic and painting, the vulgar of mankind are contented with perceiving the effect, which is the only thing of which they are judges; but perſons ſkilled in theſe elegant arts muſt underſtand how this effect is produced, what colours kindly blend, and what ſounds ſweetly harmonize. Laws are productions or works of political art; an art which, being practical, cannot, any more than the art of phyſic, be learned merely from books; for though medical books not only contain recipes or preſcriptions, but, accurately diſtinguiſhing different habits and different maladies, diſtinctly point out how each ſeparately is to be treated and cured, yet all theſe obſervations cannot be of the ſmalleſt uſe to men totally deſtitute of experience in the healing art. The ſame holds with regard to treatiſes on the ſubject of politics, which cannot be of much value to thoſe who have not learned by their own obſervation to appreciate and apply them. An aptitude and readineſs for acquiring knowledge, books, doubtleſs, may communicate and augment; but real practical knowledge cannot poſſibly be acquired

[r] How ſtrongly applicable is this remark to the ſophiſts of the preſent day!

without

without the aid of experience. As our predecessors, therefore, have left the science of legislation unfinished, it may be proper here to examine it, as well as to treat the subject of politics in general, that the philosophy which bears a reference to the affairs of human life may be perfected to the best of our ability. We shall first collect what appears to us judiciously written by others on particular branches of the subject. We shall then, from a wide survey of commonwealths and governments, endeavour to explain the means through which those political edifices in general, and the different kinds of them in particular, are preserved or subverted; as well as to unfold the causes which render some constitutions worthy of applause, and others liable to censure. The result of our speculations will enable us to determine which is the best form of government, and what are the different regulations respectively best adapted to each particular constitution.[a]

Transition to the treatise on "Politics."

[a] The method here laid down by Aristotle agrees not precisely, either with that followed by the editors of his Politics in Greek, or with the arrangement which, for the sake of perspicuity, I have thought fit to give to my translation.

In the act of finishing this first volume, I was much pleased to read the following passage in an excellent discourse lately delivered before the University of Cambridge: "Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics afford not only the most perfect specimen of scientific morality, but exhibit also the powers of the most compact and best constructed system which the human intellect ever produced upon any subject; enlivening occasionally great severity of method, and strict precision of terms, by the sublimest, though soberest, splendour of diction. If moral philosophy, I mean specifically and properly so called, is to be studied as a science, in such sources it is to be sought. Thence will be formed a manly intellectual vigour, an ingenuous modesty and dignity of habit, an energy of thought and diction, and a reach of

BOOK X.

comprehensive knowledge, which distinguishes the true English scholar. On the contrary, it is to be feared that the feeble speculation which almost all modern systems of morality encourage, and the superficial information they afford, superseding the necessity of all active and real employment of the faculties, have operated more fatally upon the mental habits of the rising generation than total ignorance could possibly have done." See "Benevolence exclusively an Evangelical Virtue," p. 19, & seq. by Thomas Rennell, D.D., late fellow of King's College, Cambridge; now Master of the Temple, and Dean of Winchester.

INDEX

INDEX

TO

THE FIRST VOLUME.

A.

B.

C.

Chofroes,

D.

E.

Education,

F.

G.

H.

I.

K.

L.

Magnanimity,

M.

N.

U.

W.

X.

Y.

Z.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

The following WORKS, *written by* John Gillies, *LL.D. F.R.S. and S.A. London, F.R.S. Edinburgh, and Historiographer to His Majesty for Scotland, are printed for* A. Strahan, *and* T. Cadell & W. Davies *in the* Strand.


I. The HISTORY of ANCIENT GREECE, its Colonies and Conquests, from the earliest Accounts till the Division of the Macedonian Empire in the East; including the History of Literature, Philosophy, and the Fine Arts. In 4 vols. 8vo. Fifth Edition, 1l. 16s. in boards.

II. A VIEW of the REIGN of FREDERIC II. of PRUSSIA, with a Parallel between that Prince and Philip II. of Macedon, 8vo. 6s. in boards.

III. HISTORY of the WORLD, from the Reign of Alexander to that of Augustus; with a Preliminary Survey of Alexander's Conquests, and an estimate of his plans, for their consolidation and improvement. In 2 vols. 4to., 4l. 4s. in boards.

Strahan and Preston,
Printers-Street, London.

book sh


1837
ARTES
SCIENTIA
VERITAS
LIBRARY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
TUEBOR
SI QUÆRIS PENINSULAM AMŒNAM
CIRCUMSPICE

ARISTOTLE's

ETHICS AND POLITICS.

VOL. II.

Strahan and Preston,
Printers-Street, London.

ARISTOTLE's ETHICS AND POLITICS,

COMPRISING HIS

PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY,

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK:

ILLUSTRATED BY INTRODUCTIONS AND NOTES;

THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF HIS LIFE;

AND A NEW ANALYSIS OF HIS SPECULATIVE WORKS;

BY

JOHN GILLIES, LL.D.

F.R.S. AND S.A. LONDON; F.R.S. EDINBURGH; AND HISTORIOGRAPHER TO HIS MAJESTY FOR SCOTLAND.

Magna animi contentio adhibenda est in explicando Aristotele.

CICERO FRAGMENT. PHILOSOPH.

THE THIRD EDITION.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. CADELL AND W. DAVIES, IN THE STRAND.

1813.

CONTENTS

OF

THE SECOND VOLUME.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK I.

BOOK II.

BOOK III.

BOOK IV.

BOOK V.

BOOK VI.

BOOK VII.

BOOK VIII.

THE

THE

WORKS

OF

ARISTOTLE.

ARISTOTLE's POLITICS.

BOOK I.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Book embraces three ſubjects, the nobleſt and moſt intereſting that civil ſcience can boaſt; the origin of ſociety and government, the diſtinction of ranks in a commonwealth, and a compariſon of the beſt plans of political economy. On each of theſe topics I ſhall offer a few remarks, not with the preſumption of interpoſing my own judgment, but with the hope of juſtifying or illuſtrating the deciſions of my Author.

In explaining the origin of political ſociety, Ariſtotle writes neither the ſatire nor the panegyric of human nature; which, by writers of leſs wiſdom than fancy, have been alternately ſubſtituted for plain hiſtory. In this, as in all other inquiries, his firſt queſtion is, what are the

phænomena? His ſecond, what is the analogy of nature? Building on theſe foundations, he concludes, that both ſociety and government are as congenial to the nature of man, as it is natural for a plant to fix its roots in the earth, to extend its branches, and to ſcatter its ſeeds. Neither the cunning cowardly principles aſſerted by Hobbes and Mandeville, nor the benevolent moral affections eſpouſed by Shafteſbury and Hutcheſon, ought, according to our author's notions, to be involved in the ſolution of the preſent queſtion; ſince the firſt political ſocieties are as independent of human intelligence, and therefore of moral determination [a], as the inſtinctive actions of plants and inſects, tending to the preſervation of their reſpective kinds, are independent of any intelligence of their own [b], even when they move and operate conformably to the laws of the moſt conſummate wiſdom.

Government, then, is coëval with ſociety, and ſociety with men. Both are the works of nature; and in explaining their origin, there is not the ſmalleſt ground for the fanciful ſuppoſition of engagements and contracts, independently of which the great modern antagoniſt of Ariſtotle declares, in the following words, that no government can be lawful or binding: "The original compact, which begins and actually conſtitutes any political ſociety, is nothing but the conſent of any number of freemen

[a] See vol. i. p. 126. & ſeq.; and p. 396. & ſeq. [b] Ibid.

capable

capable of a majority, to unite and to incorporate into ſuch a ſociety. And this is that, and that only, which could give beginning to any lawful government in the world[c]." From this maxim, perpetually inculcated in Locke's two treatiſes on government, is fairly deducible the unalienable right of mankind to be *ſelf-governed;* that is, to be their own legiſlators, and their own directors; or, if they find it inconvenient to aſſume the adminiſtration of affairs in their own perſons, to appoint repreſentatives who may exerciſe a delegated ſovereignty, eſſentially and unalienably inherent in the people at large. Thence reſults the new unalienable right of all mankind to be fairly repreſented,— a right with which each individual was inveſted from the commencement of the world, but of which, until very recently, no one knew the name, or had the leaſt notion of the thing[d]. From this right to fair repreſentation, there follows, by neceſſary conſequence, the right of univerſal ſuffrage, univerſal eligibility, and the univerſal and juſt

[c] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 185. Edit. of 1714.

[d] According to the ſyſtem of Locke and his followers, repreſentatives are appointed by the people to exerciſe, in their ſtead, political functions which the people have a right to exerciſe in their own perſons. They are elected by the people, they derive their whole power from the people; and to the people, their conſtituents, they always are reſponſible. Of this doctrine, Mr. Locke is the firſt or principal author. But repreſentatives, in the uſual and legal acceptation of the word in the Engliſh conſtitution, meant, and ſtill means, perſons in virtue of their election exerciſing political functions, which the people had not a right to execiſe in their own perſons, and ſo little reſponſible to their electors, that they are not even bound to follow their inſtructions. That the ancients were not unacquainted with repreſentation in the uſual and only practical ſenſe of the word, will be ſhewn hereafter.

preponderancy of majorities in all cafes whatever.

Such is the boafted and fpecious theory begun in the works of our Locke and our Molyneux[c], continued in thofe of our Price[f] and our Prieftley[g], and carried to the utmoft extravagance in thofe of (I wifh not to fay our) Rouffeau[h], Paine[i], and the innumerable pamphleteers whofe writings occafioned or accompanied the American and French revolutions.

Such works, co-operating with the peculiar circumftances of the times, have produced, and are ftill producing, the moft extraordinary and moft peftilent effects[k]; by arming the paffions of the multitude with principle, fortifying them by argument, and thereby ftirring into action thofe difcordant elements which naturally lurk in the bofom of every community. It is not confiftent with my defign, in defending the tenets of my author, to anfwer his political adverfaries with declamation and obloquy, (a rafh and dangerous attempt! fince the voice of the many will always be the loudeft and the ftrongeft,) but merely to examine whether the fundamental maxim of their great mafter Locke be itfelf founded in truth. To

[e] See his Cafe of Ireland, reprinted by Almon, p. 113. and again p. 169. "I have no other notion of flavery, but being bound by a law to which I do not confent."

[f] Obfervations on Civil Liberty, &c.

[g] Effay on the firft Principles of Government.

[h] Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du Droit Politique.

[i] Rights of Man, &c.

[k] Thefe effects have terminated, as was predicted in the firft edition of this book, in the ufurpation and military tyranny of a fingle defpot.

prove

prove that government is merely a matter of consent, he assumes for a reality a wild fiction of the fancy; what he calls a state of nature, which he defines to be "men living together according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them[l]." But he himself seems aware that this supposed natural state of man is a state in which man never yet was found; and in which, if by violence thrust, he could not for a single day remain. Locke, I say, saw the difficulty, which, instead of meeting, he only endeavours to elude. "Where are there," he asks, "or ever were there, any men in such a state of nature[m]?" He answers, "that since all princes and rulers of independent governments, all through the world, are in a state of nature, 'tis plain the world never was, nor never will be, without numbers of men in that state[n]." But this, I affirm, is not to answer the proposed question; for princes and rulers of independent states do not live together, nor associate and "herd," as he himself expresses it, in the same society. If they did so, they could not subsist without government: for government and society are things absolutely inseparable; they commence together; they grow up together; they are both of them equally natural; and so indissolubly united, that the destruction of the one is necessarily accompanied by the destruction of the other. This is the true sense of Aristotle as understood and

[l] Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 164.
[m] Ibid. p. 162. [n] Ibid.

BOOK I.

expreſſed by an illuſtrious defender of juſt government and genuine liberty. "As we uſe and exerciſe our bodily members, before we underſtand the ends and purpoſes of this exerciſe, ſo it is by Nature herſelf, that we are united and aſſociated into political ſociety [o]."

Locke, who ſo ſeverely, and, as I have endeavoured to prove, ſo unjuſtly arraigns what is called Ariſtotle's Metaphyſics, appears to have equally miſtaken his Politics. Had he underſtood [p] that invaluable work, this idol of modern philoſophers, and eſpecially of modern politicians, would not, probably, (ſince he was a man of great worth as well as of great wiſdom,) have produced a theory of government totally impoſſible in practice; a theory admirably fitted, indeed, for producing revolutions and ſedition, but according to which, as is evinced by all hiſtory, no political fabric ever yet was reared; or, if it were to be reared, could ever poſſibly be preſerved [q]. The neglect

[o] Quemadmodum igitur membris utimur, priuſquam didicimus cujus ea utilitatis cauſâ habeamus; ſic inter nos naturâ ad civilem communitatem conjuncti & conſociati ſumus. De Fin. Bon. & Mal. l. iii. c. xx. Conf. de Officiis, l. i. c. xvi. & ſeq. Cicero does not ſay "communitatem" ſimply, but "civilem communitatem," which agrees with Ariſtotle's definition of man, ζωον πολιτικον not merely a herding, but a political animal. See the ſame doctrine in Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh.

[p] Among Locke's private letters, there is one to Mr. King, who had aſked him for a plan of reading on morality and politics. "To proceed orderly in this," Mr. Locke obſerves, "the foundation ſhould be laid in inquiring into the ground and nature of civil ſociety, and how it is formed into different models of government, and what are the ſeveral ſpecies of it. Ariſtotle is allowed a maſter in this ſcience, and few enter into this conſideration of government without reading his Politics." How honourable a teſtimony!

[q] Ariſtot. Polit. paſſim.

or

or misapprehension of some of the most important parts of the Stagirite's writings is indeed most deeply to be lamented. Of the many thousand authors who have copied or commented his logic, the far greater number omit his interesting chapters on language; deeming the consideration of words below the dignity of philosophers. His profound observations concerning the nature and constitution of a family have been equally overlooked by his pretended followers in politics. Yet as his analysis of language has been proved in the present work to be the sole foundation of logic, so his analysis of a family, and his explanation of the causes through which its elements naturally and regularly combine, can alone enable us clearly to discern the analogous principles (principles continually insisted on by himself) which have raised and upheld the great edifice of civil society; "which is not a mass but a system, and which, like every system, implies a distinction of parts; with many moral as well as physical differences, relative and reciprocal; the powers and perfections of one part supplying the incapacities and defects of another. To form a commonwealth from elements of equal value, or of equal dignity, is an attempt not less absurd than that of composing a piece of music from one and the same note [r].

A difficult question follows, how far social inequality, whether civil or domestic, may be allowed to extend? It is with a trembling hand

[r] Aristot. Polit. passim.

that I touch the delicate ſubject of ſlavery; an undertaking to which nothing could encourage me, but the utmoſt confidence in the humanity as well as in the judgment of my author. Firſt of all, Ariſtotle expreſsly condemns the cruel practice, prevalent in his own days, of enſlaving priſoners of war [s]: ſecondly, he declares, in the moſt explicit terms, all ſlaves fairly entitled to freedom, whenever it clearly appears that they are fitly qualified for enjoying it. But the benefits conferred on men, he obſerves, muſt in all caſes be limited by their capacities for receiving them; and theſe capacities are themſelves limited by the exigencies and neceſſities of our preſent imperfect condition. The helpleſſneſs of infancy and childhood, the infirmities of old age, and the urgencies attending mankind in every ſtage of their exiſtence on earth, render it indiſpenſably neceſſary that a great proportion of the ſpecies ſhould be habitually employed in mere mechanical labour, in the ſtrenuous exertions of productive induſtry, and the petty taſks of domeſtic drudgery. Nature, therefore, in whoſe plan and intention the ſyſtem of ſociety precedes and takes place of the parts of which it

[s] Locke ſays on this ſubject, "There is another ſort of ſervants, which by a peculiar name we call ſlaves, who, being captives taken in a juſt war, are by the rights of nature ſubjected to the abſolute dominion and arbitrary power of their maſters. Theſe men, having, as I ſay, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and loſt their eſtates, and being in a ſtate of ſlavery, not capable of any property, cannot in that ſtate be conſidered as any part of civil ſociety." Locke's Works, vol. ii. p. 181. — We ſhould imagine that the *liberal* Locke and the *ſlaviſh* Ariſtotle had interchanged their ages and countries as well as their maxims and principles.

it is composed, has variously organised and moulded the human character as well as the human frame, without setting other bounds to this variety, than are imposed by the good of the whole system, of which individuals are not independent units, but constituent elements. According to this plan or intention, the Stagirite maintains, that there is room for the widest of all discriminations, and the lowest of all occupations, domestic servitude, "a species of labour not employed in production, but totally consumed in use;" because solely, but not unprofitably, spent in promoting the ease and accommodation of life. In the relation of master and servant, the good of the master may indeed be the primary object; but the benefit of the servant or slave is also a necessary result; since he only is naturally and justly a slave, whose powers are competent to mere bodily labour; who is capable of listening to reason, but incapable of exercising that sovereign faculty; and whose weakness and short-sightedness are so great, that it is safer for him to be guided or governed through life by the prudence and judgment of another. But, let it always be remembered,— "that one class of men ought to have the qualifications requisite for masters, before another can either fitly or usefully be employed as slaves." Government, then, not only civil but domestic, is a most serious duty, a most sacred trust; a trust, the very nature of which is totally incompatible with the supposed unalienable rights of all

BOOK I. all men to be ſelf-governed[t]. Thoſe rights, and thoſe only, are unalienable, which it is impoſſible for one perſon to exerciſe for another: and to maintain thoſe to be natural and unalienable rights, which the perſons, ſuppoſed to be inveſted with them, can never poſſibly exerciſe, conſiſtently either with their own ſafety, or with the good of the community, is to confound all notions of things, and to invert the whole order of nature[u]; of which it is the primary and unalterable

[t] Politics would not be a ſcience, unleſs it contained truths, abſoſolute, univerſal, and unalterable. One of theſe is that in the text; becauſe eſſentially ſpringing from the nature of ſociety and of man. Another univerſal political truth is, that the good of the governed is the main end and aim of every good government. From theſe two premiſes, it neceſſarily follows, that the main object of political ſociety never can be effectuated on Mr. Locke's principles. But the good of the community (without ſuppoſing all ſovereign power derived from the people at large, and of which each individual is entitled to participate) may, under many given circumſtances, be highly promoted by giving to the people at large a controul in the government. This controul in all large communities can only be conveniently exerciſed either by particular magiſtrates, or by repreſentative aſſemblies. Things, therefore, that have not any neceſſary connection with the origin of government (ſo far from being its *only juſt principle*) may be found admirable expedients for carrying it on. It will be ſhewn hereafter that aſſemblies elected by the people to provide for their intereſts, and thence called their repreſentatives, are not ſo new in the world as is commonly imagined. In ſome republics we ſhall ſee a double row of delegates, repreſentatives of repreſentatives; in others, we ſhall find repreſentation and taxation regarded as correlatives; and even in ſome democracies, we ſhall meet with perſons elected by the people, and repreſenting them in the moſt uſeful ſenſe of the word, " that of acting for the people at large, as the people at large, if the majority of them was wiſe and good, would act for themſelves."

[u] Stat ratio contra, & ſecretam garrit in aurem,
Ne liceat facere id, quod quis vitiabit agendo.
Publica lex hominum, naturaque continet hoc fas,
Ut teneat vetitos inſcitia debilis actus.

Perſius, Satyr. v. 96.

able

able law, that forecaſt ſhould direct improvidence, reaſon controul paſſion, wiſdom command folly [x]. I now proceed to examine Ariſtotle's reflections on political economy, which are not leſs adverſe than his long miſunderſtood and often miſtated vindication of ſlavery itſelf, both to the theories formerly prevalent, and to others which have begun recently to prevail among the civilized nations of modern Europe.

The Northern conquerors, who invaded and deſolated the Roman empire, diſdained to produce, by ſlow induſtry, what they gloried in raviſhing by ſudden violence. War was their delight and their trade. They ſubſiſted by rapine; and therefore cared not how far they were excelled by others in peaceful and productive arts, while gold, and all that it can purchaſe, might be conquered by iron. But the ſpoils of rapacity having ſupplied them with the inſtruments of luxury, they began to reliſh the pleaſures of repoſe; and inſtead of courting new dangers abroad, to imitate at home thoſe objects and conveniencies which, though they had not the genius to invent, they gradually acquired the taſte to approve, the vanity to diſplay, and the deſire to accumulate. Manufactures then were eſtabliſhed: navigation was exerciſed for the purpoſe not only of war but of traffic: an extenſive commerce was intro-

[x] Αμεινον ουν ὑπο Φρονιμου αγεσθαι, μαλιϛα μεν εχοντες εν εαυτῳ, ει δε μη, εξωθεν εφεϛωτος. Plato in Repub. x. p. 741.

duced;

duced; and colonies were planted. The avowed purpofe of all thefe operations was, to augment in each country the quantity of gold and filver; fince, with thefe precious metals, all other coveted objects might ufually be procured. The bufinefs of each individual merchant is to get money; and commercial nations, it was thought, could not reafonably have any other end in view. This falfe principle was regarded as the bafis of all found political arithmetic; and the moft conclufive reafoning of Ariftotle, in the book now before us, would not perhaps have fufficed to prove, that national wealth confifted not in gold and filver, had not the ruined ftate of Spain confirmed experimentally the fame important truth.

For many years back, political writers have acknowledged, with our author, that the real wealth of nations confifts in the productive powers of their land and labour. They acknowledge alfo, with him, that the precious metals, in contradiftinction to other ufeful commodities, have only the peculiar advantage of ferving as the fitteft inftruments of exchange, and the moft accurate meafures of value; but that the quantity or number in which they ought to be defired or accumulated is, like the quantity and number of all other meafures or inftruments, naturally limited and fixed by the ends and operations which they are employed to anfwer or effect [7]. Yet while they reafon thus juftly

[7] It is worthy of remark that Locke is one of the moft ftrenuous afferters of the now exploded doctrine concerning money, which he confiders

juſtly reſpecting gold and ſilver, the ſame writers have wanted acuteneſs and enlargement of mind to generaliſe the theorem, and to perceive, with our author, that property itſelf is as much an inſtrument as money, though ſerving for a far more complicated purpoſe; and therefore, if it be collected in greater quantities than that purpoſe requires, the ſurplus will be at beſt uſeleſs, moſt commonly pernicious; will inflame deſire, foment luxury, provoke rapacity, and produce that long train of diſorders, which made our philoſopher declare, "that the inhabitants of the Fortunate Iſles, unleſs their virtue kept pace with their external proſperity, muſt inevitably become the moſt miſerable of all mankind." In the faſhionable ſyſtems of modern politicians, national wealth is conſidered as ſynonymous with national proſperity. To the increaſe of productive induſtry, and the augmentation of public revenue, health, education, and morals, are ſacrificed without apology and without remorſe; ſince that trade is univerſally held to be the beſt, which produces moſt money with the leaſt labour. But according to Ariſtotle, it is not the quantity or the value of the work produced, that ought to form the main object of the ſtateſman's care, but the effect

conſiders "as the moſt ſolid and ſubſtantial kind of wealth, regarding the multiplication of the precious metals as the great object of political economy." See the paſſage quoted and refuted in Smith's Wealth of Nations, v. ii. p. 140. 8vo. edit. It is time that, with regard to ſubjects ſtill more important, men ſhould return from the ſchool of Locke to that of Ariſtotle.

which

BOOK I.

which the producing of that work naturally operates on the mind and body of the workmen. In the praiſes of agriculture and a country life, our author's ſentiments, and even expreſſions, have been faithfully and generally copied by the moſt judicious writers of antiquity; many of whom mark, with as much reprobation as Ariſtotle himſelf, that ſpecies of traffic cultivated, not for accommodation but for gain; ſince ſuch a traffic, univerſally diffuſed among a people, has a tendency to pervert their feelings, and to confound their principles; to make them value as ends, things only uſeful as means; and to debaſe and corrupt every part of their character; becauſe wherever wealth is the primary object of purſuit, luxury will naturally afford the principal ſource of enjoyment [a]. In agriculture and paſturage, the energy of nature co-operates with the induſtry of man. They are of all occupations, the moſt beneficial and moſt neceſſary, as well as the moſt agreeable and moſt ſalutary; conducing, with peculiar efficacy, to the firmeſt and happieſt temperament of the mind and body: and the property acquired by them is intrinſically more valuable, becauſe eſſentially more uſeful, than any other property whatever. Our author likewiſe maintains, that thoſe natural and primeval purſuits are of all the leaſt likely to engender ſloth, intemperance, avarice, and their concomitant vices; and that nations of huſbandmen, in particular, afford ma-

[a] Πλυτον τιμᾶν και σωφροσυνην ἁμα κτᾶσθαι εν τοις πολιτοις αδυνατον. Plato in Repub. viii. p. 718. edit. Ficin.

terials

terials fufceptible of the beft political form, and the leaft difpofed to difturb, by fedition, any moderately good government under which it is their lot to live. In confideration of fo many advantages attending it, he concludes that rural labour ought to be the moft favoured branch of national induftry; an opinion which nothing but the intrepidity of ignorance, fortified by falfe fyftem, could venture to contradict. Yet, how far other methods of accumulating ftock, befide thofe propofed by our author, ought to be admitted and encouraged, or difcouraged and rejected, muft depend on circumftances and events, the force of which the philofopher's experience could not fupply him with the means exactly to appreciate. From the artifices and fhifts which he explains, (and he is the only writer that explains them,) as practifed by the republics and princes of his own and preceding times, for the purpofe of raifing money, it was impoffible for him to conjecture that, in a future age of the world, monarchical government fhould attain fuch ftability as rendered the public revenues a fafe mortgage to creditors; that the immenfe debts contracted through the facility of borrowing, would have a direct tendency, by interefting a great number of powerful individuals in the permanence of conftituted authorities, to augment that facility itfelf, and thereby ftill farther to accumulate the national debt; for difcharging the intereft of which, heavy taxes muft neceffarily, but not altogether unprofitably,

BOOK I.

profitably, be levied, ſince they would, in ſome meaſure, repay, in public ſecurity, the burdens which they impoſe on perſonal labour, or rather the ſums which they withdraw from private property. But taxes to a great amount cannot poſſibly be raiſed, except in countries flouriſhing in ſuch reſources as agriculture and paſturage alone were never yet able to afford; reſources, which can only be acquired by war and rapine on the one hand, or obtained, on the other, by the powers of national induſtry, aſſiſted and multiplied by a nicely complicated machinery, and an endleſs ſubdiviſion of allotted taſks; each individual performing his part quickly and dexterouſly, becauſe each has but one, and that a ſmall part, to perform[a]; while the diligence of all is perpetually ſtimulated by the bait of gain, ſupplied from the exhauſtleſs fund of an enlightened commercial ſpirit, as extenſive as the world, and as enterpriſing as thoſe renowned adventurers who diſcovered and explored its remoteſt regions. It is in vain to inquire whether the plan of political economy propoſed by Ariſtotle, be in itſelf preferable to that which ſome modern nations purſue. Nations, circumſtanced as they are, may derive armies chiefly from agriculture, but muſt principally depend for ſupplies on manufactures and commerce. The option of their own or a better ſyſtem is now

[a] Πλειω τε ἑκαστα γιγνεται, και καλλιον, και ῥαον, ὁταν εις ἑν, η κατα φυσιν και εν καιρῳ, σχολην των αλλων αγων, πραττῃ. Plato, ibid. ii. p. 599.

no

no longer in their power: the queſtion of expediency has ceaſed: they muſt obey neceſſity[b].

This ſeems to me the only firm ground of defence for what is called the commercial ſyſtem of economy; a ſyſtem which has often been defended by very inconcluſive arguments. "Public wealth and proſperity," Mr. Hume obſerves, "is the end of all our wiſhes;" and this wealth or proſperity, both he and his follower, Dr. Smith, maintain, is only to be promoted by encouraging, with equal impartiality, all kinds of lawful induſtry; for though food be the great want of mankind, yet one man may produce as much food as will maintain

[b] It is not difficult to explain why the doctrines of ſpeculative politicians reſpecting the wealth and economy of nations, ſhould alſo differ ſo materially from the theory propoſed by our author. Among the Gothic nations who ſubdued the Roman empire, every thing moſt valuable and moſt intereſting is connected with the improvement of arts, and conſequent extenſion of commerce; which were the only engines that could counteract without violence their peculiar and unnatural arrangements with regard to landed property. Previous to the refinement and luxury introduced by commerce and the arts, the great landholders, who had engroſſed whole provinces, diſſipated the ſuperfluous produce of their grounds in maintaining idle ſervants and worthleſs dependents, ever ready to gratify the wildeſt and wickedeſt of their paſſions; to abet their inſolence, to uphold their haughtineſs, to encourage and ſecond their violence and rapacity; and the governments of Europe, ignorantly termed ariſtocracies, formed the worſt ſpecies of oligarchy; an oligarchy conſiſting, not in the collective authority of the whole body of landholders, but in the prerogatives and powers of each individual lord over his reſpective vaſſals and retainers. In ſuch a condition of ſociety the expenſive allurements of luxury, produced by what Ariſtotle condemns as over-refinement in arts and manufactures, had the moſt direct tendency to remedy evils greater than themſelves; to undermine the exorbitant power of the few, and to beſtow conſideration on the many. This particular caſe has been, by a very uſual fallacy in reaſoning, converted into a general political theorem.

BOOK I.

many[c]. But this aſſertion is not true in the acceptation in which it muſt be taken, in order to recommend the commercial ſyſtem above the agricultural. In agriculture, as we above obſerved, nature operates in concert with man; and though one family co-operating with nature, may, in a given piece of ground, produce as much food as will ſerve ſix, yet ſix families labouring the ſame ground, will not reap a proportional increaſe; and twenty families labouring the ſame ground, may find it barely ſufficient to ſupply their own nouriſhment. The more that the land is laboured, it will be the more productive; and the more fitly and fairly it is divided[d], it will (other circumſtances remaining the ſame) be the more laboured; and the ſame country or iſland will thus maintain the greater proportion of inhabitants employed in that kind of work, which, according to Ariſtotle, is the moſt favourable to health, morals, good government, the unfolding of intellectual as well as corporeal powers, and the attainment of that meaſure of happineſs which the general maſs of mankind can ever in this world hope to reach.

c Hume's Eſſays, vol. i. Refinement of Arts; and Smith's Wealth of Nations, paſſim.

d Does our author, therefore, propoſe an Agrarian law? No; he knew better. The ſecond book of his politics is of all books ever written, the beſt adapted to prove to levellers themſelves, that the meaſures from which they expect ſo much good, would, if carried into execution, infallibly terminate in their own ruin and that of the community.

BOOK I.

ARGUMENT.

Nature and end of a commonwealth.—Analysis thereof. —Monarchy the first form of government.—Domestic œconomy.—Slavery.—Accumulation of stock.—Riches, real and artificial.—Commerce.—Money.—Manufactures.—Monopolies.—Women.—Children.—Slaves. —Connection between domestic and political œconomy.

BOOK I. Chap. 1. — Nature and end of a commonwealth.

EVERY political society forms, it is plain, a sort of community or partnership, instituted for the benefit of the partners. Utility [d] is the end and aim of every such institution; and the greatest and most extensive utility is the aim of

[d] The first sentence of the Politics may be translated literally thus: "Since we see that every commonwealth is a partnership, and that every partnership is established for the sake of some good, (good, real or apparent, being the cause of all human action,) it is plain that all partnerships have good for their end and aim; and especially, that the sovereign good must be the aim of that sovereign partnership, which comprehends all the rest, and which is known by the name of a commonwealth, or of political society." The word utility in the text is therefore taken in its most extensive signification; utility, in the strict sense, constituting but one branch, and that the lowest of το αγαθον. See the Ethics, l. i. & x. passim. Plato uses the word utility nearly in the modern sense. καλλιστα γαρ δη τουτο και λεγεται και λελεξεται, ότι το μεν ωφελιμον καλον, το δε βλαβερον αισχρον, Plato de Repub. l. v. p. 655. Edit. Ficin. "This is most excellently said, and will ever continue to be said, that whatever is useful is honourable, and whatever is hurtful is shameful." In the Gorgias, p. 324. το καλον is analysed into pleasure and utility; a system revived by Mr. Hume in his Inquiry into the Principles of Morals. In both these significations "utility" is different from το χρησιμον a word denoting what is good or desirable, not in itself, but as useful or subservient to some desirable purpose.

that

BOOK I.

that great association, comprehending all the rest, and known by the name of a commonwealth [e].

A commonwealth is not to be confounded with a family, as if a large family were nothing different from a small commonwealth; nor ought we, as too many do, to confound the functions of kings and magistrates with those of superintendants [f] or masters. Magistrates rule by an established rotation; kings reign for life [g]; and

[e] As I shall frequently have occasion to use the words republic and commonwealth, the signification of which has been of late years strangely altered, I cannot better explain Aristotle's meaning of those terms than in the words of Cicero. "Respublica res est populi, cùm bene et juste geritur," &c. "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people, when it is well and rightly administered, whether by a single prince, by a small body of nobles, or by the people at large. But injustice converts the nobles into a faction; the prince, into a tyrant; the people into tyrants. In all these cases alike, the republic is not only corrupted but annihilated; since that cannot be called the wealth of the people which is administered by a faction or a tyrant; nor can that multitude be called the people, which is not associated on principles of justice and public utility." Fragm. de Repub. l. iii. Alluding to the sense above given to the word "commonwealth," James I. said to his Parliament in 1603, "I will ever prefer the weal of the public and of the whole *commonwealth* to any particular and private ends of mine."

[f] The οικονομος was a person appointed by rich men to manage their domestic concerns, and particularly to superintend and direct the labour of their slaves. When the δεσποτης, or master, was a poor man, he performed the office of οικονομος himself; for this reason Aristotle says, οιον, αν μεν ολιγων δεσποτην· αν δε πλειονων, οικονομον. "As if there were no other distinction between a master and a superintendant, but that the former had the government of a few and the latter of more."

[g] The original says, όταν μεν αυτος εφεστηκη, βασιλικον· όταν δε κατα λογυς της επιστημης της τοιαυτης, κατα μερος αρχων και αρχομενος, πολιτικον. The Latin translators all mistake the passage, "Esse quidem regem, si ipse præsit," &c. But Aristotle says, "when the same person perpetually presides, the government is regal; it is, on the other hand, republican when power changes from one hand to another,

10

and confidered in reference to the number of thofe fubject to their authority, the jurifdiction of fuperintendants is commonly more extenfive than that of mafters or fathers, and always more limited than that of magiftrates and kings. Thefe, however, are but accidental diftinctions; others more invariable and more fcientific, will refult from analyfing (according to our ufual mode of inveftigation) that complex object, a commonwealth, into its conftituent elements; thofe fimple and ultimate principles, that admit not of farther refolution.

Analyfis of political fociety.

In this analyfis, we fhall proceed moft fatisfactorily[h] by viewing fociety in its growth. Thofe parts or elements, then, will naturally force themfelves into union, which cannot continue feparately to exift. The neceffity of perpetuating the fpecies, forms the combining principle be-

another, and the citizens rule by vicarious fucceffion, according to the eftablifhed principles of focial arrangement." What thefe principles are, we fhall afterwards fee. It is fufficient at prefent to obferve that they are totally incompatible with the new-fangled doctrines concerning univerfal fuffrage and the right of majorities. The learned reader will perceive that I have here changed the order of the words, the better to exprefs the fenfe. The fignificant brevity of the Greek particles knit firmly together diftant claufes and fentences. But their force could only be expreffed in other languages by tirefome circumlocutions.

[h] Ariftotle fays, "In this, as in other inquiries, we fhould fpeculate moft fuccefsfully, could we contemplate fociety in its formation or genefis." This is that comprehenfive and fublime analyfis which Ariftotle has applied with fuch unremitting patience to the moft important fubjects of philofophy; and which is well illuftrated in mathematics by the learned Barrow, in his Geometrical Lectures; the principles of which probably laid the foundation of Newton's great difcoveries.

BOOK I.

tween males and females; a principle independent of choice or defign, and alike incident to animals and to plants, which are all naturally[i] impelled to propagate their refpective kinds. The fame imperious neceffity which compels affociation, naturally[k] produces government. Communities could not fubfift without forefight to difcern, as well as exertion to effectuate the meafures requifite for their fafety. Men capable of difcerning thofe meafures, are made for authority; and men merely capable of effectuating them by bodily labour, are made for obedience; but if fafety be their common concern, the good of the governors muft correfpond with the good of the governed, and the intereft of the fervant muft coincide with the intereft of the mafter.

Why women and flaves are confounded by barbarians.

It is found by experience, that thofe inftruments are the moft perfect, which are each of them contrived for its fpecific ufe. Slaves and women, though confounded in one mafs by barbarians, are therefore naturally different; for nature works not after the niggardly fafhion of Delphic cutlers[l], who fhape the fame knife for various and often diffimilar offices; and if women are by barbarians reduced to the level of flaves, it is becaufe barbarians themfelves have never yet rifen to the rank of men, that is, of

[i] See Analyfis, p. 126. [k] Ibid.

[l] Delphi, as the feat of the oracle, being continually frequented by ftrangers, exhibited a perpetual fair or market, where each cuftomer might be fupplied with wares agreeable to his tafte, and fuitable to his purfe. Hiftory of Greece, vol. i. c. v.

men

men fit to govern; wherefore the poets ſay, "'Tis right the Greeks ſhould govern the barbarians."

Origin and progreſs of ſociety.

Of the aſſociations above mentioned, that of a family is the firſt in its origin. "A houſe, a wife, and a labouring ox," theſe, together with the huſband or maſter, form the elements of the firſt community; for a poor man muſt be contented with a labouring ox inſtead of a ſlave. This primary aſſociation, founded on daily exigency, Charondas[m] diſtinguiſhes by a word denoting thoſe fed from the ſame board, and Epimenides[n] deſcribes it by a word denoting thoſe warmed at the ſame hearth.

Next in order follows the aſſociation of a canton or village, founded indeed on utility, but not on daily exigency, and moſt naturally formed by colonization from the firſt houſe or family. Such a community, therefore, is juſtly expreſſed by a word denoting thoſe nouriſhed from the ſame milk. It is the aſſociation of kinſmen un-

[m] Commonly reputed the legiſlator of Thurii, anciently Sybaris. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 485. Edit. Weſſeling. He is mentioned afterwards by Ariſtotle. The ſublime preface to his laws is contained in Stobæus, Serm. 42. p. 289.

[n] Probably in that work of his mentioned by Laertius, and intitled Περι της εν Κρητῃ πολιτειας. On the government of Crete. Apuleius ſays, he was Pythagoras's maſter, and Plato relates that he came to Athens ten years before the battle of Marathon, or five hundred years before Chriſt. (Plato de Legibus, l. i.) According to Plutarch (in Solon.), Cicero (de Divin. i. 18.), Pauſanias (Attic.), Epimenides had made a journey from Crete to Athens near a century before that period, and had prepared the way by his expiations and predictions, for Solon's legiſlation. He is believed to have lived above 150 years (Corſin. Faſt. Attic.). The Catalogue of the works aſcribed to him, particularly of his theological and myſtical poems, is given by Fabricius, t. i. p. 37. & ſeq.

 der

BOOK I.

Why monarchy was the first form of government.

der the authority of their common progenitor, whose jurisdiction slowly extends with the gradual multiplication of his family°. Cities therefore were first subject to kings; and to some kind of monarchy, many nations have invariably adhered; for all of them have grown to their present magnitude from feeble colonies or scattered tribes, originally subsisting under patriarchal government, in which (according to the poet),

"Each ruled his race, his neighbour not his care[p]."

That this is not a fiction, but an historical fact, is attested by that universal consent which has transferred monarchy from earth to heaven. All nations believe the gods to be governed by a king; for men, who have made the gods after their own image[q], are ever hasty in ascribing to these celestial beings, human manners and human institutions.

The

° The judicious Polybius agrees with Aristotle in maintaining that government is the work of nature, and that monarchy is the first kind of government, πρωτη μεν ακατασκευως και φυσικως συνισταται μοναρχια. "First of all comes monarchy, which is established by the bare work of nature, independently of any preparation or design." Polyb. l. vi. c. iv. vol. ii. p. 460. Edit. Sweigh. It is worthy of remark, that in the age of Polybius, Aristotle's opinions were only known by tradition; his works, as we have had occasion to relate, still remained unpublished. Polybius therefore was not acquainted with Aristotle's Politics, the perusal of which would have enabled him to avoid several errors into which he has fallen in his sixth book.

p Odyssey, ix. 115.

q Εν ανδρων, εν θεων γενος
Εκ μιας δε πνεομεν ματρος αμφοτεροι.

"The same is the race of men and gods: both of us received animation from the same mother." Pind. Nem. Ode i. v. 1. The doctrine

A commonwealth congenial to the social nature of man;

The union of various villages forms, at length, a city or commonwealth, that finished fabric of society reaching, as near as may be, the bound of perfectness; self-sufficient and complete, constituted for safety, and productive of happiness. A commonwealth is not less congenial to human nature, than the association of a family or village. It is the goal to which all preceding associations tend; their natural result, and their highest maturity; and the perfection of civil society, being the matured state of man, is like the perfection of every other progressive object, that stage of his existence which peculiarly ascertains, characterizes, and essentiates his nature[r]. Whoever, therefore, is unfit to live in a commonwealth, is above or below humanity.

> "Cursed is the man and void of law and right,
> "Unworthy property, unworthy light[s]."

Such a wretch can only delight in carnage, a solitary and ravenous vulture; but man delights in society far more than do bees or herds[t]; since

trine had prevailed, at least, from the time of Hesiod's Theogonia. Persius blames the Romans for acting on the same principle:

> Quid juvat hoc, templis nostros immittere mores,
> Et bona Dîs ex hac scelerata ducere pulpa?
>
> Satyr. ii. 63.

[r] The word is sometimes used in the same sense by the Roman writers. Thus Tacitus alluding to the dark and livid colour of the British pearls, which rendered them a less tempting prize to the avarice of the Romans (Vid. Sueton. in Jul. Cæsar. c. xlvii.), says, "Ego facilius crediderim, naturam margaritis deesse quam nobis avariciam." Tacit. in Agricol. c. 12.

[s] Iliad, ix. v. 64.

[t] While translating this chapter I happened to look into an agreeable compilement, intitled, The Philosophy of Natural History, and read

BOOK I.

since nature, which never works in vain, distinguishes him by the power of speech, not merely to signify his pains and pleasures, a purpose limiting the vocal communications of other animals, but to describe his advantages and inconveniences, to explain his rights and wrongs.

and the cause of his virtues and perfections.

A participation in rights and advantages forms the bond of political society; an institution prior, in the intention of nature, to the families and individuals from whom it is constituted[u]. What members

read the following passage: "Some writers, as Aristotle and a few moderns, implicit followers of his opinions, deny that man is naturally a gregarious or associating animal. To render this notion consistent with the actual and universal state of human nature, these authors have recourse to puerile conceits and questionable facts, which it would be fruitless to relate." Smellie's Philosophy of Natural History, c. xvi. p. 415. Who those followers of Aristotle are, I know not: but if any such there be, how unworthily has that philosopher been treated by his disciples as well as by his detractors!

[u] Aristotle's words are: ὁτι μεν ουν ἡ πολις φυσει προτερον η εκαστος, δηλον· ει γαρ μη αυταρκης ἑκαστος χωρισθεις, ὁμοιως τοις αλλοις μερεσι ἑξει προς το ὁλον. "That a commonwealth is prior by nature to each individual citizen, is plain; for if each individual, when separated, is incapable of supplying his own wants, it is evident that he must bear the same relation to the community, as other parts bear to the whole or system to which they appertain." Nature, our author observes, has always some end in view, and always employs the best means for attaining it. "This end or purpose is the first thing in the intention of Nature, though she is often obliged to effect it by a long series of intermediate operations, each of which, except the last of all, is both means and end; means with regard to that which follows, and end with regard to that which precedes it. Thus Nature or rather the God of nature, willed the existence of such a creature as man, whose characteristic distinction should consist in his perfectibility, or his capacity of being disciplined from a mere animal or savage, into a moral and intellectual being. But man is only to be disciplined by civil society; and civil society requires, for its materials, the smaller associations of tribes and families. These last again resolve themselves into individuals, distinguished by the relative appellations of husband and wife, father and son, master and servant, and constituting

members are to the body, citizens are to the commonwealth. The hand or foot, when separated from the body, retains indeed its name, but totally changes its nature, because it is completely divested of its uses and of its powers. In the same manner a citizen is a constituent part of a whole or system[x], which invests him with powers and qualifies him for functions, for which, in his individual capacity, he is totally unfit;

---

tuting the elements of families." Aristotle here speaks as if civil society itself, considered as a whole or system, complete in all its parts or members, perfect, happy, and self-sufficient, formed the end for which man was created. But in the twelfth book of his Metaphysics, in the seven last chapters of the third book of his Treatise De Anima, and even in his Ethics to Nicomachus, l. x. c. viii. he intimates that man has a still higher destination than that of acting his part well in political society. Plato, in his Thæatetus, had said, "That the main object of human pursuit ought to be ὁμοιωσις τῳ Θεῳ κατα το δυνατον· ὁμοιωσις δε, δικαιον και ὁσιον μετα φρονησεως γενεσθαι· "a resembling God as much as possible; and to resemble God is to imitate his justice, his holiness, and wisdom." Aristotle holds the same doctrine in the passages above alluded to; maintaining, however, that the moral virtues may be ultimately resolved into the intellectual; or, in other words, that wisdom and goodness, though they do not keep pace in every step of their progress, yet finally coincide.

[x] The maxim that citizens are parts of the community had long been considered as a practical principle, and had become a fruitful source of laws in the republics of Greece. The wretch guilty of suicide was punished with infamy, as robbing the state of a member[1]. The state resented injuries done to individuals, as inflicted on itself. Insults offered to women, children, or even to slaves, might be resented, prosecuted, and punished by every citizen[2]: admirable institutions, Plutarch observes, for preventing wrongs; the whole community warmly sympathising with the indignant feelings of the sufferers[3]. Turpitude, or baseness, alone dissolved the connection between a citizen and his country. He who committed actions unworthy of a man, was divested of his political rights, and severed from the community, as a gangrened member which might infect and destroy the system[4].

(1) Aristot. Ethic. passim. (2) Demosthen. in Mid. p. 610.
(3) Plutarch. in Solon. p. 88. (4) Idem, ibid.

BOOK I.

fit; and independently of which fyftem, he might fubfift indeed as a folitary favage, but could never attain that improved and happy ftate to which his progreffive nature invariably tends. He, therefore, who firft collected focieties, was the greateft benefactor to mankind. Perfected by the offices and duties of focial life, man is the beft, but, rude and undifciplined, he is the very worft of animals. For nothing is more deteftable than armed improbity; and man is armed with craft and courage, which, untamed by juftice, he will moft wickedly pervert, and become at once the moft impious and the fierceft of monfters; the moft abominable in gluttony, the moft fhameless in venery. But juftice is the fundamental virtue of political fociety, fince the order of fociety cannot be maintained without law, and laws are inftituted to declare what is juft.

Chap. 3.

The nature and branches of domeftic œconomy.

Cities or commonwealths are compofed of families; and the management of a family is properly termed œconomy. A family, to be complete, muft confift of freemen and flaves [y]; and as every complex object naturally refolves itfelf into fimple elements, we muft confider the elements of a family:—the mafter and fervant, the hufband and wife, the father and children; what all of thefe are in themfelves, and what are the relations which they naturally and properly bear to each other [z]. We

[y] This founds harfh; but hear him to the end.

[z] The relations of authority and fubjection fubfifting between the mafter and fervant were expreffed in the Greek by the fubftantives δεσποτικα

We ſhall then conſider the acquiſition of property and the accumulation of ſtock, which by ſome is treated as a branch, and by others as the moſt important branch, of œconomy. Let us begin, then, by examining the relation of maſter and ſervant; and by inveſtigating the nature of ſervitude itſelf, endeavour to form more ſalutary and more correct notions on this ſubject than thoſe which generally prevail. By ſome writers, that part of œconomy employed in the management of ſlaves has been dignified with the name of ſcience; by others, ſlavery is conſidered as an inſtitution altogether unnatural, reſulting from the cruel maxims of war. Liberty, they aſſert, is the great law of nature [a], which acknowledges not any difference between the ſlave and the maſter; ſlavery therefore is unjuſt, being founded on violence.

The nature of domeſtic ſlavery.

It is the buſineſs, then, of œconomy to procure the comfortable ſubſiſtence of a family; and all arts and employments require proper inſtruments for effecting their reſpective ends.

δεσποτεια and δουλεια. But the analogous relations ſubſiſting between the huſband and wife, the father and children, had not in Greek, Ariſtotle obſerves, any appropriate names. He therefore denotes them by the adjectives ἡ γαμικη (conjugalis ſocietas) and ἡ τεκνοποιητικη: which latter, in chapter twelfth of this book, he calls πατρικη, to which joining αρχη, we ſhall have the patria poteſtas of the Romans.

[a] The Scholiaſt on Ariſtotle's Rhetoric has preſerved a ſaying to this purpoſe of Alcidamas, the ſcholar of Gorgias of Leontium (See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 337.): Ελευθερους αφηκε παντας Θεος ουδενα δουλον ἡ φυσις πεποιηκε. "All come free from the hands of God, Nature has made no man a ſlave."

Of

BOOK I.

Of these instruments, some are inanimate, and others are endowed with life. The sailor, as well as the helm, are instruments of navigation; since they are moved and impelled by the will of the pilot, for effecting the purpose of his art. Under this aspect, any piece of property may be considered in relation to the art of œconomy. It is an instrument to be moved and employed for the purpose of comfortable subsistence. Property at large, therefore, is merely an accumulation of many such instruments; and even a slave is, in this view, a moveable instrument, endowed with life, which, impelled by the will of another, communicates motion to other instruments less excellent than himself. The statues of Dedalus, and the tripods of Vulcan, moved, we are told, spontaneously;

> "Wondrous to tell, instinct with spirit roll'd
> From place to place around the blest abodes,
> Self-moved, obedient to the beck of gods [b]."

Did this usually happen, did the shuttle thus weave, and the strings of the harp thus play, the artist would not need the assistance of workmen, nor the master require the labour of slaves.

Among the various instruments subservient to the comfort of human life, there is this material distinction; that the work performed by one class, consists in production; and the work performed by another, is totally consumed in use. A shuttle produces a web; a couch, or a suit of

[b] Iliad, viii.

clothes,

clothes, produce nothing; they refpectively afford, however, the convenience of wearing the one, and of repofing on the other. As ufe and production are things fpecifically different, the objects or inftruments that are relative to the one muft, with refpect to their ends and purpofes, be effentially different from thofe relative to the other. A domeftic flave is relative to ufe; his labour is totally confumed in promoting the eafe of his mafter. He is merely the poffeffion and property, or, as it were, the feparable part of that mafter; and every part, whether feparable or infeparable, is to be ufed and employed, not according to its own intereft or caprice, but in fubferviency to the general good, and fuitably to reafon. It is to be regarded merely in relation to that whole or fyftem to which it appertains. A flave is fimply the property of his mafter; but the mafter ftands in many other relations befide that of proprietor of his flave. Such is the nature and the function of fervitude. We proceed to examine whether this inftitution be wife and juft.

The analogy of nature evinces flavery to be juft and ufeful.

To determine this queftion, it will be fufficient to contemplate the ordinary courfe of nature, and to deduce from our obfervations clear inferences of reafon. Government and fubjection, then, are things ufeful and neceffary; they prevail every where, in animated as well as in brute matter; from their firft origin, fome natures are formed to command, and others to obey; the kinds of government and fubjection varying with the differences of their objects, but all equally ufeful for their refpective ends; and thofe kinds the

the beſt and moſt excellent, from which the beſt and moſt excellent conſequences reſult. In every compoſition whoſe parts are harmoniſed into any regular whole, the neceſſity of government and ſubjection evidently appears, whether this whole or ſyſtem be continuous or diſcrete; animated or lifeleſs; for even in muſic, there is a certain principle of rule and ſubordination: but ſuch ſpeculations are perhaps foreign to the preſent ſubject. In compoſitions endowed with life, it is the province of mind to command, and the province of matter to obey. Man conſiſts of ſoul and body, and in all men rightly conſtituted, the ſoul commands the body; although ſome men are ſo groſsly depraved, that in them the body ſeems to command the ſoul. But here the order of nature is perverted.

In the human conſtitution, therefore, mind governs matter abſolutely and deſpotically; but reaſon governs appetite with a far more limited ſway; ſtill, however, it governs like a juſt and lawful prince, and the little community of man is thus held together and ſuſtained; whereas, were the ſubordinate parts to uſurp authority, or even to aſſert equality, all would ſpeedily be undone, and the ſyſtem would fall in ruins.

The ſame obſervations apply to the various tribes of animals, which riſe above each other in excellence, in proportion to their tameneſs and docility; and which are all of them benefited by their ſubjection to man, becauſe this is conducive to their ſafety. In the different ſexes alſo, we ſee the male formed for government, and the female for ſubmiſſion; and a principle prevailing

prevailing thus univerſally in every region of nature, cannot but apply to an inſtitution ſo natural as is that of political ſociety.

What are the requiſites which fit men for ſervitude.

Thoſe men, therefore, whoſe powers are chiefly confined to the body, and whoſe principal excellence conſiſts in affording bodily ſervice; thoſe, I ſay, are naturally ſlaves, becauſe it is their intereſt to be ſo. They can obey reaſon, though they are unable to exerciſe it; and though different from tame animals, who are diſciplined by means merely of their ſenſations and appetites, they perform nearly the ſame taſks, and become the property of other men, becauſe their own ſafety requires it.

In conformity with theſe obſervations, Nature, we ſee, has variouſly moulded the human frame: ſome men are ſtrongly built, and firmly compacted; others erect and graceful, unfit for toil and drudgery, but capable of ſuſtaining honourably the offices of war and peace. This, however, holds not univerſally; for a ſervile mind is often lodged in a graceful perſon; and we have often found bodies formed for ſervitude, animated by the ſouls of freemen. Yet the diſtinction itſelf is not frivolous; for were part of the human race to be arrayed in that ſplendour of beauty which beams from the ſtatues of the gods, univerſal conſent would acknowledge the reſt of mankind naturally formed to be their ſlaves. The difference of minds, though leſs obvious, is far more characteriſtic and more important; whence we may con-

 clude

BOOK I. Chap. 4.

clude that ſlavery is founded both on utility and juſtice [x].

The miſtakes on this ſubject cauſed by confounding the kinds of ſlavery.

This deciſion, however, has been arraigned with conſiderable plauſibility: for ſlavery may be taken in two ſenſes, in one of which he is a ſlave who ſubmits to the law of war, commanding the vanquiſhed to become the property of the victors [y]. This is acknowledged to be law; but

[x] Ariſtotle founds ſlavery on different principles from thoſe aſſigned by Juſtinian, which have been univerſally followed by one party, and univerſally controverted by another; ſince the time of that Emperor, or rather ſince the Roman juriſprudence became a faſhionable ſtudy. Servi aut fiunt aut naſcuntur; fiunt jure gentium aut jure civili; naſcuntur ex ancillis noſtris. Inſt. i. 3, 4. According to Juſtinian, therefore, there are three origins of the right of ſlavery: The law of nations; the civil law; and birth, that is, deſcent from ſervile parents. By the law of nations, a conqueror was thought entitled to kill his enemy, and having ſpared his life, might afterwards deal with him as he pleaſed, and therefore reduce him into ſlavery. This, indeed, was the practice of ancient nations; but the practice, how univerſal ſoever among them, was abuſively termed a law, ſince irreconcileable with juſtice. In war the victor has not any right to kill his enemy but in caſes of abſolute neceſſity, for ſelf-defence; and there is a clear proof that this neceſſity did not exiſt, when, inſtead of killing him, he made him priſoner. Even the right of killing would not infer the right of enſlaving; ſince to many, ſlavery may be worſe than death. Juſtinian ſays, ſecondly, that ſlavery may begin "jure civili," when one man ſells himſelf to another. But every ſale implies a price, a quid pro quo; whereas, in the caſe of ſtrict ſlavery, the ſeller gives every thing; life, liberty, property; and the buyer returns nothing. Of what validity then, ſays Judge Blackſtone, can a ſale be, which deſtroys the principles on which all ſales are founded? Laſtly, as to ſlaves by birth, it is plain that this foundation of ſlavery reſts on the two former, and muſt fall with them. If neither captivity nor ſale can enſlave the parent, much leſs can they enſlave the offspring. See Blackſtone's Commentaries, vol. i. p. 424. Ariſtotle, as we ſhall ſee, might, conſiſtently with his principles, have ſubſcribed to the liberal concluſions of this excellent author.

[y] Ariſtotle ſays, ὁ γαρ νομος ὁμολογια τις ἐςι εν ῃ τα κατα πολεμον κρατȣμενα των κρατȣντων ειναι. "That law is a certain agreement, according to which all belonging to the vanquiſhed becomes the property

but the law itſelf is accuſed of iniquity, and impeached[z], like the orators of Athens when they have perſuaded the aſſembly to paſs unjuſt decrees. On this ſubject, wiſe men hold different opinions, proceeding from the different views which they take of the queſtion. Some conſider ſuperiority as the proof of virtue, becauſe its natural effect; and aſſert that, in juſtice, the victors ſhould be maſters of the vanquiſhed, as being their ſuperiors, and therefore their betters; while others deny the force of this argument, maintaining that nothing can be truly juſt, which is inconſiſtent with humanity[a]. Superiority in war, they ſay, cannot ſurely be a proof of juſtice, ſince wars are often unjuſtly undertaken, and ſucceſsfully, though wickedly, carried on and concluded. It is harſh, beſides, to aſſert that he ought to be a ſlave who is unfit for ſervitude; and that perſons of illuſtrious birth or illuſtrious merit are rendered ſlaves by falling into the hands of an enemy. To avoid this conſequence, the advocates for ſubjecting the vanquiſhed to the victors, propoſe limiting this

---

perty of the victors." This was univerſally the law of nations in Ariſtotle's time; a law which his humanity abhorred, and his courage arraigned. Inſtead of being accuſed of abetting the harſh law of ſlavery, he ought rather to be reſpected for deſtroying the falſe foundations on which this law was eſtabliſhed.

[z] The orator, who had perſuaded the Athenian aſſembly to paſs an unjuſt or a bad law, was impeached by the γραφη παρανομων. Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. 32.

[a] The text is corrupt. The word is ευνοια; and on the margin ευνομια. I conjecture the true reading is επιεικεια, equity; that is, humanity moderating ſtrict juſtice, the juſtice founded on law.

BOOK I.

law to the cafe of Barbarians vanquifhed by Greeks; for the nobility of Barbarians is confined to their refpective countries, but the nobility of Greece is as extenfive as the world. But in this mode of reafoning, they abandon their own doctrine, and acknowledge the principle which we have above eftablifhed, that flavery adheres to the character itfelf, is independent of accident, and that fome are every where flaves, and others, like the Helen of Theodectes [b], are every where free;

> "Sprung from the immortal gods, on either fide,
> Who dares reproach me with the name of flave?"

Such, indeed, feems to be the intention of Nature, who, as fhe produces man from man, and beaft from beaft, wifhes likewife to generate illuftrious defcendants from illuftrious anceftors; but here Nature often fails in accomplifhing her own purpofes [c].

Differences of the two kinds of flavery.

There are, thus, two kinds of flavery, the one founded on nature, the other eftablifhed by law, or rather produced by violence. The firft kind can only take place when the mafter is as fit to command as the flave to obey. It is then profitable both to the flave and the mafter; whofe interefts, rightly underftood, become as infeparable as the interefts of foul and body. This

[b] A native of Phafelis in Lycia, the fcholar of Plato and Ifocrates, author of fifty tragedies, and of the Art of Rhetoric in verfe. See Fabricius, l. ii. c. 19. & l. iii. c. 10. Cicero, Athenæus, and Suidas fay, that he was a fcholar of Ariftotle's. His fplendid compofitions are now reduced to a few fhort fragments.

[c] See Analyfis, vol. i. p. 127.

commu-

communion of interefts naturally engenders mutual good-will [d]; but in the flavery contrary to nature, occafioned by war, and created by force, flaves and mafters muft always be hoftile to each other.

Different kinds of fubordination founded in nature.

The principles above eftablifhed fhew, that a diverfity in the nature and relations of things neceffarily occafions various kinds of fubordination. According to the differences of thofe fubjected to its authority, government, therefore, is found to vary, to be more or lefs abfolute, and, as it were, to fluctuate between monarchy and liberty; monarchy, where one man rules always, and fometimes abfolutely; liberty, where

[d] The author advifes mafters to fecure the fidelity of flaves by the pledges of wives and children, and to indulge them with the enjoyment of feftivals and diverfions, of which their condition ftands more in need than that of freemen. De Cura Rei Familiaris, l. i. c. v. p. 494. In moft countries of Greece, flaves, indeed, were merely the loweft clafs of inhabitants, a fort of fervants for life, and not always for life, fince they were entitled on many particular grounds to demand their freedom, and even to recover it by purchafe, if frugal in the management of their peculium, or feparate property. Comp. Plato de Legibus, l. vi. Ariftoph. in Ran. v. 706. Terent. Phorm. act. i. fc. 1. Xenoph. de Repub. Athen. paffim. The Athenian flaves, when harfhly treated by their mafters, found an afylum from cruelty in the temple of Thefeus, and were allowed to pafs into the fervice of another mafter lefs tyrannical. Demofth. in Mid. Plutarch. de Superftit. Demofthenes having cited a law which forbade the ftriking of a flave, proceeds thus: "You hear, Athenians, the humanity of the law, which prevents the offering infult even to a flave. What, in the name of the gods! do you think would be the fentiments of thofe nations, from whom flaves are purchafed into Greece, fhould they be told that there were certain Greeks, men fo gentle and humane, that notwithftanding the accumulated injuries received from Barbarians, and a natural and hereditary enmity to their race, yet did not allow thefe enemies to be ill-treated even in fervitude, but had enacted a law exprefsly prohibiting infults to flaves, and had punifhed the violators of this law by death?" Demofth. adverf. Mideam, p. 392.

 different

BOOK I.

different men hold the offices of magiſtracy by vicarious ſucceſſion: but the management of a houſehold muſt always be of the firſt kind, and entruſted to one only, if we wiſh it to be well regulated.

Peculiarity of the relation between maſter and ſlave.

A maſter poſſeſſes a property in his ſlaves, and a right to employ their induſtry; yet it is not from his particular ſkill in directing this induſtry that he derives his authority. This authority is founded on the general ſuperiority of his character; ſince it is their reſpective qualities and characters that claſs mankind under the different denominations of freemen or ſlaves. Did the government of a houſehold conſiſt, as ſome writers have imagined, in any particular ſkill or craft, this ſkill or craft muſt evidently be relative to the labour required, and the ſervices exacted. At Saracuſe there lived a man who exerciſed for hire the trade of teaching the various branches of domeſtic ſervitude; which are recommended by different degrees of neceſſity or utility, but which are all of them too mean and ſordid to be underſtood by maſters of families; whoſe proper function contains in it nothing very deep or myſterious, ſince its ſole requiſite is, that the maſter know how to command, what the ſlave knows how to perform. Maſters unwilling to ſtoop to ſuch petty cares employ a ſuperintendant, who manages their houſehold, while they themſelves cultivate the liberal arts; plunge into politics, or purſue philoſophy.

Chap. 5.

Of the accumulation

Slaves form the moſt valuable, indeed, but not the only kind of ſtock. Of the accumulation of

of ftock in general, we proceed now to treat. Firft of all, is the art of accumulation the fame thing with œconomics, or merely fomething fubfervient to this fcience; and if merely fubfervient, is it in the manner that the trade of fhuttle-making is fubfervient to that of weaving, or as the art of cafting brafs is fubfervient to the art of fculpture? for fhuttles are the *inftruments* of weaving, but brafs fupplies the *materials* of fculpture. To accumulate ftock, is to provide whatever is thought neceffary for the purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence; but œconomy confifts in employing or managing the neceffaries thus provided, in the manner beft adapted to the attainment of the end in view. As the arts of accumulation and of œconomy cannot therefore be the fame, let us confider whether the former be a branch of the latter; and there being many kinds of ftock or riches, let us begin with examining the ftock fupplied by agriculture, or, in general, the art of providing food, the great and principal want of all mankind.

Of ftock in general.

It is chiefly this want, and the various means employed for fupplying it, that produces the wide variety of manners and modes of life, in men and animals. By the conftitution of nature, different animals delight in different kinds of food; fome delight in herbs, others in flefh, while a third clafs feek nourifhment from both; and in fubfervience to the facility of acquiring fuch food as is agreeable to their refpective natures, fome animals are folitary, and others are gregarious. The life of man is wonderfully diverfified by the fame circumftance, and of all *his*

The different modes of procuring the neceffaries of life.

BOOK I.

modes of life, the paſtoral is the moſt ſimple, the moſt eaſy, and the moſt indolent. Poſſeſſing a ſort of living farm ſpontaneouſly productive, the ſhepherd roams at large with his herds, which ſupply him with all the neceſſaries of ſubſiſtence, independently of any labour on his part, but the pleaſing care of conducting them to freſh paſtures. Another part of the human ſpecies reſembles, in its mode of life, the various animals of prey, and ſubſiſts by hunting and fiſhing, by war and robbery; but far the greateſt proportion of mankind derives ſubſiſtence from the earth, and its meliorated fruits. Such, then, are the different forms of human life, all reſulting from the different contrivances for procuring or producing food. Commerce, indeed, produces nothing; but it exchanges and diſtributes, as conveniency requires, the objects and commodities already produced and accumulated. A commercial ſtate of ſociety, therefore, preſuppoſes a ſuperabundance of productive induſtry. It is founded on the primary modes of acquiring the neceſſaries of life, which we have above enumerated; and which, ſeldom exiſting apart, are variouſly combined and blended, hunting and war often ſupplying the deficiencies of paſturage and agriculture.

Diſtinction between real and artificial riches. The right of property founded in nature.

One kind of property, a property in the proviſions neceſſary for life, is viſibly eſtabliſhed by Nature herſelf, who ſupplies all animals, at their birth, with neceſſary food, and afterwards furniſhes them with the means of procuring it. When the young are ſeparated from the parent in

in the form of eggs or worms, these organized germs contain in themselves the materials of their first nourishment; in viviparous animals, these materials are supplied by the teeming breasts of the mother. In their advancement to maturity, none of the living tribes are abandoned by the kind care of Nature. Herbs and plants are copiously furnished for the use of animals; and animals themselves for the various exigencies of man; almost all of them supplying him with food, while the tame serve him as instruments of industry, and the wild furnish him with useful articles of clothing, and innumerable other conveniences.

A property in things necessary for subsistence being established by Nature, the means of acquiring this property must be natural and just. Hunting, therefore, is entitled to these epithets; and war, which is a species of hunting, and which may be justly employed against wild animals, and savage men, who spurn servitude, though incapable of freedom. The arts of acquiring this property are essential to every community, whether civil or domestic. They supply that genuine wealth, the accumulation of which serves as the instrument productive of comfortable subsistence, not that factitious riches stigmatized by Solon—

"No bounds to riches ever were assigned."

To real and natural riches bounds have always been assigned; since, like all other instruments, they are limited, both in magnitude and number, by

BOOK I.

by the ends for which they ſerve, and the effects which they are intended to produce. But that factitious wealth which is often confounded with them, is indeed boundleſs, and will appear neceſſarily to be ſo, when we have inveſtigated its nature.

Chap. 6.

The nature of commerce, its different kinds.

Firſt of all, then, it is to be obſerved that every piece of property may be employed for two diſtinct purpoſes, the purpoſe of uſe, and the purpoſe of exchange. A pair of ſhoes may be worn, or they may be ſold. This ſecond purpoſe, though it is not the original and proper end for which ſhoes were made, is founded on a principle both natural and neceſſary, the diſpoſition to truck and barter, by which men part with their ſuperfluities, in order to ſupply their deficiencies. In the community of a family, there is not any room even for barter, becauſe this community is ſo cloſe and ſo intimate, that all kinds of property are conſidered as common ſtock. But when men ſeparate, at a diſtance, in ſcattered families, the varieties of local ſituation, and innumerable other circumſtances, muſt introduce that kind of exchange or barter, which we ſtill ſee practiſed among primitive and ſimple nations, who truck wine for corn, and any one commodity of which they have too much, for another of which they are in want. This firſt and natural mode of exchange gave occaſion to a ſecond far more refined and more artificial. The goods neceſſary to man, as the inſtruments of comfortable ſubſiſtence, were found not to be (many of them at leaſt)

The uſe of money, on what principles founded.

leaſt) either of eaſy conveyance, or of conſtant uſe. The beſt, perhaps the only, markets, however, often lay at a diſtance. It became neceſſary, therefore, to think of certain commodities, eaſily manageable and ſafely tranſportable, and of which the uſes are ſo general and ſo numerous, that they enſured the certainty of always obtaining for them the articles wanted in exchange. The metals, particularly iron and ſilver and ſeveral others, exactly correſpond to this deſcription. They were employed, therefore, by general agreement, as the ordinary ſtandard of value[c], and the common meaſure of

[c] The ſubject of money is treated above, vol. i. p. 374. & ſeq. In that paſſage compared with the Magna Moralia, l. i. c. xxxiv. p. 165. we find the fundamental principles of the modern œconomiſts. In both chapters the author is treating of commutative juſtice; which, as he clearly ſhews, always depends on the equality of ratios, and therefore implies four terms; namely, two perſons and two things, or two works; in the exchange of which, "he who has laboured much, receives much; and he who has laboured little, receives but little:" τον μεν πολλα πεπονηκοτα πολλα λαμβανειν, τον δε ολιγα πεπονηκοτα, ολιγα λαμβανειν. But different quantities of labour are, like other cauſes, beſt known and aſcertained by their effects; that is, by the works which they produce; works ſo complex and ſo diſſimilar that their relative values to each other can only be appreciated by the means of a common meaſure. The circumſtances mentioned in the text as belonging excluſively to the precious metals, point them out as the fitteſt of all objects for ſupplying this function, and meaſuring the exchangeable value of all other commodities, which being all commenſurable with money, are thus rendered commenſurate with each other. But even the metals are not correct meaſures (γινεται ΠΩΣ μετρον), ſince they themſelves vary in value in proportion to their plenty or ſcarcity, the more or leſs labour requiſite for procuring them, compared with that requiſite for procuring other objects of deſire, and a variety of other circumſtances, all expreſſed by the word χρεια; the deſire of poſſeſſing, and the difficulty of acquiring them. It is this varying relation which regulates the price or exchangeable value of things; and, beſide this, no other ſtandard can ever poſſibly be diſcovered. Had Monteſquieu (Eſprit des Loix, b. xxii. c. i. & ſeq.) and

BOOK I. of exchange; being themselves estimated, at first, by their bulk and weight; and afterwards stamped,

---

and Hume (Essay on the Balance of Trade) paid due attention to our author's principles concerning money, they would not have fallen into the error of maintaining that the introduction of paper currency diminished the exchangeable value of gold and silver, exactly in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. Dr. Smith, who has ably refuted this doctrine (Wealth of Nations, v. i. b. ii. c. ii.), falls into the contrary error, when he asserts (p. 498.) that paper currency has not any effect in lowering the value of gold and silver: which value, he thinks, depends entirely "upon the proportion between the quantity of labour necessary to bring a certain quantity of gold and silver to market, and that necessary to bring thither a certain quantity of any other sort of commodities." Without noticing that here, as in some other places, Dr. Smith mistakes tendencies for results, it may be observed that the introduction of paper currency supplying, or at least diminishing one of the uses of gold and silver, namely, that of circulating commodities, renders those metals less requisite for that specific purpose, less objects of desire and therefore cheaper. In other words, it must diminish the exchangeable value of all the precious metals which have been accumulated by the labour of hundreds of ages. This, I say, it must do, other circumstances remaining the same, precisely for the same reason that the introduction of glass vessels and of pastes has diminished the exchangeable value of gems and diamonds. But as the precious metals have many and various uses, none of which, besides that of serving as a measure, can be supplied by paper currency, their exchangeable value will not be diminished in proportion to the quantity of paper circulated. One use of an object may be totally destroyed; and, notwithstanding this, the other uses for which it serves, may still entitle it to great value in exchange. Paper currency, indeed, lowers the precious metals on the whole, but lowers them on the whole by diminishing one only of their uses. Were this adventitious use of them, as Aristotle observes, entirely set aside by that kind of tacit convention which established it, they would still bear a great price on account of their many useful and agreeable properties. These properties of the metals, their brilliancy, durability, divisibility, &c. which recommend them peculiarly as a *measure*, render them also a *pledge*; and their exchangeable value is, according to Aristotle, more invariable than that of any other commodity (see above, vol. i. p. 377.). Dr. Smith, b. i. c. v. p. 51. on the contrary, maintains "that the exchangeable value of corn varies less, from century to century, than that of gold and silver." *Ibid.* The discovery, indeed, of the New World lowered exceedingly the exchangeable value of the precious metals

10 in

ſtamped, in order to ſave the trouble of meaſuring and weighing them.

The

---

in much leſs than a century; but this particular caſe ought not to be converted into a general theorem. In purſuance of his notion of the greater ſtability in the exchangeable value of corn, than in that of gold and ſilver, Dr. Smith obſerves, "that every other commodity will at any particular time purchaſe a greater or ſmaller quantity of labour, in proportion to the quantity of ſubſiſtence which it can purchaſe at that time. A rent, therefore, reſerved in corn, is liable only to the variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can purchaſe. But a rent reſerved in any other commodity is liable, not only to the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn can purchaſe, but to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be purchaſed by any particular quantity of that commodity." *Ibid.* p. 53. The variations in the quantity of corn that can be purchaſed by gold or ſilver, are occaſioned by the plenty or ſcarcity of corn, or by the plenty or ſcarcity of the precious metals; but far more frequently by the former circumſtances than by the latter. The plenty of corn, or the little labour with which corn may be brought to market, diminiſhes its exchangeable value with regard to all other commodities as well as with regard to gold and ſilver. When the rent is reſerved in the precious metals, its exchangeable value, therefore, at different times, that is, the quantity of other commodities, or of the labour producing them, which this rent can at thoſe different times purchaſe or command, will not be regulated by the variation in the money prices of corn; becauſe this variation, reſulting from the plenty or ſcarcity of corn, enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of all other commodities preciſely in the ſame proportion as it enhances or reduces the exchangeable value of gold and ſilver. The money price of corn was higher in the laſt century than in the preſent; yet the money price of labour was lower in that century than in the preſent. The money price of corn is higher in England than in America; yet the money price of labour is lower in England than in America. The French œconomiſts, overlooking Ariſtotle's great principles concerning *labour* and *value*, frequently reaſon as if all things eſſential to human comfort conſiſted in food. In the paſſage above cited, Dr. S. reaſons as if all thoſe things conſiſted in corn.

Till the above note was printed in 1797, Dr. Smith's notions with regard to money, had, as far as I know, paſſed current, both on account of his complete refutation of Monteſquieu and Hume, and becauſe his doctrine itſelf was, for obvious reaſons, calculated to maintain popularity in this country. But ſince that time the ſame doctrine has been called in queſtion by a variety of writers: particularly

BOOK I.

Their abufe introduces artificial traffic; not for accommodation, but for gain.

The metals thus ftamped are called money; and the invention of money neceffarily precedes that artificial traffic, of which the main object is not comfort but gain. To get money is the bufinefs of the merchant; with him wealth and

---

cularly by Mr. Thornton in his excellent treatife "on Paper Credit." Mr. Thornton fays "that if we could fuppofe as large a fubftitution of paper in the place of coin to take place in other countries as we have lately experienced in our own, the diminution for the demand of bullion might be fuch as very materially to affect its general value, and to enhance the money price of articles over the world." Thornton on Paper Credit, p. 306. Mr. Wheatley, in a treatife on Commerce and Currency, maintains that "if the currency of the world confifted of two hundred millions of fpecie, and two hundred millions of paper circulated in the fame manner as fpecie, the price of produce would be doubled by the addition of paper." Wheatley on Currency and Commerce, p. 183. But this remark runs into the error directly oppofite to Smith's, and brings us back to the exploded doctrine of Montefquieu and Hume which Dr. Smith had very ably refuted. Mr. Thornton alfo, on fome occafions, rejects the confequences of his own principles. He is fond of comparing "paper money to a cheaper inftrument fubftituted for a dearer one," p. 171. 315, &c. Upon this comparifon he maintains with too much deference for Dr. Smith, "that paper credit may be confidered as tending in fome refpects to reduce the price of commodities, becaufe," he fays, "it is obvious, that in proportion as any inftrument of manufactures or commerce is lefs expenfive, the articles which it contributes to produce may be afforded at a cheaper rate." P. 315. Yet the cheaper in any country this inftrument (meaning thereby money) is, the dearer will be commodities. When reduced, therefore, to precife terms, the obfervation of thefe eminent writers amounts to this contradiction "that the exchangeable value of money is to be enhanced by lowering it." Again, in his viiith chapter throughout, Mr. Thornton contends that country banks do not raife the price of fubfiftence nor deprefs the value of money. His argument is, "that the holders of country paper are under the neceffity of changing it for London paper; and that this exchangeablenefs equalifes their value by a tendency in the country paper to *take exactly the fame high value with the London paper.*" Thornton, p. 219. He does not advert that, according to his own principles concerning the depreciation of coin by paper, the values of the country and London paper are *equalifed*, by their approximation on both fides to each other, although the elevation in the fmall country pool is palpable, while the depreffion in the great London lake is fcarcely difcernible.

money

money are ſynonymous; and to heap up money is in his mind to acquire all worldly advantages. By ſeveral œconomical writers, this opinion of the merchant is treated with contempt, and conſidered as mere dotage. They deride the notion of that being the moſt ſubſtantial or only wealth which, to him who ſhould accumulate it in the greateſt quantity, would only realize the fable of Midas, and thereby expoſe him to the danger of periſhing through hunger. Money, properly ſo called, they obſerve, is founded merely on convention; its currency and value depending on the mutable wills of men, which may with inconſtancy aboliſh what they have capriciouſly eſtabliſhed. Such reaſoners, therefore, recommend the acquiſition of a wealth more abſolute and independent; and think the productive arts by which ſuch wealth is accumulated[f], far more deſerving of attention than exchange

[f] On the ſubject of political œconomy, and particularly on this ſubject of money, Ariſtotle's opinions are totally different from thoſe of Child, Mun, and particularly of Locke, who is by many regarded as his greateſt metaphyſical rival. Locke, as quoted by Dr. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, vol. ii. p. 140. remarks a diſtinction between money and other moveable goods. "All other moveable goods," he ſays, "are of ſo conſumable a nature, that the wealth which conſiſts in them cannot be much depended on, and a nation which abounds in them one year, may, without any exportation, but merely by their own waſte and extravagance, be in great want of them the next. Money, on the contrary, is a ſteady friend, which, though it may travel about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country, is not very liable to be waſted or conſumed." Gold and ſilver are, therefore, according to him, the moſt ſolid and ſubſtantial part of the moveable wealth of a nation, and to multiply thoſe metals ought, he thinks, upon that account to be the great object of its political œconomy. The poverty and miſery of Spain and Portugal notwithſtanding all their gold and ſilver, and the riches and happineſs

BOOK I.

Of traffic.

exchange or traffic, eſpecially than that kind of traffic, of which money is the end and object as well as the element and principle; a traffic ultimately centering in the augmentation of factitious riches, applicable to no other uſe than that of indefinitely multiplying themſelves.

Its abuſe.

Of ſuch factitious riches, the deſire, as Solon ſaid, muſt neceſſarily be boundleſs; the blindneſs of avarice miſtaking for an object agreeable in itſelf, and as ſuch indefinitely deſirable, that which is barely an inſtrument, and of which the deſire ought to be ſtrictly limited by the purpoſes which it is fitted to ſerve. There is a limit, therefore, to accumulation for proviſion, but none to accumulation for gain.

The confuſion thereby occaſioned.

Yet the providence of a good maſter of a family, as well as the avarice of a merchant, is often ſtrenuouſly employed in the purſuit of getting money; and when their activity has acquired it, their ſimilar exigencies frequently compel them to uſe and employ it exactly in the ſame manner. But the merchant, if faithful to his principles, always employs his money reluctantly for any other purpoſe than that of augmenting itſelf. Yet, political writers, deceived by an agreement in accidental purſuit and occaſional application, confound the endleſs

---

pineſs of England, a commercial country, without mines, as well as the riches and happineſs of Switzerland, an agricultural and paſtoral country, which diſdains working its mines, more ſtrongly fortify Ariſtotle's concluſions, than a thouſand fine ſpun arguments of the French œconomiſts. Written in 1792.

drudgery

drudgery of commerce with the ſalutary duties of œconomy, and regard the accumulation of wealth as the main buſineſs of both. At the name of money, they recall all thoſe deceitful enjoyments of pride and voluptuouſneſs which money is fitted to procure, and in which, wiſhing for ever immoderately to indulge, they cannot fail inordinately to deſire that which promiſes to gratify their inordinate paſſions. If money is not to be obtained by traffic, the purpoſe for which it was firſt inſtituted, men thus minded will have recourſe for obtaining it, to other arts and other contrivances; proſtituting even ſkill and courage in this mean and mercenary ſervice. Victory over the enemies of his country forms the proper ambition of a general; the health of his patients ought to be the main purſuit of a phyſician: yet how many of the military, and how many of the medical tribe, have no other end in view but that of gratifying their ſenſeleſs, becauſe unbounded, rapacity?

We thus ſee that there are two modes of accumulating ſtock; the one natural, productive, and ſtrictly pertaining to œconomy, becauſe eſſential to the purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence; the other, neither natural nor productive, and nowiſe pertaining to œconomy; and as juſtly blameable as the other is highly laudable. When we ſpeak, however, of any kind of human induſtry as productive, we mean not that in the ſtrict ſenſe of the word it really produces any thing, but only that it ſelects and arranges the gifts of Nature, ſuitably to the exigencies

 and

and demands of human life. The manufacturer makes not the wool, but the cloth; and for the food of animals, Nature at their firſt formation, provides a ſuperabundance of thoſe elements from which they are conſtituted, and with the ſame bounty copiouſly furniſhes the materials of their future ſubſiſtence.

The function of the ſtateſman reſpecting health.

A queſtion here ariſes, why the art of procuring ſubſiſtence and accommodation, any more than the art of procuring health, ſhould be regarded as a branch of œconomy? We ſay, that both of them appertain to œconomy, political as well as domeſtic. The ſtateſman and the phyſician, however, do not exerciſe the ſame talents, the one in providing for the health of his fellow-citizens, the other in providing for the health of his patients. The buſineſs of the former conſiſts in general ſuperintendance; that of the latter in minute and particular detail; and, in the ſame manner, the function of the ſtateſman reſpecting the proviſion for comfortable ſubſiſtence and accommodation, is totally different from the ſubſervient offices of the labourer and manufacturer.

Uſury.

We have reprobated that ſpecies of artificial traffic which adds nothing to the common ſtock, but only enriches one man or one nation at the expence of another; and which, being ſubſervient to no uſeful purpoſe, terminates in no definite end. But of all modes of accumulation, the worſt, and moſt unnatural, is uſury. This is the utmoſt corruption of artificial degeneracy, ſtanding in the ſame relation to commerce, that

com-

commerce does to œconomy. By commerce, money is perverted from the purpofe of exchange to that of gain; ftill, however, this gain is obtained by the mutual transfer of different objects; but ufury, by transferring merely the fame object from one hand to another, generates money from money; and the intereft thus generated is therefore called "offspring[k]," as being precifely of the fame nature, and of the fame fpecific fubftance, with that from which it proceeds.

The theory of œconomy applied to practice. The chief branches of hufbandry.

Having thus explained the theory of œconomy, we now proceed to the practice; obferving that, as the theory is a liberal ftudy, the practice is a neceffary occupation. Whoever, therefore, would furely and honourably augment his fubftance, muft acquire an experimental knowledge, firft, of the various kinds of cattle, particularly horfes, oxen, and fheep; he muft examine their many and excellent qualities and ufes, all fubfervient to the purpofes of human life; he muft confider and compare their refpective advantages in their relations to each other, as well as to the local circumftances in which he happens to be placed. Having provided himfelf with cattle, which are the living inftruments of agriculture, he will next direct his attention to this moft ufeful art; diftributing the labour of his houfehold as circumftances require, among the various branches of tillage and plantation; without neglecting thofe advantages which offer

[k] τοκος.

themfelves fpontaneoufly from bees, birds, and fifhes.

Other modes of accumulation.

Such are the firft and moft natural contrivances for augmenting our fubftance. Exchange or traffic follows next. Of this the moft confpicuous kind is that carried on by means of fhips or waggons, by adventurous navigators, or ftationary ftorekeepers: whofe employments differ greatly in this, that fome yield moft profit, and others afford moft fecurity. To commerce, ftrictly fo called, we have already referred that mode of accumulation named ufury; and under the fame head may be claffed the letting to hire that labour or that fkill of which we have the command; from which, blended with that mode of accumulation firft mentioned, refult many mixed modes, as the various kinds of mining and quarrying; in all which, human labour is exchanged for things fruitlefs and lifelefs, yet many of them highly ufeful. To enter into a more minute detail of the various modes of productive induftry might indeed be ufeful, but certainly would be tirefome. It may be obferved in general, that all fuch occupations partake the more of art, the lefs they are dependent on fortune. Thofe of them are vile and fordid, which hurt the health or deform the body; thofe are truly fervile, which may be exercifed by the corporeal powers alone; and thofe are the meaneft and moft contemptible, which require not any vigorous exertion of either mind or body. Chares of Paros and Apollodorus of Lemnos have exhaufted the fubject of agriculture,

ture, having treated both of planting and tillage. Other arts have been explained by other authors, to whose writings those curious after such knowledge may have recourse.

Monopolies.

Persons eager for wealth may collect likewise and imitate, with much advantage to themselves, the dextrous contrivances by which other men have obtained great and sudden opulence[1]. Such, for instance, is the honest artifice ascribed to the invention of Thales the Milesian. The poverty of this great philosopher was thought to upbraid his studies, as serving no gainful, and therefore no useful purpose. But Thales, by his skill in meteorology, contrived to wipe off the reproach; for as this science enabled him to foresee that next season there would be an extraordinary crop of olives, he hired in the winter all the oil-presses in Chios and Miletus, employing his little fortune in giving earnest to their

Exemplified by Thales of Miletus.

[1] In a copius, but corrupt and mutilated fragment of Aristotle's, entitled οικονομικων το Β, "the Second Book of Oeconomics," we find intermixed with the just principles of political œconomy, the greatest part of those financial tricks which have been revived, and so often repeated in modern times: the debasement of the coin; not paper indeed, but iron currency and credit; venality of justice; mortgaging the revenues; and innumerable contrivances, by which the republics and petty princes of Lower Asia impoverished and ruined their subjects. Aristotle does not explain these dangerous artifices with a view to recommend them (for he begins by declaring the only fair and certain means of augmenting domestic and national wealth, "produce much and consume little"); neither does he describe such unwarrantable political sleights (as has been suspected of Machiavel) with a design to satirize and disgrace those concerned in them. He treats the matter merely as an abstract question of political science. You wish to get wealth—Thus, and thus, may it be obtained: but take care; you will acquire it at too dear a rate (as I have proved in innumerable parts of my works) if you purchase it by any kind of dishonesty.

respective proprietors. When the gathering season approached, and the olives were seen loading the branches, all men wished to provide oil-presses at the same time, and suddenly. But Thales, being master of the whole number, let them separately at a high price, and thereby accumulating vast wealth, proved that philosophers might be rich if they pleased, but that riches were not the object of their pursuit.

The contrivance of Thales consisted in procuring for himself a monopoly; which, in general, is a gainful project, and as such has sometimes been employed by sovereign states, when distressed for want of money.

By a Syracusan banker.

In the time of Dionysius, a banker in Sicily bought up all the corn, and, without greatly raising the price of that article, sold it to foreign merchants at the profit of fifty talents. Dionysius, when apprised of this transaction, allowed the monopolist to retain his profit, but banished him from Syracuse, as employing a mode of accumulation inconsistent with the public interest. Yet the knowledge of this, and such like contrivances, may often prove useful both to families and to states, particularly to the latter; wherefore some statesmen consider the art of improving the public revenues as the only object worthy of their study.

Chap. 8.

Analogy between the three branches of œconomics

The three branches of œconomics, or domestic œconomy, may be illustrated by the three forms of government. A master commands his slaves like an absolute monarch; a father rules his children like a king; a husband governs his wife

wife like a republican magiſtrate. The principle on which the maſter's authority is founded has been explained above: that of the huſband reſults from the natural pre-eminence of males; and that of the father, from the natural ſuperiority of manly age to unripe youth. In republics, indeed, which aim at equality, the citizens govern by vicarious ſucceſſion: yet thoſe who happen to be in office wear a peculiar dreſs; the language uſed to them is reſpectful; they are diſtinguiſhed by appropriate honours; honours paid, indeed, not to themſelves, but (as happened to the laver of Amaſis [m]) to the ſituation which they hold, and to the functions which they perform. The authority of a huſband, therefore, over his wife, is preciſely that of a magiſtrate over his fellow-citizens, but of a magiſtrate always remaining in office. The authority of fathers, founded on ſeniority and cemented by affection, reſembles that of kings; and Homer juſtly characterizes the regal dignity of Jupiter, in addreſſing him as the father of gods and men. For kings ought to differ

And the three forms of government.

[m] Amaſis was a man of low extraction, but diſtinguiſhed merit, who having gained the favour of Apries King of Egypt, found means to ſucceed to his maſter's throne. The meanneſs of his birth expoſing him to the contempt of his ſubjects, he converted a golden baſon in which he uſed to waſh his feet, into the ſtatue of a divinity, which he erected in one of the moſt conſpicuous places of his capital. The ſuperſtitious Egyptians flocked to worſhip the image. Amaſis told them that the object of their veneration had once been nothing better than a vile utenſil. It is the ſame caſe with myſelf; I was once a plebeian, but am now your king; take care, therefore, to yield to me the reſpect due to the ſituation which I now hold. Comp. Herodot. l. ii. c. 172. Diodor. Sicul. l. i. c. 68. Athen. Deipnoſoph. l. xv. p. 680.

 from

BOOK I.

from their ſubjects, not in kind, but in perfection; and this is preciſely the difference between the father and his children.

Relative importance of theſe branches.

It is manifeſt, from the obſervations already made, that the objects of political œconomy riſe above each other in dignity; that men are more important than mere property; that the ſtateſman ought to beſtow more attention in exciting the virtues of the former, than in augmenting the maſs of the latter; but that the diſcipline and improvement of freemen chiefly merits his moſt ſerious regard. And here a doubt occurs, whether a ſlave can be ſaid to partake of any other virtue than merely the power of performing bodily ſervice. If he is endowed with temperance, courage, and juſtice, wherein does he differ from a freeman? If he is entirely incapable of ſuch excellencies, how can he be called a man? The ſame difficulty preſents itſelf reſpecting women and children, whether the ſeveral virtues can be fairly aſcribed to them or not? Can a woman be dignified with the epithets of temperate, courageous, or juſt? Can ſuch virtues, or their contrary vices, belong to a boy? In one word, can that which is formed for ſubjection, exerciſe virtue in the ſame ſenſe with that which is formed for government; or if we admit the affirmative, why is the one entitled to command, and the other bound to obey?

Difficulties reſpecting the virtues and duties of ſlaves, children, and women.

General ſolution of theſe difficulties.

This difficulty cannot be ſolved by ſaying, that both of them partake of virtue, but partake of it in different meaſures; for command and obedience,

obedience are things *ſpecifically* different, not merely different in degree or in quantity. And yet it ſounds harſh, to allow virtue to one claſs of mankind, and to deny it to another. If he, who is unadorned by wiſdom and juſtice, cannot poſſibly be a good maſter, is it poſſible, for him, who is debaſed by profligacy and cowardice, to be a good ſervant? It is manifeſt, therefore, that certain virtues muſt be aſcribed to both, but virtues as eſſentially different, as are the natures and perfections of thoſe by whom they are reſpectively cultivated. Steadily to purſue a virtuous courſe of life, implies the habitual preference of this kind of life to every other. But every act of preference implies deſire and compariſon; and every act of virtuous preference implies propriety in the deſire, and accuracy in the compariſon [n]. Both circumſtances muſt concur to produce virtuous determinations; and this concurrence cannot uniformly or ſteadily take place but in minds duly exerciſed and highly perfected. In ſlaves, the faculties of deliberation and reſolution may be conſidered as little better than null; in women they are weak and dependent; in children they are unripe and defective.

Reſpecting women.

Of each claſs of mankind the virtues muſt be relative to their powers, and ought to be competent to their offices. The man fit to command may be compared with the architect, who adjuſts the plan and directs its execution. *His* ſkill muſt extend to every part of the work; *that*

[n] See vol. i. p. 397.

of

of his workmen is limited by their refpective tafks. In the work of government, reafon is the architect; it is the part of reafon to command, and the duty of weaknefs and of paffion to obey. Thus the various diftinctions of mankind neceffarily difcriminate their virtues. Self-command in a woman is not the fame thing with felf-command in a man. The juftice and courage of the two fexes do not, as Socrates[o] thought, coincide; and were we to enumerate, after the example of Gorgias, each particular excellence, inftead of contenting ourfelves with vague definitions of virtue in general, we fhould clearly perceive that what the poet fays concerning filence is univerfally applicable to all qualities whatever.

> "In woman, filence is an ornament,
> But the fame filence adds no grace to man."

There is not any quality ornamental in the one fex, which, if exhibited precifely in the fame degree, would be graceful in the other.

Children.

Children, we have obferved, are unripe and imperfect; their virtues, therefore, are to be confidered not merely as relative to their actual ftate, but principally in reference to that maturity and perfection to which nature has deftined them. They are diligently and modeftly to hearken to their teachers, and obfequioufly to obey their directors; the premature affectation of manhood would difqualify them from ever acquiring manly virtues.

[o] Apud Piaton. in Repub.

From

Slaves.

From the defcription that we have given of flaves, it is plain that the catalogue of their perfonal excellencies is not extenfive. Extreme timidity, or exceffive profligacy, is totally incompatible with their duties. To thefe duties they muft carefully be trained by the mafter himfelf, and not by the overfeer who affigns to them their refpective tafks, and who teaches them fkilfully to perform their fervile employments. It is falfe that flaves are to be governed merely by fear. They are capable of liftening to reafon, though naturally unable to exercife its energies. Our flaves, therefore, are to be admonifhed, inftructed, and difciplined not lefs than our children. A doubt here occurs, whether the virtues of artifans ought to coincide with thofe of flaves? The fame vices of idlenefs and intemperance often prove alike ruinous to both thefe claffes of men. Yet there fubfifts between them this material difference. He who is properly a flave, is fuch habitually and permanently through the imbecility of his nature. His fervitude is perpetual and complete. The mean mechanic, on the contrary, fubmits to the tirefome drudgery of diftorting, painful, and unwholefome labour; but he encounters thefe hardfhips for the fake of performing a particular tafk, which is accomplifhed in a limited time. His virtues, therefore, ought to coincide with thofe of flaves, in as far only as he partakes of a fervile condition.

Difference between mechanics and flaves.

In every treatife of Politics, it is neceffary carefully to examine the relative duties of hufbands

The connection between do-

BOOK I.

meftic and political œconomy.

bands and wives, fathers and children [p]. Thefe, we have faid, are the elements of families, and families are the elements of ftates; and, as in every fyftem, the parts ought to confpire by their refpective excellencies to promote the perfection and harmony of the whole, fo the principles and habits of women and children muft be fafhioned by the intereft of that government, to the fafety and happinefs of which they are alike effential; women forming the one half of the prefent, and children affording the fole hope of the future generation. In conformity to the plan of the community, individuals, we fay, are to be educated; and in fubferviency to this great and general object, all their particular virtues muft be moulded [q]. The nature of political

[p] There remain but imperfect fragments of Ariftotle's Firft Book of Œconomics; in which he treats of women, children, and flaves. See Ariftotle, edit. Du Vall. p. 492. & feq. The defect may be partly fupplied by the remains of the Pythagoreans preferved in Stobæus, and by the fifth book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, intitled, De Adminiftratione Domeftica. Ariftotle, doubtlefs, treated the fubject more fcientifically than his predeceffors; fince he made the rules of domeftic œconomy depend on the nature and object of the national policy. Such were his juft and extenfive views, that, as Strabo obferves (l. xiii. p. 608.), his works, even when imperfect, taught profound and practical knowledge, in oppofition to fhadowy embellifhments and fcholaftic trifling.

[q] Ariftotle gives the reafon, την δε τȣ μερȣς, προς την τȣ ὁλȣ δει βλεπειν, αρετην. "The virtue of the part muft always bear a reference to the virtue of the whole." The continual referring of particular truths to general maxims has an air of pedantry in modern languages. It certainly is ufelefs, where the particular truth is as evident as the general one. But the diflike or difguft which it excites arifes from this, that the fchoolmen adopted many maxims that were falfe or obfcure, and the pedantry of thefe fcholaftics has been long held in juft contempt.

fociety

ſociety and the forms of civil government muſt, therefore, be clearly underſtood, before we can explain and aſcertain the fluctuating and dependent rules of domeſtic diſcipline [r]. We now enter on this vaſt ſubject, beginning with the important queſtion, which form of government is the beſt.

[r] The relation between government and education, and the ſubſerviency of the latter to the former, were ſtrongly expreſſed by Pythagoras. Being aſked by a certain Xenophilus, How he might beſt educate his ſon, he replied, Send him to live in a well regulated ſtate. Diogen. Laert. viii. 16.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK II.

IN this Second Book, we fee the intellectual exertions of the deepeft thinker of antiquity ftrenuoufly exerted in folving the moft important political queftion that can poffibly be agitated. With affectionate refpect for his mafter Plato, but with ftill greater veneration for truth, our author examines and refutes his ingenious but fanciful opinions concerning the beft form of government; and in detecting the errors of that admired philofopher, as well as in expofing the dangerous fyftems of polity recommended by Phaleas of Chalcedon and Hippodamus of Miletus, he arraigns by anticipation the extravagancies that have been propofed, approved, and many of them, in our own days, carried into execution. From the fpeculations of mere theory, he paffes to thofe plans of legiflation which have actually been eftablifhed in the world; collected from the defcription of upwards of two hundred commonwealths; and prefenting, when his work was entire, the moft valuable feries of political experiments that ever was

was exhibited. But concerning the republics of Aſia and Magna Græcia, as well as thoſe of Africa and Gaul, we muſt now be contented to gather our information from mutilated or doubtful fragments. Yet let us rather congratulate ourſelves on the riches which remain, than peeviſhly regret loſſes which cannot poſſibly be repaired [a]. In the Book before us, we have the reſult and general concluſion of all our author's compariſons and reflections; which is, that the inſtitutions of Crete, Sparta, and Carthage, though far from being perfect in theory, were the beſt and wiſeſt that ever were carried into practice. In theſe governments, therefore, we may contemplate the term and limit of the civil wiſdom and antiquity. With them, each nation may compare its domeſtic polity; and each individual may be contented, if the conſtitution under which he lives, can ſtand in honourable competition with thoſe boaſted models [b]. To ſatisfy his mind completely, the reader muſt himſelf make the compariſon: and the Engliſh reader will finiſh this uſeful taſk, cheriſhing his country, and bleſſing the memory of his anceſtors.

[a] Fabricias, vol. ii. p. 196. & ſeq. gives a copious liſt of the commonwealths deſcribed by Ariſtotle. Cicero ſays, that this indefatigable author "explained the inſtitutions, manners, and diſcipline of almoſt all the republics of Greeks and Barbarians." Omnium fere civitatum non Græciæ ſolùm, ſed etiam Barbariæ, mores, inſtituta, ac diſciplinas expoſuerat. De Fin. l. v. c. 4.

[b] The objection ariſing from the ſuppoſed ignorance of the ancients with reſpect to repreſentative government, will be anſwered in the ſequel. It will be ſhewn that the Greeks were acquainted with repreſentation in the uſual and practical ſenſe of that word.

Ariſtotle

Ariſtotle is the only writer that deſcribes with fulneſs and accuracy the commonwealth of Carthage. He does more; he predicts her melancholy fate, and points out the lurking ſeeds of her decay and ruin, even during the moſt vigorous period of her health and proſperity. But, beſides the malignant poiſon which deſtroyed that republic, there was a deep and radical error in the conſtitution of all thoſe denominated the *free ſtates* of antiquity; an error which our author in ſome paſſages hints at, but which he no where completely explains. This evil conſiſted in the faulty conſtruction of what is now called the executive power; which, inſtead of being ſovereign, permanent, and indiviſible, was exerciſed by aſſemblies and ſenates, or by them delegated to an almoſt indefinite number of mutually independent miniſters and generals. The deplorable effects of this arrangement, with regard to liberty as well as juſtice, I endeavoured twenty years ago fully to illuſtrate from ancient hiſtory; and as the obſervations then made could not be influenced by the events which have ſince happened in Europe, and the actually ſubſiſting ſtate of public affairs, I think it better to tranſcribe a few paſſages from the work alluded to, than to repeat the ſame opinions in other words. "In conſidering the nature and tendency of any government, there are two principal queſtions to be reſolved; how far it protects the lives, and liberties, and properties of individuals, and what duties it requires them to perform in return for this protection? Both

Both queftions are eafily anfwered with regard to the ftates of Greece; they required every thing, and they performed almoft nothing. Such a political arrangement gave extraordinary energy to their military enterprifes[c]; and this, if it may be confidered as a good effect, was the principal advantage with which their plan of policy was attended. The ftate enjoyed an abfolute command over the perfonal fervices and the property of its fubjects; and could on every occafion call forth their moft ftrenuous exertions. The authority exercifed over the rich and the poor was equally unlimited; but the condition of the former feemed peculiarly unhappy, becaufe their eftates, as well as their perfonal fervices, might always be required of them; and, without danger of inevitable deftruction to their owners, could not poffibly be withheld. They not only fupplied the whole expence of the navy, but furnifhed fuch extraordinary contributions as any fudden emergency demanded. In all the following pleadings, there is fcarcely one example of a rich

[c] "Such nations," Ariftotle obferves, "fhine in war; in peace they ruft with their fwords." This truth ftrongly impreffed the author's mind, while it was yet a queftion of political expediency, what means fhould be ufed for avoiding a defperate conflict with a people, whofe ambition, under defpotifm, firft fubjected their neighbours to the neceffity of keeping on foot mercenary ftanding armies; and whofe more dangerous ambition, under democracy, was likely to fubject them to the ftill harder neceffity of becoming armed nations. The lively and profound fenfe which he thought it his duty to exprefs of the military energy of democracy, was ftrangely miftaken and grofsly mifreprefented, by *fome perfons* or *perfon*, who, at the time alluded to, affected to treat all thofe as enemies to peace at home, who were anxioufly zealous for peace abroad.

man venturing to appear at the bar of the public, without being able to prove that he had expended the beſt part of his fortune in the ſervice of the community. But this was a matter of neceſſity, not of choice. For the Greeks were tyrants in one capacity, and ſlaves in another; and that impervious line which ought to be drawn between the exerciſe of power in the ſovereign, and the enjóyment of liberty in the people, was a ſecret, undiſcovered in Greece, and is ſtill practically unknown in every country but our own."[d]

"But the Athenian inſtitutions, diſtreſſing as they were to individuals, who loudly complained of their injuſtice, yet enabled the republic to exert itſelf with vigour againſt its foreign and domeſtic enemies. The exorbitant and uncontrolled juriſdiction, aſſumed by the Grecian ſtates over their colonies and allies, tended ſtill farther to promote the ſame end. The enormous exactions of the Athenians from their tributary iſles, as well as the heavy taxes which they impoſed on their Aſiatic colonies, have been already deſcribed. Sparta exerciſed, in this reſpect, an authority equally tremendous. In the beginning of the Peloponneſian war, that republic demanded from her colonies in Italy and Sicily, five hundred ſhips, and large contributions in money; and during the courſe of the ſame war, ſhe made many ſimilar applications, which were ſeldom ineffectual. But it is not

[d] Introduction to the Orations of Lyſias, &c. p. 17.

from

from particular acts of extreme rigour and severity, that we must appreciate the intolerable servitude of the countries which had the misfortune to become subject to those ambitious republics. While human nature continues the same, the right to exercise power will always be attended with a strong propensity to abuse it. Unless this dangerous prerogative, on the one hand, be balanced by the invaluable privilege of defending liberty on the other; unless the line of separation between these two be boldly marked and accurately defined; unless the interests of that part of the constitution which tends to corruption, be invariably resisted by those of the generous portion which sustains its political life; it is of little consequence, whether a country be governed by one tyrant or a thousand. In both cases alike, the condition of man is precarious, and force prevails over law[e]. It shall be proved that the institutions of those ancient republics, as well as the manners resulting from them, both of which have been injudiciously extolled by many learned men, approach nearer to Oriental despotism and the manners resulting from it, than can well be imagined.

[e] To see clearly the cause of the peculiar evils inherent in all kinds of popular assemblies vested with government, we must have recourse to the trite proverb, "Set a beggar on horse-back," &c. Men not used to power are the most likely to abuse it; and when this power centers in one assembly, however constituted, it is found by universal experience, that the majority will for ever tyrannize over the minority; and will execute its unjust and wild resolutions more zealously and more ardently, exactly in proportion to the opposition which it has encountered. In its ungovernable career, the obstacles which could not check and resist, will wonderfully increase and accelerate its headlong impetuosity.

gined. The principal difference between the citizens of the one and the ſlaves of the other is, that a greater number of the former might expect, at ſome future time, to inflict the ſame calamities which they had previouſly ſuffered. But between the foreign dependencies of republican and deſpotic ſtates, there is no diſtinction whatever. The moſt rapacious Turkiſh governor, armed with all the tremendous power of his maſter, never acted with more cruelty and injuſtice, than did the magiſtrates of the Athenian republic under the ſanction of popular decrees[f]."

Theſe obſervations are confirmed by the juſt theory of political arrangements, and illuſtrated by the moſt extenſive ſurvey of thoſe denominated free ſtates, both ancient and modern. In every well-regulated community, the people ought to have a controul in the government, but ought not to adminiſter it; for power veſted in the people at large, or in an aſſembly delegated by them, muſt, in nations ordinarily circumſtanced[g], neceſſarily degenerate into the tyranny of a faction. Diſcontent, ſedition, conſpiracy, and revolution, form the miſerable train of conſequences; portrayed in characters of blood in the melancholy annals of republican hiſtory.[h]

The

[f] Introduction to Lyſias, p. 18.

[g] What the *extraordinary* circumſtances are which alter the nature of republicaniſm, will appear in the progreſs of this work.

[h] I atteſt not only the republics of Greece, but the Italian republics of the middle age, whoſe tumultuary tranſactions and ſanguinary revolutions

The evil is not accidental, it ſprings from a perennial ſource. With the conſtituent elements of every commonwealth, naturally grow up two parties, diſtinguiſhed by different names in different countries, but whoſe eſſential characteriſtics are uniform and unalterable. The nobles and the people, the rich and the poor, will always reſpectively entertain many particular views, and always allow themſelves to be governed by many ſeemingly incompatible intereſts. When theſe jarring orders are united in one ſovereign aſſembly, whichever party prevails, the majority will tyrannize over the minority, and tyrannize the more outrageouſly, becauſe the ſame perſons who have made unjuſt decrees, are inveſted with the aweful power of carrying them cruelly into execution. Even in the wildeſt democracies, ſuch a monſtrous arrangement never was durable [i]. But its continuance, however ſhort, was long enough to be feared and deteſted; ſince, to whichever ſide

---

revolutions crowd the deſultory pages of Machiavel, Guicchiardin, Nerli, Varqui, Malavolti, Ghirardacci, Fioravanti, Portenarli, &c. As a modern Italian writer obſerves, "Theſe republics were all of them expoſed to almoſt daily revolutions, and ſeldom did the ſyſtem of adminiſtration continue a whole year the ſame." Denina's Revolutions, &c. c. v. ſect. 10.

[i] It ſeldom happened, in the republics either of ancient Greece or of modern Italy, that the whole exerciſe of government was veſted in one council, in one aſſembly, or in the committees of either; but as the legiſlative body, whether ſenate or people, itſelf governed by the capricious will of a tyrannical majority, directed and controlled the exerciſe of all executive and judiciary functions, the matter was not much mended; ſince all power proceeded from one centre, and flowed from one ſource, a power unbalanced and unreſponſible, and therefore, as Ariſtotle obſerves, not made for man.

the balance inclined, either the weight of authority degenerated into despotism[k], or the flame of liberty blazed into conflagration[l]. As by universal consent, therefore, all legislators or reformers of free states divided the sovereignty between the two orders, convened in distinct chambers; the one forming a senate to deliberate and propose; the other, an assembly of the people to approve and confirm. This, doubtless, is one great point gained: the two sovereign chambers serve to check each other; the one divides, and the other chooses[m]; and while each rests satisfied with its prescribed share of power, their measures will be harmonious, and their government will be happy. But the passions of men, as our author frequently observes, are indefinite and insatiable; and scarcely a single example occurs in history, of either a sovereign senate or a sovereign assembly, which did not frequently abuse its power, and continually endeavour to aggrandize it. How is this evil to be remedied? What authority is to be interposed between contending factions? What

[k] The most prominent examples are the tyranny of the Four Hundred, and afterwards of the Thirty, at Athens. History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxi. & xxiv. Likewise the tyranny of the Decemvirs at Rome. T. Liv. l. iii. c. 32. & seq.

[l] All republican histories abound with examples of this kind. Those of Athens and of Florence contain little else for near a century preceding what is called the extinction of their liberties.

[m] In this, according to Harringon, consists the whole mystery of government; "a mystery brought unto light by two silly girls. For example, two of them have a cake yet undivided, which was given between them; Divide, says one unto the other, and I will choose; or let me divide, and you shall choose." Oceana, p. 13, edit. 1656.

hand

hand is fit to hold the balance, and to render the energy of law ſuperior to the violence of party-rage? Ariſtotle will tell us "that the middle ranks muſt be increaſed and magnified; that veneration for the conſtitutional laws muſt be inſpired; in fine, that a king muſt be eſtabliſhed, whoſe office is a pledge and ſecurity that the few ſhall not be plundered and oppreſſed, nor the many inſulted and enſlaved." In proportion to the degree in which theſe advices have been complied with, free ſtates have flouriſhed. Even the republican Machiavel will vouch, that the commonwealths of the middle age never enjoyed any tolerable meaſure of proſperity or tranquillity, when the factions of the nobles and the people were not reſtrained by the authority of ſome virtuous, prudent, and powerful citizen[a]. Into this form, of two deli-

[a] Lib. iv. ſub. init. Machiavel has branded, with indelible impreſſions of indignation and contempt, the inſtitutions and governments of modern Italy. Their hiſtory is not, however, he obſerves, without its uſe. "E ſe nel deſcribere le coſe ſeguite in queſto guaſto mondo, non ſi narrera, ò fortezza di ſoldato, ò virtu di capitano, ò amore verſo la patria di cittadino, ſi vedra con quali inganni, con quali aſtutie et arti, i principi, i ſoldati, i capi delle republiche per mantenerſi quella riputatione che non havevano meritata, ſi governavano. Il que ſara forſe non meno utile che ſi ſiano l'antiche coſe a conoſcere; perche ſe quelli i liberali animi a ſequitarle accendono, queſte a fuggirle & ſpegnerle accenderanno." L. v. Delle Hiſtorie, ſub init. "In deſcribing the tranſactions of this degenerate country, I ſhall not have to ſpeak of the bravery of ſoldiers, the ſkill of generals, the patriotiſm of citizens; but there will be frequent occaſion to recount the ſlights and artifices by which thoſe who were at the head of civil and military affairs, kept poſſeſſion of that conſideration to which they were by no means entitled. The exploits of antiquity fire noble minds with the deſire of imitating them; the tranſactions of a recent date, will fire the noble-minded among poſterity with a deſire to avoid and ſpurn ſuch ignominious examples."

berative aſſemblies with an executive magiſtrate at their head, all the moſt renowned republics, both of ancient and modern times, have ſhewn a continual tendency to throw themſelves; and that independently of contrivance and theory, or rather in oppoſition to them; ſo true it is, that "government," to uſe the words of Ariſtotle, "is the work of nature; and all good government, the reſult of time and experience."

But innumerable obſtacles, both without and within, prevented free ſtates from attaining the juſt perfection of political arrangement. The republics of antiquity were too jealous of liberty to entruſt the executive magiſtracy with ſuch a ſhare in the legiſlature as is eſſential to its own defence. The archon, the conſul, the ſuffetes, the king, or by whatever other name the firſt magiſtrate was diſtinguiſhed, judged cauſes in perſon, and commanded armies in perſon; his power did not conſiſt in appointing thoſe by whom cauſes were judged or armies commanded. In conſequence of theſe unfavourable arrangements, the wiſe and equitable adminiſtration of the laws depended on the inſtability of perſonal character, not on the ſoundneſs of the conſtitution; and diſcontent with the adminiſtration, naturally produced a revolution in the government. Among the modern nations which conquered and divided the weſtern provinces of the Roman empire, the nature of the kingly office came to be better underſtood; but as their kings were entruſted with the uncontrolled command of armies continually augmented

mented through the fear or jealoufy of ambitious, and often hoftile neighbours, it was eafy for fucceffions of fuch kings to overawe both nobles and people by the right of the fword, and to unite, in their own perfons, the fupreme legiflative with the executive power. In Great Britain alone, whofe infular fituation rendered the public fafety dependent on that kind of national force which is moft formidable to enemies abroad, but which can never be conveniently employed as an inftrument of ufurpation and tyranny at home, the progrefs towards the higheft perfection of political arrangement was left free and unincumbered; unchecked by the timid jealoufies of the people, unobftructed by the overwhelming power of the prince*. Two legiflative affemblies, the one popular, the other ariftocratical; the former entrufted with the controul of the national purfe and the inqueft of public grievances; the latter judges in matters of impeachment by the Commons; but both orders or affemblies totally deprived of all conftitutional means of hurting each other, fince

* In populous countries, the encroachments of power cannot be regularly refifted by the people collectively. The people, therefore, muft act by their delegates. But thefe delegates will uniformly and heartily unite with the general mafs of the community, in maintaining equal laws and public liberty, when they are thoroughly convinced that the power which they reftrain can never become their own. Hence the fingular advantage of an indivifible and fovereign executive, whofe functions can be legally exercifed only by refponfible minifters; and hence the wonderful ftability of the Britifh conftitution; a ftability (humanly fpeaking) unalterable, becaufe founded on the indelible and beft underftood interefts of men, the cleareft dictates of reafon, and the warmeft paffions of the heart.

the

BOOK II.

the exercife of government centers in one fovereign magiftrate, defended by a negative on the paffing of laws, and invefted with the whole prerogative of naming thofe by whom they are carried into execution; this diftribution of power, the refult of experience operating on fortunate circumftances, is the nobleft contrivance that ever was devifed for killing thofe feeds of fedition which lurk in the bofom of every commonwealth; for infuring the continuance of equal and ufeful laws; and for rendering the juft authority of thofe laws prevalent over the blind fury of contending factions. Other modes of polity have fucceeded in countries peculiarly circumftanced; but this applies univerfally; and free ftates have flourifhed in peace and profperity, exactly in proportion[p] to their approximation to this perfect model.

It has been the fafhion, however, of late years to maintain that the misfortunes of the Greek commonwealths did not originate in the fource

[p] *Other circumftances being the fame;* words which ought always to be underftood in fuch general propofitions. The nature of the country, exacting induftry and frugality, confpired with the authority of the Stadtholder in giving profperity to the Netherlands. The United States of America owe their happinefs, under their prefent executive, not merely to the great perfonal weight of their prefident, but to their extenfive poffeffions, offering the ftrongeft incitements to agriculture, to the enjoyments and virtues of domeftic life, and to the improvement of their private fortunes; all which circumftances have a tendency to render men eafily governable. Thefe republics, as well as the Swifs Cantons and their allies, prefent, doubtlefs, (I fhould fpeak of Holland in the paft tenfe,) a picture of more tranquillity and ftability than did moft ftates of ancient Greece, or the Italian republics of the middle age; and that not merely in confequence of their political arrangements, but of many other caufes, both moral and phyfical. Written in the year 1796.

above

above explained, but in the general ignorance of all the free ſtates of antiquity with regard to repreſentative government, the higheſt improvement of republicaniſm. As this doctrine is very ſedulouſly inculcated on both ſides of the Atlantic, by thoſe who, having overturned their own hereditary conſtitutions, are deſirous of encouraging other nations to imitate their example, it may not be improper to examine how far ſuch aſſertions are warranted by hiſtory; eſpecially as the examination will ſerve to illuſtrate ſeveral of our author's remarks in the following Books of his Politics. That the Greeks were totally unacquainted with repreſentative government, cannot be maintained by any who have the leaſt tincture of learning. I need not mention the Amphictyonic council[q], and the Achæan league[r], both of which repreſentative bodies I have deſcribed in another place. But I may obſerve, as a fact leſs generally attended to, that in the commonwealth of Mantinæa, perſons choſen from the people at large[s] were inveſted with the power of naming the magiſtrates. In this Arcadian republic, there was not only repreſentation ſimply, but a double row of repreſentatives; delegates of delegates; and it is not

[q] Compare the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. p. 107. & ſeq.; and vol iii. c. xxxii. p. 467.

[r] Ibid. vol. ii. c. xi. p. 14.

[s] Ariſtot. Polit. l. vi. c. iv. The author mentions other republics on the ſame plan, particularly that of Telecles the Mileſian; and in his Fourth Book, where he treats of the ſovereignty in a ſtate, maintains that elective, as well as deliberative aſſemblies, ſhould conſiſt of only a part of the citizens, acting for the whole by an eſtabliſhed rotation.

reaſon-

BOOK II. reaſonable to conjecture than an arrangement ſo obvious ſhould have remained undiſcovered among a cluſter of free ſtates, where all ſorts of propoſitions were made, and all kinds of experiments were tried; where nothing was rejected which had not been previouſly refuted; and where inſtitutions, ſeemingly the moſt unpromiſing, were condemned or approved in proportion only to the miſchief or benefit viſibly manifeſt in their effects. This is ſo true, that the ſuppoſed modern maxims, reſpecting repreſentation and taxation, were held and practiſed by the Lycians; a people not obſcure nor inconſiderable, but eminently illuſtrious both in war and peace, from the earlieſt to the lateſt period of their hiſtory. The Lycians inhabited the ſouthern coaſt of the Aſiatic peninſula, and were ſurrounded by the territories of Carian, Pamphylian, and Cilician pirates; wretches who deformed thoſe ſeas by their rapacity and cruelty, and whoſe cities were marts of booty and ſlavery, particularly of captives, born free, reduced into inextricable bongage[t]. The Lycians alone diſdained this abominable traffic; and though they often commanded the ſea even to the coaſt of Italy, yet they never were convicted or even accuſed of ſacrificing honour to gain[u]. Their equity and innocence protected them againſt the juſt vengeance which often fell on their neighbours from the Syrian

[t] Strabo, l. xiv. p. 664 & 665. from which this account of the Lycians is almoſt wholly tranſlated.
[u] Idem, ibid.

and the Roman power. From the age of Homer to that of Brutus [x] and Caſſius, they continued to flouriſh under their hereditary inſtitutions in domeſtic tranquillity and national independence. Within a circular peninſula, nearly an hundred miles in diameter, and with upwards of one hundred and ſeventy miles of ſea-coaſt, Xanthus, Patara, Pinara, with three equal, and ſeventeen inferior cities, formed from time immemorial a federal and repreſentative government. The national convention or congreſs conſiſted of deputies from the ſeveral members of the union; the greateſt cities having three votes; the middling, two; and the ſmalleſt only one vote in the election of magiſtrates and in all public concerns. In the ſame proportion they paid taxes and incurred other public burdens; their taxation and repreſentation being regarded by them as correlatives [y]. They had one common archon or ſtadtholder [z], whoſe office became in later times elective, but which may be conjectured, from the analogy of their hiſtory with that of their European brethren, to have been anciently hereditary.[a]

In

[x] See in Plutarch's life of Brutus, and in Appian (De Bell. Civil. l. iv. p. 633. & ſeq.), the memorable reſiſtance of Xanthus and Patara to Brutus.

[y] αναλογον δε και τας εισφορας εισφερουσι, και τας αλλας λειτουργιας. Strabo, l. xiv. p. 665.

[z] λυκιαρχης. Ibid.

[a] The Lycians were a happy people. Did they owe their happineſs to their repreſentative government? Hiſtory will ſhew us that they owed it to their virtuous manners, which could alone render that government either beneficial or permanent. In confirmation of this, the following ſtatement of facts may be given:—Among the Gothic

BOOK II.

In examining the other Greek republics, we ſhall find that power exerciſed by delegation formed a leading feature in every one of them. Athens itſelf, which became the moſt democratical of them all, was in its beſt times a government of repreſentation as well as of rotation; and in reading its laws, we ſhall be often tempted to believe that we are peruſing the code of a certain modern repreſentative democracy. In the former commonwealth, which from the time of Theſeus breathed a peculiar ſpirit of freedom, the comitia or ordinary aſſemblies of the people were not ſum-

Gothic conquerors of the Roman empire, elective princes having gradually raiſed themſelves to the rank of hereditary kings, their jealouſy of the nobility naturally led them to protect, encourage, and inſenſibly to exalt to power, the induſtrious and peaceful inhabitants of towns and cities; of whoſe participation in the legiſlature, the firſt clear evidence that occurs in the hiſtory of France is the reign of Philip le Bel in 1301. In 1484, Charles VIII. ſummoned deputies from the country; from which time the States-General, conſiſting of three independent chambers, each of which had a negative on the proceedings of the other two, were appointed in the manner ſeemingly the beſt adapted to unite the whole wiſdom and patriotiſm, as well as to collect the real ſenſe of the nation. The inhabitants of each pariſh ſent deputies to the juriſdictions; and theſe deputies again ſent the perſons deemed beſt qualified to repreſent them in the States-General. There were thus two orders of deputies; or deputies of deputies, an inſtitution which Mr. Hume (Idea of a perfect Commonwealth) propoſes as the higheſt improvement in repreſentative government; and which, Dr. Price (ſee Appendix to his Sermon on the French Revolution) greatly extols the *French republic*, for being *the firſt ſtate* to carry into execution. Notwithſtanding all this, the States-General of France contributed nothing to the benefit of that country. The aſſembly of 1484 was diſgraced by multiplied quarrels among the chambers. The five aſſemblies which followed, exhibited alternate ſcenes of civil diſcord and ſanguinary ſuperſtition. The States were ſummoned for the laſt time in 1614; and this aſſembly, like moſt of the preceding ones, broke up as abruptly as it had deliberated uſeleſsly. Eſſais Hiſtoriques ſur les Commices de Rome, les Etats Generaux de France, & le Parlement d'Angleterre, v. ii. p. 189, & ſeq.

moned

moned as at Rome by a consul, nor by any analogous magistrate, as in many neighbouring Greek states. At Athens the political machine moved, as it were spontaneously, with the revolution of the seasons. The astronomer Meton, who reformed the calendar ten years before the Peloponnesian war, regulated the commencement of the Athenian year by the first new moon after the summer solstice[b]. The year was divided into twelve months, consisting of twenty-nine, and of thirty days, alternately; and each month was divided into three decades[c]. On the days immediately preceding the first decade of the first month, called Hecatombaion, in allusion to the numerous sacrifices by which it was distinguished, the Athenians, from the wards in the city, and the districts in the country, amounting collectively to one hundred and seventy-four in number[d], assembled in the public market-place of the capital, in order to elect the senate, the archons, and other annual magistrates. For the purpose of conducting these elections, as well as other public matters, with the greater regularity and expedition, the people voted by divisions, called tribes; which were four in the time of Solon, but raised to ten by Clisthenes[e], who restored the republic after the expulsion of Hippias.

[b] Conf. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 186. Diodor. Sicul. l. xii. p. 96. Liban. Argum. in Demosth. Orat. in Androt.

[c] Julius Pollux, &c. apud Potter. Antiq. v. i. p. 26.

[d] Strabo, l. ix. p. 396.

[e] History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xiii.

BOOK II.

Hippias. From perſons properly qualified [f] in point of age, character, and fortune, each of the ten tribes choſe by lot fifty ſenators, who formed collectively the ſenate of the five hundred for the ſucceeding year. To the ſenate thus conſtituted, another body was aggregated [g], to ſupply the place of thoſe ſenators who might be removed by death, or diſmiſſed for malverſation in office. The whole ſenators, actual and ſupplemental, were divided into ten claſſes, repreſenting the ten tribes; each of which enjoyed preſidency in rotation [h]. The order of this preeminence was alſo determined by lot. The fifty preſiding ſenators were intitled the Prytanes; the hall in which they aſſembled and dined, the Prytaneum; and the period of thirty-five days, during which they held their dignity, was called a Prytany [i]. This period was divided into five weeks; and the fifty Prytanes into five companies, each conſiſting of ten perſons, and each preſiding in the ſenate during its reſpective week [k]. From theſe preſidents of preſidents, a ſingle perſon was choſen by lot to preſide in the ſenate for a ſingle day, during which he was entruſted with the command of the citadel, the key of the treaſury, and the cuſtody of the public ſeal of the commonwealth [l]. The

[f] Lyſias adverſ. Philon.
[g] Harpocrat. in Επιλαχοντες.
[h] Suidas in Πρυταν. Liban. Argument. in Androt.
[i] Pollux, l. viii. c. 15. Demoſth. de Corona.
[k] Liban. Argument. in Demoſth. Androt.
[l] Suidas in Επιϛατ.

nine

nine other tribes attained the honour of the Prytany, each in the order which had been eftablifhed by lot; and their prefiding companies, as well as the prefident himfelf, were appointed precifely in the manner above defcribed [m]. With this reprefentative body, Solon lodged the moft important branches of fovereignty. The fenate convened daily [n]: it prepared all matters of deliberation for the popular affembly [o]; no meafure could be lawfully enforced by the people which had not been previoufly approved by the fenate [p]; and the fenate, independently of the people, made laws which had force for a year, that is, during the period of its own exiftence [q]. The prefidents of the fenate alfo prefided in the popular affembly; fummoned its extraordinary meetings by their authority; put the queftion to a vote; collected the fuffrages; and having declared the will of the majority, diffolved the affembly [r]. The fenate, therefore, enjoyed the principal fhare in the *legiflative and executive* powers of government; but the judicature was merely a temporary commiffion, exercifed by juries chofen by lot from the people at large [s]. Thefe juries were directed in their proceedings by the nine archons [t], who were annually ap-

[m] Suidas & Harpocrat. in Προεδροι & Επιςαται.

[n] Petit. Leg. Attic. 183.

[o] Harpocrat. in Προβουλ. Demofth. in Leptin.

[p] Idem, ibid. & Plutarch in Solon.

[q] Plut. ibid. & Demofth. in Ariftocrat.

[r] Æfchin. de Falfa, Legation. & Ariftophan. Concionatric.

[s] Plutarch. in Solon. Demofth. in Ariftogeit.

[t] Ulpian. in Demofth. adverfus Midiam. Demofth. in Neær. Pollux, l. viii. c. ix.

pointed at the fame time with the fenate, and from perfons of the fame defcription with thofe qualified to fit in that council[u]. In the ftated affemblies held at the end of every year, and commonly during the laft four days of it, the people alfo appointed the military commanders, the furveyors of roads and buildings, the commiffaries and controllers of accounts, and a variety of other officers; each department of office commonly containing ten citizens, that the ten tribes might be refpectively reprefented, each by one of its own members.[x]

Solon could not forefee the events which deftroyed this political arrangement. He forefaw, however, that it was extremely liable to deftruction. He was fully apprized of the danger of tyranny, by which the republic was firft affailed[y], and of the danger of democracy, by which it was finally ruined[z]. The regulations which he eftablifhed were admirably calculated to prevent both thofe evils. I fhall not here dwell on the judicious plan of public education which he prefcribed and enforced[a], or on the admired authority of the Areopagus, which he extended or confirmed[b]; inftitutions refpectively adapted to maintain the equality of freedom on the one hand, and to uphold a fair and moderate arif-

[u] Pollux, l. viii. c. vi. Æfchin. in Ctefiph. Pelit. de Leg. Attic. p. 237.

[x] Compar. Æfchin. in Ctefiph. p. 429. p. 432. Harpocrat. in Λογιςαι. Pollux, l. viii. c. ix.

[y] Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. viii.

[z] Ibid. vol. ii. c. xiii. [a] Ibid.

[b] Ibid. & Ifocrat. Areopagit.

tocracy

tocracy on the other. This ariſtocracy was ſtill farther ſtrengthened by the laws regulating the mode of proceeding in the popular aſſembly, which ſubjected to a rigorous perquiſition the lives and characters and qualifications of the orators entitled to addreſs the people[c], and which gave a legal precedency in every debate to thoſe ſpeakers who had paſſed their fiftieth year[d]. But theſe wiſe regulations, all breathing the ſame ſpirit, were unable to reſiſt the ſtorms by which a republic enriched by commerce and elated by conqueſt, muſt ever neceſſarily be aſſailed. They could not prevent the multitude aſſembled in a large and luxurious city from yielding to the perfidious voice of demagogues, while they encouraged the people at large to become managers of their own affairs[e]; to act on every occaſion as their own miniſters; and thereby to deſtroy that line of diſtinction between the ſovereign and the ſubject, on the unalterable continuance of which the ſtability of good government will ever moſt firmly reſt, under every fluctuation of external circumſtances, of proſperity or adverſity, ſimplicity or refinement.

[c] Æſchin. in Timarch. Suidas & Harpocrateon in Ῥητορων Γραφη.

[d] Æſchin. ibid. [e] Demoſth. paſſim.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK II.

ARGUMENT.

Plato's republic. — Community of wives, children, and goods. — Nature and neceſſity of ſeparate property. — Plato's books of laws examined. — Schemes for equalizing property. — Their futility. — Hippodamus. — His ideal republic. — Arguments in favour of political innovation. — Stronger arguments againſt it. — The Spartan government. — The Cretan. — The Carthaginian. — The Athenian. — Zaleucus. — Charondas. — Philolaus. — Diocles. — Phaleas. — Pittacus. — Androgamas.

BOOK II. Chap. I.

The ſubject, and the end or purpoſe of this inquiry.

IN order to diſcover and aſcertain that form of ſociety under which thoſe would prefer to live, who were at liberty to chooſe a mode of civil exiſtence completely agreeable to their wiſh, we muſt not only conſider the moſt admired political inſtitutions that have actually prevailed in the world, but likewiſe examine thoſe imaginary plans of perfect governments, which fancy has deviſed, and which philoſophy has highly approved. Such an examination will enable us to determine the hitherto undefined limits

limits of juftice and utility, in matters of fociety and government; and will thus refcue the prefent work from the reproach of being undertaken for the unworthy purpofes of oftentation or cenfure [a].

To what objects the partnerfhip of a common wealth ought to extend.

Every commonwealth being, as we have faid, a partnerfhip, it follows, that in every commonwealth men muft be partners in fome things or in all [b]. Some things they muft poffefs in common, fince the community could not otherwife fubfift. The advantageous fituation of the capital and of the territory is neceffarily a part of the common ftock; and all men who inhabit the fame city and country muft breathe the fame air, and enjoy the fame climate. A queftion therefore arifes, how far this community ought to extend? Whether the partnerfhip of a commonwealth has its defined limits? Or whether, as Socrates maintains in the republic of Plato, all things ought to be common; wives, children, and poffeffions?

[a] σοφιζεσθαι ϛυλομενων. I refolve the firft word into the two motives by which the fophifts were ufually actuated.

[b] Ariftotle's divifion is threefold. He fays, it is neceffary that the citizens fhould enjoy all things in common; or nothing in common; or fome things in common, and other things not. But he immediately adds, that the fecond branch of the divifion is impoffible, fince, if nothing were common, a republic would not be what he has defined it, a community or partnerfhip. In compliance with the general rules which he lays down concerning divifion, he introduces a part or member, which the nature and definition of the particular fubject of inveftigation obliges him immediately to reject. The inventor of method could fcarcely be held guilty of pedantry in exemplifying his own rules: his fcholaftic imitators indeed are frequently liable to this reproach; but even the pedantry of method is feldom a very grievous fault when real inftruction is the aim.

BOOK II.

This extraordinary innovation, which is ſo different from every thing that has hitherto prevailed in the world, is attended with innumerable difficulties. Were it reduced into practice, we deny that this novelty would anſwer the purpoſe which its author means it ſhould ſerve; we deny likewiſe, that this purpoſe, which Socrates ſays ſhould be the end and aim of every commonwealth, is in itſelf deſirable.

Plato's opinion refuted.

According to this philoſopher, the main object of legiſlation is to promote the union of the citizens, "to unite them as much as poſſible; and to reduce them, as nearly as may be, from many to one." Yet it is plain, that this project of uniting, when carried beyond certain limits, would totally deſtroy the community, reducing a commonwealth to a family, and a family to an individual[c]. But a commonwealth muſt, from its nature, conſiſt not only of many individuals, but of individuals differently en-

[c] Vid. Platon. de Republic. l. v. paſſim. Ariſtotle's reaſonings never ſeem to us leſs worthy of himſelf than when he combats the exceptionable doctrines of his maſter; not that he does not ſufficiently refute them, but becauſe he refutes, at too great length, extravagancies that neither merit nor require ſuch patience of examination, and ſuch perſeverance of oppoſition. Yet, to the contemporaries and immediate ſucceſſors of Ariſtotle, the paſſages which to us appear tireſome and frigid, probably ranked among the moſt intereſting parts of his work. Such was the great fame of Plato, juſtly earned by the ſublimity and truth of many of his doctrines; and even by his paradoxes themſelves, ſo naturally introduced, ſo ingeniouſly ſupported, with ſuch power of arrangement, and ſuch charms of ſtyle, that under his plaſtic art, the moſt ſhapeleſs crudities received form, beauty, and brilliancy. That fanciful writer became a philoſopher by choice, but always remained what he had been originally, a poet by nature; and like men of a ſimilar ſtamp in modern times, often perplexed thoſe ſciences which he ſought to adorn.

dowed,

dowed, and differently employed[d]. It is not an alliance in war, operating by the mere ſtrength of numbers; it is not a nation living in ſcattered families, remote, detached, and, in civil concerns, totally unimportant to each other. But it is a ſociety of men united by their mutual exigencies, and their reſpective acquirements; ſo that the very circumſtance itſelf which, in one ſenſe, unites a city, that is, harmoniſes it into one body or ſyſtem, neceſſarily infers a multiplicity of wants, a diverſity of talents, and a diſtinction of property. The reciprocation of good offices, reſulting from all theſe varieties, upholds ſtates[e]; and the more numerous are the varieties

By the nature of political ſociety.

[d] This doctrine is beautifully illuſtrated by the greateſt of all ſyſtems in the Treatiſe de Mundo. Ariſtot. p. 608, & ſeq.

[e] Ariſtotle here refers to his Treatiſes on Ethics, in which he has explained with great accuracy the doctrine of juſtice, both moral and political. See vol. i. from p. 361 to p. 393. Comp Ethic. Eudem. b. iv. from beginning to end. Magna Moral. b. i. c. 34. In purſuing his firſt compariſon of government to a partnerſhip in trade, he obſerves, that it is eaſy to regulate the ſhares of the profit by thoſe of the capital. But when the greater ſkill or the greater labour of one partner is to be ſet in oppoſition to the greater capital of another, the diſtribution of profits then becomes more difficult; the matter, however, may, for the moſt part, be pretty accurately adjuſted. But in the great partnerſhip of civil ſociety, how many intricate proportions are to be unravelled, before the jarring elements of birth, wealth, talents, induſtry, can be harmoniſed into any laſting ſyſtem of equitable policy? This, however, muſt be done, not indeed with ſcientific accuracy, but according to thoſe liberal principles of moral geometry, which are the only rules that the practice of civil life either requires or admits. When this great work is effected, and the intereſts of the many are thus reconciled with the fair pretenſions of the few, diſtributive or political juſtice will then have performed its office; and room will be left for the impartial exerciſe of juſtice, commutative or corrective; which is to be regulated not by geometrical analogy, but by the ſimpler kind, called arithmetical: (ου κατα την αναλογιαν εκεινην, αλλα κατα την αριθμητικην;) in which the terms of any numerical ſeries increaſe or decreaſe by a fixed

BOOK II.

varieties that within certain limits prevail, the more completely will that purpose of comfortable subsistence be obtained, for which civil society was instituted[f].

Reason why the great principle of the division of labour

In proportion as labour is divided, arts are perfected; and the various branches of industry are all of them best cultivated, when the same individual is strictly confined to the same branch

---

fixed and given difference. This, therefore, according to Aristotle, is the only kind of justice and the only kind of virtue which admits of precise and definite rules; for as in any series of terms in arithmetical proportion, the common difference always remains the same, whatever be the terms, so in commutative or corrective justice, whatever be the quality or the merits of the persons concerned, the contracts and the injuries defined by law are considered as things fixed and invariable, and having fixed and invariable equivalents. See vol. i. p. 370, & seq.

[f] δει μεν γαρ ειναι πως μιαν, και την οικιαν και την πολιν, αλλα ου παντως. εστι γαρ ὡς ουκ εσται, προιουσα, πολις, εστι δ' ὡς εσται μεν, εγγυς δ' ουσα του μη πολις ειναι, εσται χειρων πολις. Literally, "Both a family and a commonwealth ought to be in *some* respects one! but not in all. For a commonwealth, when it attains perfect unity, ceases to be a commonwealth, and as it approximates this ultimate limit, it will continually become a worse commonwealth than it was." The thought is finely illustrated by Cicero, "Ut in fidibus ac tibiis, atque cantu ipso ac vocibus, concentus est quidam tenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem immutatam ac discrepantem aures eruditæ ferre non possunt; isque concentus ex dissimillimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur et congruens: sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interjectis ordinibus, ut sonis, moderata ratione civitas consensu dissimillimorum concinit; & quæ harmonia à musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitate concordia." "Concord in states is like harmony in music. The one results from the differences and relations of distinct and most dissimilar sounds; the other, from the distinction of ranks among the citizens; the high, the low, and the middle order which is interposed between them." We shall learn from Aristotle, that it is this middle order which binds and cements the political edifice. Men of this class understand better than any other, how to deal with the multitude. They have many interests in common with both of the extremes; their superiors, and their inferiors. Whence Aristotle maintains, that those states are the best and happiest, and most secure, where the middle ranks most abound.

of

of art. In matters of civil government, the ſame principle is applicable; but juſtice prohibits, that, in ſuch matters, this principle ſhould always be actually applied. In ſome communities the citizens are ſo nearly equal in merit[g], that it would be highly unjuſt that one portion of the ſtate ſhould be continually debarred from offices of magiſtracy; it would be equally unjuſt that another portion ſhould excluſively appropriate them. Whether government be a good or a bad thing, it is fair that men of equal abilities and virtues ſhould equally ſhare in it; that they ſhould receive the advantage of it as their right, or bear the burden of it as their duty. But as they cannot all of them exerciſe magiſtracy at once, it is neceſſary that they ſhould govern by vicarious ſucceſſion, each ruling and ſubmitting in his turn, and thus aſſuming and laying down ſuch important prerogatives, as render them, in their civil capacities, at different times, altogether different men.

cannot be applied to government.

Should we allow the propriety of the end at which Socrates thinks that every legiſlation ought to aim, yet we could not admit the propriety of the means by which, he thinks, this end is likely to be attained. For this purpoſe,

Chap. 2.

Arguments againſt the community of wives and children.

[g] This is here the force of the word φυσις. "They have ſo equally attained the perfections of their nature." See vol. i. p. 25. This equality among the citizens implies the ſameneſs of education and purſuits, as our author afterwards explains; and, therefore, infers that the arts of productive induſtry ſhould be exerciſed, and the exigencies of bodily accommodation ſhould be ſupplied, by thoſe who are not citizens.

he

BOOK II. he propofes the abolition of the diftinction "mine and thine," and maintains that the citizens of his fuppofed commonwealth would be perfectly unanimous, if all of them could apply the word "mine" in fpeaking of the fame objects. In this remark there is an evident fallacy. The word "all" may be taken diftributively, or collectively; if taken diftributively, it is plain, that on the fuppofition of the community of goods, the word "mine" could not be applied by any body; no *one* of the citizens could juftly fay, this is my wife, my fon, or my property; and though all collectively might, indeed, fay fo, yet their doing this would not be found conducive to concord.

Farther; that which is a common concern is very generally neglected. The energies of man are excited by that which depends on himfelf alone, and of which he only is to reap the whole profit or glory. In concerns common to him with others, it is with reluctance that he employs fuch a degree of attention and activity, as even his own intereft requires. He neglects that of which he thinks other men will take care; and as other men prove equally negligent with himfelf, the common intereft is univerfally abandoned. Thofe families, befides, are commonly the worft ferved, in which the domeftics are the moft numerous. In a commonwealth where each father had a thoufand fons, and each fon a thoufand fathers, it is plain that neither fathers nor fons would be very zeal-

ous

ous in performing their relative duties; and the condition of a nephew[h] would be more eligible under an ordinary government, than that of a ſon in Plato's republic.

In the interior parts of Africa, geographers tell us that women are common, but that each man appropriates the children which moſt reſemble himſelf. Among quadrupeds, ſome females have been obſerved to bring forth young wonderfully reſembling their fathers. The famous mare of Pharſalus was ſo remarkable for this property, that ſhe was called "The Juſt." It will be impoſſible, therefore, to hinder men from forming conjectures, grounded on reſemblance[i] and other circumſtances, that certain children are theirs; and theſe conjectures, though attended with the uneaſineſs of anxious doubt, will not prevent the partialities of parental affection. The uncertainty, alſo, will produce many evils in its turn; it will multiply and embitter crimes; raillery and reproach will be converted into irreverence and impiety; love will often degenerate into inceſt, and murder into parricide; and when ſuch abominations happen, men who are ignorant of the enormity

[h] The Greek word more commonly means a couſin-german. The Romans ſaid, "ne ſis mihi patruus;" uſing the word uncle metaphorically, for a ſevere reprover, and a moroſe guardian.

[i] Nicolaus Damaſcenus apud Stobæum, ſerm. 42. p. 291., mentions a people called Limyrnii, among whom wives were common; and children alſo, until their ſixth year; at which age they were aſſigned, after a public examination, to thoſe of the men whom they moſt reſembled.

of

of their crimes, becaufe ignorant that they were committed againft their kindred, will often neglect performing the ceremonies appointed by religion for expiating their unnatural wickedness[k].

Concord, doubtlefs, forms the happinefs of ftates; but this community of wives and children would totally deftroy that affection on which concord is founded. As a drop of honey is diffipated and loft in a pail of water; fo the fweet affection of love would totally evanifh through too extenfive a diffufion: for two circumftances are requifite to maintain and invigorate this affection;—that the objects of it be in themfelves lovely, and that they be peculiarly recommended to our love. The community of wives and children, were it in any cafe to be adopted, might, therefore, be more advantageoufly eftablifhed with regard to the peafants, whom Plato has appointed to labour and to obey, than with regard to the military clafs, whom he has appointed to legiflate and to govern. By deftroying all affection among the peafants, it would prevent their confpiring againft their mafters[l].

[k] See Ethics, l. ix. c. 6.

[l] Some fentences are omitted in this chapter, either as containing repetitions, or as relating to the fubject of Greek love; a perverfion of fentiment to which Ariftotle, of all the philofophers of his age, fhews himfelf the moft decided and moft zealous adverfary. None of them, indeed, as has been erroneoufly fuppofed, patronize fuch an abominable degeneracy; but Ariftotle alone, in his moral and political writings, uniformly treats the fubject with that marked reprobation which became a philofopher fuperior to the prejudices and fafhions of his own times.

The

Arguments against the community of goods.

The community of property, depending on different principles, merits a feparate confideration. Among fome barbarous nations, the lands are feparately cultivated, but the fruits of them are promifcuoufly confumed. Among others, the lands are common, and cultivated by the conjunct labour of the community; but each family appropriates its fhare of their fruits. Where the peafants form a diftinct but dependent clafs, the community of lands will be liberated from feveral of its inconveniences. The martial lords of the foil, as in that cafe none of them would have any labour to beftow, could not quarrel with each other about proportioning the fruits of their induftry to the quantity of their refpective exertions. But fhould the proprietors themfelves cultivate with their own hands their common property, innumerable jealoufies would immediately fpring up, as fatal experience proves almoft always to happen among thofe connected in too clofe a communion of life, the partners in a voyage or a journey, who difpute for ftraws with each other; and as a mafter is moft quarrelfome with thofe fervants who are moft frequently in his way, being employed in attendance on his perfon.

The ufeful and practical community of goods.

The ufeful and practical community of goods, a community that will neither engender animofity nor check induftry, muft refult from the falutary difcipline of laws, and the fkilful application of early and affiduous culture. According to the proverb, "all things are common among friends;" we muft imitate, extend, and, if pof-

fible,

BOOK II.

fible, carry to perfection, the plans of thofe legiflators who have in any meafure fucceeded in producing this defirable effect. At Sparta, the eftablifhment of property does not hinder the free communication of many of the benefits accruing from it. The flaves of the Lacedæmonians, their horfes, their dogs, their carriages[m], are all at the fervice of any citizen who has occafion to employ them; goods are appropriated, but their ufes are freely communicated; and this double advantage is the natural refult of a wife legiflation.

Contrafted with the fanciful fpeculations of Plato.

Socrates's community of goods would deftroy the delightful pleafure which arifes from faying "this field is mine." This pleafure, indeed, proceeds from felf-love, but a felf-love that is natural and juft; and as different from felfifhnefs, as a virtuous and proper affection is different from a vicious and blameable excefs. Deprived of feparate property, we fhould be deprived of a pleafure belonging to it ftill more delightful; the pleafure of beftowing it on our friends, on our companions, and even on deferving ftrangers[n]. Deftroy wedlock, and what room will be left for the virtue of chaftity? Deftroy property, and what room will be left for the virtue of liberality?

The diftinction of property

Yet the fyftem of Socrates carries with it at firft fight a fpecious fhow of humanity, becaufe

[m] ἐφόδια, viatica, things neceffary for a journey, which Aretinus tranflates vehicula, without authority indeed, as to the interpretation of the word, but confiftently enough with the fenfe of the paffage. Vid. Xenoph. &c. Republ. Laced. & Plutarch. in Lycurg.

[n] ξένοι, foreigners connected with us by the ties of hofpitality.

our

our attention is withdrawn from its emptineſs, and forcibly arreſted by the evils actually exiſting in ſociety; law-ſuits, perjury, clamorous reproach, and mean adulation, all of which are charged on the unequal diſtribution of property, but which are all more juſtly chargeable on human villany. The illuſion is ſupported by a falſe compariſon. We compare the diſputes occaſioned by ſeparate property, which is of great amount, with thoſe occaſioned by common property, which is of little value; not reflecting that the quantities of both ought to be fairly eſtimated, and that, the proportion being thus rightly ſtated, we ſhould find the evils reſulting from common property to be the greater of the two. A falſe principle deceived Socrates; he took for granted that the union of his citizens could not be too intimate; whereas, in reality, this union, carried beyond certain limits, would prove the deſtruction of the commonwealth; and the nearer it approximates to its deſtruction, the commonwealth becomes the worſe. Symphony is good, and metre is good; but ſymphony is deſtroyed when it changes into ſameneſs of tone, and metre is deſtroyed when it changes into ſameneſs of time°.

infers its unequal diſtribution.

The neceſſity of this illuſtrated by muſic.

Amidſt the innumerable experiments that have been made in matters of government, the ſyſtem of Socrates would undoubtedly have been earlier invented, and ſubmitted with other ſchemes

The impracticability of Plato's community.

° This juſt compariſon ſhould have occurred to the fancy of a lively nation, when they were exhorted to embrace the wild deſign of forming a commonwealth from one element.

BOOK II.

schemes of innovation to a fair trial, had it appeared to be in any degree practicable. If tried by the test of experiment, its insufficiency would manifestly shew itself. The uniting principles in states are, — laws, education, manners, and a congeniality of sentiments and affections produced by the intercourse of life, and cemented by mutual good offices [p]. But this intercourse and these offices imply the usual institutions of wards, districts, and common tables; to which, had Socrates confined himself, his plan of legislation would have wanted novelty; since, even in relieving his first class from the labour and cares of agriculture, he would only have proposed what the Lacedæmonians had previously enacted [q].

Imperfectly explained by himself.

The remaining parts of his plan, Socrates does not clearly explain. We are not informed whether the community of wives and possessions is to extend to the peasants. If it does, wherein will they differ from the military? and how can they be kept in obedience, unless, like the Cretan slaves, they be prohibited the use of arms, and forbidden the gymnastic exercises? Yet, if the peasants are not comprehended in the new regulations, Socrates, who allows them the rank of citizens, will have two republics in the same territory, differing in laws and institutions,

Difficulties respecting his peasants,

[p] See vol. i. p. 493 & seq.

[q] ὅπερ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσι, which the Lacedæmonians are now attempting to do. Aristotle speaks as if they had never completely effected their purpose. The order of the sentences is, in this paragraph, somewhat altered; and the words sometimes paraphrased, the better to express the sense.

eternally

eternally at variance with each other, and in one of which all thofe diforders will prevail which are found in other ftates. The peafants, individually or collectively, are however to be mafters of the foil, provided they pay to the military a due proportion of its fruits; a degree of independence that would engender infolence, and render them more formidable to the government than the Penefts of Theffaly and the Helots of Sparta [r]. Again, if lands are property, but women common, will the women manage houfes in which they have no feparate intereft, with the fame attention that the men cultivate their own fields? The example of inferior animals does not prove that men and women ought to exercife the fame employments, becaufe no animal but man is acquainted with the benefits refulting from the mutual exchange of the fruits of labour [s]; and the œconomy refulting from appropriate tafks is peculiar to the human race.

and women.

Socrates divides his commonwealth into two orders, that of foldiers, and that of peafants; but whether the peafants are occafionally to bear arms, or whether they are ever to be entrufted with any fhare in the go-

His diftribution of ranks,

[r] The Penefts (fo called from their poverty) were the defcendants of the neighbouring nations conquered and enflaved by the Theffalians, and moft commonly employed in cultivating the lands of their fevere mafters. In their employments, their numbers, and their continual difpofition to revolt, they agreed with the Lacedæmonian Helots. See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 157, & paffim.

[s] See above, p. 43.

 vernment,

BOOK II.

vernment, he does not determine. The wives of the ſoldiers, that is, the women who are common to this claſs, are to be trained to the gymnaſtic exerciſes as well as their huſbands; they are not only to participate in the military games of their country, but to ſuſtain the laborious duties and real dangers of the field. Though the military forms a privileged order, yet only a portion of this military is to be inveſted with the powers of deliberation and final reſolution; in other words, a ſmall body of men are to be the ſovereigns of the ſtate; and it ſhould ſeem as if thoſe ſovereigns were to reign for life; for Socrates informs us, that the divinity infuſes into ſome men, even at their birth, a portion of intellectual gold; into others, a portion of intellectual ſilver; but that the third claſs, the peaſants and artificers, are compoſed of braſs and iron. Theſe golden men, therefore, are, according to Socrates, to be perpetual magiſtrates: but, under ſuch an arrangement, can it be expected that a high-minded people, with arms in their hands, ſhould be reſtrained from ſedition?

unfit for attaining the end of political ſociety.

Though exempted from this evil, even the governing part of the city, ſubjected to ſo many privations and bound to ſo many hard duties, would not deſerve the epithet of happy; and if happineſs does not belong to them, can we expect to find it among the peaſants and mechanics? Socrates, indeed, ſays, that it is the buſineſs of a legiſlator to conſult, not the good of any particular claſs of men, but that of the whole

BOOK II.

whole ſtate; he forgets that the happineſs of a ſtate is to be meaſured by the common ſtandard of happineſs of the individuals compoſing it; for happineſs is not like an *even* number that may be compoſed of parts which are *odd*.

Chap. 4.

Examination of Plato's books of laws.

In his books of laws, which were written afterwards, Plato intended to delineate a more practicable ſcheme of government. Yet even theſe laws he gradually bends to his favourite ſyſtem; and, except in the articles of the community of wives and poſſeſſions, and of the public tables deſtined for the women, his two republics nearly agree in form, though they differ in magnitude; the firſt containing one thouſand, and the ſecond, five thouſand men bearing arms. All the diſcourſes of Socrates, doubtleſs, diſcover great freedom of thought, and much patience of inveſtigation; they are diſtinguiſhed by novelty, ingenuity, and elegance; but that all his obſervations ſhould be juſt, is more than could be expected from man. Five thouſand ſoldiers confined to the buſineſs of war, and cultivating no one kind of productive induſtry, would, with their due proportion of wives, children, and domeſtics, require for their comfortable ſubſiſtence the plains of Babylon, or ſome other country equally extenſive [t]. Suppoſitions, though arbitrary, ought not to be impoſſible.

Socrates

[t] The purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence for which commonwealths are inſtituted, requiring a minute ſubdiviſion of labour, Ariſtotle ſays, that in this particular view, the more populous is the community, its end will be the more completely attained. But the conve-

BOOK II.

Socrates does not fay that his foldiers are to fubfift comfortably, but temperately; this is ill expreffed, for men may fubfift temperately, but wretchedly [u]. He fays, that laws ought to be relative to the country, and to the men of that country; he ought to have added, " and to the furrounding nations." The provifions for defenfive war, at leaft [w], ought not to be omitted in any wife plan of legiflation.

His equalization of landed property, imperfect without concomitant regulations.

In his fecond republic he equalizes eftates, but leaves population unlimited; faying, that deaths and barrennefs are found by experience to keep the populoufnefs of moft countries, at different periods, nearly on the fame level. But under

---

conveniencies and accommodations, furnifhed by the mutual exchange of labour and its fruits, are not the only ingredients of comfortable fubfiftence; education, morals, and other elements, conftituting national felicity, fet bounds to that populoufnefs which the mere traffic of conveniencies would leave unlimited. It is thus, in general, that the degree in which one political advantage can be attained, is limited by a regard to other advantages which muft not be neglected; and to compare and reconcile them with each other, to compenfate inequalities and to adjuft contrarieties, is the great duty of the ftatefman. All things confidered he declares, in favour of what would be now deemed a very fmall commonwealth, confifting of 15,000 or 20,000 citizens (which muft provide for defence, by confederating with other ftates formed on a fimilar plan); and he fays, that the third or fourth part of this community could not fubfift in arms and idlenefs, unlefs the territory was very extenfive. Experience juftifies this remark. Political writers fay, that fcarcely one man in a hundred, and certainly not one in fifty, can in modern times be maintained as a foldier without the gradual depopulation of their refpective communities. Yet how great is the difproportion between a fourth and a fiftieth? and how fcantily are modern foldiers provided for, in comparifon with the foldiers of antiquity?

[u] The author adds, " liberally and luxurioufly." The adjuncts, " liberally and foberly," muft be united in order to exprefs ζην ευ.

[w] Ariftotle, as we fhall fee hereafter, juftifies even offenfive war in certain cafes.

ordinary

ordinary governments, increafe of population would only occafion a greater fubdivifion of landed property; whereas in Plato's republic, the fupernumeraries would be altogether deftitute of eftates; becaufe the lands being already reduced to equal, and as it were, elementary parts, would be incapable of farther partition. In all countries the juft proportion between wealth and populoufnefs ought to be an object of the moft ferious attention. Neglect in this particular produces that poverty which is the mother of villainy and fedition. In the laws of Pheidon of Corinth, one of the moft antient writers on the fubject of politics, a regulation is introduced directly the reverfe of Plato's; Pheidon limits population, but does not equalize poffeffions: the relative advantages of either plan we fhall afterwards examine.

Imperfection of his conftitutional regulations.

In Plato's fecond republic, the characters of men fit for office are very imperfectly defcribed by faying, that in the compofition of a commonwealth, the governors fhould be as different from the governed, as, in the compofition of a web, the warp is from the woof. In point of wealth, his citizens are divided into four claffes, of which the firft is to be four times as rich as the laft. Having thus permitted the unequal accumulation of perfonals, why does he fo nicely limit the acquifition of landed property? To each family he affigns two houfes, a prefent as inconvenient as it is expenfive. The general fcheme of his commonwealth is to be neither

democratical nor oligarchical, but a mixture of both forms; ſince all the citizens capable of purchaſing heavy armour are to be entitled to a ſhare in the government; a regulation which excludes only the meaneſt portion of the loweſt claſs. This mixed form of policy is well adapted to common uſe, but if Plato meant it as the beſt poſſible ſyſtem, next to that of his philoſophical commonwealth, he probably rates it too highly; many will prefer to it the government of Sparta, and other ſyſtems of policy more ſtrictly formed on the ariſtocratic model.

Judgment in favour of mixed government.

Some men are of opinion that the beſt government muſt be compounded of monarchy, ariſtocracy, and democracy. On this account they highly commend the inſtitutions of Sparta, which admit of a king, of a ſenate, and of the democratical power of the Ephori, who are choſen by and from the people. Others regard the power of the Ephori as too arbitrary and tyrannical; and think that whatever is democratical at Sparta, reſults, not from its political conſtitution, but from its cuſtoms and manners; the common and frugal tables; the public and uniform education; the daily commerce of life, and the habitual interchange of good offices among perſons of all ranks.

In Plato's ſecond commonwealth, there is not any mixture of monarchy; it conſiſts of democracy and oligarchy, but contains moſt of oligarchy; and yet he ſays, inconſiſtently enough, that the beſt government is compoſed of democracy

cracy and tyranny [x], which two corruptions can hardly be honoured with the name of governments, or, if ſo called, muſt ſurely be held the very worſt of all.

Particularly with regard to elections.

That Plato's ſecond commonwealth inclines moſt to oligarchy, is evident from the laws reſpecting the appointment of the magiſtrates. This appointment is partly by ſuffrage, partly by lot; the former of which is conformable to oligarchy, the latter to democracy. This mixed mode of appointment is, therefore, conformable to a mixture of thoſe two forms. But that the

[x] Plato does not ſay tyranny, but monarchy. The paſſage alluded to is in the Sixth Book of his Laws, p. 858. edit. Ficin. I had often read it without conſideringi t as liable to the objection ſtated in the text becauſe I never doubted that there was an error of the preſs, *viz.* μοναρχικης inſtead of αριστοκρατικης. In the ſenſe in which the paſſage is taken by Ariſtotle, it is not only inconſiſtent with the context, but with the whole tenor of Plato's political writings; decidedly and uniformly hoſtile to abitrary power, whether monarchical or democratical. See his Republic, book i. p. 582. edit. Ficin. The difficulty may, however, be removed without correcting the text, if we ſuppoſe that Plato conſiders monarchy as the limit of ariſtocracy, as democracy is of republicaniſm. Abſolute monarchy and perfect democracy are two extremes, and good government lies between them. When a republic expands into democracy, it ceaſes to be a republic; when an ariſtocracy contracts into a monarchy, it ceaſes to be an ariſtocracy. Republics and ariſtocracies, as both Plato and Ariſtotle ſhew, have reſpectively a tendency to this expanſion and contraction, which may be conſidered as their ultimate limits; or two contrary extremes, by the due blending of which juſt government is produced. In conformity with this, ſee what is ſaid of the twofold juſtice and twofold equality; the one conſiſting in ſameneſs of meaſure, weight, and number, which is eaſily recogniſed; the other hardly diſcernible by man, though approved by the judgment of God himſelf; and, as far as it prevails in this lower world, the ſource of happineſs to individuals and communities. The reaſon is given, τῳ μεν γαρ μειζονι πλειω, τῳ δ' ελαττονι σμικροτερα νεμει, μετρια διδουσα προς την αυτων φυσιν εκατερω: "for it attributes to the greater more, and to the leſſer leſs, aſſigning to each what is commenſurate to its reſpective nature." De Legib. l. vi. p. 859.

rich

BOOK II.

rich ſhould be compelled, under a forfeit, to attend the aſſemblies for electing magiſtrates, and for other public duties, while the attendance of the poor remains optional, is a regulation highly favourable to oligarchy. The lower claſſes will frequently neglect attendance, and the public affairs will thus devolve excluſively on the more wealthy portion of the community. In conſtituting the ſenate, candidates are to be named from the four claſſes of the citizens at large. But the two lower claſſes are not bound to attend at the naming of candidates from men of their own order. From candidates thus named the ſenate is, by a new election, to be conſtituted; but this ſucceſſion of elections, in which the magiſtrates are choſen from candidates previouſly named, is always a dangerous expedient, ſince it expoſes the government to be uſurped by a combination of artful men, who need not be very numerous. Such is Plato's ſecond republic, a mixture of oligarchy and democracy, as will evidently appear when we have examined more accurately the polity compounded of thoſe two forms [y].

Chap. 5.

Concerning other ſchemes of ideal commonwealths.

Other ſchemes of ideal commonwealths have been delineated by philoſophers and politicians, and alſo by men entitled to neither appellation; all of which ſchemes approach much nearer to ſuch governments as have actually prevailed in the world, than do the two republics of Plato.

[y] The text is confuſed and corrupt. I have given to it the order and the ſenſe ſeemingly moſt conſiſtent with other parts of the work.

In none of the political models proposed by other writers do we read any thing concerning the community of wives, the community of goods, or common tables destined for the women. They begin their codes of legislation by institutions more necessary and more practicable.

Phaleas's plan for equalizing property.

To some writers, nothing appears of so much consequence as the skilful regulation of property; because it is this much coveted object that gives birth to most disputes and most seditions. Phaleas of Chalcedon [z] was the first who proposed, as a most salutary institution, the equalizing of wealth among the citizens; a thing, he thinks, easily established in new settlements; and which, he says, might easily be introduced into old countries by one simple law, commanding the rich always to give marriage-portions with their daughters, but never to receive any; and the poor always to receive, but never to give them. Plato in his laws, on the contrary, allows the inequality of fortunes within certain limits; permitting, as we before observed, the citizens of the first class to be four times as rich as those of the last.

[z] Neither of this Phaleas, nor of Pheidon mentioned above, have we any notices but those left by Aristotle. Christopher Hendreich (De Repub. Carthagin. p. 166, & p. 239.) makes Phaleas a Carthaginian: he was the lawgiver of Chalcedon, a city on the Thracian Bosphorus, opposite to Byzantium, or Constantinople, and built seventeen years before it. Chalcedon was called in derision "the city of the blind," because its founders, overlooking the noble situation on which Constantinople now stands, had chosen one greatly inferior to it. Plin. v. 32. Tacitus, xii. 62. A legislator, six centuries before Christ, equalizing fortunes on the eastern coast of the Bosphorus, — how strange a contrast with the laws now prevalent there!

Whoever

BOOK II.

Its inconveniencies.

Whoever would regulate the extent of fortunes, muſt alſo regulate the increaſe of families. If children multiply beyond the means of ſupporting them, the intention of the law will be fruſtrated, and families will be ſuddenly reduced from opulence to beggary; a revolution always dangerous to public tranquillity.

Other ſchemes of ſimilar nature.

That a certain degree of equalization of property tends to ſtrengthen the bands of ſociety, eſcaped not the ſagacity of ancient legiſlators. In legiſlating for Athens, Solon acknowledged the influence of this principle [a]. The early inſtitutions of ſeveral republics both limit the acquiſition, and prohibit, under certain circumſtances, the ſale, of lands. In Locris, a citizen cannot diſpoſe of his eſtate, unleſs he can make it appear that he is reduced to this neceſſity by ſome unmerited and manifeſt calamity. The alienation of ancient inheritances in Leucas prepared the way for a revolution in the government; and offices of magiſtracy no longer requiring a fixed qualification in point of fortune, the mixed form of policy gradually degenerated, into nearly a ſimple democracy. But equality itſelf is not a thing univerſally deſirable; for ſhares may be all equal, and yet all

Their futility.

[a] Solon allowed a brother to marry his ſiſter on the father's ſide, but not his ſiſter uterine; becauſe by marrying the latter, he might have increaſed the eſtate which deſcended to him from his father, by that which came from the firſt huſband of his mother; and thus in his own perſon have accumulated two inheritances. Com. Plutarch. in Themiſt. p. 128. Petit. Leg. Attic. p. 480.; and Monteſquieu, Eſprit de Loix, l. v. c. 5. Several other of Solon's laws breathe the ſame ſpirit. Conf. Plutarch. in Solon. p. 89. Demoſth. in Macart. p. 1036. Petit. de Leg. Attic. p. 441—444.

too

too great if they foster sloth and luxury; they may be all equal, and yet all too small if they engender wretchedness. Mediocrity, therefore, ought to be the aim of legislation; but this object will be better attained by moderating passion than by levelling property.

Phaleas, indeed, proposes not only to equalize possessions, but to render education uniform. He does not explain, however, wherein this uniform education is to consist. The citizens may be all educated alike, and all of them ill educated, if care be not taken early to subdue in them the miserable passions of avarice and ambition.

The real causes of civil disorders.

Discontents arise not merely from the inequality of possessions, but from the equality of honours. The multitude complain that property is unjustly, because unequally, distributed; men of superior merit or superior pretensions complain that honours are unjustly, if equally, distributed; and that

"The good and worthless find their meed the same [b]."

The bare necessaries of life, food and fuel, clothes to cover our nakedness, and a home to shelter us from the storm, comforts which it is pretended the equalization of property would enable all men to enjoy, are not the only incentives to injustice. The greatest crimes are committed for none of those things, but for obtaining or securing the objects of ill-regulated de-

[b] Iliad, ix. Achilles speaks to Ulysses.

fires,

BOOK II.

fires, and fenfelefs, becaufe infatiable, paffions; and fometimes for acquiring objects of tafte and elegance, from which we expect to derive pleafure unmixed with pain; pure, unfading, and independent enjoyment. It is not to avoid cold or hunger that tyrants cover themfelves with blood; and ftates decree the moft illuftrious rewards, not to him who catches a thief, but to him who kills an ufurper[c]. Phaleas's plan of equalizing property is ufeful, therefore, againft the leaft and moft inconfiderable only of the three evils which difturb fociety; evils, for each of which there is an appropriate remedy; fubfiftence infured by induftry, for the firft; an education infpiring the habit of moderation and felf-command, for the fecond; and for the third, the attractive, rational, and uncloying charms of philofophy; in the ftudy and practice of which, men will find a delight, and the only delight not liable to contingencies, round and complete in itfelf, and as ftable as it is independent.

Their remedies.

The proper limits of national wealth.

In delineating the fcheme of his republic, Phaleas has confined his attention to matters of domeftic policy. He has not inquired, though the inquiry was neceffary, how the national force is to be raifed or fupported. Money, or its equivalents, are effential in war as well as in peace. Phaleas has not endeavoured to afcertain the extent of the national wealth. Yet

[c] The word τυραννος properly denotes him who has acquired the fovereignty of a ftate formerly free. With whatever moderation he might exercife his power, he was called τυραννος from the manner by which he obtained it. But Ariftotle here means the tyrannical abufe of ufurped power.

there

there are certain limits within which it ought to be confined; its immoderate magnitude might tempt the rapacity or provoke the invafion of greater powers; but it ought to be fufficiently confiderable to enable us to meet our equals with confidence; and even to teach our fuperiors that they may probably lofe more by conteft than they are likely to gain by victory. When Autaphradates prepared to befiege Atarneus[d], Eubulus, the mafter of that city, defired him to calculate how much time would be wafted in the fiege, and how much money would in that time be expended; obferving, that for a lefs fum he would probably be willing to fell the place. Autaphradates calculated, reflected, and defifted from the fiege.

Inefficacy and imperfection of laws equalizing wealth.

The equalization of fortunes may have fome flight tendency to ftifle animofity and to prevent diffenfion. But its effect is always inconfiderable, and often doubtful; fince thofe who think themfelves entitled to fuperiority will not patiently brook equality. To ftand on a level with the multitude is not their proper place; and to acquire their due elevation, they will confpire together and fubvert the commonwealth. 'The wickednefs of man is boundlefs: it feems at firft as if a trifle would content him, but his paffions invigorate by gratification; always indulged, always craving, and continually

[d] See above, p. 8, & p. 17. and Paufanias, b. iv. c. 35. This place had fallen to decay in Pliny's time, though ftill renowned for precious ftones as clear as cryftal, "Cepionides in Æolidis Atarne quondam oppido, nunc pago, nafcuntur." Plin. N. H. v. 30. Conf. xxxvii. 10.

preying

BOOK II.

preying on him who feeds them. This evil cannot be remedied by equalizing property, whether lands or moveables, of which laſt Phaleas has omitted to ſpeak. It can be cured only by that ſalutary diſcipline which will make one part of the community delight in doing juſtice, and by that ſound policy which will prevent the remaining part from committing with impunity any ſerious wrong; for the majority of mankind will always be the ſport of their own headſtrong paſſions; and though they ought to be treated with equity and humanity, muſt be habitually overawed by authority, and ſeaſonably reſtrained by power. Phaleas's republic will be but a ſmall one if mechanics and artificers be debarred from all ſhare in the government. The inſtitutions of Epidamnus[c] reſpecting the lower ranks, and thoſe eſtabliſhed on the ſame ſubject by Diophantus at Athens, are worthy of imitation. Such are the merits and the defects of the republic of Phaleas.

Chap. 6.

The ideal republic of Hippodamus, an architect of Miletus.

Hippodamus, the ſon of Euryphon, a Mileſian, and by profeſſion an architect, gained celebrity in his own art by conſtructing the Piræus at Athens, and by improving the method of diſtributing ſtreets, and planning cities. His love of diſtinction expoſed him to the reproach of vanity; and many aſcribed to affectation, his

[c] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 375. and vol. ii. p. 185. The lower claſſes in Epidamnus as well as in Athens, though not public ſlaves as in Laconia and Theſſaly, were much employed in what Ariſtotle conſiders as ſervile taſks, becauſe performed by the exertions of mere bodily labour; particularly in building, mining, and other public works.

his magnificent drefs, his flowing locks, and the warm mantle which he wore, even during the heat of fummer. Hippodamus was ambitious of reaching eminence in all kinds of knowledge, and is the firft author who, without any practice in affairs, wrote a treatife concerning the beft form of government. His republic confifted of ten thoufand men, divided into the three claffes of artificers, hufbandmen, and foldiers. The territory he likewife divides into three portions; the facred, deftined for the various exigencies of the public worfhip; the common, to be cultivated for the common benefit of the foldiers; and the private, to be feparately appropriated by the hufbandmen. His laws alfo were divided into three kinds, becaufe he thought there were only three forts of injuries; infults, damages, and death. He inftituted a court of appeal, compofed of felect fenators. Sentence, he thought, ought not to be paffed by votes or ballot; but that each judge fhould be furnifhed with a tablet, on which he fhould write guilty, if he fimply condemned; and which he fhould leave unwritten, if he fimply acquitted; but on which, if he found the defendant in fome meafure guilty, but not to the full extent of the indictment, he fhould mark this difference, ftating how much the culprit fhould pay, or what punifhment he fhould fuffer. As the law formerly ftood, Hippodamus obferved, that in all cafes requiring this diftinction, the judge, who was bound by oath to obferve juftice in his decifions, muft commit perjury whenever he either fimply

The new laws.

and

BOOK II.

and pofitively condemned, or fimply and pofitively acquitted. Hippodamus alfo eftablifhed a law in favour of thofe whofe inventions tended to improve the conftitution of the commonwealth; they were to be diftinguifhed by peculiar honours; and the children of thofe who fell in battle were to be maintained and educated at the public expence. This laft regulation, firft introduced by the architect of Miletus, has been adopted by Athens and other cities. According to his plan of policy, the magiftrates were all of them to be elected by the free and impartial fuffrages of their fellow-citizens, confifting of the three claffes of men above mentioned: the concerns of the ftate, the affairs of ftrangers, the care and management of orphans, formed the three important objects entrufted to their adminiftration.

Examination of his republic.

Such are the leading features of the republic of Hippodamus. In examining this republic, the firft difficulty that occurs refpects his divifion of the citizens. The hufbandmen, the artificers, and the foldiers, are all of them to be members of the ftate; but the hufbandmen deftitute of arms, the artificers deftitute of both lands and arms, will maintain a very unequal conflict with the foldiers, if thefe laft fhould be tempted to enflave them. An affociation of men, fo unequally treated by the legiflator, muft continually tend to diffolution. The great executive magiftracies, together with every office of military command, devolve of courfe on the foldiers. Can the two remaining claffes

claſſes be expected to wiſh the continuance of a government, from whoſe honours and emoluments they are for ever to be excluded? A revolution, therefore, muſt ſpeedily take place, unleſs the military be more powerful than both the huſbandmen and the artificers united; and if they actually be ſo, of what ſignification is it, that theſe degraded claſſes are ſummoned to give their votes at elections, and mocked with the appellation of citizens? Artificers, ſubſiſting by the fruits of their own labour, are eſſential to the exiſtence of every city or community. But the claſs of huſbandmen, as regulated by Hippodamus, by what tie of utility are they linked to the ſtate? The common lands might be cultivated by the military themſelves; which would deſtroy the diſtinction between the ſoldiers and the peaſants. They might be cultivated by men deſtitute of private eſtates; and this would form a fourth claſs, diſtinct from the huſbandmen of Hippodamus; who, by a moſt awkward regulation, are to labour one diſtrict, conſiſting of their private eſtates, for their own maintenance, and another, conſiſting of the common lands, for the maintenance of the military; a moſt uſeleſs diſtinction of property, and moſt abſurd partition of employment, by which much valuable time would be loſt, and much unneceſſary expence incurred.

Of his judicial regulations.

The judicial regulations of Hippodamus are not leſs blameable, ſince their direct tendency is to convert judges into arbiters, and thereby

BOOK II.

to arm them with an arbitrary power of decision, which can never be expedient to the parties, unless it be specially granted, and voluntarily entrusted. In matters submitted to arbitration, communication of sentiment and discussion of opinion are not only allowed but required. In courts of justice, most legislators have strictly prohibited both; commanding each judge simply to condemn or simply to acquit, as his own reason directs. By the innovations of Hippodamus, legal proceedings would be involved in inextricable confusion. The defendant might be ordered by one judge to pay twenty minæ; by another more; and by a third, less; each might differ from every other; and all from the plaintiff. The sentence would be thus split into such a multitude of parts as it would be difficult to collect, and impossible to unite; and all these difficulties would be created and encountered, in order to obviate an imaginary inconvenience; for it is false that the judge is perjured, who simply acquits a party sued for twenty minæ, although he may believe that he really owes half that sum. The judge would, on the contrary, be perjured, if he did not acquit him; and in all similar cases, the fault lies not in the law or in the judge, but in the libel and in the plaintiff, whose case is not correctly stated, and whose action is not fairly brought.

His law in favour of political improvements.

The law in favour of those whose inventions tend to improve the constitution of the commonwealth, is more specious than solid. Bearing

ing beauty on its furface[c], it is fraught with perfecution, innovation, and fedition. It is the opinion of many, that ancient laws, which are good, are preferable to new ones, though better; and that a moderately wife conftitution of government ought never to be altered. Upon this delicate fubject, the following obfervations may deferve attention. The advocates for alteration and improvement obferve, that the gymnaftic exercifes and medicine, as well as all other arts and faculties, have been carried to their actual ftate of perfection by repeated trials and reiterated efforts. If legiflation be a fcience or an art, muft it not partake of the fame nature, and follow the fame progrefs with all other arts and fciences which, being founded on obfervation, have been reared, extended, and perfected by experiment and reflection? That it does partake of the fame progrefs, civil hiftory affords the moft convincing proofs. What can be more rude, what more barbarous, than the ancient laws of the Greeks, when they frequented the public places with fwords by their fides; and bought and fold their women like cattle in a market? In thofe ftates which have adhered too fcrupuloufly to their hereditary ufages, what groffnefs, iniquity, and cruelty every where prevail! At Cumæ, a man may be convicted and punifhed as a murderer, on the evidence of the

Arguments in favour of political innovation.

[c] Ariftotle's expreffion is remarkable; ευοφθαλμον ακουσαι: the firft word, denoting what is pleafing to the eye, had come to denote what is agreeable in general; and thence, joined with ακουσαι, "what is pleafing to hear."

kindred

BOOK II.

kindred of him who profecutes for the murder. It is not for what is ancient, but for what is ufeful, that men of fenfe ought to contend; and whatever is diftinguifhed by the former quality, cannot be expected to poffefs much of the latter. The ancient inhabitants of the world, whether produced by the genial power of the earth[d], or faved from the ruins of fome dreadful cataftrophe, muft have been degraded by weaknefs of underftanding, and difgraced by unruly ftrength of paffion. The inftitutions afcribed to the earth-born giants are not, furely, worthy of being followed with refpectful deference. But innovations, were it defirable to prevent them, are not, however, to be prevented: they are neceffary and inevitable. Written laws, with whatever comprehenfivenefs and precifion they may be penned, cannot exprefs all that variety of cafes to which, and which only, they may with juftice be applied. Rights are to be maintained, wrongs to be prevented, and therefore laws are made. Thefe laws are general; exceptions to them occur; new exceptions multiply; and the number and importance of the exceptions at length produce new laws far more equitable than thofe which had previoufly been eftablifhed.

Stronger arguments againft it.

Formidable as thefe arguments feem, they may be oppofed by others of not lefs weight:

[d] Ariftotle is here fpeaking as an advocate; and, in ftating the arguments in favour of innovation, does not, therefore, think it neceffary to adhere to the eftablifhed tenets of his philofophy. See Analyfis, p. 135.

arguments

arguments which prove that even the ruſt of government is to be reſpected, and that its fabric is never to be touched but with a fearful and trembling hand. When the evil of perſevering in hereditary inſtitutions is ſmall, it ought always to be endured, becauſe the evil of departing from them is certainly very great. Slight imperfections, therefore, whether in the laws themſelves, or in thoſe who adminiſter and execute the laws, ought always to be overlooked, becauſe they cannot be corrected without occaſioning a much greater miſchief, and tending to weaken that reverence which the ſafety of all governments requires that the citizens at large ſhould entertain, cultivate, and cheriſh for the hereditary inſtitutions of their country. The compariſon drawn from the improvement of arts, does not apply to the amendment of laws. To change or improve an art, and to alter or amend a law, are things as diſſimilar in their operation as different in their tendency: for laws operate as practical principles of moral action[e]; and, like all the rules of morality, derive

[e] The Stagirite's argument againſt innovation does not apply to that kind of it propoſed by Lord Bacon, namely, the imitating that great innovator Time, whoſe operations are ſo ſlow and ſkilful, that they elude the ſenſes and eſcape obſervation, "Novator maximus, tempus; quid ni igitur tempus imitemur?" and again, "Quis novator tempus imitatur, quod novationes ita inſinuat, ut ſenſus fallant?" That great man concludes with Ariſtotle, "It is improper to try new experiments in the political body, unleſs the neceſſity be urgent, or the utility evident. Great care muſt be taken that the deſire of reformation may occaſion the change, and not the deſire of the change plead for the reformation. Again, let all novelty, though it cannot, perhaps, be rejected, yet be held ſuſpected. And laſtly, as

BOOK II. rive their force and efficacy, as even the name imports, from the cuftomary repetition of habitual acts, and the flow operation of time. Every alteration of the laws, therefore, tends to fubvert that authority on which the perfuafive energy of all laws is founded; to abridge, weaken, and deftroy the power of law itfelf[f]. Though

as the Scripture directs, let us ftand upon the old paths, and fee and afk for the good way, and walk therein." Political Effays, Effay xi. It is worthy of remark, that Bacon lived in the age of reformation in religion, and was himfelf a great reformer in philofophy. He combated fuccefsfully the pretended philofophy of Ariftotle, which was certainly far worfe than no philofophy at all; but his diflike to the diftorted fhadow made him think, at leaft fpeak, too difrefpectfully of the fubftance. Whoever has read only the works of Bacon, is not a competent judge; but whoever has read the works both of Bacon and of Ariftotle, will be ready to acknowledge that the former is wanting in gratitude to an author whom he is continually arraigning and continually copying. Yet Lord Bacon is not altogether without excufe: in his time, the pretended authority of Ariftotle enthralled the human mind. In the prefent age, that illuftrious modern might, confiftently with his *principles*, greatly vary his *conduct*; and exaggerate the merit of the Stagirite, in the fame fpirit, and with the fame views, which made him formerly depreciate and defame it.

[f] Notwithftanding this decifion of Ariftotle's, a learned modern writer obferves; "As to the perpetuating their inftitutions and rendering them immutable, this entered not into the intention of the old Grecian legiflation. A fyftem of immutable and irrevocable laws might indeed be the barbarous project of Eaftern policy: but the Grecian legiflators were too well experienced in the nature of mankind, the genius of fociety, and the ceafelefs viciffitude of human things, ever to dream of fo ridiculous a defign." Warburton's Divine Legation of Mofes, b. ii. fect. 3. This is expreffed too ftrongly and too abfolutely. Not to mention the example of Lycurgus, (fee Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. 3.) which Warburton indeed admits as an exception, but fays that Lycurgus was fingle in the ridiculous attempt of making his laws perpetual; a whole volume might be written to prove Ariftotle's decifion conformable to the general voice of poets, orators, hiftorians, and legiflators. Δει δε και τους νομους της πατριδος καθαπερ τινας δευτερους θεους συντηρειν. "That we ought to maintain unaltered the laws of our country, and refpect them

Though innovation in general should not be universally reprobated, yet various questions would arise, on what occasions it is warrantable. The

them as certain secondary divinities." Stobæus, serm. xxxviii. p. 229. Such is the general corollary resulting from the political writings of Grecian antiquity *; a corollary adopted by Cicero †, their best interpreter, De Legibus; and such is the doctrine maintained by Demosthenes himself, when speaking to the Athenians, whose decrees, governed by wild demagogues, were as variable as the Euripus. See his Oration against Timocrates, particularly the last pages. In the same Oration (p. 480, ex edit. Wolf.) there is a passage worthy of remark. "I am inclined, citizen judges, to explain to you how the Locrians make laws. You will not suffer any detriment by hearing this example; an example of the mode of legislation in a well-regulated state. The Locrians are so firmly persuaded that it is their duty to uphold their ancient laws, and to defend them against the interest or caprice of innovators, that whoever proposes a new law, does it with a halter about his neck. Should the law be approved, the proposer departs unhurt; but should his law be rejected, he is strangled in his own halter. This salutary institution proves an effectual check to innovation; and the Locrians strictly observe their ancient laws; insomuch, that in a great length of time, only one single law has been altered. The old law ordained, that whoever struck out the eye of another, should lose one of his own eyes; a punishment which did not admit of any pecuniary commutation, but was to be rigorously inflicted. A man with only one eye, being threatened by his adversary with the loss of the single eye he had, and thinking life insupportable under the calamity of blindness, ventured to propose this alteration of the law; 'That he who struck out the eye of a person who had but one, should be deprived of both his own eyes, so that the punishment might be equal to the crime.' The amendment was approved; and this is said to have been the only alteration in the Locrian law, in the space of more than two hundred years. But your demagogues, citizen judges, make new laws, solely for their own convenience, almost every month: if you do not punish them, the people at large will soon be enslaved by these wild beasts." ουκ αν φθανοι το πληθος τουτοις τοις θηριοις δουλευον. As the law mentioned by Demosthenes is ascribed to Zaleucus (Ζαλευκον ος ενομοθετησε τον καινον εισοισοντα νομον βροχον περικειμενον, &c. Stobæus, p. 229.

* See the 2nd Book of Plato on Laws, and the 4th Book of his Republic throughout.

† Debet enim constituta sic esse civitas, ut æterna sit. Fragm. de Legibus, l. iii.

BOOK II.

The difference of manners, governments, and of men, by whom alterations are propofed, and by whom they are to be conducted, will produce very complicated and almoft innumerable queftions; the folution of which we fhall defer to a more feafonable opportunity.

Chap. 7.

Obfervations preparatory to an examination of the Spartan, Cretan, and Cathaginian republics.

In examining the Spartan, the Cretan, or indeed any fyftem of laws, two queftions ought chiefly to fix our attention. The firft queftion is, Whether thefe laws be calculated to promote the beft interefts of mankind? The fecond, Whether they be calculated to promote thofe interefts which, under particular circumftances, the legiflator takes to be the beft: in other words, whether the inftitutions which we examine be confiftent with the moft defirable and moft perfect model of civil polity; and whether they be confiftent with what the lawgiver, all things confidered, deems the government moft

ferm. xxxviii.), the Locrians here fpoken of muft be the Locri Epizephyrii; fo called from their territory near the promontory Zephyrium, at the fouthern extremity of Italy. Pindar calls them Zephyrian Locrians, in his fhort and pithy panegyric:

Νεμει γαρ ατρεκεια πολιν Λοκρων
Ζεφυριων, μελει δε τοισι Καλλιοπα
Και χαλκεος Αρης.

"Juftice governs the republic of the Zephyrian Locrians; who cultivate, with equal fuccefs, arts and arms." The law concerning the halter, which Stobæus refers to Zeleucus, is numbered by Diodorus Siculus among the laws of Charondas. But the fame writer tells us, that Charondas borrowed moft of his laws from former codes. Diodor. xii. 79. p. 485. It is probable therefore that the principle of refifting innovation once prevailed at Thurii, as well as in the republic of the Locri Epizephyrii; though hiftory indicates that it was far lefs rigidly adhered to in the former republic, which was difturbed by frequent revolutions. Ephor. apud Strabon. p. 260.

fuitable

ſuitable to thoſe for whom he legiſlates? In every well-regulated commonwealth, it is agreed that all thoſe citizens who have any ſhare in the public adminiſtration, ſhould enjoy leiſure for attending to this important concern. But how ſuch leiſure may beſt be obtained, is not eaſy to determine. The Peneſts have often with arms aſſailed the Theſſalians; and the Helots, the Spartans; and thoſe degraded orders of peaſants live as it were in continual ambuſh, watching the moment to retaliate thoſe injuries which they have indignantly ſuffered from men whoſe leiſure reſults only from their own toil. The Cretan peaſants have never diſcovered the ſame ſpirit of ſedition; becauſe, the cities of Crete being all of them ſupported by the labour of ſervile ruſtics, it could not be the intereſt of any one ſtate to teach the ſlaves of its neighbours to rebel, ſince every neighbour, who happened to be hoſtile, would conſtantly enjoy an opportunity of retorting the injury. But the Argives, Arcadians, and Meſſenians, ſubſiſting chiefly by their own labour, and waging eternal wars with Sparta, always endeavoured to divide and divert the enemy's force, by ſtirring the Helots to rebellion; and the Peneſts firſt revolted from the Theſſalians, during the wars of the latter with the Acheans, Perræbians, and Magneſians. In the treatment of ſlaves and peaſants, it is difficult to hit the middle point between the extremes of indulgence and harſhneſs; indulgence that is productive of inſolence, and harſhneſs that will be repaid with hatred. But

Difficulties in regulating the peaſants.

Why they are leſs ſeditious in Crete than in Theſſaly, &c.

BOOK II.

But either extreme is highly inconſiſtent with the proper management of thoſe lower claſſes, who form as it were the arms of the community.

Lycurgus's faulty indulgence to women.

Nothing proves more ruinous to a ſtate than the defective education of the women; ſince wherever the inſtitutions reſpecting one half of the community are faulty, the corruptions of that half will gradually taint the whole. The undiſciplined manners of the Spartan women are inconſiſtent with every wiſe plan of legiſlation, and totally adverſe to the principal aim of Lycurgus; who, exacting the moſt rigid temperance in his men, with a view to harden them to fortitude, has granted every indulgence to his women, and thereby corrupted them with licentiouſneſs. In a nation of ſoldiers, the errors in female education, and the vicious paſſions reſulting from that fatal ſource, are doubly prejudicial; for the poet had ſurveyed life and manners with diſcernment, who firſt coupled Mars and Venus; all martial nations being immoderately amorous, and therefore particularly obnoxious to the undue influence, or rather the dominion, of women; with the exception however of the Celts [g], and if there be any other people who openly prefer unnatural love. It is of little conſequence whether women rule the ſtate, or men, governed by women, rule it in ſubſervience to female paſſions. During the invaſion of the Thebans, the Spartan women [h],

[g] Vid. Athenæum, l. xiii. c. 27.

[h] See the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. p. 394.

inſtead

instead of rendering those services which women on similar occasions have often performed, caused more evil than even the arms of the enemy: and avarice must always domineer wherever women bear sway.

Whence it arose.

The incongruous regulations respecting the two sexes in Sparta proceeded from a natural cause. The severe duties of the field had prepared the men for submission to civil discipline; but the women, untamed and turbulent, spurned the yoke of legislation. The fault, therefore, is chargeable on themselves, rather than on Lycurgus. But we are not now inquiring who is to blame, but what is blameable?

Faulty regulations respecting property.

The unequal distribution of property forms another material defect in the Spartan government. Lycurgus prohibited the acquisition of lands by purchase, but set no bounds to their transmission and accumulation by gifts and testaments. Landed property therefore has been engrossed by a few; and if the whole territory were divided into five equal portions, not less than two of these portions would be found vested in women; such is the improvidence of the laws respecting succession, the enormity of dowers, and the extravagance of marriage settlements! The natural effect of such faulty regulations is to diminish the populousness of the country, which scarcely contains the twentieth part of the inhabitants which it is capable of supplying with subsistence, or the twentieth part of the thirty thousand heavy-armed men, and fifteen hundred cavalry, which it was thought able to send into the field. One great evil resulting

Their ill-effects.

resulting from this diminution of people was fatally experienced when the single defeat at Leuctra reduced this ancient kingdom to the brink of ruin. It is reported that the kings preceding Lycurgus supplied the waste of the natives in war, by alluring foreigners into the country; and that the Spartans alone amounted to ten thousand men bearing arms. Without examining this report we may affirm, that the strength derived from numbers will be better and more safely promoted by levelling the excessive inequalities of property. Lycurgus, however, certainly wished to increase the strength of the state, when he enacted, that the man who had *three* sons should be exempted from the night-watch, and that he who had four should enjoy a complete immunity from all public burdens. But this regulation evidently clashes with the preceding, since, under a faulty distribution of property, an increase of populousness is only an augmentation of misery.

Advantages and inconveniences attending the Ephori.

The popular part of the constitution of Sparta, residing in the Ephori, is liable to many objections: though invested with the most awful powers, the Ephori or inspectors must all of them be chosen indiscriminately from the multitude, and often from those of the lowest and poorest class. The decisions of such men ought not to be arbitrary or final. Their corruption has been shamefully manifest on many former occasions[1]; and in a very recent transaction, their venality, resulting from their poverty,

[1] History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 61.

had well nigh ruined the commonwealth. Their authority, too, is exorbitant and tyrannical; even the kings acknowledge the neceſſity of paying court to them; and their undue influence in the government has often expoſed the ariſtocracy of Sparta to the evils flowing from the moſt turbulent democracy. Yet it muſt be acknowledged, that this magiſtracy of the Ephori, ill regulated as it is, tends to preſerve the balance of the conſtitution, and has thereby perpetuated its duration. To give ſtability to any government, it is neceſſary that all orders of the ſtate ſhould feel their intereſt in its ſafety. Whether by accident or deſign, this ſalutary purpoſe has been effected at Sparta. The kings are inflexibly bound to a conſtitution which confers on them peculiar honours: the fidelity of the higher ranks of men is ſecured by the inſtitution of the ſenate, an admiſſion into which is the excluſive reward of their merit and ſervices: the people at large remain content with their condition, when they contemplate the ſovereign magiſtracy of the five Ephori promiſcuouſly elected from the whole; and who ought certainly to be ſo elected, though not after the childiſh faſhion that now prevails [k]. The

[k] Ariſtotle applies the ſame epithet, a few ſentences below, to the election of the ſenate; but omits telling us wherein this puerility conſiſted. The defect is ſupplied by Plutarch, in the life of Lycurgus; who relates, "That the aſſembly of the people having convened in the market-place, a certain number of ſelect perſons were confined in a neighbouring edifice; where, without the poſſibility of ſeeing or being ſeen by the aſſembly, they could only hear its ſhouts. The candidates for the ſenate then marched through the middle of the

BOOK II.

The indulgences alſo permitted to the Ephori in their ordinary mode of life, are totally inconſiſtent with the ſpirit of Lycurgus's legiſlation. Severity of manners carried to the extremes of harſhneſs and rigour is the prevailing feature of his policy; but while the reſt of the citizens ſnatch only by ſtealth even the moſt lawful pleaſures, the Ephori are abſurdly indulged in the unbounded gratification of all their paſſions.

Imperfections of the ſenate.

The conſtitution of the Spartan ſenate labours under many defects; when the legiſlator enacted that the members of this council ſhould hold their office for life, he did not conſider that the underſtanding[1] grows old as well as the body. The great and uncontroverted powers veſted in the ſenate might be ſafely entruſted to conſummate wiſdom and perfect virtue: but the Spartan ſenators have been ſeduced by partiality, and often corrupted by bribes. Their

the aſſembly, one after the other, in the order determined by lot. As each candidate paſſed in review, the people teſtified their favour by acclamation; while the impriſoned judges marked on tablets the loudneſs and frequency of the ſhouts, without knowing to which of the candidates they applied. He who was honoured by the moſt frequent repetitions of the loudeſt ſhouts was declared ſenator." Our author juſtly condemns this mode of election as childiſh, ſince the Lacedæmonians, like children unable to count, contented themſelves with probability in a matter where, by telling the votes, abſolute certainty might have been attained. This mode of election was alſo well calculated to gratify the fraudulent deſigns of the judges; for when they happened to have an undue partiality for any of the candidates, they might gueſs, from his general character, with what kind of ſhouts he was likely to be received; and, in oppoſition to truth, declare the acclamations in his favour the loudeſt and moſt frequent. Vid. Thucydid. l. i. p. 58. edit. Frankfort, 1594.

[1] See Analyſis, p. 57, & ſeq.

malver-

malverfations therefore ought to be reftrained by the regular operation of a law, compelling them at ftated times to give an account of their administration; as their undue exercife of power is but imperfectly checked by being occafionally obnoxious to the wild tyranny of the Ephori. Their mode of election is puerile[m]; and that none fhould be admitted into the fenate, but thofe who canvafs for that honour, tends to excite and invigorate that impudence of felfifh ambition which occafions half the wickednefs of mankind, and which is imprudently inflamed by the inftitutions of Lycurgus.

Of the two kings of Sparta.

Whether the office of king be at all ufeful in a republican government, fhall be examined hereafter. In whatever manner that queftion may be determined, it is plain that this office ought to be the reward of tried and approved merit; fince the inftitutions of Sparta have not been found capable of forming men, recommended by the accidental circumftance of birth, worthy of filling a throne. The legiflator, indeed, vifibly defpaired of perfecting his fellow-citizens in virtue, fince he condefcended to derive affiftance from their paffions and their vices. Men at variance with each other are confidered as the fitteft perfons to be joined in the fame important commiffions; and the fafety of the ftate is thought to have no fmall dependence on the diffenfion of the kings.

Of the Phiditia, or common tables.

The Phiditia, or public tables, are ill inftituted, for thofe only can frequent them who are

[m] See note k.

capable

BOOK II.

capable of bearing their fair proportion of the expence. At Crete, the expence of the public tables is fupplied by the ftate, and even the pooreft citizens may enjoy them; but as managed at Sparta, the Phiditia have weakened the democratical part of the conftitution, which they were intended to ftrengthen and uphold.

Of the high admiral.

The extraordinary powers granted to the high admiral of the republic have been juftly condemned by feveral writers. The two kings are the perpetual and hereditary commanders of the army; but the high admiral is vefted with fuch unbounded authority in naval affairs as renders him a fort of third king in the country, whofe ambition has often fhaken and almoft rent afunder the community.

Lycurgus's undue predilection for war.

Plato's obfervation is juft, that the laws of Lycurgus are well adapted to the affairs of war, but to them only; Sparta therefore has been faved by her wars, and ruined by her victories, which fhe knew not how to improve or to enjoy: her citizens thought rightly and wifely, that virtue was better fitted than vice for acquiring conqueft and dominion; they thought erroneoufly and abfurdly, that thefe effects of virtue were more valuable than the caufe.

The irregular collection of the Spartan revenue.

At Sparta the ftate is poor, and the revenues ill levied, for the wide extent of territory renders the citizens negligent in mutually exacting their reciprocal contributions. The poverty and difinterertednefs of the public thus forms a ftriking contraft with the wealth and avarice of individuals. But enough concerning the

Spartan

Spartan government, of which we have now enumerated the moſt material defects.

BOOK II. Chap. 8.

The go-vernment of Crete.

The civil polity of Crete nearly reſembles that of Sparta, in ſome parts not inferior to it, but in general worſe arranged and leſs poliſhed; the Spartan government being later in its formation, and an improvement on the conſtitution of Crete, which Lycurgus took for his model. During the travels of that lawgiver, after he ceaſed to be guardian to king Charilaus, the iſland of Crete, recommended by its ancient connection with his mother country, chiefly attracted his regard, and long challenged his reſidence; for Lyctos was a colony of Lacedæmon, and the ſettlers in that diſtrict conformed to the laws ſubſiſting in other parts of the iſland, which have continued to prevail to this day as firſt eſtabliſhed by the elder Minos.

Advantageous poſition of that iſland.

Crete, riſing in the midſt of the Mediterranean ſea, projecting towards Peloponneſus on one ſide, and on the other advancing towards Rhodes and Triopium on the coaſt of Aſia, is formed as it were by nature for holding the naval empire of Greece, which is every where a maritime country; Minos induſtriouſly availed himſelf of this advantageous ſituation, conquered ſome of the iſlands, colonized others, and died at Camicus in his unfortunate expedition againſt Sicily.

Agreement in the Spartan and Cretan inſtitutions.

There is a ſtriking analogy, we have ſaid, between the Cretan and Spartan inſtitutions: the territory of Laconia is cultivated for the benefit

benefit of the public by the ſubordinate claſs of Helots; the territory of Crete is cultivated for the ſame purpoſe by ſervile ruſtics denominated Periæci, becauſe inhabiting the dependent villages ſcattered over the territory, and ſurrounding their reſpective capitals. The inſtitution of common tables prevails in both countries: and theſe tables, at which the men only aſſemble, and which are now from their parſimony called Phiditia at Sparta, were anciently called in that country Andria, or tables appropriated to the male ſex; a term by which they are ſtill diſtinguiſhed in Crete, in which iſland the cuſtom took birth. The ſenate of Sparta correſponds to the ſenate in Crete, and the five Ephori in the one country bear a near affinity to the ten Coſmï of the other. The Cretan armies too were originally commanded by kings; but the power of the kings, which conſiſted, as at Sparta, in their being the hereditary generals of the commonwealth, has devolved on the Coſmï; who, together with the ſenate, have a negative before debate on the deliberations of the popular aſſembly, compoſed of the whole body of the citizens.

The clubs or public tables better regulated at Crete than in Sparta.

The public tables, we have ſaid, are better conſtituted in Crete than in Sparta; in the latter country each meſſmate muſt provide his ſhare of the entertainment, and when he ceaſes to make this proviſion, his right of commenſality is immediately at an end. At Crete, on the other hand, the corn and cattle, the produce of the common lands, and the contributions

tions levied on the Periæci, or peaſants, are divided into two great ſhares; the firſt of which is appropriated to temples, ſacrifices, and other objects appertaining to religion and the public ſervice; the ſecond is deſtined for the ſupply of the *Andreia*, or common-tables, and for affording food to perſons of either ſex and of all ages in the country. The Cretan legiſlator has ſome fine ſpeculations on the ſubject of ſpare diet and frugality; and employs for maintaining the due proportion of citizens and ſubſiſtence, ſome extraordinary regulations, the merits of which we ſhall take another opportunity to diſcuſs.

The bad regulation of the Coſmï and ſenate.

The office of the Coſmï at Crete labours under all the inconveniences which were found to reſult from that of the Ephori at Sparta. There is not any ſtandard of merit by which perſons ſoliciting either of thoſe high offices muſt, before their election, be examined and tried; and as the Coſmï can only be choſen from a certain number of families, the moſt illuſtrious in the iſland, the honours conferred on them are invidious and dangerous, and have a tendency to excite the greater diſcontent in the multitude, ſince thoſe alone who have diſcharged the office of the Coſmï can be elected into the ſenate, in which they keep their ſeats for life, neither controllable in their deciſions as judges, nor reſponſible for their adminiſtration as ſtateſmen.

The evils therefrom reſulting.

That the people have hitherto endured this unequal diſtribution of power, affords not any

any argument by which its policy can be defended; for the inſular ſituation of Crete cuts off communication with ſtrangers, and prevents *their* interference by intrigue and bribery, which, whenever it finds room to operate, always proves dangerous to an unjuſt and partial government.

The remedy applied, worſe than the evil.

But the remedy employed againſt this evil is ſtill worſe than the evil itſelf; ſince it controls by violence what might be ſubjected to law. The offended citizens conſpire againſt the obnoxious magiſtrate; and ſometimes by themſelves alone, ſometimes with the aſſiſtance of his colleagues, drive him from the community; unleſs he avoids this diſgraceful extremity by ſeaſonably abdicating his office.

The turbulence of the Cretan nobles.

Crete, which is ſometimes ſhaken by the mutinous ſpirit of the people, has been ſtill more fatally convulſed by the turbulence of the nobles, who, diſdaining the authority of government, aſſemble their partiſans, levy war againſt the magiſtrates and againſt each other, and for a while rend aſunder all thoſe bands by which communities are upheld and cemented. Men, both willing and able to inflict ſuch dreadful calamities, muſt long ere now have totally ruined their country, had not the ſafety of Crete, as we before ſaid, been wonderfully protected by the ineſtimable advantages of its inſular ſituation; which, by excluding the dangerous interference of ſtrangers, long rendered the fidelity of the Periæci a ſtriking contraſt to the fickleneſs of the Helots. But foreign war having

having recently invaded the iſland, expoſes the nakedneſs of Crete, and evinces the debility of its government.

Chap. 9.

Excellence of the Carthaginian conſtitution.

The inſtitutions of the Carthaginians have been the ſubject of much commendation; and, when compared with the rudeneſs and coarſeneſs viſible in other ſtates, the refinement of Carthaginian polity, doubtleſs, merits applauſe; particularly thoſe inſtitutions which are analogous to the laws of Lycurgus; for the three conſtitutions of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage, bear much reſemblance to each other; they are extremely diſſimilar to all other governments; and all three have adopted many maxims that are wiſe, and many regulations that are ſalutary. The excellence of the Carthaginian government is evinced by one ſingle reflection. Though its origin remounts to a very ancient date, and though for many centuries it has contained within its boſom a numerous and a free people; yet Carthage has never, to the preſent day, experienced any one ſedition worthy of record, nor has it ever endured for a moment the cruel yoke of a tyrant. The common-tables at Carthage are analogous to thoſe of Crete and Sparta: the council of the Hundred and Four in the firſt mentioned country, reſembles the magiſtracy of the Spartan Ephori, except that the Carthaginian Ephori, or inſpectors, are choſen with nicer diſcrimination: both nations acknowledge the experienced wiſdom of ſenates; and both ſubmit to the authority of kings, limited in peace, ſupreme in the field.

 But

BOOK II.

But the ftrong claim of merit is preferred to all other confiderations in afcertaining the title to the Carthaginian throne [m]; for weak or worthlefs men, intrufted with much power, cannot fail to do much harm; a maxim often exemplified in the kings of Sparta.

The corruptions introduced into the Carthaginian government.

The Carthaginian, as well as the Cretan and Spartan governments, whether by fubfequent and unneceffary additions, or in virtue of the primary regulations by which they were refpectively conftituted, have all of them degenerated from that moft perfect form of commonwealth, which we call by way of eminence the republic; in which, popular and ariftocratic powers are harmonioufly blended into one equitable fyftem of polity, benefiting all, and doing injury to none. Of the corruptions thus introduced into the Carthaginian government, fome have a tendency to relax the republic into a democracy; and others have a tendency to narrow the ariftocracy into an oligarchy. To the former kind we may refer that inftitution which, when the kings and fenators do not exactly coincide in opinion, fubmits every matter of debate to the difcuffion and final determination of the people; to the latter, we muft refer the extraordinary powers of the Council of Five, a council felf-

[m] The author obferves, that kings, meaning thereby fuch republican magiftrates as the Suffetes of Carthage and the Kings of Sparta, ought not to be chofen from ordinary families, nor from ordinary individuals of thofe families; and that pre-eminence of perfonal merit fhould take place of feniority. What is faid of ordinary families, μητε τυτο το τυχον, bears a reference to the opinion of the Greeks concerning the pre-eminence of particular races. See the Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii. & iii.

 elected

elected and immortal; and which also elects the Ephori, or supreme magistrates of the people. In the preference of suffrage to lot, and in serving the public without fee or reward, the Carthaginians seem to respect the aristocratic model. But the constitution of the judiciary power is highly oligarchical [n], the whole of that power being vested in one court, which tries all kinds of causes, and decides all of them without appeal. Yet that which has principally tended to convert the republic into an oligarchy is, an opinion strongly impressed on the nation at

Occasioned chiefly by the undue preponderance of wealth over greater political advantages.

[n] Nothing can be more interesting than Aristotle's account of the Carthaginian government; since the misfortunes, which his sagacity foresaw, are described in history; his prophecies being exactly fulfilled. Two centuries after Aristotle's time, Livy observes; "Judicum ordo Carthagine eâ tempestate dominabatur; eò maximè quòd iidem perpetui judices erant. Res, fama, vitaque omnium in illorum potestate erat. Qui unum ejus ordinis, idem omnes adversos habebat." The judiciary order at that time were tyrants in Carthage; and chiefly because their jurisdiction was perpetual. The estate, the character, and the life of each individual were entirely in their hands. Whoever incurred the displeasure of a single judge, had the whole body for his enemies." Lib. xxxiii. c. xlvi. It is here worthy of remark, that Livy's language tends to convey a false notion of the Carthaginian government. There was no judiciary order in Carthage, as in several of the Greek republics, and likewise in Rome, where the judges were appointed, in some ages of the commonwealth, from the senators, and in others from the knights. In Carthage, on the other hand, Aristotle expressly tells us that none but the actual magistrates were allowed to exercise the judiciary function. The political history of Carthage remains still to be written; for the Roman writers universally misrepresent the institutions of that country, through ignorance or prejudice; and, by bestowing Roman appellations on Carthaginian magistrates, lead the reader to suppose much greater analogy than really subsisted between two states, founded on the most dissimilar principles, and actuated by the most opposite views. But into this extensive and important subject it would be improper here to enter, because I shall have occasion fully to discuss it in my History of the World from Alexander to Augustus; of which I have written the first volume, and collected materials for the second.

 large,

BOOK II.

large, that, in recommending to office, opulence ought to concur with merit; ſo that, as virtue or merit forms the principle of an ariſtocracy, and wealth of an oligarchy, the government of Carthage will conſtitute a third and mixed kind of civil polity, blending in equal proportions the principles of ariſtocracy and oligarchy, of which it is compounded.

Reflections on this ſubject.

Wealth muſt be poſſeſſed before leiſure can be obtained; and until leiſure is obtained, office ought not to be courted; ſince he who is oppreſſed by private concerns, cannot be expected to manage public affairs, either wiſely or faithfully. But the legiſlator and conſtitution are in fault, if men eminent for abilities and virtues, whether in public or private ſtations, be ever diſgraced by unſeemly poverty, or ever prevented by meaner cares from exerciſing their powers, and benefiting their country. In the diſtribution of honours, to prefer wealth to virtue, is to vilify and debaſe thoſe honours themſelves; it is to corrupt and degrade thoſe who wear them. The evil is deep and univerſal; for ſuch as the heads[o] of the community are, ſuch muſt the people

[o] Ariſtotle ſays, that whatever ſeems eſtimable to the heads of the community, the ſame will be eſteemed by the reſt of the citizens. Cicero has admirably tranſlated, generaliſed, and expanded the reflection. "Nec enim tantum mali eſt peccare principes (quanquam eſt magnum hoc per ſe ipſum malum), quantum illud, quòd permulti imitatores principum exiſtunt. Nam licet videre, ſi velis replicare memoriam temporum, qualeſcunque ſummi civitatis viri fuerunt, talem civitatem fuiſſe; quæcunque mutatio morum in principibus exſtiterit, eandem in populo ſecuturam. Idque haud paulo eſt verius, quàm quòd Platoni noſtro placet, qui, muſicorum cantibus, ait, mutatis, mutari civitatum ſtatus. Ego autem nobilium vitâ victuque

ple at large ſpeedily become. No ariſtocracy can be ſafe, which does not prefer perſonal merit to all other diſtinctions; for he who by wealth obtains office, will endeavour by office to augment wealth; and if poverty intruſted with authority be liable, even in honeſt minds, to the ſuſpicion of ſacrificing duty to gain, it is abſurd to expect that corruption, armed with power, will refuſe to repair loſs, and to compenſate by rapacity the expences of bribery.[p]

The dangerous accumulation of office,

The Carthaginian government acts unwiſely in accumulating too many offices in the ſame hands.

---

victuque mutato, mores mutari civitatum puto. Quo perniciofius de republicâ merentur vitioſi principes, quòd non ſolùm vitia concipiunt ipſi, ſed infundant in civitatem; neque ſolùm obſunt, quòd ipſi corrumpuntur, pluſque exemplo quàm peccato nocent." De Legibus, l. iii. c. xiv. "The vices and crimes of the nobility, though great evils in themſelves, are rendered ſtill greater, becauſe they will always be the objects of general imitation. The experience of hiſtory teaches, that, in point of morals, ſuch as have been the leading men of a ſtate, ſuch alſo has been the ſtate itſelf; and that whatever alteration has taken place in the manners of the great, a ſimilar alteration has followed in thoſe of the people at large. This truth is far better aſcertained than the obſervation of Plato, that the character of a nation changes, by changing the ſtyle of its muſic. But I aſſert, that it changes by changing the lives and behaviour of the great. Wherefore profligate princes and profligate leaders are ſo much the more puniſhable than other men, becauſe they are not only vicious in themſelves, but infuſe their vices into the public; and becauſe whatever miſchief reſults from their crimes, ſtill greater reſults from their example.

[p] Livy ſpeaks as if Ariſtotle's prophecy had been before his eyes, when he relates the facts by which it was accompliſhed. "Vectigalia publica prædæ ac diviſui principum quibuſdam ac magiſtratibus erant." And again, "Tum vero iſti, quos paverat per aliquot annos publicus peculatus, velut bonis ereptis, non furto eorum manibus extorto, inſenſi & irati, Romanos in Annibalem inſtigabant." Liv. l. xxxiii. c. xlvi. & xlvii.

BOOK II.

hands. The example of well-organized armies ſhews the ineſtimable benefits reſulting from the nice partition of duty, and the innumerable gradations of authority. The more minutely labour of every kind is ſubdivided, the more perfectly, and the more promptly, each man will perform his aſſigned taſk; and that government only is firmly ſupported, which aſſociates many deſerving citizens to its functions and its honours. The conduct of the Carthaginians is preciſely the reverſe; and this conduct has produced a deep and permanent diſeaſe in the conſtitution, which the magiſtates have hitherto palliated by a temporary and precarious remedy.

palliated in Carthage by a temporary and precarious remedy.

As the national proſperity of Carthage has long continued in an advancing ſtate, the principal families have been enabled to maintain their odious monopoly of government, by employing thoſe moſt inclined and moſt able to ſubvert it, in the numerous and increaſing dependencies of their empire. But the ſucceſs of this remedy requires the co-operation of fortune; both its cauſe and effects are barely external. A good conſtitution ſhould be found within [q]. Such are the excellencies, and ſuch the imperfections, of the governments of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage; which, in compariſon with moſt others, have been juſtly celebrated.

[q] Theſe obſervations are worthy of the moſt ſerious attention. When a nation is advancing in wealth and greatneſs, the moſt dangerous maladies, exiſting only in an indolent ſtate, may long lie altogether concealed. The firſt ſhock of adverſity reveals the fatal ſecret; but then, perhaps, it is no longer time to attempt the radical cure.

Of

The constitution of Athens.

Of the writers on the ſubject of politics, ſome have confined themſelves merely to theory; others have illuſtrated theory by practice, and aſſiſted, in their own or in foreign countries, in the adminiſtration of thoſe governments which they had deviſed and eſtabliſhed, or of thoſe laws which they had contrived and enacted. The principal doctrines of merely ſpeculative politicians, we have already examined; we have likewiſe deſcribed the practical ſyſtem of Lycurgus; and now proceed to explain the legiſlation of Solon, who is celebrated as the reſtorer of the hereditary freedom of Athens, and as the deliverer of the people from the yoke of an intemperate and cruel oligarchy. In the conſtitution eſtabliſhed by Solon, his admirers obſerve, that the jarring intereſts of hoſtile orders are ſkilfully harmoniſed into one equitable ſyſtem, juſtly formed, and nicely balanced, by the oligarchy of the Areopagus, which is perpetual; the ariſtocracy of the Archons, who are elective; and the democracy of the courts of judicature, whoſe members are appointed indiſcriminately from all the citizens by lot. Solon, it is probable, did not firſt introduce, but ſimply receive and approve, the perpetuity of the Areopagus, and the election of the Archons: but he invented and eſtabliſhed the popular conſtitution of the judiciary power; a conſtitution, which ſome writers have branded as introductory to the confuſion and tyranny of a wild democracy. Maſters of the courts

BOOK II.

courts of juſtice, and conſequently of the lives and fortunes of all ranks of men in the ſtate, the people have drained and exhauſted every ſource of authority, not flowing from themſelves.

Cauſes of its degeneracy.

Pericles, with the aſſiſtance of Ephialtes, abridged the power of the Areopagus; the ſame Pericles, by granting fees to the judges and jurymen, and converting a matter of duty into an object of gain, ſtill farther debaſed the compoſition, and increaſed the tyranny, of the Athenian tribunals. What Pericles left imperfect, ſucceeding demagogues ſupplied; and one democratical regulation ſtill followed another, until the government aſſumed its preſent form, or rather exhibited its preſent deformity. Yet this fatal reſult is not imputable to Solon [r], but rather chargeable on fortune. The naval victories of Athens, in the Perſian war, ſwelled the inſolence of the populace, who, headed by orators more inſolent than themſelves, arrogated all authority to their own order, and uſurped the government. Solon juſtly intruſted the multitude with the power of electing the magiſtrates, and with that of taking an account of their adminiſtration; powers which cannot eaſily be withheld from the people, without degrading them into ſlaves, or converting them into enemies. But all the executive offices of government were confined to men of the three firſt claſſes: the *Thetes*, conſiſting of labourers

[r] See the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, paſſim.; particularly vol. ii. c. xiii.

and

and mechanics, and forming the moſt numerous portion of the community, were totally excluded from every employment requiring either coolneſs of temper or quickneſs of underſtanding.

The legiſlations of Zaleucus and Charondas.

Zaleucus legiſlated for the weſtern Locrians; and Charondas, a native of Catana in Sicily, gave laws, not only to his own citizens, but to the other Ionic communities ſcattered over Sicily and Italy. Some writers trace up to Onomacritus the inſtitutions of thoſe legiſlators, relating that Onomacritus ſailed to Crete to learn the art of divination; that he became famous as a lawgiver; that Thales was his companion, and Lycurgus the ſcholar of Thales, Zaleucus the ſcholar of Lycurgus, and Charondas the ſcholar of Zaleucus: but this order of ſucceſſion is not juſtified by chronology.

Of Philolaus, Phaleas, &c.

Philolaus, a native of Corinth, and deſcended from the illuſtrious family of the Bacchiadæ, who long governed that city, gave laws to the Thebans. Philolaus was the friend of Diocles, likewiſe a Corinthian, who gained the Olympic prize, and who fled from his native city, as deteſting the inceſtuous paſſion of his mother Halcyoné. Diocles fixed his reſidence in Thebes; the affectionate Philolaus ſoon followed him thither; in that city they lived and died; and there, the monuments of theſe two friends are ſtill ſhewn to ſtrangers, diſpoſed in ſuch ſituations as render them fully conſpicuous to each other; that of Philolaus alſo enjoying a view of Corinth, but that of Diocles concealing from

the

BOOK II.

the ſight both that city and its territory, as if he wiſhed to baniſh from his eyes objects only calculated to recal the ſad memory of his domeſtic calamity. Philolaus, having thus fixed his abode in Thebes, propoſed various laws for the benefit of that republic; particularly the law of adoption, contrived for perpetuating the ancient families, and for preſerving a due proportion between the number of landholders, and the number of ſhares or lots, into which the territory was divided. Charondas inſtituted a new action[a] againſt the odious crimes of calumny and

[a] The name of this action, as Bentley proves, was επισκηψις, which took place when a man, caſt in a trial by falſe teſtimony, entered his plea to have another trial to prove the witneſſes perjured. It is mentioned by Demoſthenes more than once, and by Lyſias contra Pandionem. See Diſſertation upon Phalaris, p. 368. Bentley ſays, " that Diodorus tells us from his copy of Charondas's laws that he had πολλα ιδια, many things peculiar, and reckons up half a ſcore of them; and yet the ſingle thing obſerved by Ariſtotle does not appear among them." In this, Bentley is miſtaken; for the peculiarity of Charondas's law againſt perjured calumniators appears in Diodorus, and makes a great figure there. — His words follow: Τȣς δ' επι συκοφαντιᾳ καταγνωσθεντας προσεταξε περιπατειν εστεφανωμενȣς μυρικῃ, ὁπως εν πασι τοις πολιταις πρωτειον της πονηριας περιπεποιημενοι· διο και τινας επι τȣτῳ τῳ εγκληματι καταδικασθεντας, το μεγεθος της ὑϐρεως ȣκ ενεγκοντας, ἑκȣσιως ἑαυτȣς εκ τȣ ζην μεταςησαι. ȣ συντελεσθεντος, εφυγαγευθη πας εκ της πολεως ὁ συκοφαντειν ειωθως, και το πολιτευμα μακαριον ειχε βιον της τοιαυτης κακιας απηλλαγμενον. Diodor. l. xii. p. 486. " He commanded thoſe convicted of calumny to go about crowned with tamariſk, that they might appear to all the citizens to have attained the laſt ſtage of wickedneſs; therefore ſome of thoſe convicted of this crime, incapable of ſupporting the weight of infamy, voluntarily deſtroyed themſelves; in conſequence of which examples, calumny totally diſappeared, and the ſtate thenceforth ſubſiſted happily, being divorced from ſuch a miſchief." The word tamariſk is in the original μυρικη, myricé, of which Pliny ſays, " Myricen in Italia quam alii tamaricen vocant, cujus infelicia ligna appellamus. Solitaria circum ſaxa aquoſa; quâ in domum illatâ, difficiles partus fieri produnt, morteſque miſeras." Plin. Nat. Hiſt. xii. 21. This unhappy

and perjury; and his laws furpafs, in elegancy and inaccuracy, even the juridical compofitions of the prefent day. Phaleas diftinguifhed himfelf by equalizing property; and Plato, by appointing common tables for women; and by propofing, among men, the community of wives, children, and goods. His lefs extravagant novelties are, that children fhould be taught to ufe both hands with equal dexterity, and that a perfon bound to the obfervance of perfect fobriety fhould prefide in companies affembled for convivial merriment. The laws of Draco[t] were remarkable for nothing but their exceffive and undiftinguifhing feverity. Pittacus[u] did not delineate any new fcheme of policy, but eftablifhed feveral new laws; of which, one peculiar to himfelf is, that offences committed by perfons intoxicated, fhould be punifhed with double rigour; a law founded rather on inflexible utility, which confiders how evils may be prevented, than on merciful juftice, which examines what offences ought to be pardoned[x].

---

unhappy and inaufpicious plant, creeping folitary amidft watery rocks, was a fit decoration for an outcaft of fociety, a wretch fhunned and detefted.—To how many expreffive cuftoms of antiquity do we ftill want a key?

[t] Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 105.

[u] Ibid. vol. ii. p. 235.

[x] Both Plato and Ariftotle are more indulgent in the article of wine, than the more ancient philofophers and legiflators. A law of Zaleucus is preferved in Athenæus, l. x. p. 226. and commented in Ælian, Var. Hift. ii. 37. which treats the drinking of pure wine with Mohammedan feverity, ει τὶς ακρατον επιε, μη προσαταξαντος ἰατρῶ θεραπειας ἑνεκα, θανατος ην ἡ ξημια.—"Whoever drinks pure wine, except for the fake of health, and by the prescription of a phyfician, let him be punifhed by death."

Andro-

Androgamas, a native of Rhegium, gave laws to Chalcis in Thrace; his code is moſt ample on the ſubject of heireſſes and of murders; but is not diſtinguiſhed by any peculiarity worthy of record. Let this much ſuffice concerning plans of policy and laws, which either authority has eſtabliſhed, or ſpeculation deviſed.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

APPENDIX TO BOOK II.

IN my endeavour to illuftrate various fubjects treated in this Book, I frequently had occafion to allude to the Italian republics of the middle age; which exhibited a faint and rude picture of the polities of ancient Greece. Of all thefe republics, there is one, and only one, ftill fubfifting on the ancient model. This fmall but precious remain of former, and by fome thought better times, I endeavoured, from careful obfervation, to delineate upwards of twenty years ago, in an article firft made public in 1795, and fince that time frequently reprinted. But the intimate connexion of that juvenile performance with the fubject of the prefent Book of Ariftotle's Politics, has fuggefted the propriety of giving here an enlarged edition of it, enriched and confirmed by original documents, extracted, through the intereft of Sir John Cox Hippefley, from the fecret archives of the republic, and moft obligingly communicated to me by Sir John Macpherfon.

At the diftance of twelve miles from Rimini and the Hadriatic Sea, we beheld a cloud-capt

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

mountain, ſteep, rugged, and inhoſpitable, yet to Britons, whoſe affection for their own happy iſland cheriſhed even the fainteſt image of congenial liberty, more attractive and more engaging than all the gay luxuriance of Tuſcan[a] plains. A black expanſion of vapour partly concealed from our view the territory of what the Greeks would have called a nation, ſeldom viſited by ſtrangers, though aſſuredly moſt deſerving of that honour. Liberty brightens and fertilizes the craggy rocks of St. Marino; and inſtead of paradiſes inhabited by devils, (for thus the recollection or ſuppoſition of better times indignantly characterizes the countries through which we had juſt travelled,) this little ſtate, we were told, would exhibit rugged hills and ſavage precipices cultivated and adorned by the ſtubborn induſtry of free men, who labour with alacrity, becauſe they reap with ſecurity. We panted at the thoughts of taking a nearer ſurvey of this political wonder, and were impatient to leave Rimini; but the country adjacent to that city was deluged with rain; the rivers continued to overflow; horſes could not ſafely clamber over rocks; and Rimini could not fur-

[a] The epithet Tuſcan is juſtified by the authority of Polybius, l. ii. c. 14. and c. 17. He deſcribes that extenſive plain bounded by the Alps, the Appennines, and the Hadriatic, and alſo the plains about Nola and Capua, called the Phlegræan Fields, as anciently inhabited by the Tuſcans. The territory of this people, he ſays, formed incomparably the fineſt portion of Europe. Before Polybius wrote his Hiſtory, the dominion of the Tuſcans had contracted to a narrow ſpan; and according to the ſaying of the modern Italians, while the Pope poſſeſſes the marrow, the Great Duke of Tuſcany has now only the bones, of Italy.

niſh us with mules. But they are delicate travellers whom ſuch puny difficulties could reſtrain from viſiting this illuſtrious mountain, where Liberty, herſelf a mountain goddeſs, has upwards of twelve centuries fixed her rural throne. Careleſs of mules, or horſes, or carriages, to which laſt the republic of St. Marino is at all times inacceſſible, we adopted a mode of travelling which, in a country where pomp is immoderately ſtudied, becauſe wealth is too indiſcriminately prized, might poſſibly have excluded unknown wanderers from the proud manſions of nobles and princes, the palaces of biſhops, and the vineas of cardinals, but which, we rightly conjectured, would recommend us as welcome gueſts to the citizens of St. Marino, whoſe own manliness of character muſt approve the congenial hardihood of humble pedeſtrians.

The diſtance from Rimini to the Borgo, or ſuburbs of St. Marino, for the città, or city, ſtands half a mile higher on the hill, is computed at only ten Italian miles. But the badneſs of the weather and of the roads would have increaſed the tedioufneſs of our fatiguing journey, had not our fancies been amuſed by the appearance and converſation of ſeveral perſons whom we occaſionally met or overtook, and who, notwithſtanding that hardneſs of features which characterizes mountaineers, diſplayed in their words and looks a certain candour and ſincerity, with an undeſcribed mixture of humanity and firmneſs, which we had rarely ſeen pourtrayed on the face of an Italian. Such

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

virtues, perhaps, many Italians may poffefs; fuch virtues Raphael and Guido probably difcerned in their contemporaries; unlefs it be fuppofed that the *antique* not only ennobled and exalted, but originally infpired their conceptions. Yet whatever might be the pre-eminence of Tranfalpine beauty, during the fplendour of the *cinque cento*, it muft be confeffed of the Italians of our days, that the expreffion indicating virtues of the mild or generous caft, feldom breaks through the dark gloom and fullen cares which contract their brows and cloud their countenances.

At the diftance of five miles from Rimini, a fmall rivulet, decorated by a difproportionably large ftone bridge, which, at another feafon of the year, would have exemplified the Spanifh proverb of "bridges without water," feparates the territories of St. Marino from thofe of the Pope. Proceeding forward, we found the road extremely narrow, much worn by the rain, alternately rough and flippery, and always fo bad, that we congratulated each other on rejecting the ufe of the miferable rips that were offered to us at Rimini. In the midft of a heavy fhower we clambered to the Borgo, fituate on the fide of the hill, and diftant (as already faid) half a mile from the città, on its fummit. The former is deftined for the habitation of peafants, artifans, and ftrangers; the honour of inhabiting the latter is referved for the nobles, the citizens, and thofe who, in the language of antiquity, would be ftyled the public guefts of the commonwealth.

monwealth. In the whole territory there is but one inn; and that of courſe in the Borgo; for lone houſes are rare in all parts of the continent, the Britiſh dominions alone, by their native ſtrength and the excellence of their government, being happily exempted from the terror of banditti in time of peace, and marauders in time of war. We diſcovered the inn at St. Marino, as is uſual in Italy, by the crowd before the door. Having entered, we were civilly received by the landlord, ſeated by the fireſide in company with ſeveral other ſtrangers, and ſpeedily preſented with a bottle of ſparkling white wine, the beſt we had taſted in Italy, and reſembling Champagne in the characteriſtic excellencies of that ſprightly liquor.

We had not remained long in this caravanſary, (for ſuch is the proper name for the place of hoſpitality in which we were received,) when the dreſs, manners, and converſation of our fellow-travellers ſtrongly excited our attention, and afforded ſcope for boundleſs ſpeculation. They were the moſt ſavage-looking men that I had ever beheld; covered with thick capottas[c], of coarſe dark brown woollen, lined with dark ſheep's ſkin. Their hats, which they kept on their heads, were of an enormous ſize, ſwelling to the circumference of an ordinary umbrella. With their dreſs and appearance their words and geſtures bore too faithful a correſpondence. "*Schioppi*" and "*coltellate*" (gun ſhots and

[c] Great coats.

dagger-thrufts) were frequently in their mouths. As the wine went brifkly round, the converfation became ftill more animated, and took a turn more decidedly terrible. They now talked of nothing but fierce encounters, hair-breadth efcapes, and hideous lurking-places. From their whole behaviour, there was reafon to apprehend, that we had unwarily fallen into company with Rinaldo's party: but a few hints that dropped from him who was moft intoxicated, finally undeceived us, and difcovered to our fatisfaction and fhame, that inftead of a band of robbers, we had only met with a party of fmugglers. Their maffy capottas and broad-brimmed hats formed their defenfive armour againft cuftom-houfe officers and *fbirri*[d]; and the narratives which they heard or related with fuch ardour or delight, contained the acts of prowefs by which they had repelled the bravery of the Romans, and the arts of ftratagem by which they had deceived the cunning of the Tufcans. From the intermediate fituation of St. Marino between the dominions of Tufcany and thofe of the Pope, its territory is continually infefted by vifits from thofe unlicenfed traffickers, who being enemies by trade to thofe who adminifter the laws and collect the revenues of their country, naturally degenerate into daring and diforderly ruffians, the terror of peaceful men, and both the difgrace and the bane of civilized fociety.

[d] Thofe who execute the orders of civil magiftrates.

" From

From the company of the ſmugglers we longed to ſeparate, the more becauſe they eagerly ſolicited our ſtay, promiſing to conduct us ſafely acroſs the mountains, and to defend our perſons and properties againſt robbers and aſſaſſins; but we thought it a piece of good fortune, that our moſt valuable property, as we ſhewed to them, conſiſted in our ſwords and piſtols. Having called our St. Marino hoſt, we paid him for his wine and his ſauſage *(proſciutto)*; and were pleaſed to find, that, contrary to our univerſal experience of Italian landlords, he was uncommonly thankful for a very moderate gratification, a ſingularity which, though it probably proceeded from his being little converſant with Engliſh and other opulent travellers, we treaſured with delight, as a conſpicuous proof of republican[e] virtue, that had eſcaped pure and unſullied from the contagion of thoſe worthleſs gueſts, with whom his occupation in life condemned him often to aſſociate.

About two o'clock in the afternoon we left the Borgo to climb up to the Città, carrying our ſwords in our right hands; a precaution which the company we had juſt left, warranted

[e] According to Machiavelli and Monteſquieu, and their maſter Ariſtotle, republics require more virtue than monarchies, becauſe in republics the citizens make laws to govern themſelves, whereas in monarchies the ſubjects are compelled to obey the laws made by the prince. In republican governments, therefore, the citizens ought, in the words of Ariſtotle, and of a ſtill higher authority, ‘to be a law unto themſelves.’ How few nations, therefore, are qualified, in modern times, for living quietly and happily under a republic; and leaſt of all, that nation which has ſhewn itſelf the leaſt virtuous of all.

 in

in this modern republic, but which, as Thucydides informs us in his proem, would have expofed us to be branded with the appellation of barbarians in the republics of Ancient Greece. Before we had reached the fummit of the hill, the cloud had difperfed, the fun fhone bright, we breathed a purer air, and the clear light, which difplayed the city and territory of St. Marino, was heightened by contraft with the thick gloom which involved the circumjacent plains. Tranfported with the contemplation of a landfcape which feemed fo admirably to accord with the political ftate of the mountain, a bright gem of liberty amidft the darknefs of Italian fervitude, we clambered cheerfully over the precipices, never reflecting that, as there was not any place of reception for ftrangers in the Città, we might poffibly be expofed to the alternative of fleeping in the ftreets, or returning to the caravanfary, crowded with fmugglers, whofe intoxication might exafperate their natural ferocity. From all our paft remarks, we had concluded that the vice of drunkennefs was abominated even by the loweft claffes of the Italians. We dreaded their fury and their knives in this unufual ftate of mind; but amidft all our terrors could not forbear philofophizing[f] on what we had feen, and conjecturing, from the tumultuous merriment and drunken debauchery

[f] This word requires an apology; for the facred name of philofophy has been as fhamefully polluted in modern times, by fophifts and fceptics, as the word republic by madmen and levellers. The prefent generation muft perhaps pafs away, before either of thefe terms fhall refume its priftine and native honours.

bauchery of the ſmugglers, that the famed ſobriety of the Italian nation is an artificial virtue ariſing from ſituation and circumſtances, not depending on temperament, or reſulting from character. Drinking is the vice of men whoſe lives are chequered by viciſſitudes of toil and eaſe, of danger and ſecurity. It is the vice of ſoldiers, mariners, and huntſmen; of thoſe who exerciſe boiſterous occupations, or purſue dangerous amuſements: and if the modern Italians are leſs addicted to exceſs in wine than the Greeks and Romans in ancient, or the Engliſh and Germans in modern times, their temperance may fairly be aſcribed to the indolent monotony of their liſtleſs lives; which, being never exhauſted by fatigue, can never be gladdened by repoſe; and being never agitated by the terrors of danger, can never be tranſported by the joys of deliverance.

From theſe airy ſpeculations, by which we fancied that we ſtripped Italy of what ſome travellers have too haſtily concluded to be the only virtue which ſhe has left, we were awakened by the appearance of a venerable perſon, in a bag wig and ſword, cautiouſly leading his *bourrique*[s] down the precipice. He returned our ſalute with an air of courteſy beſpeaking ſuch affability, that we quickly entered into converſation with him, and diſcovered, to our ſurpriſe and joy, that we were in company with a very reſpectable perſonage, and one whom Mr. Addiſon

[s] Aſs.

has

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

has dignified with the appellation of 'the fourth man in the ſtate.' The ſtipendiary phyſician of St. Marino (for this was the perſon with whom we were converſing) told us, that we might be accommodated with good lodging in the convent of Capuchins; and as we were ſtrangers, that he would return, ſhew us the houſe, and preſent us to Father Bonelli. We expreſſed our unwillingneſs to give him the trouble of again aſcending the hill; but of this trouble the deeply wrinkled mountaineer made light, and we yielded to his propoſal with only apparent reluctance; ſince, to the indelicacy of introducing ourſelves, we preferred the introduction of a man whom we had even caſually met with on the road. To the convent we were admitted by a *frate ſervente*, or lay friar, and conducted to the *Padre Maeſtro*, the Prior Bonelli, a man ſixty years old, courteous and cheerful, and, as we were told by the phyſician, deſcended from one of the nobleſt families in the commonwealth. Having received and returned ſuch compliments as are held indiſpenſable in this ceremonious country, the prior conducted us above ſtairs, and ſhewed us two clean and comfortable chambers, which he ſaid we might command, while we deigned to honour the republic (ſuch were his expreſſions) with the favour of our reſidence. As to our entertainment, he ſaid we might, as beſt pleaſed us, either ſup apart by ourſelves, or in company with him and his monks. We told him, our happineſs would be complete, were we permitted

10 to

to enjoy the advantage of his company and conversation. My conversation! You shall soon enjoy better than mine; since within half an hour I shall have the honour of conducting you to the house of a charming young lady, (so I must call her, though my own kinswoman,) whose *conversazione* assembles this evening. During this dialogue a servant arrived, bringing our portmanteau from Rimini, and thereby enabling us with more decency of appearance to pay our respects to the lady, in company with the prior her uncle. The Signora P—— received us politely in an inner apartment, after we had passed through two outer rooms, in each of which there was a servant in waiting. Above a dozen gentlemen, well dressed and polite after the fashion of Italy, with six other ladies, formed this agreeable party. Coffee and sorbettis being served, cards were introduced; and, in quality of strangers, we had the honour of losing a few sequins at ombre with the mistress of the house. The other ladies present took up, each of them, two gentlemen; for ombre is the universal game, because in Italian assemblies the number of men commonly triples that of women; the latter, when unmarried, seldom going abroad; and when married, being ambitious of appearing to receive company every evening at home. During the intervals of play, we endeavoured to turn the conversation on the history and present state of St. Marino, but found this subject to be too grave for the company. In this little state, as well as in other parts of Italy,

APPEND. TO BOOK II. Italy, the ſocial amuſements of life, conſiſting chiefly in what are called *converſazioni*, have widely deviated from the *ſympoſia* of the Greeks and the *convivia* of the Romans. Inſtead of philoſophical dialogues and epideiktic orations; and inſtead of thoſe animated rehearſals of approved works of hiſtory and poetry, which formed the entertainment and delight of antiquity, the modern Italian *converſazioni* exhibit a very different ſcene; a ſcene in which play is the buſineſs, gallantry the amuſement; and of which, avarice, vanity, and mere ſenſual pleaſure form the ſole connecting principle and chief ultimate end. Such inſipid and ſuch mercenary aſſemblies are ſometimes enlivened by the jokes of the buffoon; the *improviſatore* ſometimes diſplays in them the powers of his memory rather than the elegance of his fancy; and every entertainment in Italy, whether gay or ſerious, is always ſeaſoned with muſic; but chiefly that ſoft voluptuous muſic which was baniſhed by Lycurgus, proſcribed by Plato, and prohibited by other legiſlators, under ſevere penalties, as unfriendly to virtue and deſtructive of manhood. The great amuſements of life are commonly nothing more than images of its neceſſary occupations; and where the latter, therefore, are of any peculiar complexion, ſo alſo muſt be the former. Is it becauſe the occupations of the ancients were leſs ſoftened than thoſe of the moderns, that women are found to have acted among different nations ſuch different parts in ſociety? And that the contraſt is ſo ſtriking be-

tween

tween the wife of a citizen of St. Marino, furrounded with her card-tables, her mufic, and her admirers, and the Roman Lucretia, *nocte ferâ deditam lanæ inter lucubrantes ancillas* (Tit. Liv. i. 57.), or the more copious defcriptions of female modefty and induftry given by Ifcomachus in Xenophon's Treatife on Domeftic Œconomy? In modern Italy this contraft of manners difplays its greateft force. Though lefs beautiful and lefs accomplifhed than the Englifh and French, the Italian women expect fuperior attention, and exact greater affiduities. To be well with the ladies, is the higheft ambition of the men. Upon this principle their manners are formed; by this, their behaviour is regulated; and the art of converfation, in its utmoft fprightlinefs and higheft perfection, is reduced to that playful wantonnefs which, touching flightly on what is felt moft fenfibly, amufes with perpetual fhadows of defired realities.

To the honour of St. Marino it muft be obferved, that neither the Prior Bonelli, nor two *counfellors* who were prefent, took any confiderable part in this too fportive converfation; and the gentlemen at the Signora P——'s were chiefly Romans and Florentines; men, we were told, whom fometimes inclination, but more frequently extravagance and neceffity, drive from their refpective countries, and who, having relations or friends in St. Marino, eftablifh themfelves in that cheap city, where they fubfift on the wreck of their fortunes, and elude the purfuit of their creditors.

Next

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

Next morning, Bonelli having invited ſeveral of his fellow-citizens to drink chocolate, we learned from them, that the morality and piety which had long diſtinguiſhed St. Marino, daily ſuffered decline through the contagious influence of thoſe profligate intruders, whom good policy ought never to have admitted within the territory, but whom the indulgence of humanity could not be prevailed on to expel.

After breakfaſt, our good-natured landlord kindly propoſed a walk, that his Engliſh gueſts might view the city and adjacent country. The main ſtreet is well paved, but narrow and ſteep. The ſimilarity of the houſes indicates a happy mediocrity of fortune. There is a fine ciſtern of pure water; and we admired the coolneſs and dryneſs of the wine-cellars, ventilated by communications with caverns in the rock. To this circumſtance, as much as to the quality of the ſoil and careful culture of the grape, the wine of St. Marino is indebted for its peculiar excellence.

The whole territory of the republic extends about thirty-five miles in circumferance. It is of an irregular oval form, and its mean diameter may be eſtimated at nine Engliſh miles. The ſoil naturally craggy and barren, and hardly fit for goats, yet actually maintains (ſuch are the attractions of liberty) upwards of ſeven thouſand perſons; and, being everywhere adorned by mulberry-trees, vines, and olives, ſupplies the materials

rials of an advantageous trade, particularly in ſilk, with Rome, Florence, and other cities of Italy.

In extent of territory, St. Marino, inconſiderable as it ſeems, equals many republics that have performed mighty achievements and purchaſed immortal renown. The independent ſtates of Theſpiæ and Platæa were reſpectively leſs extenſive; and the boundaries of the modern republic exceed thoſe of Ægina and Megara; the former of which was diſtinguiſhed by its commerce and its colonies in Egypt and the Eaſt; and the latter, as Lyſias and Xenophon inform us, could bring into the field, beſides proportionable bodies of light troops, 3000 hardy pikemen, who with the ſervice of Mars united that of Ceres and of Bacchus; extracting from bleak hills and rugged mountains rich harveſts and teeming vintages.

The remembrance of our beloved republics of Greece, ennobled by the ineſtimable gifts of taſte and fancy, endeared to us St. Marino, even by its littleneſs. In this literary enthuſiaſm, we could willingly have traverſed every inch of its diminutive territory: but politeneſs required that we ſhould not ſubject Bonelli and his friends to ſuch unneceſſary fatigue; and the changeableneſs of the weather, a continual variation of ſunſhine and cloudineſs, the ſolemnity of dark magnifying vapours, together with the velocity of drizzly or gleamy ſhowers, produced ſuch unuſual accidents of light and ſhade in this mountain ſcene, as often ſuſpended the motion of our limbs, and fixed our eyes in aſtoniſhment.

From

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

From the higheſt top of St. Marino we beheld the bright ſummit of another and far loftier mountain, towering above, and beyond a dark cloud, which by contraſt threw the conical top of the hill to ſuch a diſtance, that it ſeemed to riſe from another world. The height of St. Marino (we were told) had been accurately meaſured by Father Boſcowich, and found to be nearly half a mile above the level of the neighbouring ſea.

Almoſt immediately after returning from our walk, dinner was ſerved at the convent; for the politeneſs of Father Bonelli had prolonged his ſtay abroad far beyond his uſual hour of repaſt. Speedily after dinner we were conducted by the good father to the *converſazione* of another lady, alſo his relation; where we had the honour of meeting the *capitaneos*, or conſuls, the *commiſſareo*, or chief judge, and ſeveral diſtinguiſhed members of the ſenate. Recommended only by our youth and curioſity, we ſpent the evening moſt agreeably with thoſe reſpectable magiſtrates, who were as communicative in anſwering as inquiſitive in aſking queſtions. The company continually increaſing, and Father Bonelli carefully addreſſing all new-comers by the titles of their reſpective offices, we were ſurpriſed toward the cloſe of the evening, and the uſual hour of retirement, that we had not yet ſeen *Il Signor Dottore* and *Il Pædagogo Publico*, the phyſician and ſchool-maſter, repreſented by Mr. Addiſon as two of the moſt diſtinguiſhed dignitaries in the commonwealth.

A ſhort

A ſhort acquaintance is ſufficient to inſpire confidence between congenial minds. We frankly teſtified our ſurpriſe to the father. He laughed heartily at our ſimplicity, and thought the joke too good not to be communicated to the company. When their vociferous mirth had ſubſided, an old gentleman, who had been repeatedly inveſted with the higheſt honours of his country, obſerved, that he well knew Mr. Addiſon's account of St. Marino, which had been tranſlated more than once into the French and Italian languages. Remote and inconſiderable as they were, his anceſtors were highly honoured by the notice of that illuſtrious traveller, who, he underſtood, was not only a claſſic author in Engliſh, but an author who had uniformly and moſt ſucceſsfully employed his pen in the cauſe of virtue and liberty. Yet, as muſt often happen to travellers, Mr. Addiſon, he continued, has, in ſpeaking of this little republic, been deceived by firſt appearances. Neither our ſchoolmaſter nor phyſician enjoy any pre-eminence in the ſtate. They are maintained indeed by public ſalaries, as in ſeveral other cities of Italy; and there is nothing peculiar in their condition here, except that the ſchoolmaſter has more, and the phyſician leſs, to do, than in moſt other places, becauſe our diſeaſes are few, and our children are many. This ſally having been received with approbation by the company, the veteran proceeded to explain the real diſtinction of ranks in St. Marino, conſiſting in the *nobili*, *cittadini*, *ſtipendiati*, nobles, citizens, and ſtipendiaries.

 The

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

The nobles, he told us, exceeded not twenty families, of which ſeveral enjoyed eſtates without the territory, worth from three to eight hundred pounds ſterling a year: that, from reſpect to the Holy See, under whoſe protection the republic had long ſubſiſted quietly and happily, many perſons of diſtinction in the Pope's territories had been admitted *cittadini honorati*, honorary citizens, of St. Marino, particularly ſeveral illuſtrious houſes of Rimini, and the forty noble families of Bologna. Even of the Venetian nobles themſelves, ancient as they certainly were, and inveſted as they ſtill continued to be with the whole ſovereignty of their country, many diſdained not to be aſſociated to the diminutive honours of St. Marino, and to increaſe the number of its citizens; and that this aggregation of illuſtrious foreigners, far from being conſidered as dangerous to public liberty, was deemed eſſential, in ſo ſmall a commonwealth, to national ſafety.

Leſt the converſation might take a leſs intereſting turn, I drew from my pocket Mr. Addiſon's account of St. Marino, which, being exceedingly ſhort, I begged leave to read, that his errors, if he had committed any, might be corrected, and the alterations noted which the country had undergone in the ſpace of ſeventy years, from 1703 to 1773.

The propoſal being obligingly accepted, I read in Mr. Addiſon, 'They have at St. Marino five churches, and reckon above five thouſand ſouls in their community.' Inſtead of which I

was defired to fay, 'They have in St. Marino ten parifhes, ten churches, and reckon above feven thoufand fouls in their community.' Again Mr. Addifon fays, 'The Council of Sixty, notwithftanding its name, confifts but of forty perfons.' That was the cafe when this illuftrious author vifited the republic; but the council has fince that time been augmented by twenty members, and the number now agrees with the name. Thefe circumftances are important; for from them it appears that while the neighbouring territory of Rome is impoverifhed and gloomed by the dominion of ecclefiaftics, of which, in the words of Dr. Robertfon, 'to fqueeze and to amafs, not to meliorate, is the object [h];' and while the neighbouring cities of

[h] See Robertfon's Charles V. vol. i. fect. iii. p. 157. He adds, 'The patrimony of St. Peter was worfe governed than any other part of Europe; and though a generous pontiff might fufpend for a little, or counteract the effect of thofe vices which are peculiar to the government of ecclefiaftics, the difeafe not only remained incurable, but has gone on increafing from age to age, and the decline of the ftate has kept pace with its progrefs.' On reading over this paffage, a doubt arifes whether it ought not to be expunged, as unjuftly fevere. Confidered in one view, the dominion of the popes was naturally prejudicial to fociety; but an evil becomes a good, which prevents evils greater than itfelf. The authority of popes reftrained the alternate tyranny of paramount kings and feudal barons. Religion, in its leaft perfect form, was a check to headftrong paffion, and a reftraint on ruffian violence: and fhould it be admitted, that the temporal government of ecclefiaftics had tended to deprefs the induftry and populoufnefs of their immediate dominions, (a pofition which would require a very complex and elaborate inveftigation to fubftantiate,) yet this local depreffion would be compenfated and over balanced by the diftinguifhed merit of the popes, in the prefervation, advancement, and diffufion of learning, civility, and elegant arts; to which Rome, in barbarous ages, offered the only, or the fafeft, afylum; and of which fhe ftill exhibits the moft ineftimable models.

 Tufcany

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

Tuſcany are accuſed of ſhamefully abandoning their privileges and their wealth to the Grand Duke, who, parſimonious in the extreme, as to his own perſon and government, is thought ſolicitous of ſeconding by his heavy purſe the wild projects of his brother the Emperor Joſeph; the little republic of St. Marino, on the contrary, has been increaſing its populouſneſs, confirming its ſtrength, and extending the baſis of its government. For theſe advantages it is indebted to its mountainous ſituation, virtuous manners, and total want of ambition; which laſt-mentioned qualities, as ancient hiſtory teaches us, are far from being characteriſtics of republican government; though a republic that is without them can neither ſubſiſt happily itſelf, nor allow happineſs to its neighbours.

In the republics of Italy, (St. Marino alone excepted,) the people at large are excluded, by the circumſtance of their birth, from any principal ſhare in the ſovereignty. Inſtead of one royal maſter, they are ſubjects of ſix hundred[1] petty princes; and their condition is far leſs eligible than that of the ſubjects of monarchies; becauſe the latter cannot be collectively offended by the pomp of a monarch, which, excluding compariſon, is ſuperior to envy; and

[1] In the ſhop of an eminent bookſeller and publiſher of an ancient and celebrated republic of Italy, I was explaining to a young patrician the nature of an Engliſh circulating library. 'Why do not you, Paſquali,' ſaid he, turning to the bookſeller, 'introduce ſuch an inſtitution?' The other replied, '*Sono troppo principi!* — We have too many princes.' Theſe princes, the noble Venetians, who deſerved a better fate, are now enſlaved with their country.

are

are individually entitled to aſpire, by their talents and merits, to the exerciſe of every magiſtracy, and to the enjoyment of every preferment and every honour which their king and country can beſtow. The republic of St. Marino, on the other hand, like ſeveral commonwealths of antiquity, and like ſome leſſer Cantons of Switzerland, for the greater are univerſally moulded after the rigid Italian model, contains what is found by experience to be a due mixture of popular government among ſo ſimple a people, and in ſo ſmall a ſtate. The Council of Sixty is equally compoſed of *nobili* and *cittadini*, patricians and plebeians. This council, which may be called the ſenate, conducts the ordinary branches of public adminiſtration; but the *Arengo*, or aſſembly of the people, containing a repreſentative from every houſe or family, may be ſummoned for the purpoſe of elections and on other important emergencies: it has long uniformly approved the deciſions of the ſenate. In chooſing ſenators and magiſtrates, the reſpect of the citizens for hereditary worth commonly raiſes the ſon to the dignity before held by his father. Indeed moſt profeſſions and employments deſcend in lineal ſucceſſion among this ſimple people; a circumſtance which explains a very extraordinary fact mentioned by Mr. Addiſon, that in two purchaſes made reſpectively in the years 1100 and 1170, the names of the commiſſioners or agents, on the part of the republic, ſhould be the ſame in both tranſactions,

 though

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

though the deeds were executed at the diſtance of ſeventy years from each other.

Notwithſtanding the natural and proper influence of wealth and birth and merit; the liberties and properties of individuals are incomparably more ſafe in St. Marino, than they could ever be rendered under the capricious tyranny of a levelling democracy; and the people at large have the firmeſt ſecurity that their ſuperiors will not abuſe their juſt pre-eminence, ſince all the plebeians of full age are trained to arms, and commanded by a ſort of military tribune of their own chooſing, whoſe employment is inferior in dignity to that of the *capitaneos*, or conſuls, yet altogether diſtinct from the juriſdiction of thoſe patrician magiſtrates. This important military officer is overlooked by Mr. Addiſon, who has alſo omitted to mention the treaſurer of the republic. The buſineſs of the latter conſiſts in collecting and adminiſtering the public contributions, and in paying the *ſtipendiati* or penſionaries, whoſe ſalaries, as may be imagined, are extremely moderate; that of the *commiſſareo*, or chief judge, amounting only to ſixty pounds a year. His income is conſiderably augmented by the *ſportulæ*, or fees paid by the litigant parties; ſo that his whole appointments fall little ſhort of one hundred pounds *per annum*, a ſum which in this primitive commonwealth is found ſufficient to ſupport the dignity of a chief juſtice.

The laws of St. Marino are contained in a thin folio, printed in 1599, at Rimini, intitled, "*Statuta*

"*Statuta Illuſtriſſimæ Reipublicæ;*" and the whole hiſtory of this happy and truly illuſtrious, becauſe virtuous and peaceful, community is compriſed in the following pages, extracted from the ſecret archives of the ſtate.

Marino, and his companion Leon, came from Illyria to Rimini towards the commencement of the fourth century, and exhibited the new phænomenon of Anachorites in the weſtern world. In order to practiſe their auſterities undiſturbed, Leon retired to Mount Feretro; and Marino, to Mount Titan; which mountains, diſtant ſeven Italian miles from each other, reſpectively aſſumed the names of San Leo and San Marino, about the beginning of the ninth century.[k]

But long before this æra, many Italian monks, emulating the auſtere ſuperſtition of the Illyrian ſtrangers, had been allured by theſe romantic ſituations well according with the loftineſs and ſolemnity of their own characters; while inha-

[k] The fame of theſe Saints appears to have been increaſed and confirmed by time. Marino, with whom we are concerned, is mentioned in martyrologies and calendars. He is ſaid to have been a Dalmatian by birth, and an architect by profeſſion; and to have come to Rimini, in his youth, towards the commencement of the fourth century. In the annals of Baronius, there is a letter of the year 511, which makes mention of an Anachorite who lived on Mount Titan. Marino, who afforded the firſt example of this auſtere mode of life in the Weſt, muſt have left behind him a ſtrong impreſſion of his piety; ſince many churches were dedicated to his worſhip at wide intervals of time and place; among which may be mentioned, the Royal Monaſtery of Pavia, built or reſtored by Aſtolphus King of the Lombards; an ancient church with a rich monaſtery at Rimini; the great pariſh church in Bologna; as well as the cathedral in the city and iſland of Arbe in the Adriatic, oppoſite to the Venetian province of Morlachia.

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

bitants of the neighbouring plains, haraſſed by thoſe barbarous irruptions which prevailed in the fifth and following centuries, occaſionally ſought refuge among rude and ſavage faſtneſſes, from more rude and more ſavage invaders. Amidſt theſe ferocious incurſions, which were finally repreſſed by Pepin and Charlemagne, the lay inhabitants of Mount Titan gradually united into a regular commonwealth; and the Anachorites formed themſelves into a religious ſociety, under the direction of an abbot. The *republic* early endowed the *convent* with lands amply ſufficient for its ſupport; the property of which lands, as appears by a rare manuſcript of the year 884, preſerved in the ſecret archives of the republic, was conteſted by Delton Biſhop of Rimini againſt Stephen Abbot of Mount Titan. The cauſe was tried, according to the cuſtom of thoſe times, by the *judices datini* and *ſcabini*; and decided in favour of the monaſtery. The ſame valuable monument which bears teſtimony to theſe facts, diſproves the fictitious donation of the mountain by King Pepin; of which grant the original has never been produced, but of which there are ſaid to be two copies, one by the Librarian Anaſtaſio, and the other by the Chamberlain Centio. In the former we read "Serram [1] caſtrum St. Mariani," and in the lat-

[1] In barbarous Latin and Italian, *ſerra* means a craggy mountain — a word applicable enough, but never really, applied in ancient records to Mount Titan, afterwards called "Penne de St. Marino" The name is ſaid, in the manuſcript above cited, to have ariſen from the towers ſhaped like the feathers of an arrow, with which the mountain was crowned.

ter,

ter, "Serram caſtrum St. Martini;" inſtead of both which names, St. Marino has been as abſurdly as arbitrarily ſubſtituted; ſince the place now bearing this name retained its original appellation of Mount Titan for more than a century after the date of King Pepin's pretended diploma.

The firſt inhabitants of the mountain did not eſtabliſh themſelves on the rough and rocky ſummits on which one part of the city now ſtands, but occupied the gentle ſlope at a mile's diſtance in the direction of ſouth-weſt, then embraced by deep woods, and ſtill called *Il Luogo Vecchio;* words indicating that it was the ancient ſeat of the republic. In this ſequeſtered wilderneſs the inhabitants of Mount Titan long enjoyed a peaceful obſcurity, undiſturbed by the great powers which ſwayed the politics of Italy; and almoſt unknown to them, until Otho the Great invaded that country in the year 962, to make war on King Berenger. The latter retreated to Mount Feretro, afterwards called San Leo. His fortreſſes there, were blocked up two years; he was at length compelled to ſurrender through famine; his queen and himſelf were carried priſoners into Franconia. During this warfare, the diſtrict of Mount Titan, conſpicuous, by its vicinity and its loftineſs, to the contending parties, was allowed to maintain its neutrality; an indulgence for which it was in part indebted to the jealouſy ſubſiſting between the Emperor Otho, and John XII. who then wore the papal crown. The latter laboured by repeated

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

repeated embaffies to moderate the ambition of the former, and to reftrain the incurfions of his troops. The Emperor, on the other hand, ftruck by the fingular manners of a people, whofe honeft fimplicity gained his efteem, and whofe poverty could not tempt his avarice, frequently vifited Mount Titan, while his army was employed in the fiege of Feretro; and on one occafion of this fort, confirmed by his imperial grant the entire liberty and independence which the principal citizens of the republic fwore that their anceftors had from time immemorial enjoyed.

During the eleventh century, Italy began to be torn by the diffenfions of the Guelphs and Ghibellines; the former, partifans of the Pope; the latter, of the Emperor. This inteftine war, which pervaded the whole country, greatly multiplied the towers and baftions by which every province, every diftrict, and the refidence of almoft every diftinguifhed nobleman, long continued to be fortified. Men fcarcely felt themfelves fecure in the moft inacceffible fituations; and the inhabitants of St. Titan, now denominated St. Marino, removed from the floping lawn formerly mentioned, to the very fummit of the mountain called Rocca di Girone, which natural faftnefs the jealous republicans farther fecured by walls and caftles.[m]

[m] In the principal church of the prefent city, there is a ftatue of the fuppofed founder of the republic, holding a mountain in his hand, crowned with three towers or caftles; emblems fitly chofen for the arms of the community.

In

In the twelfth century, they ſtrengthened their ſecurity by entering into an intimate connection with the counts of Felori, diſtinguiſhed ornaments of the imperial party. This noble family, which afterwards gave dukes to Urbino, condeſcended to become citizens of the republic; and brought to it an acceſſion of ſtrength and wealth, which ſoon diſcovered itſelf in the purchaſe of ſome grounds on the ſouth-weſt, and the extenſion of the city to ſituations more eligible than the Rocca di Girone, where the ſafety of the inhabitants was frequently endangered by the fury of the winds.

During the greater part of the thirteenth century, St. Marino eſcaped moleſtation from the petty, but almoſt continual, hoſtilities which diſtreſſed the neighbouring territories. This happy exemption from the evils incident to war, the republic owed to the wiſdom and moderation of its own councils, and to the friendly protection of the biſhopric of Feretro, which was long hereditary in the family of the counts of Felori of Mount Capiolo. But when that biſhopric fell into the poſſeſſion of the Guelph faction, and eſpecially after the new biſhop treacherouſly ſeized, in 1281, the fortreſs of San Leo belonging to the counts of Felori, the republic had its full ſhare of troubles. Its territories were repeatedly invaded, but the invaders were as often manfully repelled. The danger, however, increaſed when the crafty Malateſta de Verrucchio, who was alſo a warm partiſan of the Guelphs, made himſelf maſter

of

APPEND. TO BOOK II. of Rimini towards the close of the thirteenth century; after having expelled from that city the Chevalier Percitaule, a powerful Ghibelline, who with much difficulty escaped to St. Marino to the house of his friend the celebrated Guido Felorio, a man who afterwards inflicted signal vengeance on the party of the Guelphs.

Yet with the fourteenth century the age of persecution commenced; and the republic was continually harassed by the bishops of Feretro, or by the lords of Rimini, for an hundred and sixty years; until, in the year 1462, the fierce Sigismond Malatesta, an execrated and excommunicated heretic, as odious by his vices, as eminent for his talents, was totally defeated by Pope Pius II. During this long period of warfare, the republic defended itself valiantly, under the counts of Felori and dukes of Urbino, its counsellors, protectors, and generals. About the middle of the fifteenth century, Duke Frederic of Felorio procured for it an alliance with Florence; an alliance faithfully maintained on both sides, while that republic continued to subsist. St. Marino also entered into a transaction with the King of the two Sicilies in 1459, in virtue of which it acquired the two southern districts of Fiorentino and Torricella, abounding in rich pastures, embowered in lofty forests of oak and chesnut trees. At the expence of its persecutor Sigismond, it also extended its dominions on the North and East, by gaining the districts Serravalle and Faettano, highly productive in vines and olives; as well as the fertile

fields

fields of Mongiardino, which ftill forms the granary of the republic.

Thus did this little ftate continue to flourifh amidft perpetual wars, upheld by the virtue of its citizens, and guided by the paternal care of the family of the Felori. The alliance procured for it with Florence by means of Frederico Felorio proved effectual for repelling the incurfions of the Pope's armies, which in 1489 befieged Robert Malatefta, the fon of Sigifmond, in Rimini. The Florentines enabled Frederic Duke of Urbino to cover the dominions of its ally, and completely to defeat the invaders, who feemed to have aimed at nothing lefs than the fubjection of the community. The letters written by the government of Florence in this feafon of danger, are ftill preferved in the fecret archives of St. Marino. They bear teftimony to that fpirit of liberty which had prevailed in Italy from the æra of the famous peace of Conftance in 1170, when many of the principal cities in that country affumed the republican form of government. The Florentines write to their diftreffed allies, whom they addrefs by the appellation of—"Magnificent lords, our deareft friends," that they were not more indignant at the infolence of the Pope's troops, in making inroads into the poffeffions of St. Marino, than if they had carried their incurfions to the gates of Florence itfelf. They obferve, that they had haftened to fend troops and money, and alfo to difpatch letters to the Duke of Urbino, and to the governments of Naples and Milan; that affiftance would

would ſpeedily arrive; and the remedy, doubtleſs, prove more efficacious than even the greatneſs of the evil required. "Exhortations to you, to be of good comfort, are unneceſſary, eſpecially from us who know the greatneſs of your ſouls, which renders you ſo reſpectable a branch of our confederacy. Perſevere in ſhewing your prudence, fidelity, and courage, which, beſides that they will delight and gladden your own ſouls, (ſuch being the nature of virtue,) will greatly oblige us and our allies, who will keep your meritorious exertions in eternal remembrance." Next day the Florentines wrote again, exhorting the citizens of St. Marino "to remain firm and reſolute, to loſe their lives rather than their liberties, ſince it was far better for men accuſtomed to freedom to be dead than enſlaved. God, who favours the cauſe of freedom, will proſper your undertakings; and your intereſts will never be forſaken by us and our friends. You have heard of the ſupplies of men and money already raiſed for your aſſiſtance. More of both will continue to be provided, until you have enough."

From this time forward, until the year 1543, the republic, being unmoleſted by foreign enemies, flouriſhed in peace and proſperity under the wiſe guidance of the dukes of Urbino, its counſellors and protectors. But in the year above mentioned, the exile Peter Strozzi, who commanded the French troops cantoned in Mirandola and its confines, where he was buſily employed in raiſing recruits for the ſervice of his

his maſter, Francis I., entered into a correſpondence with ſome of the Pope's generals in that neighbourhood, for the ſurpriſe and conqueſt of St. Marino. The inſtrument choſen for effecting this deſign was Captain Fabiano of Mount San Savino. The Emperor Charles V. had landed at Genoa; and the Pope, Paul III., had proceeded as far as Bologna, eager to have an interview with the Emperor, who was equally ſolicitous to avoid all intercourſe with his holineſs. The movement thereby occaſioned in that part of Italy, ſeemed to Strozzi and Fabiano the moſt favourable moment for executing their treacherous enterpriſe. Five hundred armed men were ſent in ſmall diviſions acroſs the ridges of Montagnaola. It was intended that, under the conduct of different guides, they ſhould unite into one body, and aſſail in the night the unſuſpecting republicans. But a thick fog baffled the local knowledge of the guides. The troops could not be in due time aſſembled: and the inhabitants of the place, being meanwhile apprized of their own imminent danger, immediately flew to arms, and compelled the invaders to retreat with the mortification of committing a fruitleſs crime, which had redounded as much to their own diſgrace as to the honour of their adverſaries.

The moſt memorable circumſtance attending this event was the warm intereſt taken by the Italian powers in the ſafety of St. Marino. Coſmo di Medici, Duke of Florence, in a letter dated the 20th June 1543, mentions with how much

much difpleafure he had heard of Captain Fabiano's undertaking; he requefts that he himfelf might be favoured with a full account of the whole enterprife; its authors, agents, and abettors; affuring the "refpectable citizens of St. Marino, his deareft friends, that he will ever be ready to prove, by his utmoft exertions, his unalterable attachment to whatever may concern their intereft or honour." The Marquis of Graffales, then refiding at Fano as ambaffador from the Emperor to the Pope, immediately difpatched a courier to Genoa, to acquaint his imperial majefty with the tranfaction. This powerful and renowned prince, whofe mind was equal to the greateft affairs, thought not the fmalleft below his notice. He was no fooner informed of the enterprife againft St. Marino, than he fent Baftamenti di Herrera to confer in his name with its magiftrates; to congratulate them on their fafety, and to affure them that he would always confider their affairs as his own; fince, befides his great concern for the tranquillity of Italy in general, he could not but view with the fondeft partiality a commonwealth, whofe government had ever been fo wifely and fo regularly adminiftered. The Pope, Paul III., did not choofe to be behind-hand with other princes in his profeffions of regard: and in order to ingratiate himfelf with the emperor, whofe favour he then courted, thought fit to order the French troops to quit the neighbourhood of St. Marino, and to keep at an unfufpicious diftance from its territory.

This

This favourable difpofition in his holinefs towards them, was cultivated by the republicans with equal affiduity and fuccefs. In the year 1548, the Pope's treafurer and the officers of his revenue in Romagna endeavoured, indeed, to fubject the commonwealth to the new tax on falt, which had been impofed on all the reft of that province. But Paul himfelf explicitly difavowed this proceeding; and iffued his brief, dated 11th October 1548, declaring the complete independence of St. Marino in temporal affairs; and thus confirming its inhabitants in the enjoyment of their immemorial liberties. The fame equitable conduct towards the republic was purfued by his fucceffors Clement VIII. and Urban VIII.; under the latter of whom, the duchy of Urbino, on the demife of its laft duke in 1623, being united to the dominions of the holy fee, the republic of St. Marino obtained the protection of the fame power, upon many and well-defined conditions. This political connection with the pope was not thought greatly to encroach on the independence of the commonwealth. It had been ufual with the Italian republics of the middle age to court the patronage of neighbouring princes; and, even in their conftitutional concerns, to have recourfe to noblemen of high rank and fplendid fortune, who might alternately prefide in their tribunals[n], and command their armies. St. Marino had

[n] St. Marino was diftinguifhed above the neighbouring republics, for the impartiality with which juftice was adminiftered; and was later

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

had long repofed unbounded, yet well-placed, confidence in the family of Felori; and what Machiavel fays of Florence is in a great degree applicable to all the other free ftates of Italy, that their affairs were never profperous, unlefs when conducted by the fteady wifdom of fome illuftrious individual.

St. Marino refpected the popes in their civil, and venerated them in their religious character. The warm expreffions of thofe fentiments contented the vicars of St. Peter; but fuch empty acknowledgements could not fatisfy the ambitious and intriguing Alberoni, who, when legate of Romagna in the year 1740, formed a plan for converting refpect into allegiance, and the duty of protection into the right of dominion. A confiderable party of the inhabitants, feduced by his promifes, or gained by his bribes, had confented to betray into his hands the liberties of their country. When the appointed day arrived, Alberoni rode up the mountain, attended by a numerous fuite. He was received by the principal inhabitants at the door of the great church, and conducted by the priefts to a magnificent feat under a canopy. But unfortunately for the execution of his purpofe, the mafs began, as ufual in that republic, with the word

later than moft of them in adopting the "Judice eftero," the jurifdiction of a foreigner, "articolo troppo neceffario per tolgierfi ogni fufpicione nei guidici pæfani: an eftablifhment found neceffary in confequence of the too juft fufpicions againft judges born in the country."

 "Liber-

"Libertas." This single word produced such an enthusiasm in the minds of those who understood his designs, as well as of those who only suspected them, that they rose with common consent, attacked the cardinal and his attendants, drove them precipitately from the church, and made them descend the mountain with a degree of disordered trepidation extremely unlike to the slow and pompous solemnity with which they had ascended it. This last memorable event in the history of St. Marino well corresponds with that firmness and courage with which it is supposed to have maintained its independence, amidst the hostile collisions of Imperial and Pontifical power; an independence, however, which appears to have been owing to the penurious circumstances of a people, which could not tempt rapacity, and their virtuous manners which always conciliated the affection of one party, more than they provoked the animosity of another.

From the preceding narrative it is not very easy to ascertain what share Marino, the Dalmatian architect, had in the first institution of the state. On the supposition that he was its founder and lawgiver, Mr. Addison observes, "that the origin of St. Marino must be acknowledged to be far nobler than that of Rome, which was an asylum for robbers and murderers; whereas St. Marino was the resort of persons eminent for their piety and devotion." This ob-

 servation

fervation appears to me to be erroneous in two refpects, decorating with unfair honours the one republic, and heaping unmerited difgrace on the other. If piety founded St. Marino, with this piety much fuperftition was intermixed; a fuperftition unfriendly to the beft principles of fociety, and hoftile to the favourite ends of nature, preaching celibacy, and exacting mortification, the hideous offspring of ignorance and terror, detefting men as criminals, and trembling at God as a tyrant. But Rome, according to the only hiftorian[c] who has circumftantially and authentically defcribed its early tranfactions, was an expanfion of Alba Longa, itfelf a Grecian colony, which, according to the immemorial and facred cuftom of its mother-country, diffufed into new fettlements the exuberance of a flourifhing population, produced by the wifeft and moft liberal inftitutions. According to the fame admirable hiftorian, the manly difcernment of Romulus offered an afylum not merely for robbers and murderers, but for thofe who were threatened with murder or robbery, who fpurned fubjection, or fled from oppreffion; for amidft the lawlefs turbulence of ancient Italy, the weak needed protectors againft the ftrong, the few againft the many; and Rome, at her earlieft age, already fyftematically affifted the weakeft party; thus adopting in her infancy that politic heroifm, which was deftined by firm and majeftic fteps to conduct her man-

[c] Dionyfius of Halicarnaffus.

hood

hood and maturity to the fair ſovereignty of conſenting nations.

Both in their origin and in their progreſs, Rome and St. Marino form the natural objects, not indeed of a compariſon, but of a ſtriking contraſt; and compreſſed as is the latter republic between the dominions of the Pope and thoſe of the Grand Duke, to whoſe ſubjects St. Marino is now bound to allow a free paſſage through its territory, its citizens would deſerve ridicule or pity, did they affect the character, or imitate the maxims, of thoſe magnanimous ſenators, who, for the ſpace of more than two centuries, ſwayed the politics and controlled the revolutions of the world. Convinced that their independence reſults chiefly from their inſignificancy, the ſenators of St. Marino ſmiled, when we read in Mr. Addiſon, 'Theſe republicans would ſell their liberties dear to any that attacked them.' We had not the indelicacy to deſire them to interpret this ſmile; or to make ourſelves any comment upon it, being perſuaded, that, precarious and ſhadowy as their liberty is, their rational knowledge and their virtues have enabled them to extract from it both ſubſtantial and permanent enjoyment, and make them live happier here, amidſt rocks and ſnows, than are their Tuſcan and Roman neighbours in rich plains and warm valleys.

To the inhabitants of this little ſtate, the ſenate, the aſſembly, the different offices of magiſtracy, innocent rural labours, and military exerciſes equally uſeful and innocent, ſupply a continual

APPEND. TO BOOK II.

continual fucceffion of manly engagements. Hopes and fears refpecting the fafety of their country awaken curiofity and excite inquiry. They read the gazettes of Europe with intereft; they ftudy hiftory with improvement; in converfation their queftions are pertinent, and their anfwers fatisfactory. Contrary to what has been obferved by travellers of other Italians, the citizens of St. Marino delight in literary converfation; and Mr. Addifon remarks, that he hardly met with an unlettered man in their republic. In fpeaking of Beccaria's book on Style, then recently publifhed, one of the fenators faid, that it was a treatife on ftyle in a very bad ftyle, abounding in falfe ornaments and epigrammatic gallicifm. Another obferved, he wifhed that fafhionable writer, who had been commented on by Voltaire, an author ftill more fafhionable and more pernicious than himfelf, would confine himfelf to fuch harmlefs topics as rhetoric and ftyle; for his book on crimes and punifhments was calculated to do much ferious mifchief, at leaft to prevent much pofitive good; becaufe in that popular work he had declaimed very perfuafively againft capital punifhments, in a country perpetually difgraced by capital crimes, which were fcarcely ever capitally punifhed.

The love of letters which diftinguifhes the people of St. Marino makes them regret that they are feldom vifited by literary travellers. Of our own countrymen belonging to this defcription, they mentioned with much refpect Mr. Addifon,

Addiſon, and Il Signor Giovanni Symonds, now profeſſor of hiſtory in the univerſity of Cambridge. We were proud of being claſſed with ſuch men by the honeſt ſimplicity of theſe virtuous mountaineers, whom we left with regret, moſt heartily wiſhing to them the continuance of their liberties; which, to men of their character, and theirs only, are real and ſolid bleſſings.

For let it never be forgotten, that the ineſtimable gift of civil liberty may often be providentially withheld, becauſe it cannot be ſafely beſtowed, unleſs rational knowledge has been attained, and virtuous habits have been acquired. In the language of the wiſeſt man of Pagan antiquity, a great length of time is requiſite to the formation of any moderately good government; becauſe that government is always the beſt, which is the beſt adapted to the genius and habits of its ſubjects[p]. The inſtitutions which ſuit the well-balanced frame of mind of the mountaineers of St. Marino, who, breathing a purer air, ſeem to have diveſted themſelves of many of the groſſer and more earthly affections, might ill accord with the ſoftened tenants of the Capuan plains; ſince, according to the ſame penetrating ſearcher into the ſecrets of human nature, 'the inhabitants of the Fortunate Iſlands, if ſuch iſlands really exiſt, muſt either be the moſt virtuous or the moſt wretched of men.' Ariſtotle hardly knew the inhabitants of

[p] Ariſtot. Politics, b. ii. p. 6.

 the

the Britiſh Iſles: but let us, who know ourſelves and our good fortune, confide in the aſſurance, that this incomparable author would no longer entertain the above geographical doubt, were he to revive in the eighteenth century, and to viſit the Britiſh dominions under the government of George III.[q] As we have long been the happieſt of nations, let us cheriſh the hope, that the cauſes of our happineſs are, morally ſpeaking, unalterable. The character of our anceſtors, uniting, beyond all people on earth, firmneſs with humanity, gave to us our government; and the preſervation of our government, as it now ſtands, under a prince who is at once the patron and the model of thoſe virtues on which alone national proſperity can reſt, forms the ſureſt pledge for the ſtability of that character, which has long adorned, and we truſt will ever adorn, the envied name of Briton.

[q] About the time this was written, a letter from a foreign prelate, now high in office in a neighbouring country, contained the following memorable words: "Tout ici," meaning England, "eſt dans un état de proſperité vraiment révoltante."

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK III.

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Third Book, the author, proceeding to investigate the nature and characteristic qualities of the different forms of government, begins, according to his usual method, by analysing that complex object, a commonwealth, into its constituent elements, called citizens. His first inquiry, therefore, is, What constitutes a citizen? An inquiry that will appear very simple to many of those simple men who are continually debating particular cases involved in the solution of this general question.

It is worthy of remark that in opposition to those ancient, as well at those modern theories, which vainly endeavour to reduce practical matters to metaphysical precision, Aristotle maintains that the definition of a citizen which holds good in one state, is often not at all applicable in another. He even bestows that honourable name on those who, in modern times, are more usually denominated subjects; observing, "that as government is properly an arrangement of those

thofe who are partners in the benefits of political fociety, the fitnefs of government muft, like that of every other arrangement, depend primarily and principally on the nature and differences of the objects that collectively compofe the fyftem. This arrangement, therefore, muft vary with every variation of its parts, materials, or elements; which, in this cafe, are fentient and moral beings, liable to be affected and altered by a wide variety of actuating principles." In enumerating thefe principles, the author obferves, that the diftinctive characters of communities are greatly dependent on the means ufually employed by them for acquiring the neceffaries and accommodations of life. Paftoral, agricultural, and commercial nations are, therefore, feverally marked by ftrong lines of difcrimination. Climate, alfo, has a confpicuous influence; and innumerable local caufes concurring with the events of time and chance, and co-operating with education and nature, fo varioufly mould mankind, that nothing but the blindnefs of ignorance and narrownefs of prejudice could think of extending fimilar plans of policy to nations as differently circumftanced as they are unlike in the bent of their genius.

But though governments may and muft vary in their form, they ought all to agree in their end, "the good of the governed." Ariftotle ftrenuoufly maintains this doctrine, which will ever found fo harfhly in the ears of political bigots of all defcriptions; and which has ever been as infolently fcorned in the practice of republican

publican demagogues, as it has been ſhameleſsly combated in the arguments of court flatterers. By what arrangements the good of the governed is moſt likely to be promoted, muſt be learned from the experience of hiſtory; but, in our author's opinion, that people ought to remain contented with its lot, which is not mocked with ſhadows inſtead of realities; deluded with tyranny under the ſemblance of royalty, oligarchy under that of ariſtocracy, and democracy under that of a republic. Regardleſs of perſonal danger from tyrants or a tyrannical populace, the philoſopher boldly arraigns thoſe baſe cheats and vile counterfeits; thoſe unnatural perverſions of lawful power, and wicked mimics of legitimate government. It is not eaſy to diſcover which of the parties that then divided and tore in pieces their common country, he moſt heartily deteſted. In civil commotions, a man who is called to act, ought publicly to chooſe his ſide, though he may often have but a choice of difficulties; but he whoſe buſineſs is ſpeculation, will commonly beſt perform his duty, if, in proportion to the meaſure of his courage and abilities, he ventures to expoſe and condemn the exceſſes of contending factions, and to ſuggeſt thoſe reflections that have the moſt direct tendency to ſoothe their rage, and to moderate their fury. This taſk our philoſopher ſkilfully performs, by proving with irreſiſtible evidence that birth, wealth, education, and authority, as well as courage, ſtrength, numbers, and liberty, are all of

BOOK III. of them eſſential ingredients in the compoſition of a well-conſtituted commonwealth; but that the compoſition muſt fall in pieces, when any one of the elements is active beyond its ſphere; whether government be engroſſed by contemptuous opulence, or uſurped by rapacious poverty; oppreſſed by the unfeeling pride of the few, or diſgraced by the malignant paſſions of the multitude.

The Third Book of the Politics concludes with an enumeration and deſcription of the different kinds of monarchy; a ſpecies of government which, according to our author, is not only legitimate, but in many countries neceſſary. The moſt extenſive ſurvey of hiſtory fully juſtifies the concluſions which the philoſopher had drawn from the records of Egypt and the Eaſt. The Romans, who in the age of the Scipios had admired "the ſervile ſtupidity of the Cappadocians in declaring that they could not live without a king [a]," acknowledged in the age of Auguſtus, that their own commonwealth could not happily ſubſiſt but under the dominion of one prince [b]. The Emperor Julian [c] repreſents all the great nations of his own times as governed by the ſame political principles, which had been ſo uniformly [d] maintained by the

[a] θαυμασαντος! ει τινες ουν ὑτως απειρηκοτες προς την ελευθεριαν.—Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

[b] Seneca de Beneficiis, l. ii. c. 20.

[c] Julian. adverſ. Chriſtian.

[d] They rejected the republican government when offered to them by their conquerors; and when their own royal line became extinct, called

the Cappadocians. If liberty had been offered to the Thracians, the Myſians, and the Getæ, thoſe populous and warlike tribes would, according to Philoſtratus [e], have ſpurned the unwelcome preſent. The hiſtorian Livy acknowledges that the cities ſubject to King Eumenes had not any reaſon to envy the boaſted condition of republicans [f]; and the orator Iſocrates congratulates in ſtill warmer language, the felicity of the ſtates of Cyprus, which had ſubmitted to the dominion of Evagoras [g]. But the ſtrongeſt argument in favour of monarchy is deducible from the progreſſive proſperity of many countries of Europe, during the preſent and two preceding centuries; in which courſe of time the diſmembered provinces of the weſtern empire have enjoyed under kings a meaſure of national felicity unexampled in the hiſtory of the world.

As a conſiderable part of Ariſtotle's treatiſe on monarchy has periſhed, it would be preſumptuous to aſſign limits to the improvement of which he thought that form of government ſuſceptible. From a hint in the Sixth Book of his Politics, he appears to have been fully aware of the utility of a reviſion of ſentences paſſed under the influence of popular deluſion, or extorted through

called Ariobarzanes to an hereditary throne; and after the extinction alſo of the line of Ariobarzanes in the third generation, cheerfully ſubmitted to Archelaus, a ſtranger, recommended to them by Mark Antony. Strabo, l. xii. p. 540.

[e] Philoſtrat. in Vit. Apollon. [f] Liv. l. xlii. c. 5.

[g] Iſocrat. in Evagor.

through the ſeverity of legal forms; maintaining that in every well-governed ſtate, a diſcretionary power of grace and mercy ſhould be lodged, not with the ſubordinate magiſtrate, but with the ſupreme executive authority. This doubtleſs, if not the moſt ſplendid diſtinction, is at leaſt the moſt amiable prerogative of the throne. But there are other diſtinctions totally unknown to antiquity, yet calculated to produce both the moſt important immediate benefits, and to give to modern monarchy a degree of firmneſs and ſtability of which no other form of government can boaſt.

We read in Plutarch[h] of the coronation-oath adminiſtered to the kings of Epirus. Xenophon[i] mentions a ſimilar inſtitution in Lacedæmon. Both Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus[k] deſcribe the conſtitutional limitations of the kings of Perſia. The laſt-mentioned writer alſo copiouſly expatiates on the ſingular reſtraints impoſed on the kings of Egypt during their lives, and relates that thoſe of them who had incurred public indignation, were publicly arraigned after their death, and publicly puniſhed by the privation of a royal, or even a decent ſepulture[l]. Joſephus informs us that this regulation alſo prevailed in Judæa[m]. But all theſe expedients, as well as thoſe employed by the Macedonians, the freeſt nation[n]

[h] Plut. in Pyrrho.
[i] De Repub. Lacedæm.
[k] L. xvii.
[l] Diodor. l. i. ſect. 72.
[m] Joſeph. l. viii. c. 3.
[n] See Hiſtory of the World from Alexander to Auguſtus, p. 28, & paſſim.

of

of antiquity acknowledging the authority of kings, were coarſe and uncertain contrivances for limiting the regal power; contrivances always ſo doubtful, and often ſo ineffectual, that by the conſenting voice of antiquity, the happineſs of a people was held by the precarious tenure of perſonal merit in the prince. In conſequence of this opinion, the right of election appeared the moſt plauſible title to a throne; and even in thoſe countries where the royal pre-eminence of particular families was univerſally acknowledged, there was not any invariable rule for aſcertaining among different pretenders the order of ſucceſſion. This is fully illuſtrated in the hiſtory of the kingdoms formed from the diſmemberment of the Macedonian empire, and deſerves to be conſidered as one principal cauſe of their rapid decline and final extinction. But when the ſalutary maxims are eſtabliſhed "that kings can do no wrong, and that acts of government can be legaliſed only through the intervention of reſponſible miniſters," the inequalities of perſonal character in princes become ſo harmleſs in practice, that the caſual advantages of election totally diſappear in compariſon with the certain benefit of a fixed and definite rule to which nations may always have recourſe for tranſmitting without bloodſhed the inheritance of their crowns.

On this ſpecies of monarchy, limited and hereditary, the fruits of genuine republicaniſm have been ſucceſsfully engrafted; and are found by experience to flouriſh there, with a degree of

of vigour and of beauty which they had never exhibited on their parent plant. This form of government alone completely folves the problem propofed by our author, when he obferves, that, "difficult as it is to adjuft the true theory of political arrangements, it is ftill more difficult to keep the component parts in their fitteft pofitions." This difficulty, I fay, is furmounted by modern monarchy, and by it only; under which alfo, as will be proved hereafter, that diftribution of political functions on which all kinds of good adminiftration fo greatly depend, may be moft completely eftablifhed, and moft fteadily upheld.

BOOK III.

ARGUMENT.

Citizen. — How conſtituted. — Virtues of the man and of the citizen. — Their difference. — Different forms of government. — Their diſtinctive characters. — Pretenſions of democracy. — Of oligarchy. — Monarchy. — Its five kinds. — Arraigned — Defended.

BOOK III. Chap. I.

Analyſis of a common-wealth.

IN explaining the nature and principle [n] of the different forms of government, which are nothing elſe than various arrangements of men in ſociety, it is neceſſary clearly to aſcertain what conſtitutes a ſtate; an object not uniformly conceived, nor accurately defined; ſince one perſon often aſcribes *that* to the ſtate, which another holds to be an act merely of the king or of the ſenate, of the tyrant or the oligarchy. A ſtate or commonwealth, then, is a complex object; its component elements are thoſe called citizens; to know therefore what is a commonwealth, we muſt previouſly inveſtigate what conſtitutes a citizen. In different governments, the term citizen denotes different deſcriptions of perſons; in democracies, men in

[n] τις ἑκαςη (ſcil. πολιτεια) και ποια τις. "What each form of government is, and what are its qualities." Its qualities, as we ſhall ſee, reſult from its principle, and this again depends on the materials from which it is compoſed; for Ariſtotle did not agree with thoſe audacious political ſpeculatiſts, who think it allowable to treat men as artificers do wood or metal.

BOOK III.

the loweſt walks of life are often entitled to this reſpectable appellation; from which, perſons of the ſame claſs are, in oligarchies, totally excluded. It is not, therefore, the rank in life that conſtitutes the rank in a commonwealth.[o]

What conſtitutes a citizen.

The term citizen is ſometimes applied to illuſtrious foreigners who, for their merit or ſervices, have been aſſociated to the honours and adopted into the boſom of the republic. But ſuch honorary citizens form not the ſubject of our preſent inquiry. It is plain likewiſe that the bare circumſtance of place, or the habitual reſidence in the territory or city, does not conſtitute a citizen, ſince ſlaves, and the claſs of men called *inhabitants*[p], are not diſtinguiſhed by this appellation. Nor are thoſe to be conſidered as our fellow-citizens who merely enjoy the protection of our laws, and who are qualified in their own perſons to appear under the characters of plaintiffs and defendants; for ſtrangers with whoſe countries we have a treaty of commerce, or an intercourſe of hoſpitality, are entitled to challenge as their due the protection of our courts of juſtice; although in many cities thoſe who are ſimply inhabitants cannot

[o] For the ſake of perſpicuity, I have expanded this paſſage conformably to the author's words below, c. iii. and in various parts of his works.

[p] μετοικοι, commonly but improperly tranſlated ſojourners, ſince theſe have a caſual, merely, and unſettled reſidence; whereas the Grecian μετοικοι reſided habitually and fixedly in their reſpective ſtates, like the claſs called "habitans" in Geneva, and ſome Swiſs Cantons: and were, as our author ſays in another paſſage, ſharers in the ſame habitation, though not partners in the government.

proſecute

profecute or defend in their own name, but in all their legal tranfactions muft have recourfe to their procurator or patron. Minors not yet enrolled at the regifter-office, and perfons fuperannuated, who are honourably difcharged from civil functions, fugitives, outlaws, and men branded by the note of infamy, can none of them be called properly or fimply citizens, fince whenever we apply to them this name, we muft join with it fome epithet or corrective, without which addition we do not accurately explain our meaning. Who then is fimply or properly a citizen? He, and he only, who enjoys a due fhare in the government of that community of which he is a member.

The fhare of the government, or magiftracy, common to all the citizens not diftinguifhed by a name.

Of the offices of government, fome are limited in point of time; the man who has exercifed them once, cannot exercife them again, or at leaft cannot refume them, till a certain interval has elapfed from the time when he laid them down. Other offices are not thus limited, but may be occafionally exercifed by all the citizens, at all times, indifferently. Of this kind is the power of deciding as a judge or juryman in the tribunals, and that of voting as a member in the national affembly. It is true, that jurymen[q]

[q] The Grecian tribunals agreed more nearly with our notion of juries than the Roman. The former generally admitted of the citizens at large; whereas the Roman judicature was exercifed on ordinary occafions, for near three centuries, by the Patricians exclufively. But that the Romans thought with Ariftotle as to the fupreme importance of the judicial power, appears from the perpetual ftruggles on this fubject among the orders in the commonwealth; particularly during that moft important period which elapfed from the feditions of the Gracchi, to the defpotifm of the Cæfars.

 and

BOOK III.

and voters, as their office is common to all the citizens, are not diſtinguiſhed by any appropriate appellation denoting their indefinite or perpetual powers; they are not even dignified by the name of magiſtrates; yet if magiſtracy be ſomething more than an honorary title, it belongs in reality moſt peculiarly to thoſe who are inveſted with the higheſt authority in the ſtate; who direct the national deliberations, who govern the public reſolves, and who are the ultimate umpires of reputation, life, and property.

Though anonymous, the moſt important of all magiſtracies.

Under what conſtitutions the ſtrict definition of a citizen is applicable.

This definition of a citizen cannot, however, be applied in the greater part of governments actually exiſting in the world, many of which, as will appear hereafter, are nothing better than corruptions and tyrannies. Neither is it applicable in its full extent in thoſe communities which, though governed with a view to the public good, have ſubſtituted the authority of kings or ſenates to the power of popular aſſemblies and popular tribunals. In Sparta and at Carthage, as we have before ſeen, the judiciary power is intruſted to certain magiſtrates; to the Ephori in civil, to the ſenate in criminal, trials; and when ſuch magiſtrates rule by vicarious ſucceſſion, he may be called a citizen who has a right to govern in his turn. In democracies, this right is extended to the people at large. The definition of a citizen above given is therefore peculiarly applicable to popular governments; and a city or commonwealth is nothing more than a collection of citizens thus deſcribed, ſufficiently

fufficiently numerous for attaining that purpofe of comfortable fubfiftence, for which civil fociety was inftituted.

Coarfe definitions of a citizen.

It is a coarfe and unfatisfactory, but fometimes an ufeful, definition of a citizen, to fay that he is one defcended from citizens in the male and female line; or one whofe anceftors were citizens for two or more generations. The queftion ftill recurs, what conferred this character on thofe anceftors who firft founded the ftate? To them the circumftance of defcent cannot poffibly apply; and if anceftry alone were fufficient to make citizens, we might inquire, as Gorgias of Leontium, either in doubt or in irony, afked the Theffalians of Lariffa, whether as potters make pots [r], there were certain artificers at Lariffa for manufacturing Lariffean citizens. It is inquired with better reafon, whether thofe are citizens who have obtained this appellation in confequence of a revolution in the commonwealth? At Athens, Clifthenes, after the expulfion of the tyrants, aggregated many ftrangers and many flaves to this honourable clafs [s]. In this cafe, the queftion is not whether thefe are citizens, but whether they became fuch *juftly*. Some, indeed, hold that he who is unjuftly a citizen, is a pfeudo-citizen, a mere counterfeit. But this cannot be true, if we define a citizen, as above, by the power or magiftracy with which he is

Difficulties occafioned thereby.

[r] The original fays, "as mortar-makers make mortars."

[s] Ariftotle fays, "εφυλετευσε, diftributed among the tribes, many ftrangers," &c. See above, p. 80.

BOOK III.

invested, and acknowledge that many magistrates, and even kings, who have obtained their offices unjustly, still continue nevertheless to govern and to reign. He is justly a citizen who is created such by the act of the commonwealth; but what is an act of the commonwealth may sometimes, as we before observed, be a matter of dispute. When an oligarchy or a tyranny is converted into a democracy, some people are of opinion that the contracts entered into by the magistrates or the tyrant ought not to be fulfilled, because those contracts were the acts, not of the commonwealth, but of the government; and of a government too, not founded on public utility, but established by injustice, and supported by force. Yet democracies themselves have often been so established and so supported, and *their* acts, at least, have nevertheless always been considered as the acts of the commonwealth.[t]

To

[t] Therefore, "If the acts of tyrannical democracies are considered as those of the state, in the same manner ought the acts of oligarchies and tyrannies." Hooker had studied Aristotle, and from this *arch philosopher*, as he calls him, (Ecclesiastical Polity, l. i. sect. 10.) he himself borrowed many important parts of his excellent, but often misapplied, work. In reference to the subject in the text, he observes, "that in many things assent is given, they that give it not imagining they do so, because the manner of their assenting is not apparent. As for example, when an absolute monarch commandeth his subjects that which seemeth good in his own discretion, hath not this edict the force of a law, whether they disapprove or dislike it? Again, that which hath been received long since, and is by custom now established, we keep as a law which we may not transgress. . . . And to be commanded we consent, where that society, whereof we are part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement. Wherefore as any man's deed past

BOOK III. Chap. 2.

What constitutes the identity of a commonwealth.

To determine what is the act of the body politic often depends on ascertaining the circumstances which constitute its sameness or identity; circumstances which are no sooner withdrawn, than its continuity of existence is dissolved, and the commonwealth or city [u] no longer remains the same identical city that it was before. That the sameness of local situation does not constitute this identity, will appear evident to the most superficial observer. A commonwealth may transport itself from one place to another, and some portion of its members may live at a remote distance from the rest. The Peloponnesus and its seven republics might be inclosed within one wall; but within this wall would be contained, not a city or commonwealth, but an aggregate of nations, less connected with each other than the inhabitants of Babylon, whose walls, it is said, were stormed and taken upwards of two days before every division of the immense multitude was apprised of the public disaster. Concerning the magnitude of states we shall have occcasion afterwards to speak; and to examine whether they may be composed of many nations, or ought to consist of one only;

is good as long as he himself continueth it, so the act of a public society of men done five hundred years since standeth theirs who presently are of the same society, because corporations are immortal: we were then alive in our predecessors, and they in their successors do live still." Eccles. Polit. p. 19. edit. 1723.

[u] A city, the author observes, is one of those words which are taken in different acceptations; in the sense here meant it is synonymous with commonwealth.

an enquiry not misbecoming a statesman. At present let us enquire whether the sameness of inhabitants, or rather the continuance of the same race of inhabitants, constitutes the identity of a commonwealth, in the same manner as the identity of a fountain or river is ascertained by the flowing of the same kind of water from the same sources, though in perpetually varying streams. Agreeably to this comparison, ought we to say that the commonweath, while composed of the same race of men, continues the same identical commonwealth? Or rather, ought we not to say that the identity, in this case, is to be ascribed merely to the people or the inhabitants? Every commonwealth, as we have said, forms a sort of partnership or community; and in this community or partnership, each individual has his share. This share is determined by the form of the government, which is nothing else than the arrangement of the different individuals in the community; and when this arrangement is altered, the commonwealth, though still composed of the same persons, cannot remain specifically the same. A tragic and a comic chorus may be executed by precisely the same performers; precisely the same notes compose the boldness of the Doric, and the wildness of the Phrygian music. In such cases, though the constituent parts be the same, a difference in their arrangement and disposition produces a totally different result. The identity of a commonwealth depends, therefore, on the continuance of the same form of government; but it is a distinct inquiry,

inquiry, whether, in consequence of a change in the form of government, contracts subsisting before the revolution ought, in justice, to be fulfilled?[x]

Chap. 3.

Distinction between the virtues of the man and of the citizen.

A question naturally follows, whether a good citizen must of necessity be endowed with the virtues of a good man? This question can only be solved by considering what are the essential qualities of a citizen. A citizen then is, as it were, one of a ship's company, and a sharer with the rest in one common concern. Different sailors have different occupations. One steers the helm; another is boatswain; many ply the oars. The accurate and complete definition of each individual must, doubtless, express his particular employment and his appropriate duty. Yet one general definition is applicable to them all; since they are all alike concerned in promoting a prosperous navigation, and all alike interested in the safety of the common vessel. The republic is the vessel in which citizens are embarked; and the safety of the republic is, as we proved above, the safety of its form of government. To this, the virtues of good citizens must always be relative; and as civil constitutions widely differ,

[x] The author does not examine this question, but it is easy to perceive that he would have decided it in a manner little conformable to the prevailing practice of his own times. The Athenians, indeed, gave one illustrious example of their respect for the sanctity of engagements contracted in the name of the public, when they burdened themselves with a loan which had been made to the thirty tyrants. Demosthen. advers. Leptin. & Isocrat. Areopagit. See also my Translation of Isocrates, p. 495. and History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. p. 125. vth edit.

the

BOOK III.

the virtues neceſſary to preſerve them muſt differ as widely. They are virtues not abſolutely, but politically; and bear a reference to an end or purpoſe, independently of which they would not deſerve even the name of virtue. But the virtues of a good man are ultimately deſirable on their own account, as conſtituting in themſelves the perfection and happineſs of his rational and moral nature.

Political virtues relative to rank, age, and ſex.

In no country whatever have the greater part of mankind attained this conſummate excellence; but unleſs the majority in every country were politically virtuous, the commonwealth muſt ſoon periſh, ſince its ſubſiſtence can only be maintained while each, or at leaſt the greater part of its members perform their proper offices, or, in other words, exerciſe their reſpective virtues; virtues as different from each other, as are the various exigencies of human life to which they are reſpectively adapted. Our compariſon of the chorus is here ſtrictly applicable. The office and the virtue of him who leads the band is altogether different from the office and the virtue of every other performer. But of the leader himſelf, of him who directs the chorus of ſtate, what are the peculiar excellencies? When he executes his office aright, wiſdom and goodneſs are with propriety aſcribed to him. There is an education too, that befits men born to command, and them only; leſſons of war and horſemanſhip are given to the ſons of kings; and Euripides ſays in the perſon of a young prince,

"Teach me not frivolous arts,
"But teach me only how to ſerve my country."

There

There is an education, therefore, becoming a prince, and there are men fit for receiving none other. Jaſon [y] of Pheræ declared, without a figure of ſpeech, that he was famiſhed for want of empire. Power, it ſeems, was as neceſſary to Jaſon, as food to other men; and if he had not gained a crown, he muſt have ceaſed to live. This magnanimous Theſſalian had learned, forſooth, only how to command, but a citizen muſt alſo learn how to obey; and it is juſtly obſerved, that, in the equality of free commonwealths, men muſt be diſciplined by obedience, before they can be ſafely intruſted with authority. In proportion, therefore, as the form of government approximates political perfection, the virtues of a good man and of a good citizen will the more nearly coincide. In all ſuch governments, prudence in the governors, and right opinion in the governed, are eſſential and peculiar requiſites; other virtues are common to both, but variouſly modified by age, ſex, office, and condition.[z]

Citizens and their virtues different in different forms of government.

If virtue, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, be eſſential to a citizen, by what name ſhall we call thoſe low mechanics, who are condemned by their indigence to unwholeſome and degrading drudgery? They are not ſlaves, they are not mere inhabitants, their labour is uſeful to the ſtate, and yet the lives which neceſſity compels them to

[y] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. pp. 377, 378, & ſeq.

[z] I have tranſpoſed and compreſſed this paſſage, omitting ſome obſcure clauſes which are elſewhere more clearly expreſſed.

lead,

lead, contribute not in any degree to the formation of virtue, either intellectual or moral. In ancient times, these mean artisans were sometimes classed with slaves; and as slaves in many cities, they still continue to be considered; for it is worthy of remark, that defining a citizen as above, "one entitled to share the government of his country," we exclude from that rank, women, minors, and children, who are not less essential in a state than mechanics and artisans. But as there are various forms of government, there must also be various kinds of citizens. In democracies, artisans and even day-labourers may enjoy the honours of the state, in aristocracies this is impossible, because office is the reward of virtue; in oligarchies, the labourer never can, but the artisan sometimes may, attain the rank of citizen; because in such governments wealth chiefly opens the road to preferment, and industrious and skilful workmen often acquire considerable opulence. A law therefore prevailed at Thebes, excluding every artisan who had not shut shop upwards of ten years, from enjoying any office of magistracy. In times of national calamity, strangers, bastards, persons of half-blood, and even slaves, have been associated to the honours of the commonwealth; but this liberality gradually ceased with the public exigency, and an honourable descent, first on the father's side at least, and afterwards on the side also of the mother, was again required for constituting a citizen. Homer introduces Achilles complaining that he is treated

BOOK III.

treated like "an unhonoured ſtranger." A participation in honours and offices is, in fact, eſſential to the character of him who is truly a citizen; and when the appellation is beſtowed on any other, it is to be conſidered as nothing better than a flattering cheat. It is plain, therefore, that the character of a good man coincides in ſome governments with that of a good citizen, in others not; but that even in the former, the two characters completely coincide in the caſe only of thoſe properly qualified to ſhare and to direct the public adminiſtration.[a]

Chap. 4. — Of the different forms of government.

We now proceed to inveſtigate the number, the nature, and the genius of the different forms of government[b]. Man, we have ſaid, is naturally a herding and political animal; he delights in the company of others, and covets it for no other purpoſe but merely that of enjoyment. But utility ſoon ſtrengthens the aſſociation which nature has collected; for ſociety is recommended to us, not only for the purpoſe of

[a] Hard would be the lot of mankind if thoſe only were fit to live in ſociety who had acquired confirmed habits of virtue. The purpoſe of comfortable ſubſiſtence, for which communities are inſtituted, does not require in the greater part of the perſons compoſing them ſuch conſummate perfection. There is one caſe, however, pointed out in the text, in which the character of a good citizen neceſſarily infers that of a good man. This is the caſe of magiſtrates or miniſters, of thoſe called to direct or conduct the affairs of the community. In political life, the diſtinction between private and public character was firſt invented by the moſt deteſtable knavery, as it is unhappily perpetuated by the moſt lamentable credulity.

[b] Ariſtotle here repeats, that government is the arrangement of men in ſociety, and eſpecially of thoſe men who, by the forms of the conſtitution, are inveſted with the ſovereignty. He enumerates alſo ſome different kinds of republics, as is done by him more fully hereafter in the next chapter.

ſup-

BOOK III.

ſupporting life, a thing ſo ſweet in itſelf that men are eager to preſerve it even under moſt deplorable circumſtances, but for the purpoſe of living honourably and happily. The comfortable ſubſiſtence, therefore, of the whole body collectively, and of each individual ſeparately, ought to be regarded as the end and purpoſe for which communities have aſſembled, and the bond by which they are held together. In that moſt unequal of all aſſociations, the aſſociation, if it may be ſo called, of the maſter and the ſlave, we have already proved that there is a ſtrict coincidence of intereſts; for though the advantage of the maſter be the thing principally intended, the advantage of the ſlave (we mean the ſlave by imbecility of nature) is alſo a neceſſary reſult.[c]

That all juſt government has for its end and object the good of the governed.

In the management of families, the intereſt of fathers and huſbands coincides with that of wives and children; but as every art has for its object the benefit of thoſe on whom it is exerciſed; phyſic, the health of the patient; gymnaſtic, the ſtrength and dexterity of the ſcholar; ſo the art of domeſtic government muſt have for its object the benefit of the houſe or family. The benefit of the maſter is likewiſe the uſual reſult; for as he who profeſſes the gymnaſtic may himſelf ſometimes be a wreſtler, and

[c] See above, p. 37. The imperfection of modern language does not enable us to expreſs by one word δεσποτεια, which I have tranſlated the aſſociation of maſter and ſlave: an aſſociation which the author endeavours to prove mutually beneficial to both parties, by obſerving, as he had before done, that the deſtruction of the ſlave would put an end to the δεσποτεια.

as

as he who directs the veſſel muſt always be a paſſenger, ſo the one ſometimes, and the other always, derives perſonal advantage from his reſpective art, the direct and eſſential object of which lies, however, beyond himſelf, and centers in thoſe for whoſe improvement the leſſons of the former are given, and for whoſe ſafety the ſkill of the latter is exerciſed. In political partnerſhips, the ſame principle holds good; and the art of government, like all other arts, is practiſed directly and principally for the benefit of thoſe over whom it is exerciſed, that is, the good of the governed[d]. This is ſo ſtrictly true, that in the equality of ancient republics, thoſe who performed the taſk and ſuſtained the burden of magiſtracy, and who ſubjected themſelves to the painful duties of uninterrupted vigilance and ſtrenuous exertion in the ſervice of the public, thought it juſt that others next in ſucceſſion ſhould perform the ſame taſk, ſuſtain the ſame burden, and ſubmit to the ſame duties; and thus repay the benefit which they had previouſly received, and ſerve in their turn as guardians and watchmen of the community[e]. But fees and ſalaries have corrupted this natural and healthy condition of ſociety, and engendered the diſeaſe of avarice, which is only to be palliated by the emolument of perpetual office. The emolument, however,

[d] Plato, and, before him, the Pythagorean Fragments, forcibly maintain and beautifully illuſtrate this doctrine. Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584. edit. Ficin. and Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xi. p. 28.

[e] Vid. Plat. de Repub. l. i. p. 584.

is

is accidental; the burden eſſential. Thoſe governments, therefore, which conſult the good of the public, and thoſe only, are right and juſt. Thoſe which conſult the good of the magiſtrates alone, are mere perverſions of government, corrupt tyrannies of unworthy maſters over reluctant ſlaves: but a commonwealth is the partnerſhip of freedom.

Chap. 5.

Enumeration and definition of the different forms of government.

In enumerating and explaining the various forms of government, method requires that we begin with thoſe which are right and juſt, becauſe theſe being previouſly defined, their counterfeits and corruptions will at once become manifeſt. In every political aſſociation, it is neceſſary that one man, the few, or the many, ſhould bear ſway; and whichever of them happens to take place, if the public good be the great rule of adminiſtration, the government is right and juſt, and is called a monarchy when lodged in the hands of one; an ariſtocracy, when in the hands of the few, and a republic when in the hands of the many. The word ariſtocracy denotes the government of the beſt men, or the government that is beſt in itſelf. A republic is the general name of all commonwealths, but is applied particularly to denote a government adminiſtered by the people at large, but adminiſtered with juſtice, not oppreſſive to any claſs of citizens, but impartially conſulting the good of all.

The diſtinctive characters of governments.

The propriety of theſe names is juſtified by the nature of things. That one man, or a few, may be adorned by an accumulation of virtues, is

is what experience will juſtify; but that the multitude in any country ſhould be ſo illuſtriouſly diſtinguiſhed, is inconſiſtent with experience. The virtue moſt likely to pervade a whole people, is martial ſpirit. Citizens, therefore, who are ſoldiers, naturally bear ſway in that form of civil polity which is called by way of diſtinction *the republic*[f]. The corrupt deviation from monarchy, or rather from royalty, is tyranny; for a tyrant is a monarch who rules with no other view than the benefit of himſelf and his family. Ariſtocracy degenerates into oligarchy, when the few, who are rich, govern the ſtate as beſt ſuits the intereſts of their avarice and ambition: and a republic degenerates into a democracy, when the many, who are poor, make the gratification of their own paſſions the only rule of their adminiſtration[g]. Wherever

[f] The natural connection between republicaniſm and martial ſpirit is ſtrongly atteſted by all the hiſtorians of antiquity from Herodotus to Livy. See Herodot. l. v. c. lxxviii. and Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. viii. p. 364. and vol. iii. c. xxi. p. 7. Read in Livy the Hiſtory of Rome after the expulſion of the Tarquins, and the deſtruction of the Decemvirs. But it is worthy of obſervation, that this eſſential connection has been ſometimes overlooked in modern times, and well it might by thoſe who attended only to names; for in ſpeaking of the greateſt battle fought among the Italian ſtates, many of which were called republics, towards the end of the fifteenth century, Machiavel has the following memorable words: "Et fuc queſta giornata combattuta con più virtu, che alcun altra che foſſe ſtata fatta in cinquanta anni in Italia; perche vi mori tra l'una parte & l'altra più che mille huomini." Delle Hiſtorie, l. viii. p. 306. "This action was fought with more valour than any other which had happened for fifty years in Italy; ſince on the two ſides, the number of the ſlain exceeded 1000 men."

[g] Ariſtotle makes an apology for ſpeaking ſo freely of oligarchies and democracies, which were in fact the only governments then exiſting in Greece; and into one or other of which all republics have

 ſo

BOOK III.

Wherever wealth alone opens the road to preferment, oligarchy prevails; poverty, on the other hand, is the conftant attendant of democracy; and the diftinctive character of thofe governments confifts not in this, that the many or the few bear fway, but in the one cafe, that rapacious poverty be armed with power, and in the other, that contemptuous opulence be invefted with authority. But as eminence in wealth can only fall to the fhare of a few, and as *all* may participate the advantages of equal freedom, the partizans of the rich and of the multitude agitate republican ftates, each faction ftriving to engrofs the government.

Chap. 6.

The unjuft pretenfions of the partifans of democracy; and

In the contentions which take place, both parties pretend to have juftice on their fide; but there is a democratical and an oligarchical juftice, which ftrongly favours of iniquity. Moft men are wretched judges in their own caufe. Paffion narrows their underftanding; and in every complicated cafe they fee thofe circumftances only which are favourable to themfelves, and obftinately fhut their eyes to whatever favours their adverfaries. Juftice, the partifans of democracy affert to be nothing but equality; adding, that where men are equal in liberty,

fo natural and fo ftrong a tendency to degenerate. He fays, that in treating a fubject philofophically, and not merely for the purpofe of practical utility, a juft theory cannot be educed, unlefs the particulars which enter into the general queftion be fully enumerated and fairly examined. We are happy in living in a country where the injuftice and cruelty both of oligarchies and democracies may be unrefervedly expofed and fearlefsly arraigned.

liberty, they are entitled to an equal enjoyment of all other advantages. Juſtice, the partiſans of oligarchy maintain, and maintain rightly, to conſiſt not in equality, but in proportion[h]; not in this, that the ſhares of all be equal, but in this, that each man have his due: but as they themſelves are ſuperior in wealth, they claim a ſuperiority in all other reſpects.

the unjuſt pretenſions of the aſſertors of oligarchy, or what is now called ariſtocracy

Their reaſoning would be concluſive, had communities been formed merely for the purpoſes of preſerving and accumulating riches. On that ſuppoſition, the proportions of the profit might be exactly aſcertained by the ſhares of the capital. But commonwealths have *not* been inſtituted for the ſake of riches, nor for commerce by which riches are acquired, nor for that ſort of conventional juſtice, by which they are maintained and defended. The Tuſcans, Carthaginians, and other maritime nations, are connected by the bonds of mutual traffic; their exports and imports are carefully regulated by treaties; they have courts of juſtice to which the ſubjects of one country may apply when injured by thoſe of another; and they have alliances in war, ſtipulating mutually to enſure to each other their reſpective commercial advantages. But here, their reciprocal connections end; they are not ſubject, in other matters, to the ſame laws, nor governed by the ſame magiſtrates; they are not united by affection or

Difference between a commonwealth and other aſſociations.

[h] The ſubject of juſtice is fully diſcuſſed in the Fifth Book of the Ethics, to which the author here refers. See vol. i. p. 361, & ſeq.

 friend-

BOOK III.

friendſhip; and provided each party be juſt in his dealings, it is totally indifferent to the other what may be his character in all other particulars; an indifference which cannot prevail among thoſe who are fellow-citizens in reality, and not merely in name. But ſuppoſe the connection to be rendered more intimate, and imagine the walls of Corinth to be united with thoſe of Megara: ſuppoſe ſtill farther, that the right of intermarriage, a right eſſential to the exiſtence of communities, were eſtabliſhed; and admit that each individual were protected in his induſtry and in his dealings, by laws wiſely framed, faithfully adminiſtered, and realiſing the metaphor of the ſophiſt Lycophron[1], "that law is a ſurety and a pledge;" yet nothing of all this, neither the community of reſidence, nor the connection of affinity, nor mutual dependence in trade, nor common aſſociation in war, none of theſe ties, nor all of them together, would be ſufficient to conſolidate the political edifice, and to conſtitute that kind of partnerſhip which is properly called a commonwealth: a partnerſhip aiming not merely at ſubſiſtence, but at well-being; and ſubſervient not merely to the intereſts of life, but to the intereſts of that kind of life which is ultimately deſirable to man, as the perfection of his ſocial and moral nature.

This perfection cannot be attained independently of the community of reſidence, the connections

[1] This Lycophron is mentioned by our author in his Sophiſtic. Elench. paſſim; & Rhetor. l. iii. c. iii.

nections of affinity, and the long-continued habits of daily and familiar intercourfe. Feftivals, facrifices, common occupations, and common amufements, knit mankind into friendfhip, collect families into cantons, and confolidate cantons into commonwealths. By exercifing the energies and operations of the focial principle, the genuine happinefs of human life is improved and perfected: and that man who, by his perfonal excellencies and the lovelinefs of his character, contributes moft to this great end, whatever may be his inferiority to many others in birth or in wealth, ought to be regarded as the principal fharer in the great political partnerfhip.[k]

Chap. 7.

Difficulties attending the queftion, in what portion of the ftate the fovereignty ought to refide?

It has been found a matter of difficulty to determine in what portion of the ftate the fovereignty ought to refide. In the majority of the people at large? Then the fovereignty muft be vefted in poverty; and if the poor plunder the rich, who fhall arraign their injuftice? In the few, who are wealthy, or thofe ftill fewer, who are virtuous? Then the public muft be infulted in the one cafe, and difhonoured in the other; for offices of authority are the honours conferred by republics; and fhould the fame men remain always in place, they muft purchafe this pre-eminence by the difgrace of the people at large.

[k] The author concludes this chapter with a fentence unconnected with the context, namely, "The doubts and difputes concerning governments arife from confidering juftice, which is a complex object, under one only afpect; and thus fubftituting a part of it for the whole." This remark, which was before made, it feemed unneceffary to repeat.

BOOK III.

large. Shall we then eftablifh a king? The evil evidently would become the greater, how meritorious foever we may fuppofe the character of this king to be[l], fince the fphere of honour would thus be ftill more narrowly contracted, and that of difgrace ftill more widely expanded. Perhaps the vigour of fovereign power is incompatible with the imbecility of human paffion; and, therefore, ought not to be committed to man, but intrufted to law. Yet if the fpirit of your laws be democratical or oligarchical, wherein will this alteration avail you? The evils complained of, will evidently ftill prevail.

Solution of thefe difficulties.

Great as thefe difficulties feem, they are not, however, altogether incapable of folution. The people at large, how contemptible foever they may appear when taken individually, are yet, when collectively confidered, not, perhaps, unworthy of fovereignty[m]. It is a trite obfervation, that thofe entertainments where each man

[l] The author here does not dogmatife, but difcufs. In purfuing the principle on which he now reafons, he draws a conclufion againft royalty: but viewing the fubject under a different afpect, he confiders, in other paffages, the kingly power as a fit balance between the people and the great; and regards the royal authority as a firm pledge, that the poor fhall not be oppreffed, nor the rich plundered.

[m] This is the only queftion which the author here examines; leaving, as he obferves, the folution of the other difficulties to another opportunity. In the whole of what he fays, he fpeaks merely as an advocate; and his arguments, he obferves, apply not to any people indifcriminately, but to a people peculiarly circumftanced (προς τι πληθος), who are the only fit materials for what he calls his πολιτεια, or republic; as will be explained more fully hereafter. It is farther worthy of remark, that when Ariftotle fpeaks of the people, he here means *populus*, not *plebs*; the people at large, not the lower ranks only.

fends

fends the dish most agreeable to his own palate, are preferable to those furnished by the most sumptuous delicacy of individuals. The people at large are allowed to be the best judges of music and of poetry. The general taste is thus acknowledged to be better than that of the few, or of one man, however skilful. Considered collectively, the people form a complex animal, with many feet, with many hands, with many faculties, with many virtues; each member contributing something, more or less valuable, to the perfection of the whole body. The moral and intellectual excellencies of the multitude thus differ from those of a wise and virtuous man, as the beauty of a fine picture[a] does from the beauty of individuals; of whom some may have eyes, and others may have other features, more perfect and more beautiful than those of the picture; yet the picture, collecting only excellencies, and always avoiding deformities, will be found more beautiful and more perfect than any original in nature, with whom it can be compared. The excellencies, therefore, of that complex entity, the Public, may sometimes surpass those of the most accomplished prince or most virtuous council. That this commonly holds, I would not, indeed, venture to affirm. It rather seems manifest, that to some bodies of men the argument cannot possibly apply; for if

[a] Such was the Helen of Crotona painted by Zeuxis. "Neque enim putavit, omnia, quæ quæreret ad venustatem, uno in corpore se reperire posse," &c. Cicero de Inventione Rhetorica, l. ii. c. i.

 it

BOOK III.

it applied to them, it would extend alfo to wild beafts, fince wherein fome multitudes differ from wild beafts it is not eafy to difcover.

For what functions the people at large are beft qualified.

The fafety of every free government requires that the major part of the citizens fhould enjoy a certain weight in the adminiftration. If this does not take place, the majority muft be diffatisfied; and where the majority are diffatisfied, the government will foon be fubverted. But what fort of magiftracy is the humble citizen, the mere unit of the crowd, qualified to exercife? Offices of high perfonal truft, or of important executive authority, his ignorance would difgrace, or his injuftice might betray. For the performance of extraordinary tafks, extraordinary virtues, as well as extraordinary abilities, are required; and fuch virtues and abilities are not to be expected in the individuals of a promifcuous multitude. It remains, therefore, that the people at large be intrufted with the deliberative[°] and judicial powers of government, becaufe the members of affemblies, fenates, and courts of juftice, acting not individually, but collectively, prove mutually affifting to each other. In fuch popular tribunals, virtue and paffion, reafon and fentiment, courage and wifdom, are harmonioufly blended into one falutary compofition, in which even the groffeft ingredients are not without their ufe; for experience teaches, that the pureft nourifhment is

The exercife of the deliberative and judicial powers.

° In what fenfe the word "deliberative" is to be here underftood, will be explained prefently.

not

not always the beſt, but that fine flour is moſt wholeſome when mixed with the coarſe.[p]

Objections on this ſubject, propoſed and anſwered.

Guided by this principle, Solon and ſome other legiſlators committed to the people at large the power of appointing the magiſtrates, as well as that of taking an account of their adminiſtration. This political arrangement, indeed, is expoſed to the following objection. To appoint a phyſician, or to take an account of his conduct in his profeſſion, ſeems to belong only to thoſe who are ſkilled in the art of phyſic[q]. A geometer muſt be examined by geometricians; and a pilot, by men acquainted with navigation. Wherefore, then, ought the people indiſcriminately to be entitled to judge their magiſtrates, and to appreciate their merit or demerit in employments, which the people indiſcriminately are not qualified to exerciſe? This objection may be anſwered by recurring to the principles already eſtabliſhed, that the people collectively conſidered (unleſs conſiſting of a vile and ſlaviſh populace) are capable of diſcharging functions,

[p] Nam multitudo fere melius quam ſinguli de rebus omnibus judicat. Singuli enim quaſdam habent virtutum particulas, quæ ſimul collatæ unam excellentem virtutem conficiunt. Quod in medicorum pharmacis, ac in primis in antidoto eo, quod Mithridaticum vocant, perſpicue cerni poteſt. In eo enim pleræque res per ſe noxiæ, ubi confuſæ fuerint, ſalutare adverſus venena remedium afferunt. Buchannanus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. xxviii.

[q] Perſons thus ſkilled, the author divides into three claſſes: δημιουργοι, αρχιτεκτονικοι, πεπαιδευμενοι: mere practitioners; men of accurate and profound ſcience; and perſons inſtructed, but leſs correctly and deeply, in the healing art. The diſtinction between οι αρχιτεκτονικοι, or οι ειδοτες and οι πεπαιδευμενοι, occurs frequently in other parts of his works, and in reference to other arts and ſciences.

of

BOOK III.

of which, in their individual character, they feem altogether unworthy. Befides this, the productions of every art are not beft appreciated by its profeffors. The pilot is a better judge of a helm than the fhip-carpenter. A cook is feldom confulted about the merit of the fupper which he has dreffed; and he who inhabits a houfe, needs not a jury of architects to afcertain the degree of praife or of blame due to the contrivance of the builder.

There is ftill another ground on which the arrangement of popular governments is cenfured. That magiftrates fhould be elected by, and refponfible to, the promifcuous crowd of citizens, convened in affemblies and courts of juftice, feems highly unreafonable, becaufe the upper ranks of men are thus fubjected to the authority of their inferiors. To be a general or a treafurer, that is, to command the public force, or to manage the public purfe, or to perform any feparate function of executive magiftracy, it is neceffary to be endowed with certain pre-eminent qualifications; a mature age, an ample patrimony, an uniformly approved and refpected character. Ought fuch dignified perfons to be examined, tried, and fometimes profecuted to punifhment, by men of no eftimation; of different ages, different characters, and often deftitute of fortune? Is not this to commit the greater magiftracy to thofe judged unworthy of holding the leffer? Thefe queftions may be fatiffactorily anfwered by obferving, that the individuals compofing the fenate or affembly are not

themſelves the aſſembly or ſenate. They are parts only of thoſe awful tribunals, and the magiſtrates are tried not by the parts, but by the whole; that is, by the aſſembly, ſenate, or courts of juſtice, which, whatever may be the character and condition of many of the members compoſing them, are certainly more wealthy and more reſpectable than any of thoſe magiſtrates who are held amenable to their juriſdiction. The preſent difficulty, therefore, may thus be removed; but the doubt which we firſt ſtarted, proves that the laws ſhould always decide whenever their general language (for their language muſt be general) applies to the caſe in queſtion; and that judges ſhould then only ſpeak when the laws are ſilent. But what laws are entitled to the appellation of good, does not yet appear. This only is manifeſt, that the laws muſt depend on the nature of the government; juſt, therefore, under a good government, and unjuſt under a bad one.

Chap. 8.

According to what circumſtances and qualities, political honours and advantages ought to be apportioned and diſtributed.

Every ſcience and every art propoſes to itſelf ſome end or purpoſe which it conſiders as abſolutely good and ultimately deſirable, that is, good and deſirable in itſelf without reference to the attainment of any object beyond it. Of politics, the moſt comprehenſive and the moſt important of all ſciences, the end and aim is the public good of the community, which can only be upheld, by juſtice, which, as we before ſaid, forms the great law of the moral world. To a certain length, the general opinions of mankind with regard to juſtice agree with the accurate deciſions of philoſophy. Among equals, juſtice is

BOOK III.

is acknowledged to confift in equality; among are thofe who are unequal, it is acknowledged to confift in proportion, that is, in giving to each his due. But what, and how many, are the circumftances which ought to regulate this proportion, is not clearly afcertained. Ought a fuperiority in every advantageous quality, when other things are alike, to entitle its poffeffor to a fuperiority of political advantages? Shall men's ftatures or colours be confidered as laying a foundation for the difcrimination of ranks in fociety? In leffer matters, fuch a principle of diftinction is not allowed to operate. At a concert of mufic, the beft inftrument is given, not to the handfomeft man, but to the beft performer. How much foever he may be furpaffed in beauty or nobility, and how much foever the value of beauty and nobility may furpafs that of mufical fkill, yet the beft performer is always honoured with the beft flute. The reafon is plain; the circumftances in which his rivals are fuperior, contribute nothing to the work in hand. They have no manner of relation to mufical performance: and therefore, with regard to it, cannot ftand in competition with the quality in which he excels them. For things fpecifically different, and which admit not of a common meafure, can only be eftimated by confidering how far they refpectively contribute to fome common end. To compare them abftractedly is impoffible or abfurd. A difference in every valuable quality ought not, therefore, to be a fource of political diftinction. Swiftnefs

neſs meets with due honour at the Olympic games. But the honours conferred by cities are apportioned to qualities eſſential to the exiſtence or well-being of the ſtate. A community cannot conſiſt of beggars or of ſlaves. Liberty, therefore, and wealth and birth, naturally contend for pre-eminence; but if theſe things be neceſſary to conſtitute a commonwealth, juſtice and valour are not leſs neceſſary to defend and uphold it. In the conteſt, therefore, for civil pre-eminence, education and virtue ſeem fairly entitled to the firſt honours, becauſe of all things, education and virtue moſt contribute to the perfection of civil ſociety. The partiſans of wealth allege, that the rich are moſt faithful to their engagements; and that thoſe who have the greateſt ſhare in the public ſtock, ought to be inveſted with the government. The nobles contend, that as ſlaves are eſſentially different from citizens, thoſe who are fartheſt removed from a ſervile extraction, ought to be regarded as citizens of a ſuperior claſs, and therefore to be armed with authority. They ſtrengthen this concluſion, by obſerving that nobility is nothing elſe but the virtue of the race, hereditary worth, and preſcriptive dignity. But ſuch arguments, in their ultimate tendency, would prove, that one man, if more noble and wealthy than the reſt, ought to be made king; and even in a virtuous republic, that he who ſurpaſſed his fellow-citizens in virtue, ought to be exalted to regal power. Such is the abſurdity reſulting from the ſuppoſition,

that

BOOK III.

that thofe who are fuperior in one particular [r], ought to be entitled to a fuperiority in political fociety; in which mankind have affembled in order to club their refpective advantages, and in order to direct their various but united efforts to one falutary end and purpofe; and in which the people at large may always quafh the vain pretenfions of the few, by faying, *we collectively* are richer, wifer, and nobler than you. The beft laws, therefore, are thofe which are framed for the general benefit of the citizens; that is, of men qualified alternately to govern and to obey, differently qualified, indeed, in different governments; but in the beft, qualified and determined to govern and to obey according to the rules which right reafon prefcribes.

Chap. 9.

Virtue beyond compare unfit for fociety.

The exiftence of every commonwealth prefuppofes, however, a certain degree of equality among thofe who are its conftituent members. Should exceffive inequality prevail, efpecially in thofe things which form the power and fplendour of fociety itfelf, the affociation will gradually tend to a diffolution; and, therefore, if one man, or a few, fhould difplay a degree of virtue, by which that of all the reft would be totally eclipfed, fuch men, if too few in number to fubfift by themfelves in a feparate fociety, could not form a part, or be confidered as members,

[r] Ariftotle obferves, that nothing is eafier than to eftablifh a democracy, an oligarchy, or a tyranny; becaufe all thofe governments are perfectly fimple in their conftruction; to make them, requires no accuracy of comparifon, no power of combination. But he obferves and proves, again and again, that they are all of them mere perverfions and mockeries of juft government.

of

of any community whatever. It is the law of commonwealths, that the citizens compoſing them ſhould rule by vicarious ſucceſſion; becauſe thoſe who contribute, nearly in equal portions, to the benefit and luſtre of the community, are entitled to expect from that community nearly the ſame treatment. But the ſame treatment, that is, a mere equality of honours and advantages, would be the height of injuſtice to conſpicuous eminence and incomparable worth. Who is to govern the natural governors of mankind? What laws are made for men who are a law unto themſelves? The attempt to legiſlate for ſuch men would be expoſed to ridicule; and they might anſwer the arguments of thoſe fooliſh enough to undertake this taſk, as Antiſthenes[8] ſays, that the lions, in the aſſembly of beaſts, anſwered the eloquent harangue of the hares on the ſubject of equal laws.

Neceſſity of the oſtraciſm.

The oſtraciſm of democratics was invented for levelling that extreme inequality, under which ſuch forms of government cannot poſſibly ſubſiſt. The aſſembly baniſhes for a limited time thoſe too conſpicuouſly diſtinguiſhed by wealth, popularity, connections, or any other political advantage. For a ſimilar reaſon, the Argonauts, we are told, rejected the aſſiſtance of Hercules. His virtues too much overtopped thoſe of the adventurers with whom he wiſhed to be aſſociated. The council, therefore, which Periander gave to Thraſybulus is not blameable,

[8] Antiſthenes was a ſcholar of Socrates, who, in imitation of his maſter, mixed facetiouſneſs with ſeverity. See Hiſtory of Ancient reece, vol. iii. c. xxiv. p. 149.

abſtract-

BOOK III.

abſtractedly and in itſelf, but becauſe that counſel was both given and employed for the purpoſe of ſupporting a cruel tyranny. Periander, we are told, ſaid nothing to the queſtion of Thraſybulus, "by what means he ſhould maintain the ſovereignty of Miletus;" but, conducting his meſſenger into a field of corn, lopped the talleſt ſtalks, and thus levelled the ſurface. The meſſenger reported what he had ſeen, and what Thraſybulus appears to have underſtood, having ſpeedily ſet himſelf to cut off the firſt men of the city. Both democracies and oligarchies follow the ſame policy. The Athenians, in violation of treaties, chaſtiſed the Samians, Chians, and Leſbians, in order to break the ſtubborn pride of thoſe fierce iſlanders, and to level their aſpiring ſentiments with thoſe of their more obſequious allies. The Perſian monarch has often ſmit and humbled the Medes and Babylonians, vainly elated by the remembrance of their ancient empire[t]. The levelling maxim, therefore, is univerſally applicable in all ſuch governments.

Illuſtrated by the example of the arts.

The ſame principle obtains in muſic, in mechanics, in painting, and indeed in every art. A painter would not admit into his performance any limb or member, however beautiful, exceeding the proportional magnitude of the figure which he delineates. A ſhip-builder muſt adapt the helm, and every other part, to the ſize of the whole veſſel; and in a chorus of muſic, an overpowering voice would diſturb and deſtroy

[t] The author does not ſay that theſe things are right; but he maintains that they are neceſſary for the ſafety of the government, which, being bad in itſelf, can only be preſerved by bad means.

the

the effect of the symphony. The ostracism, therefore, in democracies, and some analogous institution in monarchies, is useful for maintaining the harmony of the political concert. It is better, indeed, that the legislator, at the first formation of the commonwealth, should provide against the necessity of ever having recourse to such violent remedies. But if this has not been done originally, he must, in that case, as at sea, tack about, and thus steer the vessel of the state into a safe harbour.

The gross abuse of this institution.

The ostracism, however, instead of being seasonably and usefully employed, is too often abused to factions and pernicious purposes. In corrupt commonwealths, justice is measured by the utility of that portion of the state, to whose interest the public good is, on all occasions, readily sacrificed. Such apparent or relative justice is, indeed, real and absolute iniquity; but it is the only kind of justice that, under bad governments, can possibly prevail. The ostracism, therefore, will not be properly applied in those cases to which it is solely or chiefly applicable; for it is a matter of doubt, whether this invention ought ever to be employed in a virtuous and well-regulated community. When a man conspicuously overtops his fellow-citizens, I say not in other political advantages, but in virtue itself, what is then to be done? It will not be said, that in a well-regulated state, his superiority in virtue ought to subject him to banishment. Nor will it be said, that such conspicuous superiority, submitting to the law of vica-

To what case inapplicable.

BOOK III.

rious succession, ought to command and obey alternately. This would be as absurd as dividing the empire with Jupiter. It remains, therefore, that all men should cheerfully and uniformly obey such rulers, and acknowledge the natural and perpetual sovereignty of their virtues.

Chap. 10.

Of monarchy, and its five kinds.

This observation naturally leads us to speak of kings. We have formerly numbered monarchy among the just forms of government. But whether is it universally the best form; or useful in some states and hurtful in others? First of all, it is evident that there are various kinds of monarchy. The kings of Sparta, who seem to be of all kings the most limited by law, conduct the military expeditions, and preside in the religious worship, of their country. They are the hereditary generals of the commonwealth. In the heroic ages, kings were not armed with the power of life and death, except by a kind of martial law, limited in its execution to a day of battle. Agamemnon patiently endures reproach and insult in the council; but issuing to the field, he says,

> "Who dares inglorious in his ships to stay?
> Who dares to tremble on this signal day?
> That wretch, too mean to fall by martial power,
> The birds shall mangle and the dogs devour,
> For death is in my hand [u]."

[u] Iliad ii. v. 391. Aristotle quotes Homer, and even Herodotus, from memory; so familiar was he with those admired authors. From this circumstance, his citations are not always correct; as in the example before us, where to the four verses in the text, he adds from another part of the Iliad, παρ' γαρ εμοι θανατος, — "For death is in my hand."

This,

This, therefore, is one kind of monarchy, a perpetual generalſhip, ſometimes hereditary, and ſometimes elective. Another ſpecies of monarchy is that which prevails among the Aſiatic barbarians. Their kings exerciſe a power abſolute, unlimited, and almoſt tyrannical; yet their authority is legal, hereditary, and ſecure. The genius of the Greeks is, in point of government, different from that of the Barbarians; and the genius of the Europeans is different from that of the Aſiatics, who of all nations are the moſt patient of deſpotiſm. Their kings, therefore, are guarded, not as tyrants are in Europe, by the arms of foreign mercenaries, but by the ſervile fidelity of their native troops; and their dominion becomes lawful, becauſe voluntarily endured; inſomuch that the guards of European princes are employed againſt the citizens, and the guards of Aſiatic princes conſiſt of the citizens themſelves. A third ſpecies of monarchy is that of the Æſymnetes in ancient Greece, who were nothing elſe than *elective tyrants*, ſometimes choſen for life, and ſometimes appointed for a limited time, or the concluſion of a particular buſineſs. The people of Mitylené thus choſe Pittacus to conduct the war againſt the exiles, headed by Antimenides, and the poet Alcæus; who, in one of his convivial ſongs, arraigns the folly of the multitude, "for appointing, vociferouſly and tumultuouſly, the baneful Pittacus to tyranniſe a frantic and ill-fated country." The government of the Æſymnetes partook both of tyranny and of royalty; they were deſpots exer-

 ciſing

BOOK III.

ciſing lawful power, becauſe lawfully granted; but differing from Aſiatic monarchs, becauſe their temporary power was not congenial to the ſpirit and uſages of their country. A fourth ſpecies of monarchy prevailed in the heroic ages, a limited royalty; juſt, legal, and hereditary. Thoſe who ſignally benefited mankind in arts or arms, who collected ſocieties, formed ſettlements, and eſtabliſhed colonies, received voluntary ſubmiſſion from public gratitude [x]. They became generals in war, judges in peace, and preſided in ſuch acts of religion as were not excluſively attached to particular prieſthoods. In deciding the differences of their ſubjects, they ſwore to obſerve the rules of juſtice; and the form of the oath conſiſted in elevating the ſceptre [y]. In progreſs of time, theſe branches of authority were either voluntarily reſigned by kings, or forcibly reſumed by their people. In moſt commonwealths, kings have been reduced to the condition of mere preſidents in religious ceremonies; and in that country of Greece in which their office beſt deſerves the name of royalty, they are merely hereditary generals.

[x] See Sarpedon's ſpeech in Homer, Γλαυκι τιη δε νωι τετιμημεσθα μαλιϛα, &c. Il. xii. v. 310. and Pope, v. 370 — 386.

> "Such, they may cry, deſerve the ſovereign ſtate,
> Whom thoſe that envy, dare not imitate."

[y] The ſceptre was given to kings as the badge of their authority, and entitled them to adminiſter the θεμιϛας διος, Jove's laws; which when they perverted or infringed, the ſceptre dropped from their hands. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. ii. paſſim.

To

To theſe four kinds of monarchy above mentioned, we muſt ſtill add a fifth and laſt kind, the moſt abſolute of all. A king may bear to a ſtate the ſame relation which a maſter does to a family, having the whole power of the ſovereignty concentrated in his own perſon. The office of ſuch a monarch, and that of a king of Sparta, form the two ultimate limits of monarchical power, which cannot be greater than it is in the firſt caſe, nor leſſer than it is in the ſecond. The perpetual generalſhip of Sparta cannot even be ſaid to conſtitute a particular form of government. It is not the conſtitution itſelf, but rather a law of that conſtitution; and a law that may take place under any other conſtitution whatever. We ſhall not, therefore, at preſent examine its advantages or inconveniences; but proceed to conſider thoſe kinds of royalty which contain the ſpecific qualities of kingly government.

Chap. II. — An eſtimate of the advantages and defects of monarchy.

In appreciating their merits or defects, we muſt eſtimate the contending pretenſions of good laws and good men[1]. The partiſans of kings obſerve, that laws can only ſpeak a general language; that their applications to particular caſes, which taken collectively, form the ſum of human tranſactions, is often doubtful, dangerous, or hurtful; that there is not any art of which the practice can be regulated by immutable precept; that even in Egypt, a country

[1] In treating of monarchy, Ariſtotle has principally abſolute monarchy in view. He ſtates the objections to it with that fulneſs and force with which he commonly repreſents the arguments of his adverſaries; refuting them afterwards with as much brevity as the ſubject can poſſibly admit.

BOOK III.

ſingularly attached to the formality of rules, phyſicians are allowed, after the third day of the malady, to alter the mode of treatment preſcribed by authority; and even before that time, to alter it at their peril. The advocates for laws aſſert, and aſſert juſtly, that the queſtion partly reſolves itſelf into one more general, "whether ought reaſon or paſſion to bear ſway?" Laws, therefore, muſt be eſtabliſhed; but as they cannot completely involve the deciſion of each particular caſe, whether ought one man, or many, to adminiſter and apply them? The arguments in favour of the *judgment* of the many, we have already had occaſion to explain[a]; and in favour of their *juſtice*, it may be obſerved, that the many are leſs liable to corruption than one man or the few, in the ſame manner that a large lake is leſs corruptible than a ſmall pool. If we deal, therefore, impartially with kings, magiſtrates, and people, regarding them all as compoſed of the ſame materials, endowed with ſimilar excellencies, and liable to ſimilar imperfections; it muſt be acknowledged that in communities conſiſting of ſuch members, and particularly in the cities of Greece, a republic is better than an ariſtocracy, and an ariſtocracy than a monarchy. Kings were originally eſtabliſhed by the gratitude of ſmall communities, in which there were but few perſons of conſiderable weight or diſtinguiſhed merit. But as the number of men deſerving the name of peers, or equals, increaſed, the

Why introduced, and wherefore aboliſhed.

[a] See above, c. viii. p. 216.

kingly

kingly government was changed for an ariſtocratical republic. Under this government nations flouriſhed, and riches were accumulated. Riches were followed by luxury, and luxury by rapacity. The wealth of the ſtate became the plunder of individuals. Oligarchies, and then tyrannies, ſucceſſively prevailed; an uſurping faction continually narrowing the baſis of its own power, till this power, ſupported on a ſingle point, was eaſily overturned by the juſt reſentment of the multitude [b]. Democracy then aroſe, and prevailed in its turn; and it is a matter, perhaps, of ſome difficulty to eſtabliſh any other form of government in large cities and populous communities.

Inconveniences of hereditary monarchy.

Should monarchy be admitted as an uſeful inſtitution, a new queſtion occurs, whether it ought to be hereditary? Whatever be the character of a young prince, ought he, in default of his father, to aſſume the government, and to rule for the ruin of his country? But the king,

[b] Ariſtotle's theory of political revolutions is wonderfully confirmed by the ancient Hiſtory of Italy. In that country limited monarchies firſt prevailed, which degenerating into tyrannies, made way for ariſtocracies. Rome, Naples, Capua, Nola, Tuſculum, were long governed by ſenates: but as cities became more populous, an epidemical malady ſeized the People of perſecuting the Patricians. This evil raged during the Carthaginian wars, from which time there was a continual progreſs towards democracy. Yet in all theſe republics, whether popular or ariſtocratical, the ſupreme power of the ſtate was generally held by diſtinguiſhed individuals; a Valerius, Camillus, or Fabius, of Rome; a Manilius, chief of the Latins; a Herennius, of the Samnites, &c. all of them dignified magiſtrates, or illuſtrious generals, acting a ſimilar part in their reſpective countries, which the Medici did in modern times in Florence; and the Malateſtas, Viſcontis, Felorios, &c. in other cities of Italy.

BOOK III.

knowing the profligacy of the prince, will provide a more worthy fucceffor. This furely fuppofes a degree of virtue greater than can be expected from man, that, for the good of the public, a father fhould exclude his own fon from a throne. As adminiftrator of the laws, the king muft be intrufted with a military force, fufficient to render them effectual. This force, it is eafy to fee, ought to be fuch as will enable him to coerce refractory individuals, but not to oppress the community. Such was the proportion of troops anciently committed by the Greeks to their Æfymnetes; and fuch was the rule by which a citizen of Syracufe wifhed to limit the military force entrufted to Dionyfius.

Chap. 12.

Monarchy arraigned.

But fome perfons affert, that it is impoffible to modify kingly power into any thing like reafon and juftice. That the invention is altogether unnatural; and that placing a prince on the throne is nothing elfe than raifing paffion and a wild beaft to the feat of fovereignty. That no man is a fair judge in his own caufe; and that a king, therefore, can never judge fairly between himfelf and his people. That phyficians, when fick, truft not to their own fkill, but require the advice of others; and that mafters of the gymnaftic exercifes pretend not to be proper judges of their own exhibitions. In all cafes whatever, mankind acknowledge the danger of impaffioned, and therefore partial, decifions, and ought the more earneftly to ftrive againft this danger, in proportion to the importance of the objects that inflame the ardour of defire, and ftrengthen

ſtrengthen the bias of ſelfiſhneſs. That the only juſt ſovereigns, therefore, are God and the laws; eſpecially thoſe unwritten, moral, and univerſal laws, founded in nature, reared and perfected by education and cuſtom. Beſides this, were the heart and will of a king not to be diſtruſted, his head and his underſtanding would be totally unequal to the diſcharge of an office not made for humanity. Can one man be ſuppoſed capable of ſuperintending the concerns of a whole people? Let him be ever ſo good, two muſt ſtill be better than one.

> "By mutual confidence and mutual aid,
> Great deeds are done, and great diſcoveries made;
> The wiſe new prudence from the wiſe acquire,
> And one brave hero fans another's fire [c]."

And Agamemnon, ſenſible of his own inability to exerciſe regal power, prayed,

> "Oh! would the Gods, in love to Greece, decree
> But ten ſuch ſages as they grant in thee [d]:
> Such wiſdom ſoon ſhould Priam's force deſtroy,
> And ſoon ſhould fall the haughty towers of Troy [e]."

That the laws muſt be adminiſtered, and their general language adapted to particular caſes, by the diſcernment of upright judges, affords not any argument in favour of the judge as ſuperior to the law. For it is acknowledged, that in every caſe to which laws are applicable, they only ought to judge and to govern; and from the law itſelf men derive thoſe principles that enlighten their reaſon and direct their deciſions. Enured to the diſcipline of this wiſe ſchool-miſtreſs,

[c] Pope's Iliad, ii. 224. [d] Ibid. 370. [e] Ibid. 443.

they

BOOK III.

they not only underſtand the letter, but imbibe the ſpirit of her inſtructions; and in continuing habitually ſubject to the laws, they become duly qualified to explain them, which that man can never be, who is raiſed above the laws.

All monarchies reſolve themſelves into oligarchies, or ariſtocracies.

Beſides, there is an abſurdity in ſuppoſing that one man with two eyes and two ears can obſerve as widely, or with two hands and two feet can act as vigorouſly, as many men with many perceptive and many active powers. Kings themſelves bear witneſs to the law of nature, aſſociating to their government many eyes, many hands, many organs of ſenſe, and many inſtruments of action. Their *friends*, that is, the friends both of their perſons and government, are full partners in power; they would not exert themſelves to ſupport a ſyſtem to which they were unfriendly; and friendſhip, we have before proved, can only ſubſiſt among equals. The government of one, therefore, neceſſarily terminating in that of many, his peers and equals, it is ſurely moſt adviſable to form directly and at once, that kind of conſtitution which muſt always be circuitouſly eſtabliſhed.

Monarchy defended: to what nations it is beſt adapted.

Theſe arguments againſt royalty are not ſo concluſive as they ſeem; becauſe they reſt entirely on the fallacy of extending to mankind in general, obſervations that have been found applicable to ſome particular communities. Government is nothing elſe but the arrangement of individuals in a ſtate, and the propriety of every arrangement or compoſition muſt depend on the number and nature of its materials. Some ſo-

cieties of men are fitted for living under what we have called a republic, that is, a juſt and equal polity, adminiſtered by rotation; and no people whatever are fitted for living under a tyranny, whether of one man, of an oligarchical ſenate, or of a democratical aſſembly; all which we have declared baſe perverſions of government, and direct violations of nature. But between theſe extremes, there may be ſome nations ſo conſtituted as ſpontaneouſly to obey a lord or deſpot, as ſervants obey a maſter; and others ſo conſtituted as voluntarily to obey a king, or even an ariſtocratical ſenate, as wives and children obey their fathers or huſbands. Thoſe who are unequal by nature, cannot be levelled by any contrivance of man; and when authority is juſt and uſeful, ſubmiſſion will be ready and cheerful. Even in republics themſelves, where men are arranged, not according to their wealth, but according to their worth; where the citizens love liberty, which they have arms and courage to defend; yet ſhould the illuſtrious virtues of one man, or one family, totally eclipſe the merit of the community at large, ſuch a man, or ſuch a family, muſt either be baniſhed by the oſtraciſm or enthroned. So much concerning monarchy, its nature and kinds; what nations it ſuits, and for what reaſons it ſuits them.[f]

[f] The laſt chapter is merely a recapitulation; after which the author ſays, that it is his intention to proceed to treat of the beſt form of government.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK IV.

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK IV.

IN the Firſt Book of his Politics, Ariſtotle examines the origin of ſociety and government, the eſſential diſtinction of ranks in a commonwealth, and the beſt plans of political œconomy. In the Second, he deſcribes the moſt admired ſchemes of policy, either delineated by philoſophers, or inſtituted by legiſlators. In the Third, (of which a conſiderable part is now loſt,) he explained the nature and principle of the various governments exiſting in Greece, and in the ancient world, whether republican or monarchical; beſtowing juſt and liberal praiſe, where praiſe ſeemed to be due; but declaring himſelf not completely ſatisfied with any thing that philoſophers had deviſed, legiſlators preſcribed, or that time and chance had produced, he proceeds in the Fourth (commonly publiſhed as the Seventh) Book to exhibit the reſult of his own reflections concerning the great queſtion, which form of government is the beſt?

This

This problem cannot, he obferves, be folved abftractedly; becaufe government being an arrangement, the beft government muft be the beft arrangement, and the beft arrangement is that which the materials to be arranged, are the beft fitted both to receive and to preferve. The great nations of Egypt and the Eaft had fhewn themfelves incapable of fubfifting under any milder dominion than that of abfolute monarchy, which was not tyranny to them, becaufe voluntarily endured; congenial to their original character, and confirmed by hereditary and prefcriptive ufage. The genius and temper of the Greeks, indeed, were as different from thofe of the Afiatics and Africans, as from thofe of the fierce and undifciplined barbarians in the north and weft of Europe. The queftion therefore comes to be, what is the beft government for the Greeks, or rather for that portion of the Greeks, fufficiently numerous to form a community apart? for Ariftotle thought the whole nation far too bulky to be moulded into one commonwealth, but well adapted by its magnitude to form a powerful confederacy; which by purfuing a line of policy which he marks out, in its foreign as well as domeftic tranfactions, might have greatly accelerated the improvement and eminently heightened the profperity of the furrounding world. The queftion, therefore, ftill returns, How are the firft elements of this confederacy to be produced? What ought to be the conftitution, and what the properties of that political germ, deftined to invigorate into fuch

folid

BOOK IV.

ſolid ſtrength, at the ſame time that it expands to ſuch flouriſhing beauty?

In treating this ſubject, Ariſtotle proves, with convincing evidence, that the ſame energies and habits conſtitute the happineſs both of individuals and of nations. Men make governments, not governments them: nor by any ſyſtem of political arrangement can a happy commonwealth be conſtituted from fools or cowards, profligates or knaves. The bricks muſt firſt be prepared before the edifice can be reared; and to the ſophiſts of Greece, who maintained, that as men were corrupted by bad governments, ſo they might be corrected and purified by good ones, the author replies by aſking, how a good building can be made from bad materials? To make a government requires great length of time; and to amend a corrupt government, he obſerves, requires ſtill longer time; becauſe, in this latter caſe, men have not only to learn what they did not before know, but alſo to unlearn what they had previouſly been taught. The happineſs of the community at large is the end of all good government: but Ariſtotle derides the vain opinion that this happineſs, which is often deſtroyed by the injuſtice and cruelty of magiſtrates, is only to be recovered and reſtored through the operation of popular aſſemblies. The majority of the people are poor, their juſtice will therefore be rapacity; the majority of the people are ignorant, their policy therefore will be folly; the majority of the people are themſelves domineered by headſtrong and im-

petuous paffions, their dominion therefore will be anarchy, oppreffion, and cruelty; and to intruft government, even for a moment, to fuch clumfy and artlefs hands, will, inftead of having any tendency to reform it, be the likelieft means to prevent the poffibility of any thing like rational reform from ever being effected.

Virtue, in a political fenfe, is defined the love of the conftitution; but under the beft conftitution poffible, virtue fimply, and political virtue, perfectly coincide. How virtue, fimple and unqualified, that is, virtue in the ftrict philofophical fenfe, may be rendered the actuating principle of government, Ariftotle proceeds with great accuracy to explain; and the ariftocracy which he thus eftablifhes, while it maintains the juft pre-eminence of the few, will invariably promote the beft interefts of all; containing in itfelf a perennial fpring of gradual but fure improvement; and raifing to higher benefits all defcriptions of men, (not excepting flaves themfelves,) exactly in proportion to their capacities for enjoying them.

Readers of reflection will perufe with pleafure his judicious obfervations concerning the extent and populoufnefs of his commonwealth; the moft advantageous foil and climate, the beft fituation of the country and of the capital; their neceffary accommodations, and moft defirable embellifhments. Such particulars as thefe fufficiently explain themfelves; but the three following points, two of which relate to domeftic, and one to foreign policy, are not unworthy of illuftration.

For

For cementing his citizens into friendſhip, and for maintaining unimpaired, the true ſpirit of any thing like a free and a good conſtitution, Ariſtotle, both in this and other Books, aſcribes ſingular efficacy to thoſe convivial meetings, called by the Greeks *ſyſſities*, and by the Engliſh *clubs*. In the Greek ſenſe of the word, clubs long formed the prevailing characteriſtic and peculiar delight of one modern nation. Our neighbours neither had the name nor the thing; and an Engliſhman who had inhabited the capital, whatever inducements might lead him to foreign lands, always ſighed with regret (and that in a degree proportional to his good ſenſe) for thoſe precious hours unincumbered by care and unfettered by ceremony, where frankneſs chaſtiſed by decency, and ardour fraught with knowledge, flowed in full and free ſtreams of unguarded converſation. Before haſtily condemning Ariſtotle for aſcribing great and momentous effects to ſlight and trivial cauſes, it may be worth while to pauſe, and carefully to conſider how much this ſingularity in our own manners contributed to form that character, and eſpecially that temper, which is beſt calculated for enjoying, without abuſe, the ineſtimable benefits of a free government.

A ſecond point on which Ariſtotle reſts the chief ſupport of his commonwealth, is the diſtribution of public functions among its citizens, according to their reſpective ages. That a city or commonwealth may ſubſiſt comfortably, as to matters of bodily accommodation, it muſt be provided

provided with peaſants, mechanics, and merchants; that it may ſubſiſt happily, ſecurely, and reſpectably, it muſt be provided with magiſtrates, prieſts, and ſoldiers. Ariſtotle endeavours to prove, both by experience and arguments, that the claſſes of men habitually employed as inſtruments of productive induſtry, ought to be all of them ſtrictly confined, each to his aſſigned taſk; and that the more minutely their taſks are ſubdivided, and the more rigidly each through life adheres to his own, the more promptly and the more perfectly will the work of all be performed. But does the ſame reaſoning apply to thoſe public and political functions which conſtitute the duty and dignity of a citizen? As the trade of a weaver ought never to be conjoined with that of a ſmith or a carpenter; in the ſame manner ought the military profeſſion never to be exerciſed at the ſame time, and by the ſame perſons who perform the offices of prieſts and magiſtrates. Ariſtotle maintains, that thoſe functions ought to be performed by the ſame perſons, not however ſimultaneouſly, but at different periods of their lives. Young men in the bloom of their health, ſtrength, and courage, make the beſt ſoldiers; the matured vigour of underſtanding is neceſſary to the due exerciſe of deliberative and judicial powers; whereas the honourable functions of the prieſthood, not requiring any painful or any ſtrenuous exertion either of the body or of the mind, ought to be reſerved for the occupation and the reward of declining years.

BOOK IV.

Ariftotle would have eafily perceived the incompatibility of fuch regulations with the condition of modern times. The civil law of Athens, and of every other republic of Greece, was a fcience ftill more fimple than the civil law of Rome, of which Cicero boafts, that amidft all his variety of occupations he could make himfelf mafter in the courfe of a few weeks. In the Chriftian kingdoms of Europe, priefts are not only the performers of religious ceremonies, but the great moral inftructors of mankind; and the preparations requifite for the profeffion either of the law or of the church, are fufficient to employ and exhauft the diligence of that portion of life which, according to Ariftotle's plan, ought to be dedicated to far different purfuits. It is thus that the arrangements in political fociety muft always depend on the materials to be arranged; and that inftitutions feemingly the moft natural and moft falutary will, under given circumftances, be found the moft abfurd and moft deftructive. The ftudy of abftract politics is, therefore, of all fciences the moft liable to abufe, though of them all the moft ufeful, when confined within its proper fphere. By determining thofe arrangements which, independently of local and temporary circumftances, are moft conformable to the effential ftructure and effential ends of fociety, it fupplies the conductors of public affairs with a political limit or model of perfection, to which, without ever reaching, they may continually ftrive to approximate; thereby counteracting that

that tendency from bad to worfe, of which the fuperficial as well as the deep obfervers of human life have at all times, and in all countries, fo juftly and fo univerfally complained. In moral and intellectual endowments, one man is fcarcely ever more different from another, than the fame man is different from himfelf at different periods of his life. The diftinctions of age are the moft natural, the moft palpable, and the leaft invidious of all diftinctions; and wretched muft be that commonwealth, in which the prerogatives of virtuous old age are not both honourably fuftained and cheerfully acknowledged!

The juft and natural prerogatives of age ought, however, to be carefully diftinguifhed from the abfolute and unnatural dominion of fathers over their children, which was eftablifhed by law in ancient Perfia, and in ancient Rome. With refpect to the former country, Ariftotle fays, that its regulations concerning the *patria poteftas* were barbarous and tyrannical[a]. At Rome, fathers were not punifhable for felling their children, or even for putting them to death; and a fon, while his father lived, could not, unlefs emancipated, legally enjoy any feparate property. Extraordinary as thofe powers feem, they were not, however, rafhly given to fathers by the founders of the Roman ftate, the deepeft of all politicians, "fince they were induced to confer them, by confidering the natural preeminence of fathers, the innumerable labours which they fuftain for the fake of their children,

[a] Ethic. Nichom. viii. 12.

 the

BOOK IV. the neceffity of keeping the latter under a watchful authority; which they knew, from the inftinctive affection of parents for their offspring, would be mildly exercifed." Such are the fentiments of Simplicius[b]; but Ariftotle holds, that parents, as to the treatment of their children, and mafters, as to the treatment of their flaves, ought to be amenable to the laws, and accountable to the magiftrates; fince power without refponfibility is not made for man.

The third point in the prefent Book requiring illuftration, relates to the moft important branch of foreign policy. According to the theory at leaft, though not the practice, both of the Greeks and Romans, war could be warrantably undertaken only for the purpofes of felf-defence, of making reprifals, and of revenging injuries[c]. But the mild and manly fpirit of Chriftianity, reprobating, as an unjuftifiable caufe of action, every fpecies and every degree of revenge, is thought to have altered and improved the law of nations refpecting war and peace; and to have reftricted the right of hoftility fimply to refiftance. Even this law of refiftance or defence has been rejected by the fcruples of fome of the aufterer fects: but their arguments, founded on the literal fenfe of particular texts, have been anfwered by proving, that thefe texts enjoin forbearance only in the cafe of flight and trivial injuries, and are to be regarded as general recommendations of Chriftian patience, not as

[b] Ad Epictet. Encheirid.

[c] Omnia quæ defendi, repetique et ulcifci fas fit. Liv. l. v. c. xlix.

parti-

particular commands for abandoning to unjuſt violence our perſons, our families, our friends, and our country. Had Chriſtianity purpoſed the complete abolition of war on all grounds whatever, ſuch an innovation muſt have been announced in language ſpecific and peremptory. The new and extraordinary law would not have been left to be collected by inference; it would have been expreſsly declared and ſolemnly promulgated. By the power, indeed, of moral motives, and the force of rational arguments, Chriſtianity renders odious or contemptible, ambition, avarice, uncharitableness, and all thoſe ſelfiſh paſſions which are the principal and ordinary cauſes of aggreſſion. Were its divine doctrines univerſally reſpected, wars would from that moment univerſally ceaſe, becauſe none could meditate future wrong; and the party who had already committed injuries, would be ſolicitous amply to repair them. But until this happy revolution be effected in human manners, violence may be repelled by force; crimes may be puniſhed for the ſake of amendment and example; and incorrigible offenders, whether individuals or communities, may be utterly cut off, when their deſtruction appears eſſentially requiſite to the public ſafety. Beſides thoſe plain and palpable grounds of war, which have always been avowed in the practice at leaſt of all Chriſtian nations, Ariſtotle maintains, that individuals or communities, qualified for command, may aſſert by arms an authority juſtifiable, becauſe uſeful, to thoſe who are its ſub-

 jects;

jects; an authority moderate and political over freemen, absolute and despotic over slaves. For extenuating the harshness of this decision, it may be observed, that by metaphors familiar to most languages, we speak of the infancy of society, indicating that many human beings, who have attained the age of manhood, are nearly as incapable as children of governing their own conduct. To such full-grown children, it would surely be a piece of good fortune to fall under the direction of a wise and virtuous father. We speak of other communities of men as servile, barbarous, savage, and even brutal; it would, assuredly, be highly advantageous to such nations to meet with wise and virtuous masters. Barbarous and savage nations, therefore, may be rightfully attacked in war, if, without being conquered, the former could not be civilised, nor the latter be tamed.

This specious maxim is liable indeed to be frequently abused, because it must be explained and applied by human reason, dark in itself, and often clouded by passion. But does the principle of self-defence, which Grotius would substitute in its stead, delineate an unerring rule of action? According to the uniform current of modern history, has not the approved right of self-defence been constituted by an apprehension of remote and improbable contingencies? In the practice, at least, of nations, does it not include whatever our avarice, our ambition, in one word, our selfishness, supposes essential to our well-being, the increase of our wealth

wealth or power, the superiority of our military or naval force, the preservation of our hereditary advantages, and the insurance of our future prospects? One nation is too strong—our safety requires that it should be weakened; another, by its situation, may be tempted to extend its borders—our own frontier is to be fortified by new acquisitions of territory, and defended by new bulwarks; by territory to be gained by invasion, and bulwarks which inspire more real terror than that by which they were raised. It would be endless to recite the incongruities resulting from the interpretation of a law, which tends to set the practice of nations at continual variance with their principles; a law too refined for the coarseness, and too limited for the variety of human transactions; which, in our present imperfect state, require that the exercise of the right of war, like all other deliberate acts, should be governed by the fallible dictates of human prudence, adjusting, as well as may be, the measures of coercion to the salutary ends of public expediency, including the best interests both of the victors and of the vanquished.

It may be worthy of remark, in concluding this introduction to Aristotle's ideal commonwealth, that his great political as well as philosophical adversary was employed, in 1663, to delineate a plan of government for Carolina. He gave the whole authority, legislative and executive, to the eight proprietors. The great Milton proposed a plan of government for England.

BOOK IV.

land[d]. The sovereignty was to reside in a grand council, not only supreme but perpetual. Compared with Aristotle's commonwealth, that of Locke will appear no better than a diet of *starosts;* and that of Milton, an oligarchy of *decemvirs*.

[d] See his "Ready and easy Way to establish a Free Commonwealth."

BOOK IV.*

ARGUMENT.

Different views of national happineſs.—Fair eſtimate thereof.—The beſt commonwealth.—Extent and nature of its territory.—Commerce—Naval power—Climate—Conſtituent members—Health—Marriage—Children.

BOOK IV. Chap. I.

The foundation of public happineſs.

RIGHTLY to inveſtigate the beſt form of government, it is neceſſary previouſly to aſcertain what is the beſt kind of life; ſince the latter of theſe remaining undetermined, the former alſo muſt continue to be unknown. Thoſe men (barring improbable accidents) are the happieſt, who live under the beſt government of which their circumſtances admit. We muſt begin, therefore, by examining what kind of life is moſt eligible for mankind in general; and ſecondly, whether the well-being of individuals and of communities reſults from the ſame cauſes, and is to be eſtimated by the ſame ſtandard. The former of theſe topics has been ſufficiently diſcuſſed in our popular diſcourſes; where we made uſe of a diviſion that appears to be indiſputably accurate; namely, that the happineſs of men depends on their external proſperity, on the frame and habit of their bodies, on the ſtate and condition of their minds. He

* Commonly publiſhed as Book VII.

ſurely

furely would be unworthy to be called happy, who poffeffed not the fmalleft particle of fortitude, of temperance, of juftice, or of prudence; fince the wretch totally deftitute of thefe virtues refpectively, would be frightened at the buzzing of a fly; would wallow unreftrained in the moft beaftly fenfuality; would not hefitate, for the fmalleft gain, to deftroy his beft benefactor; and in point of intellectual operations, would betray either childifh imbecility or frantic abfurdity. That a certain portion of virtue is effential to the well-being of a human creature, cannot, therefore, be a matter of difpute; but to what this portion ought to amount, occafions much diverfity of opinion. In general, mankind are fatisfied with their refpective fhares of virtue, how fcanty foever they may be, but extremely diffatisfied with their fhares of all other advantages; for their meafure of virtue, however inconfiderable it may appear to others, rarely appearing deficient to themfelves, they feek not to augment it; while their eftates and money, their fame and their power, cannot poffibly, in their own opinion, be too widely enlarged, or too highly accumulated. But *we* fay to them, that fuch vulgar illufions, even vulgar obfervation may fuffice to difpel. The external advantages of power and fortune are acquired and maintained by virtue, not virtue by them; and whether we confider the virtuous energies themfelves, or the fruits which they unceafingly produce, the fovereign good of life muft evidently be found in moral

and intellectual excellence, moderately ſupplied with external accommodations, rather than in the greateſt accumulation of external advantages, unimproved and unadorned by virtue. External proſperity is indeed inſtrumental in producing happiness, and therefore, like every other inſtrument, muſt have its aſſigned limits; beyond which it is inconvenient or hurtful. But to mental excellence no limit can be aſſigned: the farther it extends, the more *uſeful* it becomes, if the epithet of *uſeful* need ever to be ſuperadded to that of *honourable*. Beſides this, the relative importance of qualities is beſt eſtimated by that of their reſpective ſubjects. But the mind, both in itſelf and in reference to man, is far better than the body, or than property. The excellencies of the mind, therefore, are in the ſame proportion to be preferred to the higheſt perfection of the body, and the beſt diſpoſition of external circumſtances. The two laſt are of a far inferior, and merely a ſubſervient nature; ſince no man of ſenſe covets or purſues them, but for the ſake of the mind, with a view to promote its genuine improvement, and to heighten its native joys. Let this great truth then be acknowledged; a truth evinced by the Deity himſelf, who is happy, not from any external cauſe, but through the inherent attributes of his divine nature.

Chap. 2. — The ſame with that of individuals.

Proſperity and happineſs, then, are things altogether different. Chance or fortune may beſtow the former, but they cannot produce the energies of virtue, which are the eſſential ſource of

BOOK IV.

of the latter. Thefe energies are precifely the fame, whether exercifed by individuals or by communities; neither altering their inward form, nor changing their external effects. Public and private happinefs, therefore, muft reft on precifely the fame foundation, a conclufion juftified even by univerfal confent; fince thofe who place the happinefs of the individual in riches, are folicitous chiefly about preferving and augmenting national wealth; and thofe who place the happinefs of the individual in power, are folicitous chiefly about preferving or augmenting national dominion. A fimilar inference is drawn by the admirer of virtue: He who regards it as the fupreme felicity of the individual, alfo confiders it as the main fource of national happinefs.

Chap. 3.

The beft fchemes of national happinefs.

But fince virtue is twofold, fpeculative and practical, and that men ambitious of excellence refpectively dedicate themfelves to the purfuit of philofophy or that of politics; it is worth while to confider which of the two kinds of life, a life of ftrenuous action or of peaceful contemplation, is moft deferving of being imitated by ftates; fince it is the office of wifdom to teach nations as well as individuals to prefer the beft ends, and fkilfully to purfue them. The advocates for peaceful repofe and contemplative tranquillity obferve, that for a nation to govern its neighbours defpotically is the height of injuftice, and therefore the moft confummate folly; and that to govern them moderately and carefully, though not liable to fuch palpable objections,

tions, is however a work of great difficulty, and fraught with much trouble and much anxiety. Other reasoners, though they condemn every kind of injustice and despotism, maintain that the contentious agitations of war and government form the happiness and glory of nations, since they afford the best and noblest field for the public exhibition of illustrious abilities, and of pre-eminent virtues. A third class, and this is the most numerous, boldly patronise ambition and tyranny, and assert that the main business of nations consists in extending their power and aggrandising their empire.

The practice of most great nations shews that they placed it in valour and conquest.

In Sparta and in Crete, the public education, as well as the laws, are contrived merely as means for attaining this favourite end. The same remark applies to the Scythians, the Persians, the Thracians, and the Celts; and, indeed, to all those great nations whose valour or populousness have enabled them to assert their pretensions, or encouraged them to display their ambition. In Carthage, a soldier is entitled to wear as many rings as he has served campaigns. There was an old law in Macedon, that the man who had not slain an enemy in the field of battle, should be girt, not with an ornamental belt, but with a halter. The Scythians, in their public festivals, never presented the circling cup to hands guiltless of blood. The Iberians, a martial people, adorn the tombs of their deceased warriors with obelisks or pillars, equal in number to the enemies whom they have

BOOK IV.

have respectively slain[c]. Similar institutions prevail in other countries, either enacted by law, or established by custom; and yet nothing can appear more absurd to men capable of reflection, than to believe it the business of government to hold either nations or individuals in reluctant subjection. Who ever heard that it was the duty of a physician to compel, or even to persuade his patients to be cured, or the duty of a pilot to compel, or even to persuade the ship's company to be saved? The science of government, like that of physic and of navigation, is invented for the public benefit; and men will allow themselves to be benefited, without persuasion and without compulsion.

[c] The institutions of Rome had not acquired that celebrity, which entitled them to be cited as examples in the time of Aristotle, who flourished towards the beginning of the fifth century from the building of the city. Yet, even at this early period, the Romans were distinguished above all nations in the world, by the nice gradation, as well as by the general diffusion, of military honours. From the time of the Publilian law, "ut plebiscita omnes Quirites tenerent." U.C. 416, which was a confirmation of the Valerian, U.C. 306; and which was itself confirmed by the Hortensian, U.C. 467 *, the people at large enjoyed an ascendancy in the government; and the military ambition of the commonwealth thereby acquired that degree of vigour and activity which (external circumstances permitting) has always most conspicuously appeared under such a political arrangement. In modern times, military distinctions, as well as the martial spirit, have prevailed most in monarchies. This was not the case anciently, but completely the reverse: and it may be observed, that external circumstances being the same, the ambition of conquest diffused through the general mass of a society must be a more ardent as well as a more firm and steady principle of action than when confined within the breasts of a few individuals, whose passions are not, like those of communities, immortal.

* Conf. T. Liv. III. 55. vii. 42. Plin. Nat. Hist. xvi. 10. & Pompon. de Origin. ii. 8. Aul. Gell. xv. 27.

The

Their estimate proved to be erroneous.

The conduct of nations has perplexed this subject, because the conduct of nations has been distorted by passion. They have imposed laws on their neighbours, which they themselves would have indignantly rejected. Behaving moderately and equitably at home, they have acted tyrannically abroad, confounding the limits of politic and despotic government, although, as we have already proved, to enslave freemen is not less absurd and contrary to nature than to hunt and eat them. A state may be so circumstanced as to exist happily without conquest and without war; and how splendid soever military glory may be deemed, it is valuable merely as the means of obtaining a still more valuable end. This end cannot surely consist in gratifying the lust of ambition, for no pleasure is more contemptible than that of commanding slaves, and to reduce freemen into servitude is an unnatural gratification, equally dangerous and deceitful. The happiness of communities, as well as of individuals, consists, doubtless, in action; but to the external action of a state, a wide field lies open in the diversity of genius and character of the surrounding nations, each of which, to be treated justly, must perhaps be treated differently. Besides this, there are many internal relations which the constituent parts of a commonwealth bear to each other, and many resulting duties to be habitually and daily performed[f]. But were nothing of this kind to be performed,

[f] Aristotle here repeats what is often said in other parts of this work, the injustice of any kind of authority not derived from nature;

BOOK IV.

performed, nor any external effect to be produced, action would not, therefore, ceafe; nor the purpofe of happinefs be defeated. The pleafure of intellectual action is the more perfect, in proportion as fuch action terminates in itfelf. The geometer who folves his problem, the philofopher who purfues his fpeculation [g], refpectively exercife energies immediately delightful in themfelves, independently of any diftant end, or any external effect. What can be external to God and the univerfe? Yet the action of the univerfe is not therefore fufpended; and the Deity [h], who fuftains the whole, enjoys the

---

nature; the differences between the power or jurifdiction of mafters, fathers, and hufbands, and the evils refulting from confounding the limits of governments fpecifically different.

[g] τας ταις διανοιαις αρχιτεκτονας. The word architect in Greek was extended to fignify a contriver in general, the man who planned with his head, what others were to execute with their hands. In this fenfe it is ufed in the text; of which I have endeavoured to convey the full meaning without adhering literally to the words. How, indeed, can we tranflate clearly, yet literally, παλυ μαλλον τας αυτοτελεις. . . ἡ γαρ ευπραξια τελος, ὡςε και πραξις τις. Cicero, in many of the fineft paffages of his works, expands and adorns Ariftotle's thoughts. "Si nobis, cum ex hac vita migraverimus, in beatorum infulis, immortale ævum, ut fabulæ ferunt, degere liceret, quid opus effet eloquentia, cum judicia nulla fierent? aut ipfis etiam virtutibus? nec enim fortitudinis indigeremus, nullo propofito aut labore aut periculo; nec juftitia, cum effet nihil, quod appeteretur alieni; nec temperantia, quæ regeret eas, quæ nullæ effent libidines: ne prudentia quidem egeremus, nullo dilectu propofito bonorum et malorum. Una igitur effemus beati cognitione naturæ, et fcientia, qua fola etiam deorum eft vita laudanda. Ex quo intelligi poteft, cetera neceffitatis; unum hoc voluptatis." Cicero Fragment. Philofoph. five Hortenfius.

[h] This is conformable to a fublime theological paffage in the Treatife de Cœlo, L. ii. c. xiii. p. 465. in which Ariftotle, after explaining the Pythagorean fyftem of aftronomy, is endeavouring to refute one of its principal doctrines. The Pythagoreans held the element of fire to be more precious than that of earth, and therefore affigned to

the perfection of felicity in exercising his divine energies. By such sublime comparisons we are taught, that the happiness of men, considered collectively or individually, is still to be found within themselves; and that the same kind of life which is the best for each citizen apart, is also the best for the whole community.

Chap. 4.

Transitions to the examination of what is absolutely the best commonwealth.

This short preface seemed a necessary prelude to our treatise concerning the best form of government, for it was proper to begin with that which is the most important of all, to which all other things are relative and subservient, and *without* which they are not, all of them taken collectively, of any, the smallest value: we now proceed to examine those external advantages and outward accommodations, which serve as the materials from which the best common-

to it the more honourable place, and considered it as the center of the celestial motions. Plutarch. in Vit. Num. p. 67. edit. Xyland. This center being the post of greatest importance in the universe, and requiring the most vigilant watch, they called the fire occupying this post Διος φυλακην, the watch of Jupiter. In opposition to these hypotheses, Aristotle, constantly guided in his conclusions by observation and analogy, takes notice that the center or middle is certainly that which is most important and principal in any system when it is that by which the system is connected and sustained. But this middle, or rather this principle of connection, will not be found to coincide with what is the middle in point of magnitude, or with what is called the center of gravity. In animals the connecting and sustaining principle resides not in the middle of their bodies; neither is there good reason for supposing it to be so situate in the universe. Philosophers need not, therefore, give themselves trouble about the safety of the universe, setting a watch at the center of its space or magnitude, but ought rather to investigate its connecting and sustaining principle, where, and of what kind, it is. The rest is mere matter; this is the soul of the system: ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς συστασεως, "that which gives the system its characteristic form, makes it subsist, and be what it is."

 wealths

BOOK IV.

wealths are compofed, and as foundations on which the beft conftitutions are conftructed.

That fuch a common-wealth has limits in point of populoufnefs.

In explaining this fubject our fuppofitions, doubtlefs, are arbitrary; but good fenfe requires that they be not impracticable. The ftatefman, like the fhipbuilder or the weaver, requires a due provifion of materials; and the better thofe materials are, the more perfect will be the fruit of his political labour. The materials of the ftatefman or legiflator are the number and character of his people, the extent and quality of his country. The excellence of a commonwealth, however, is not to be eftimated by its populoufnefs or extent, but by its fitnefs for performing its proper functions. Hippocrates was a greater phyfician than many phyficians twice his fize. Slaves, fojourners, and ftrangers render a city populous, but do not make it *great;* neither can this epithet be beftowed where there are many mechanics and manufacturers, but few citizens completely armed and fkilfully difciplined. The experience of hiftory proves, that ftates of unlimited populoufnefs have never been well regulated. How is it poffible that they fhould, if law be nothing elfe than an arrangement, and if *that* be incapable of arrangement which is indefinite in number or quantity? To harmonife immenfity into fyftem, is the work only of that Divine Power which comprehends the univerfe. Beauty commonly refults from the proportion of quantity; and that which exceeds, as well as that which falls fhort of the due proportion, cannot be called beautiful,

either

either literally or figuratively. There is a limit, therefore, to the magnitude of every whole or fyftem, whether it be the work of nature or of art. A fhip of two furlongs in length, is as unfit for the purpofe of navigation as one of two fpans; and although a community may contain a greater number of individuals than are requifite for thofe purpofes of felf-fufficiency and comfortable fubfiftence, for which commonwealths are inftituted, yet this excefs is not unlimited; fince, when carried beyond certain bounds, it would difqualify the body-politic for its proper functions; rendering it incapable alike of prudent command and of prompt obedience. An army reinforced by continual acceffions would finally ceafe to be an army; for were Stentor fit to be its herald, who would prefume to be its general? What human fkill would undertake to combine its operations, and to harmonife its movements?

What thefe limits are.

The fovereign functions of a ftate confift in appointing magiftrates, and in deciding differences. But it is impoffible that magiftrates fhould be judicioufly appointed, or differences fkilfully decided, unlefs the characters and abilities of the citizens be carefully obferved and accurately afcertained: and thefe precautions will not be eafily taken in countries of unbounded populoufnefs; in which, alfo, there is this inconvenience, that ftrangers and fojourners will have an opportunity, through the difficulty of detection, of clandeftinely ufurping the rank of citizens. The magnitude of a commonwealth,

BOOK IV.

though variable, has, therefore, on either ſide, its fixed boundaries. It muſt be all-ſufficient in itſelf for the purpoſes of comfortable ſubſiſtence, and for the reciprocal ſupply of mutual wants. But its inhabitants muſt not be too numerous to be comprehended at one glance of the ſtateſman's eye, and to be conducted in all their actions by the vigilant operation of political diſcipline.

Chap. 5.

Concerning the extent and nature of the territory.

Upon ſimilar principles we muſt decide concerning the extent and nature of the territory. That which is moſt fertile in the greateſt variety of productions ſeems entitled to a juſt preference, provided this fertility be not ſo luxuriant as to encourage indolence or engender voluptuouſneſs[1]. Military men will tell us what makes a country eaſy of egreſs yet difficult of invaſion. The territory ſhould alſo be compactly ſituate; that it may eaſily fall within the ſuperintending eye of the ſtateſman or general, that its parts may be able mutually to aſſiſt each other, and that the whole may be readily defended.

Chap. 6.

Whether the capital ought to be ſituate near the ſea.

The maritime poſition of the capital will greatly contribute to this laſt purpoſe; for its inhabitants may ſpeedily embark, and ſail to the defence of any part of their poſſeſſions that happens to be attacked; and they may attack the enemy in thoſe parts that are moſt vulnerable.

[1] The author here promiſes to examine more accurately hereafter what ought to be the limits of national wealth; but in the work as it now ſtands, this promiſe is not fulfilled. Several other queſtions are ſtarted by Ariſtotle in his Politics, which are not any where anſwered; which proves that performance to have come down to us in an imperfect ſtate.

nerable. It is alfo of great importance to commerce, and efpecially to the tranfportation of wood and other bulky articles, that the capital be conveniently fituate with regard both to the fea, and to the circumjacent land. Yet, in other refpects, the vicinity of the fea[k] is attended with dangerous confequences. Men will generally entertain a higher veneration for their hereditary inftitutions, in proportion as they lefs communicate with ftrangers; and the promifcuous crowd of failors and foreigners, which traffic naturally collects, can fcarcely fail to injure the morals of well-educated citizens.

How far commerce ought to be cultivated, and how its inconveniences may be remedied.

If we cultivate commerce, it muft be for accommodation only, not for gain: our citizens are not to degrade themfelves into brokers and carriers, nor to fquander away in the arts of luxury that labour which may be far more profitably, as well as more honourably, employed in the cultivation of the foil, and in the production of neceffaries; the occupation which is of all others the beft adapted to the bulk of mankind,

[k] Maritime power was fo grofsly abufed by the ancient republics, that it is continually branded by moralifts as producing vile and verfatile manners, ηθη ποικιλα και φαυλα, Plato de Leg. fub. init. The furprifing of defencelefs cities, the defolating of unguarded coafts, attacks without glory, and retreats without fhame, were reprefented as operations not lefs inconfiftent with true courage, than incompatible with humanity and juftice. Ifocrat. Orat. de Pace, & Plato ubi fupra. The ancient republics entrufted arms to thofe only who had a property to defend. Their foldiers were levied from the firft claffes, or privileged orders, of fociety. But failors were taken from the promifcuous crowd, and generally from the meaneft populace. This practice, which prevailed equally in Greece and Rome, was founded on found policy. The exertions of failors, being naturally directed againft foreign enemies, are lefs likely to prove dangerous to the internal ftability of government.

 the

BOOK IV.

the moſt favourable to the health of their minds and bodies, and therefore the beſt fitted to promote national proſperity. Our commerce muſt be limited to the purpoſe of ſupplying our domeſtic wants; and in order to attain this purpoſe without endangering the purity of our domeſtic manners, we may imitate the example of thoſe cities and countries which have their docks and harbours encloſed by walls and fortifications, and ſeparated at a due diſtance from the capital; thus permitting the importation of foreign commodities, but intercepting the contagion of foreign vices.

Concerning naval power.

Naval power is peculiarly uſeful for the purpoſes of intimidating our enemies and protecting our allies; but its extent ought to be commenſurate with the rank which a ſtate aſpires to hold in the political ſyſtem. A people ambitious of command muſt be provided with a ſtrong navy; and this may be equipped without raiſing the naval crowd to the condition of citizens. Even on ſhipboard, thoſe who brandiſh the ſpear muſt maintain their ſuperiority over thoſe who handle the oar; and the latter, in whatever number they may be wanted, will eaſily be raiſed from the maſs of the peaſants and labourers. Such is the practice of ſeveral wiſe ſtates, particularly of that of Heraclæa, which maintains a numerous fleet of gallies, yet preſerves its citizens untainted by the contagious profligacy of mariners. Thus much may ſuffice concerning the extent of the city and territory, and concerning the magnitude of the naval

force.

force. We formerly affigned due limits to the number of the citizens, and now proceed to confider what ought to be their genius and character; a queftion that will be beft folved by paffing in review, and examining, thofe nations of Greece, and of the world in general, which appear to be moft worthy of our efteem.

Chap. 7.

Of the character refulting from a cold climate;

The inhabitants of Europe, and of moft cold countries, abound in ftrength and courage; but their intellectual powers are feeble or defective. They enjoy liberty, but are unacquainted with good polity; and though capable of maintaining their independence, are unworthy of afpiring to empire. The inhabitants of Afia, on the contrary, are artful and ingenious, but mean-fpirited and daftardly. They have, therefore, always been, and continue to this day, either fubjects or flaves. But the intermediate fituation of the Greeks feems to have happily blended in their character the virtues of courage and prudence, and to have formed them for thinking calmly, yet feeling ftrongly. They enjoy, therefore, the double advantage of liberty and laws; and are qualified for ruling the world, were they happily confederate under one form of government[1]. The Greeks, however,

from a warm climate;

from a temperate climate.

[1] Ariftotle maintained in a former chapter that a commonwealth had its limits in point of populoufnefs; and endeavoured to point out with fufficient accuracy for all practical purpofes what thefe limits were. In the paffage before us he fays, γινο; Ελληνων δυναμενον αρχειν παντων, μιας τυγχανον πολιτειας. "That the Greeks, if under the fame governance, would be able to command all nations." In fact, the extreme difference in the forms of government in Greece was the great obftacle to their national union in one political confederacy; which

BOOK IV.

The beſt moral materials for legiſlation.

ever, are not all equally conſpicuous for this happy temperament, and the manly policy which is its natural reſult. In ſome nations the character is rude and ſhapeleſs; one quality being deficient, while another is redundant: but in whatever people ardent courage moſt naturally harmoniſes with cool combination, and dignity of ſentiment with energy of intellect, that people muſt be conſidered as the beſt materials for legiſlation, and the fitteſt to be moulded into a virtuous commonwealth. It is ſaid by ſome writers, that the military guardians of ſtates ought, like faithful dogs, to ſhew themſelves mild towards thoſe whom they know, but fierce towards ſtrangers. Yet true magnanimity is incapable of ferocity, and is never moved even to aſperity, but in reſentment of injuſtice or inſult. When theſe provocations proceed from friends and acquaintances, our anger is enhanced by this circumſtance. "Waſt thou not tormented by thy friends?" ſays Archilocus, to whet his ſatire; and it is reaſonable that men ſhould be doubly offended when they meet with injury and neglect, where they had a right to expect friendſhip and regard. Hence the proverbs, "cruel are the wars of brothers;" and "thoſe who are incapable of anger and reſentment, muſt alſo be incapable of friendſhip and gratitude;" and indeed all thoſe affections originate

which is the thing here intended by Ariſtotle, ſince, according to the principles above explained, Greece was far too populous to be happily united in one commonwealth.

in

in one and the fame fource[l]. Thus much may fuffice concerning the qualities moft ufeful towards the formation of good citizens; for in practical matters, fcientific accuracy is neither attainable nor requifite.

Chap. 8.

Diftinction between the integral parts of a ftate and the things neceffary for its fubfiftence.

Every whole or fyftem, whether it be the work of nature or of art, may require many things for its fubfiftence which are not to be numbered among its conftituent parts. Food is neceffary for fupporting animal life, but is not a part of thofe animals who confume it. Land and other objects of property, whether inanimate or endued with life, are neceffary for upholding ftates, yet none of thefe poffeffions or inftruments form any part of the commonwealth; which, as defined above, is the affociation of equals for the purpofe of living happily, that is, of living virtuoufly, for happinefs has been proved to confift in the exercife of virtuous energies; though men, indeed, feek to find it in very different purfuits, hunting vain fhadows, which diverfify without correcting their modes of life, and vary without improving their forms of government.

Enumeration of the things neceffary for the fubfiftence of a commonwealth.

The things effential to every ftate, whether as conftituent parts or as concomitants[m], may be reduced to the fix following heads. 1. Food, the great want of mankind. 2. Arts, becaufe to effect the comfort of life is a work requiring many inftruments. 3. Arms, for citizens muft be

[l] See vol. i. b. vi. c. ii. p. 396. & feq.

[m] The author dwells here on this diftinction, which is fully explained elfewhere.

BOOK IV.

be armed to prevent domeftic diforders, and ward off foreign violence. 4. Money, as the medium of exchange, and meafure of value, and neceffary in the exigencies of war as well as in the operations of commerce. 5. An eftablifhment for the functions of religion [n], which are of all functions the firft in dignity. 6. Councils of deliberation, and courts of juftice, which are of all eftablifhments the moft neceffary. Any of thefe objects being wanting, the commonwealth is imperfect, or incapable of anfwering its end. In every commonwealth, therefore, there muft be hufbandmen, artifans, foldiers, merchants, priefts, and judges.[o]

Chap. 9.

In the beft commonwealth, thofe employed in mean and mercenary labour not to rank as citizens.

A queftion arifes, whether in that moft perfect community of which human nature is fufceptible, the citizens fhould affume indifferently, and as their occafions may require, all thofe various characters; or whether certain employments be not inconfiftent with the habitual exercife of thofe virtuous energies which we have proved to be the principal end and aim of every political partnerfhip. It appears, at firft fight, that a life of mechanical drudgery, or a life of haggling commerce, is totally incompatible with that dignified life which it is our wifh that our

[n] If we except the French republic, the Chinefe are the only great nation who, according to recent accounts, ever diffented from Ariftotle in this particular. See Staunton's Embaffy to China, vol. ii. p. 101.

[o] Under the name of judges he means to comprehend, as in the following chapter, το βουλευομενον περι των συμφεροντων, as well as το κρινον περι των δικαιων, "thofe who deliberate and determine in queftions of public expediency," as well as "thofe who examine into and adjuft the controverfies between individuals."

citizens

citizens ſhould lead, and totally adverſe to that generous elevation of mind with which it is our ambition to inſpire them. The mere trade of huſbandry, the aſſiduous labour and minute attentions which it requires, would be deſtructive of that ſecure leiſure which is eſſential to the formation of their characters; and ſuch ſordid cares would impede and obſtruct the generous and manly exertions by which virtue is diſplayed and confirmed. Men, habitually addicted to the lowly purſuits of providing neceſſaries and accumulating gain, are unfit members of our republic, becauſe they are incapable of reliſhing thoſe enjoyments in which we have ſuppoſed its chief happineſs to conſiſt. They are to be claſſed with things neceſſary to the commonwealth, but not to be ranked with its citizens; for the beſt and moſt perfect commonwealth muſt provide for the happineſs of all its members, and a commonwealth founded on virtue cannot provide for the happineſs of men who are but feebly touched by her charms. Such men, therefore, though neceſſary to a commonwealth, are not parts of the commonwealth, any more than food, though neceſſary to an animal, is part of an animal; or than the inſtruments employed in producing any work, are themſelves parts of that work. The productive labour of peaſants and artiſans, how neceſſary ſoever to the purpoſes of outward accommodation and comfortable ſubſiſtence, is not, therefore, to be confounded nor claſſed with the high political

BOOK IV.

political functions of soldiers, priests, and magistrates.[p]

What are the proper employments of citizens.

It remains, therefore, to examine, whether arms, religion, and magistracy ought to be regarded as things specifically different, and of which the offices ought to be separately exercised by distinct professions. In every good government the military ought, doubtless, to depend on the civil power; but will men bearing arms be contented with a condition of unalterable dependence? Or will those who feel their ability to change the constitution at pleasure, submit for ever to a political arrangement disgraceful to themselves? Such patient resignation cannot reasonably be expected, nor can that which is contrary to reason be requisite to good government.

That these employments ought to be distributed according to the different periods of human life.

The capacity for exercising military and civil functions depends on qualities that are variable, because they result from a variable cause, the changeable powers of man in the different periods of human life. Strength, agility, and courage attain their highest perfection at that period of youth when the body reaches its prime; foresight, temper, and wisdom do not acquire their full maturity, but with the acmé and perfection of the mind. The *same* persons, therefore, but at *different* periods of their lives, must exercise military and civil functions; and thus each

[p] In this passage I have changed the order of the sentences, the better to prepare the modern reader for a decision, which to him must appear harsh in the exteme, though it could not be viewed in that light by the readers of antiquity.

class

class of citizens will perform that office for which it is best qualified, and to which it is best entitled. It remains only to speak of the priesthood. This solemn function must, doubtless, be exercised by men of the most respectable class. But to perform with decency and dignity the rites of religion, requires not any violent exertion of body or mind. Such honourable duties, therefore, ought to be reserved for the occupation and the reward of declining years; and those who have spent their youth and their manhood in more active and strenuous cares, ought to dedicate their old age to the calm ceremonies of religion, and finally to repose in the peaceful sanctuaries of the gods.

Chap. 10.

That the wisest nations of antiquity acknowledged the distinction between citizens on the one hand, and peasants and artisans on the other.

The distinction between the constituent parts of a commonwealth, and things merely necessary for its subsistence, remounts to the highest antiquity. Both in Egypt and in Crete[p], the soldiers have long been, what they continue to this day, a class altogether distinct from the peasants. Sesostris is said to have established this arrangement in Egypt; and Minos, in Crete. The *syssitia*, or public tables, in that island, are thought to have been instituted as early as the time of Minos; and similar establishments are said to have taken place in Italy at a still earlier date. For the historians of that country inform us, that Œnotria received the name of Italy from

[p] This chapter may be considered as an illustration of the principles established in the preceding, from the history of those nations who diffused religion, laws, and civility over the ancient world.

King

BOOK IV.

King Italus; a name comprehending the coaſt between the Scyllatine and Lametine gulphs; which are oppoſite to each other, and diſtant by land only half a day's journey[q]. Italus is ſaid to have changed the Œnotrians from ſhepherds into huſbandmen, and to have given them other laws relative to their new mode of life, and particularly thoſe regulating the public tables; which remain in force among his deſcendants to this day. For northwards, from the country firſt called Italy, the Opici and Auſonians extend themſelves, on one hand, towards the Tuſcan ſea; but on the other hand, the Chaonians, an Œnotrian tribe, have ſtretched towards the Ionian ſea and Iapygia. Among them the eſtabliſhment of *ſyſſitia* firſt prevailed, and from them it was adopted by other nations. But the ſeparation of citizens and peaſants prevailed much earlier; for the age of Seſoſtris long preceded that of Minos. It is probable that political, like all other inventions, have been often diſcovered and often loſt; and that many inſtitutions have been laid aſide and revived, times without number. Men having acquired neceſſaries, naturally ſeek accommodations; and having provided for the ſtrength and ſupport of their political edifices, they ſet themſelves to improve and embelliſh them. The ſtyle of ſuperfluous ornaments varies with the caprice by which they are produced; but there are ornaments connected with

[q] Vid. Cluverii Ital. Antiq. p. 1290. & ſeq.

uſe,

ufe, which ought to be found in every well-regulated commonwealth; and why we take the *fyffitia* to be of this kind will be afterwards explained.

Of the diftribution and character of the peafants and artifans, and that liberty ought to be propofed as the reward of all flaves worthy to enjoy it.

We are now to fpeak of the diftribution and character of the peafants and artifans, which, according to our principles, muft be partly the property of the public and partly the property of particular citizens; for although our republic rejects the community of goods as repreffive to exertion, and even deftructive of virtue, yet wifhing poffeffions to be ftrictly appropriated, we wifh that their ufes be freely communicated; that according to the proverb all things may be common among friends; and that no one of the citizens may long continue in want of any object with which another can conveniently fupply him. The citizens, therefore, are to be maintained at public tables, the expences of which, as well as thofe of the facrifices and religious feftivals, are to be fupplied from the lands laboured in common by the public flaves; for men of fmall incomes could not contribute fufficiently for thefe purpofes, and at the fame time fupport eafily the charges of their private families. The territory, therefore, ought to confift partly of common, and partly of private property; and each of thefe ought to be again fubdivided, fince the common is deftined to anfwer two purpofes, and to fupply the expences of religion and thofe of the *fyffitia*; and fince the lands of each citizen ought to lie partly in the vicinity of the capital, and partly on the frontier, or, if united in one mafs,

BOOK IV. maſs, ought to have ſome ſituation nearly equidiſtant from thoſe extremes. Both juſtice and expediency require ſuch a diſtribution; for advantages and inconveniencies will thus be more fairly balanced among the private citizens, and the ſtate itſelf will be thus rendered more unanimous in public deliberations and military enterpriſes. As poſſeſſions are now arranged, one portion of the community is commonly too much, and another to little, alarmed at the proſpect of a foreign war; wherefore ſome ſtates have enacted that landholders living on the frontier ſhould not be allowed to vote in queſtions concerning war and peace, becauſe ſuch perſons are likely to ſacrifice to private intereſt the advantage and honour of their country. Such ought to be the diſtribution of the territory; and thoſe who cultivate it ought (if we can have them to our wiſh) to be ſlaves of various extractions, different in manners and endowments, but all deſtitute of courage. But if this cannot be obtained, let them be the barbarians in our neighbourhood, of ſtrong bodies and ſervile minds. How ſlaves are to be treated we ſhall afterwards explain; and alſo aſſign our reaſons why liberty ought to be the reward of all ſlaves univerſally[r] who approve themſelves worthy

[r] The moſt ſolid objection to ſlavery is that of its perpetuity; that a human being, how great ſoever his acquirements and his merits, ſhould never be the director of his own conduct; and how well qualified ſoever he may become to govern himſelf, ſhould be perpetually and unalterably ſubjected to the authority of another. This objection forcibly ſtruck Ariſtotle at a time when the lower claſſes of men

worthy of obtaining and capable of enjoying it.

The fituation of the capital ought to be determined by circumftances moft conducive to health, comfort, and fecurity.

We have explained what is the beft fituation of the capital, both with refpect to the fea and to the contiguous territory. But its fituation ought alfo to be relative to health, which depends chiefly on good air and good water; and calculated for the enjoyment of peace, and for fafety in war. The circumftances, therefore, that ought to determine the pofition of our capital are thefe four,—air, water, comfort, and fecurity. In Greece, cities open to the eaft are deemed the moft healthful; and next to that, a northern afpect is preferred, chiefly for the fake of coolnefs. A capital fituate to our wifh, ought to abound in falubrious fountains; and if that advantage cannot be obtained, preparations fhould be made for receiving the rain water in copious refervoirs: and the pureft fprings fhould be fet apart for the fuftenance of human life, under ftrict prohibitions of employing them

The circumftances moft conducive to health;

men in all countries and under all forms of government univerfally fubfifted in the condition of fervitude. It is to be regretted that we have not his reafons at length why emancipation, the practice of which was fo common in the ancient world, fhould not depend on the will of individual mafters, but fhould refult from the general will of the community, granting on certain conditions, and after a certain time, liberty to flaves. It may be objected indeed, that a cruel or unjuft mafter would be ready to impofe a double tafk on thofe who were likely foon to efcape from his hands. But this is anfwered by faying, that according to Ariftotle's principles fuch a man was not qualified, and therefore not entitled to be a mafter; and that flaves in the ancient republics, at leaft, were under the protection of the laws, which reftrained or punifhed the cruelty or injuftice of mafters. See above, b. i. c. iv. p. 38.

 for

BOOK IV.

for any lefs important purpofe. This law ought not to be regarded as frivolous: for good health depends chiefly on the quality of thofe things of which we make the moft frequent ufe; and fuch manifeftly are air and water.

to comfort and fecurity.

The nature of fortifications and fortreffes is relative to the nature of government, and ought to vary with the alteration of its forms. Lofty and impregnable citadels beft fuit monarchies and oligarchies. The equal defence of walls, guarding with impartial juftice the fafety of the people at large, is beft adapted to republics and democracies; and the authority of ariftocratical nobles will be moft fecurely maintained, neither by walls nor citadels, but by a number of well-fortified caftles. With regard to the form and diftribution of manfions and ftreets, the modern ftyle of building, introduced by the architect Hippodamus[8], is moft favourable to health and pleafure, and moft convenient for all the occupations and purpofes of civil life. But his ftraight lines and fpacious openings impair ftrength while they embellifh beauty, and render his cities eafily pervious to an invading enemy. For the purpofes of war, ftreets ought to be winding and intricate, obftructed by impediments and entangled by perplexities. But that cities may anfwer the ends both of war and peace, they fhould be at once ftrong and elegant; and this complex object will be beft effected by imitating the labours of the gardener

[8] See b. ii. c. vi. p. 111, & feq.

in

in planting his quincunx, where the power of reſiſtance combines with fair arrangement, and where perplexity reſults from uniformity itſelf. There is more folly than magnanimity in the opinion, that cities ought not to be walled. True courage will not reject the aſſiſtance of art under manifeſt inequality of ſtrength; and as miſſile weapons and battering engines have been perfected by the ingenuity of the preſent age, the ſafety of cities requires that the ſcience of defence ſhould keep pace with that of attack. The Lacedæmonians and others who have diſdained walls as the refuge of cowardice, have dearly paid for their temerity.

Chap. 12.

The ornaments of the capital.

By good regulations, fortified cities may enjoy all the advantages of thoſe that are open to the country on every ſide; and the bulwarks and battlements may be converted into agreeable ornaments, ſcenes of pleaſing recreation to the citizens, but of threatening aſpect to hoſtile neighbours. The guard rooms may ſerve as halls for the ſyſſitia or common tables; near to which may be worſhipped, in one edifice, thoſe gods whoſe temples neither laws or oracles command to be ſeparated, at a certain diſtance, from all other buildings. This edifice, erected in honour of religion in general, ought to be as lofty and conſpicuous as its purpoſe is uſeful and dignified, of awful magnificence and commanding ſtrength. Around this temple a forum ought to be formed and incloſed, ſimilar to that of Theſſaly, called the liberal rendezvous. This ſpacious incloſure is not to be incumbered by the

The liberal rendezvous.

BOOK IV.

the ſhops of artificers, nor polluted by the tricks of traffic. Neither peaſant nor mechanic is ever to enter its pure precincts, unleſs ſummoned by the magiſtrate; for it is conſecrated as the ſcene of ingenuous converſe and martial exerciſe; where perſons, claſſed by their ages, are to invigorate and confirm their powers by emulous contention; and where youth is to be trained to modeſty and manlineſs, under the vigilant ſuperintendance of virtuous old age. The ſquare employed for the market-place is to be totally diſtinct: it ought to be eaſily acceſſible to imports by ſea, and tranſportations by land; the officers of police and the courts of juſtice are to aſſemble in its neighbourhood; it is deſtined for buſineſs and neceſſity, as the liberal forum is deſtined for exerciſe and enjoyment. The diſtricts and townſhips are to be regulated after the model of the capital; but on this ſubject it is not neceſſary to enlarge: to contrive good arrangements is eaſy; the difficulty lies in reducing them to practice. Good intentions are ſufficient for the firſt; the ſecond requires the co-operation of good fortune.

The market-place, and courts of juſtice.

The diſtricts and townſhips.

Chap. 13.

Tranſition to the character of the citizens of the beſt commonwealth.

Having thus explained the external accommodations of our commonwealth, we next proceed to examine what ought to be the genius and character of its citizens; and to explain what are the means moſt likely to inſpire that genius, and impreſs that character which will beſt qualify them for enjoying political happineſs. The perfection of human felicity requires that we ſhould chooſe the beſt ends, and employ the beſt

beſt means for attaining them. Theſe objects ſometimes harmoniſe, and are ſometimes diſcordant; the means being bad while the ends are good, or the ends being bad while the means are good; and ſometimes neither the one nor the other are worthy of approbation; which happens when the means are not likely to attain the end propoſed, and when this end itſelf, though attained, is not likely to promote the great ultimate purpoſe of good or happineſs. This takes place in phyſic, when the phyſician errs both in aſcertaining that habit of body which is moſt conducive to the health of his patient, and in appreciating that mode of life, that diet and exerciſe which are fitted to ſuperinduce the habit which he has erroneouſly preferred. But the felicity of men depends not entirely on human efforts; for nature or fortune muſt alſo contribute their ſhare. Yet to minds confirmed in virtue, few accommodations are requiſite; while ſuch is the depravity of ſome characters, that the moſt favourable circumſtances only heighten their wretchedneſs; and to think with the vulgar, that external advantages alone can produce happineſs, is not leſs abſurd than to call the lyre a muſician, and to aſcribe *that* to the inſtrument, which ought to be referred to the artiſt. A good man will, on every occaſion, act handſomely; and perform his duty under poverty and diſeaſe, as well as in health and proſperity. A juſt judge will condemn guilt as well as reward merit. Yet the happineſs of a good man and the juſt judge is

What this character ought to be.

BOOK IV.

connected with the latter circumſtances rather than with the former; becauſe in the latter no painful conflict is required, but the mind is left to the free exerciſe of virtuous energies, unclogged by difficulties[t] and unretarded by obſtacles. In forming our republic, we may, therefore, ſuppoſe the work of fortune to be done to our hands; our buſineſs is to teach the legiſlator how to perform his duty; or, in other words, how to render his commonwealth virtuous and happy.

Chap. 14.

Analyſis of education.

Happineſs depends on virtue; and virtue depends on nature, cuſtom, and reaſon. That we are formed capable of virtue, and ſuſceptible of certain qualities of mind and body, is the bounty of Nature, which has made us of the human kind. But habit can improve or pervert theſe natural advantages. Other animals march uniformly in the track of nature; ſome few are guided alſo by cuſtom: but man only is diſciplined by reaſon; and may be perſuaded even to change bad habits, by the influence of example and the conviction of argument. From theſe two united, the power of education reſults; that forming and preſerving power without which the beſt political fabrics would ſoon crumble into duſt; and which we now proceed

[t] This doctrine is more fully explained in thoſe paſſages of the Ethics which treat of happineſs. What the author calls in the text the χρησις αρετης τελεια, and the χρησις εξ ὑποθεσεως; "abſolute and conditional virtue;" is ſufficiently explained by the examples given in the tranſlation. Happineſs conſiſts rather in ſuch actions as are virtuous *ſimply and abſolutely* than in ſuch as neceſſarily imply ſome pre-exiſting evil, which they are exerted to remedy.

to explain, having formerly defcribed what ought to be the natural difpofitions of thofe moft fufceptible of its benefits.

That education ought to be public and uniform.

Firft of all, this education ought, according to our principles, to be uniform; for it is our aim to render the citizens at large virtuous and happy, and to qualify all of them for the offices of government as well as for the duties of obedience. Were one portion of the community as far diftinguifhed above the reft, as we believe the gods and heroes to be exalted above men, or, as Scylax fays, "that the kings of India are fuperior to their fubjects, in the virtues of mind and body," it would be proper that thefe dignified races or families fhould be invefted with hereditary and unalterable authority; and, for this purpofe, trained and educated in a manner peculiar to themfelves, and relative to that pre-eminent rank which they were for ever deftined to hold. But fince fuch races or families are no where to be found in thefe parts of the world, juftice concurs with good policy, in requiring that the citizens fhould rule by vicarious fuccef-ceffion; and how this ought to be done, Nature herfelf fufficiently indicates. According to the order of nature, fome men are young while others are old. This diftinction of age is the leaft invidious of all diftinctions; and it is well obferved, that thofe only are qualified to command, who have been fkilfully trained to obey. Of the command exercifed by defpots we do not here fpeak; *their* government is ufeful only to themfelves, to their families and favourites; but

 the

BOOK IV.

the government of a commonwealth is inftituted for the benefit of the governed; who in youth will cheerfully fubmit to many tafks and many fervices, which would be difgraceful if performed merely for the fake of others, but which are ennobled by their tendency to promote the improvement of thofe on whom they are impofed.

What are the ends at which it ought to aim.

Since the education of the citizens ought then to be uniform, and fince we formerly proved that the virtues and happinefs of the citizen coincide with thofe of the man, we have next to inquire wherein the perfection of the individual confifts. In the human foul there are two diftinct parts, one of which is endowed with reafon, and the other, though not poffeffing reafon in itfelf, is framed capable of liftening to, and obeying its dictates. On the difpofition of thefe two parts, the virtues and excellencies of human nature depend; but in which of the two the ultimate end or chief happinefs of man is placed, will not be difficult for thofe acquainted with our philofophy to decide. From the works of art and nature fubmitted to our obfervation, it is eafy to remark that things which are worfe, are always made for the fake of thofe that are better; that this order is never on any occafion reverfed; but how long foever may be the feries of means and ends, that all the intermediate ends finally terminate and center in fome one great and ultimate purpofe. But that part of the foul which is endowed with reafon, is manifeftly better than that which is merely capable of

of obeying its dictates; the operations of the one, therefore, muſt be proportionably better than thoſe of the other; and the exerciſe of the latter muſt be conſidered as merely preparatory to the energies of the former. The energies of reaſon or intellect may either be employed in contemplation, or applied to the practice of life. It is, therefore, theoretical or practical; the former engaged in the purſuit and contemplation of truth and beauty, the latter occupied in the acquiſition of things neceſſary or uſeful to ourſelves or others. Human life is thus divided between war and peace, buſineſs and leiſure, the occupations impoſed by neceſſity, and the enjoyments attending that refined pleaſure which accompanies and completes our intellectual energies. In his ſyſtem of education, the legiſlator ought to have reſpect, doubtleſs, to all theſe objects; yet never to forget that war is undertaken for the ſake of peace, and buſineſs for the ſake of leiſure; and that the occupations of utility and neceſſity ultimately terminate in the purſuit of beauty and truth.

That theſe ends have been miſtaken by Lycurgus and other legiſlators.

But in oppoſition to theſe unalterable maxims, the moſt famed legiſlators of Greece have illiberally preferred things uſeful to things honourable, and have been illiberally and abſurdly praiſed by Thibro, and other writers, for this prepoſterous preference of means to ends. Lycurgus is celebrated for forming a nation of conquerors; his laws were in force when the Lacedæmonians were defeated and ſubdued. Yet had his deſign been ſucceſsful, it would not have

BOOK IV.

have been either commendable or profitable, ſince the unjuſt dominion exerciſed by Sparta over her neighbours and allies would have taught ſome ſecond, but more lucky Pauſanias[u], to render himſelf the tyrant of his country. Abſolute power over equals is deſirable neither for individuals nor ſtates; nor ought war ever to be waged in order to obtain it. Yet the military virtues will be cultivated by every wiſe republic; firſt, for its own defence; ſecondly, for acquiring a dominion juſt and lawful, becauſe advantageous even to the vanquiſhed; and thirdly, for reducing into ſlavery nations incapable of living ſafely under any more honourable condition. Experience juſtifies theſe aſſertions. Moſt ambitious nations have been ſaved for a while by war, but finally ruined by conqueſt. Their characters ruſted like iron, and in peace loſt their ſplendor. Their misfortunes are chargeable on a faulty legiſlation, which had not taught them to enjoy leiſure.

Chap. 15.

Our commonwealth to be formed on a more extenſive plan; great in war, but chiefly illuſtrious in peace.

But, according to the proverb, leiſure is not made for ſlaves. This beſt bleſſing muſt be acquired and preſerved by ardent enterpriſe and unbending fortitude; ſince a community deſtitute of courage and impatient of ſuffering, muſt ſpeedily fall under the yoke of ſome more warlike neighbour. The active and ſtubborn virtues of war are neceſſary, therefore, as remote means towards enjoying the happineſs of peace; but they are neceſſary barely as means, for the

[u] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xii. p. 56 & ſeq.

enjoy-

enjoyment itſelf muſt be ſought in wiſdom. The virtues of juſtice and temperance are neceſſary under all circumſtances, but chiefly in peace and proſperity; for the hardſhips of war are a ſchool of diſcipline, whereas the indulgences of peace naturally engender inſolence; ſo that were the fable of the Fortunate Iſlands to be realiſed, their inhabitants would of all men moſt require the aſſiſtance of wiſdom, juſtice, and temperance; ſince, deſtitute of thoſe virtues, they would be of all men the moſt wretched. Our commonwealth, therefore, is not to be moulded after the narrow Lacedæmonian model, nor are our citizens to be great only in war; they are to be chiefly illuſtrious in peace; and to render them ſuch, muſt be the work of early and aſſiduous culture.

This muſt be the work of education. The order in which it is to be conducted.

In explaining how this culture ought to be conducted, we muſt again obſerve, that man being compounded of ſoul and body, the ſoul itſelf is compoſed of a rational and irrational part; and that thoſe parts of our complex frame which are firſt in their origin, are laſt in dignity. The body is made before the ſoul, and the deſires and paſſions of the ſoul, conſtituting its irrational part, appear in young children, and infants long before the age of reaſon. Yet the rational part is that which properly conſtitutes the man, being the end and perfection of his nature. With reference to this end, therefore, culture ſhould begin early to operate, by means of cuſtom and habit, on the appetites and paſſions; ſo that when reaſon firſt dawns, theſe ſubor-

BOOK IV.

ſubordinate powers may already be diſpoſed to acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her, in due time, in the ſweeteſt harmony. Such then is the order in which education muſt be conducted. The body is firſt to be formed, and that for the ſake of the ſoul; and then the irrational part of the ſoul is to be diſciplined, and that for the ſake of the rational.

Chap. 16.

Importance of the queſtion reſpecting the age fitteſt for entering into wedlock.

According to this ſyſtem of arrangement, the firſt care of the legiſlator ought to conſiſt in aſcertaining the age and qualities of perſons fit to be joined in wedlock. Perſons ſo united, ought to deſcend together into the vale of years; and their powers of producing beings like themſelves ought together to co-exiſt, uniformly to decay, and nearly at the ſame time to ceaſe: the contrary of which ſeldom fails to occaſion much domeſtic uneaſineſs. Reſpect alſo ſhould be had to the ſucceſſion of children, who ought neither to be too remotely diſtant, nor too cloſely to tread on the heels of their parents. When the former takes place, parents can expect to derive but little benefit from their children; and when the latter is the caſe, children will ſeldom entertain much reverence for their parents, who, being nearly their equals in age, will be conſidered as on a foot of equality in all other reſpects; and with whom, therefore, they will be often ready to differ in matters of opinion, or to quarrel about matters of intereſt. It happens moſt fortunately that all theſe ends and purpoſes may be attained and anſwered by preciſely the ſame means, the coupling parties

parties in wedlock at the proper and feafon-able age.

What this age ought to be in either fex.

About the age of feventy, men commonly ceafe to be hufbands; and after the age of fifty, women feldom become mothers. The times of entering into marriage for the different fexes ought to be refpectively regulated by thefe extreme limits; which will reduce the fitteft marriageable age of women to eighteen, and of men to thirty-feven, a little more or lefs; for the propriety of practical matters confifts not in an indivifible point. In confequence of this regulation, the contracting parties, in that which forms one main object of their union, will enjoy the happieft correfpondence, their powers will fimultaneoufly flourifh, and fimultaneoufly decay. Premature conjunctions produce imperfect offspring, females rather than males, and thofe feeble in make, and fhort in ftature. That this happens in the human race as well as in other animals, is vifible in the puny inhabitants of countries where early marriages prevail. But to the female fex premature wedlock is peculiarly dangerous, fince in confequence of anticipating the commands of nature, many of them fuffer greatly in child-birth, and many of them die. The evil reaches the mind itfelf, for early habitudes make the moft indelible impreffions; and the germ of voluptuoufnefs too fpeedily expanded, will penetrate the whole frame, and for ever vitiate the character. In males, premature venery feems to ftunt the growth: the animal ought to be itfelf perfect before it is duly qualified

to

BOOK IV.

to propagate its kind. Let the fexes, therefore, contract marriage at the periods above determined. They will be then refpectively in the acmé and full bloom of their age. The correfpondence of their powers will render their defires harmonious, and their lives happy. They will grow old together; and, as fuch feafonable marriages will for the moft part be foon productive of progeny, the fon will be advancing to perfect manhood when the father is verging to the extremity of old age.

The fitteft feafon and beft habit for the purpofe of wedlock.

Winter is the fitteft feafon for confummating marriage; and, as naturalifts tell us, when the wind blows from the north [x]. The ftate of body moft likely to fupply the commonwealth with good children, is neither the artificial brawninefs of prize-fighters, nor a frame emaciated and worn out by abftemioufnefs or fatigue; but a conftitution equally remote from thefe vicious extremes, invigorated by fuch exercifes as the life of a free citizen requires; not exceffive, but frequent; various, not violent.

Attention due to pregnant women for the fake of their minds and of their offspring.

Thefe obfervations are applicable to both fexes; but of women in pregnancy particular care is to be taken that they do not indulge themfelves in indolence, nor enfeeble their offfpring by ufing too thin a diet. For the prevention of both evils, (fince exercife will

[x] This explains why the governors of the winds were invoked by the Greeks wifhing to have children; a thing which Archbifhop Potter thinks extraordinary and unaccountable: — "What bufinefs the winds have in generation is difficult to imagine." Potter's Antiq. vol. ii. c. xiv. p. 318.

ftrengthen

ftrengthen appetite,) the legiflator fhould enjoin his countrywomen, when pregnant, to walk daily to the temples, and pay their devotions to the powers prefiding over childbirth. At the fame time the female mind, in this delicate fituation, fhould be diligently attended to, neither foured by neglect, nor ruffled by paffion; but amufed by images of pleafure, and foothed into unalterable ferenity; for plants do not more certainly indicate the foil from which they fpring, than children receive and reflect the temper of their parents.

Concerning the expofition of children, and chaftity.

Concerning the expofition of children, let it be enacted that nothing that has life fhall be deftroyed, unlefs it be defective in its members, or grofsly deformed in its fhape. Yet means muft taken to prevent exceffive population [y]; and, as one period of life is unripe, fo another is too far decayed for the purpofes of wedlock. Thofe who diftribute the epochs of life into periods of feven years, affign fifty for the acmé of the mind. Four or five years after fifty, a man, therefore, fhould abftain from the rites of love merely for the fake of offspring, which would probably enjoy neither vigour of mind nor health of body.

[y] το δε ἱσιον καὶ το μη, διωρισμενον τη αισθησει και τῳ ξην εϛαι. Ariftotle would have the exuberance of population to be reftrained, yet nothing that has life to be deftroyed, unlefs marked or depraved by exceffive deformity. In the career of his ftern decifions he ftops fhort of the unrelenting Chinefe: "among whom habit feems to have familiarifed a notion that life only becomes truly precious, and inattention to it criminal, after it has continued long enough to be endowed with a mind and fentiment; but that mere dawning exiftence may be fuffered to be loft without fcruple, though it cannot without reluctance." Staunton's Embaffy to China, v. ii. p. 158.

Let

BOOK IV.

Let the rites of the marriage-bed be at all times equally respected by the husband and by the wife; but should the husband, during the period limited for giving children to the republic, be convicted of a breach of chastity, let him be punished with public infamy, and those evils which follow in its train.

Chap. 17.

Concerning the nourishment of children, their exercises and treatment.

The nourishment of children is bountifully supplied by Nature in the copious exuberance of milk, which the example of warlike nations, and even of wild animals, proves to be of all kinds of food the most congenial to the body, and the most favourable to its growth and strength. Wine, doubtless, gives spirits and vigour, but the use of wine in children might be productive of disease. All young animals delight in freely exerting their natural motions; and this instinctive propensity is equally strong and equally salutary to infants. Care, however, must be taken that their delicate members be not distorted through too eager a contention: in this view various mechanical contrivances have been invented, and proved by experience to be of important use. Infants should be early accustomed to bear cold; which will invigorate their strength, and gradually prepare their bodies for resisting the hardships of war. Some barbarous nations plunge their new-born infants into rivers. The Celts expose their children in thin coverings to the northern blast; and whatever is to be effected by custom, should be begun early, and carried on gradually. In the present case, the first experiments will not be attended with danger,

ger, for the natural heat of children enables them to refift and repel the impreffions of cold. Such are the attentions required by our firft years.

In the following age, and until children have completed their fifth year, no painful tafk fhould be impofed, and no violent exertion required from the mind or body, left health might be injured, and growth obftructed. All that utility demands, is to keep their faculties awake, and to prevent them from contracting any habits of floth; which will be beft effected by fuch plays and fports as are neither illiberal, nor fatiguing, nor fedentary. The tales and fables which are told them, ought to be written, at leaft examined, by the magiftrate who prefides over education; and their playful amufements ought, in general, to be imitations of thofe ferious tranfactions in which they will be concerned when called to the bufinefs of life. Laws and contrivances have been devifed and framed for preventing thofe compreffions of the breath and thofe exertions of the voice which are frequent with young children; but all fuch attempts to counteract the defigns of nature, we totally difapprove. The contentions of the breath and fpirits are known by experience to invigorate the exertions of men; and the crying of children, which occafions fimilar intenfions and remiffions of their organs, is equally falutary to them, promoting their growth and augmenting their ftrength.

Until the age of feven complete, the fchool for children ought to be the father's houfe; but during

The education of children till the

BOOK IV.

age of puberty, chiefly physical and moral.

during this early period, they muſt be ſtrictly guarded againſt the infectious communication of ſlaves; no illiberal geſture is to be preſented to their ſight; no illiberal image is to be ſuggeſted to their fancy. Lewd indecency of language ought to be reprobated and puniſhed in every well-regulated city; for from uſing filthy expreſſions without ſhame, there is an eaſy tranſition to the practiſing of filthy actions without diſguſt. Obſcene ſtatues or pictures are never to be ſeen but in the temples of thoſe divinities, whom the law enjoins to be worſhipped under ſuch emblems, by fathers, in behalf of their wives and families; nor ought children to be ſpectators of comedy or farce, before the age of admiſſion to the public tables, when education, if well directed, will have confirmed their morals. Theodorus, the celebrated tragic actor, made it a rule never to allow any player, how inferior ſoever might be his talents, to occupy the ſtage before him; obſerving, that mankind were always governed by firſt impreſſions. If that be the caſe, how much care ſhould be taken to render the firſt impreſſions of children favourable to virtue, and to make them regard as ſtrange and monſtrous whatever might ſow the ſeeds of malice, cruelty, or profligacy? Let them behold in their tender years, thoſe honourable occupations, and thoſe martial exerciſes, which they are deſtined in due time carefully to learn, and ſkilfully to practice. Above all, let thoſe important periods of life preceding and following puberty, be the objects of moſt aſſiduous vigilance;

lance; but as this depends not entirely on age, we are less to regard the fanciful distinctions of numbers, than to watch the solid differences of nature; of which it is the great and perpetual duty of education to second the views, and to supply the defects.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK V.*

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK V.

IN the Fourth Book Ariftotle defcribes the beft form of government; and in the Fifth, he explains that fyftem of education by which this government will be beft upheld. Plutarch and other approved authors, ancient and modern, who have exprefsly written on education, do little more than expand and illuftrate the pregnant fenfe which uniformly pervades this Book; omitting fome remarks, which, being peculiar to Ariftotle, will be found by moft modern readers equally new and important.

Mufic, confidered under a certain afpect, was the claffic learning of antiquity, and regarded as intimately, almoft infeparably, connected with morality, as well as poetry. The author, therefore, as might be expected, expatiates on the fubject of mufic; which he claffes with thofe fciences that terminate completely in themfelves, and which, independently of profit or

* Commonly publifhed as Book VIII.

utility,

utility, merit cultivation merely for the ſake of pleaſure; forming at once the higheſt embelliſhment and happieſt exerciſe of the mind.

Having repeatedly remarked, that education ought to be relative to the nature of the government, he maintains as a conſequence of this maxim, that the cuſtoms prevalent in his own age ought to be totally reverſed; and that the people in democracies ought to be trained to modeſty and reſpect for their ſuperiors, while the nobles in ariſtocracies ought to be habituated to moderation and affability towards their inferiors. In conformity with this doctrine, he thinks that education ought to be public; and I believe that the experience of modern as well as of ancient times will juſtify and confirm his concluſion; having had an opportunity to remark during a long reſidence in a great variety of different countries, that the inhabitants were better educated almoſt exactly in proportion to the degree in which public education prevailed among them.

BOOK V.

ARGUMENT.

Education. — Its different branches. — How far to be cultivated. — Grammar — Drawing — Gymnaſtic — Muſic. — Exerciſes adapted to different ages. — Doubts concerning muſic. — Its different kinds. — Purgation of the paſſions.

BOOK V. Chap. 1.

Education the forming and ſuſtaining power of government.

THAT the education of youth ought to form a principal object of the legiſlator's attention cannot be a matter of doubt; ſince it is education that firſt moulds, and that afterwards ſuſtains the various modes of government; a democratical education alone ſuiting a democracy, an oligarchical an oligarchy; and the better and more perfect are the different ſyſtems of education, the better and more perfect will be thoſe plans of government which they are reſpectively calculated to introduce and uphold. Preparation and exerciſe are neceſſary for the acquiſition of every art; and not leaſt for the attainment of the great art of political life. In this important object, fellow-citizens are all equally and all deeply concerned; and as they are all united in one common work for one common purpoſe, their education ought to be uniform and public, and regulated by general conſent; not abandoned, as at preſent, to the blind deciſion of

chance,

chance, or the idle caprice of parents. For the children of citizens belong to the commonwealth, of which they are deſtined to be members; and, like every member or part, muſt be formed and faſhioned in ſubſerviency to the good of that whole, or ſyſtem, to which they collectively appertain. Such are the maxims of the Spartans, which cannot in this particular be too highly extolled. Of all men they are the moſt attentive to education, and their education is public.

Chap. 2.

Wherein political education conſiſts.

But wherein ought political education to conſiſt; what are its different branches, and in what manner, or to what extent, ought each branch to be cultivated? The diſcordant practice of nations has involved theſe queſtions in much perplexity. Different ſyſtems of legiſlation have different ſcopes and tendencies, and even when they agree in the ſame end, they employ different means for its attainment. Is education to be chiefly directed to things of common and vulgar uſe, ſubſervient to bodily accommodation and productive of external proſperity? Or ought its main buſineſs to conſiſt in ſharpening, fortifying, and ennobling the mind? If the mind and virtue be juſtly preferred to the body and fortune, yet by what principles are we to arrange the virtues themſelves? With which of them ought our culture to begin, and in which of them ought it to terminate? Firſt of all, it is evident that children ought to be inſtructed in things ſubſervient to the purpoſe of external accommodation, in proportion to their neceſſity or utility,

Its different branches.

To what extent each branch ought to be cultivated.

BOOK V.

utility, provided ſuch things be not illiberal and ſordid, tending to diſtort or enervate the body, to narrow or debaſe the ſoul, to chill the fancy or encumber the intellect. From ſuch mean and mercenary drudgery, which would diſqualify them for the exerciſe of virtue, and unfit them for the offices of freemen, our citizens muſt totally abſtain. Even to thoſe arts dignified by the epithet of liberal, their application ought not to be directed without due ſelection and prudent reſerve. In many accompliſhments, mediocrity is preferable to excellence; for an ambition gratified by what is frivolous will be incapable of aſpiring to what is great. In aſcertaining the doubtful nature of thoſe frivolous but agreeable talents, much depends on the end or purpoſe for which they are acquired and cultivated. To diſplay them for vanity or gain, is worthy of none but ſlaves; but they will not miſbecome a citizen, if he exerciſes them for his own amuſement, or the gratification of his friends; as relaxations from ſeverer ſtudies, or preparations for higher purſuits.

Chap. 3.

Grammar or letters, their uſe.

Education is moſt commonly reduced to four heads, grammar [a], gymnaſtic, muſic, and drawing. Letters are the elements of calculation, as well as of grammar or compoſition, and are eſſentially requiſite in innumerable purpoſes of daily occurrence. The ſame may be obſerved of drawing, which teaches the knowledge of forms, about which ſo many indiſpenſable oc-

Drawing, its uſe.

[a] Conf. Diodor. Sicul. vol. i. p. 486.

cupations

cupations are continually converſant. The gymnaſtic is ſubſervient to ſtrength and courage, invigorating the body and fortifying the mind. Muſic, indeed, is now degraded into a playful paſtime, but was introduced into education, by our wiſer anceſtors, becauſe youth ought to be taught, not only how to purſue buſineſs, but how to enjoy leiſure; an enjoyment which is the end of buſineſs itſelf, and the limit in which all our active purſuits finally terminate. This enjoyment is of a nature too noble and too elevated to conſiſt in plays and paſtimes, which it would be abſurd to conſider as the main end and final purpoſe of life, and which are chiefly uſeful in the intervals of toilſome exertion, as ſalutary recreations of the mind, and ſeaſonable unbendings from contentious activity.

BOOK V.

Gymnaſtic, its uſe.

Muſic, its uſe.

Leiſure is in itſelf pleaſurable; and on its own account, deſirable: whereas buſineſs is never undertaken and purſued merely for its own ſake, but for the ſake of ſomething beyond it; a ſomething as variable as the opinions of men are manifold, and their habits diſſimilar; ſome placing happineſs in one kind of enjoyment, and others in another; but thoſe who are beſt formed and moſt ſkilfully educated, placing it in ſuch enjoyments only as are honourable and laudable. An education, therefore, is requiſite to make us delight in thoſe things which are beſt calculated to afford genuine ſatisfaction; and the arts and ſtudies from which this ſatisfaction reſults, are not to be degraded by the epithets *uſeful* or *neceſſary*, ſince

The example of muſic proves that there is an education requiſite to the enjoyment of liberal leiſure.

BOOK V.

since they relate to nothing external, but terminate in themſelves, and are on their own account and ultimately the objects of deſire, as the immediate cauſes of rational and honeſt pleaſure. In this view the ancients conſidered muſic, and gave it a diſtinguiſhed rank in their ſcholaſtic ſyſtem; not as a thing uſeful, for to what purpoſe does it ſerve? Not as neceſſary in the way that letters are neceſſary in accounts, in œconomy, in literature or ſcience, and a thouſand political purpoſes, both civil and military; or as drawing is uſeful in teaching the knowledge of forms, in appreciating works of art, and in preventing deception in the purchaſe of inſtruments and utenſils, the implements of trade, or the articles of furniture. It remains, therefore, that muſic ſhould be acquired and cultivated as a thing deſirable in itſelf, for the agreeable occupation of liberal leiſure, and the elegant embelliſhment of life. Therefore Homer ſays, "Let ſweet Thalia decorate the feaſt;" and again, "The bard is called to raviſh every ear." And Ulyſſes thus paints the beſt enjoyments of peace and proſperity,

> "How ſweet the products of a peaceful reign,
> The heaven-taught poet and enchanting ſtrain [b]."

The example of muſic, as taught by the ancients, juſtifies us, therefore, in aſſerting, that our ſons ought to be inſtructed not only in

[b] Odyſſ. ix. v. 213.

things

things ufeful or neceffary, but in things liberal and honourable. How many, and what thefe things are, and by what means the tafte for them may be beft infpired, and the knowledge of them beft communicated, we fhall examine hereafter. At prefent it is fufficient to have proved by the authority of the ancients, that fuch things exift, and ought to be objects of our care. This is plain in the cafe of mufic; and a little attention will fhew that it holds true in other ftudies. The knowledge of letters is ufeful in the bufinefs of life, in reading and accounts, and innumerable other purpofes. But the ftudy of them is not bounded by this vulgar utility. They are preparations for higher branches of fcience. Drawing alfo is ufeful for the ordinary and coarfe purpofes above fpecified; it is, therefore, admitted into the general courfe of common education. But the ftudy of drawing leads to fomething beyond thefe vulgar ufes; and by familiarifing us with the nature and variety of forms, carries us to the contemplation of *beauty*, as letters, which are the elements of calculation and compofition, terminate in the contemplation of *truth*. Thofe men reft fatisfied with a condition far fhort of the perfection of their nature, whofe minds have never opened to fuch fublime pleafures. To be always feeking what is ufeful, is unworthy of a liberal, and inconfiftent with an elevated, character.

Chap. 4. How the body is to

We have before obferved, that moral education ought to precede the intellectual, and that the

BOOK V.

be hardened by exercise without inspiring ferocity of character.

the culture of the body ought to precede that of the mind. The nations moſt attentive to the formation of the body, ſtrive to give to it an athletic habit, which injures the beauty of the ſhape, and ſtunts the growth. The Lacedæmonians avoid this error; but by impoſing exceſſive labours on the body, they engender ferocity in the mind, thinking this conducive to martial ſpirit. But, as we before obſerved, education ought not to be confined to any one object, nor chiefly directed to ſuch objects as military valour; and if this excellence were our principal concern, it would not be inſpired by the Spartan diſcipline. For neither in men nor in animals does valour accompany ſullen ferocity, but is rather found in mild, generous, and lion-like natures. There are many nations who delight in carnage, that are deſtitute of courage. The Achaei and Heniochi of Pontus, cowardly as they are, feel neither horror in ſhedding, nor diſguſt in taſting human blood; ſome inland nations of Aſia equal or ſurpaſs this brutal ſavageneſs; they are cruel beaſts of prey, not valiant men. Even the obſtinate fierceneſs of Sparta could not maintain her pre-eminence. She has been excelled by her neighbours in the virtues of war as well as of peace. While the Lacedæmonians alone cultivated arms, they acquired an eaſy aſcendency over undiſciplined troops. But ſince their neighbours have been trained to martial exerciſes, they have approved themſelves ſuperior in war to the Spartans. Neither a wolf nor any

any other fuch bloody favage, but only a brave man, is truly qualified to maintain an honorable conflict. For mere warlike courage, taken feparately by itfelf, is a doubtful and defective quality; and cultivated too affiduoufly by the hardening difcipline of toils and ftruggles, will degrade and debafe the man, blunt his faculties, narrow his foul, and render him as bad a foldier as he is a contemptible citizen.

Of the exercifes beft adapted to the refpective ages.

The gymnaftic, therefore, muft be taught and exercifed in fubferviency to nobler purfuits. Till the age of puberty, the lighter exercifes only fhould be enjoined and practifed: athletic exertions and a forced regimen ought to be profcribed and prohibited; for fuch artificial violence would mar the work of nature, disfigure the fhape, impede the growth, and for ever prevent the attainment of manly ftrength. That this muft be its effect, experience evinces. In the long lift of Olympic victors, fcarcely two or three have gained the prize, both when they were boys and after they became men. Their capacities were checked, and their powers exhaufted by premature exertions and an unfeafonable regimen. During the three years immediately following puberty, the application of youth fhould be directed to thofe branches of education which form and invigorate the mind. They will then, at the age of feventeen, be capable of fubmitting to a regulated diet, and of fuftaining the fatigue of athletic exercifes. For laborious contention of the mind and of the body ought not to take place at the fame age; the

BOOK V.

the exertions of the body obſtructing thoſe of the mind, and the exertions of the mind relaxing the vigour of the body.

Chap. 5.

Doubts concerning muſic.

Is it merely a ſoothing recreation?

In a former chapter, ſome difficulties occurred reſpecting muſic, and ſome doubts were ſtarted concerning its power and its end. Is it merely a ſoothing recreation, like the two *care-killing* powers of ſleep and wine? Thus they are characteriſed by Euripides; and it muſt be acknowledged that, by many, muſic, ſleep, and wine, are arranged in the ſame claſs, and uſed for the ſame purpoſe; to which, dancing, alſo, is by ſome thought to contribute. Or is muſic not merely a recreative paſtime, but an eſſential branch of diſcipline, capable of moulding and faſhioning the mind, not leſs than the gymnaſtic moulds and faſhions the body? Or is the efficacy of this noble art limited by neither of theſe uſes, and muſic to be regarded neither as a recreation from paſt labours, nor a preparation for future exertions, but as an enjoyment complete and perfect in itſelf, analogous to the pleaſure eſſential to moral and intellectual energies, which, forming the perfection of man, are deſirable on their own account, independently of any thing that has preceded, or of any thing that is to follow them?

or an eſſential branch of diſcipline?

or an enjoyment complete in itſelf?

Difficulties attending theſe queſtions.

That muſic, conſidered as a branch of education, is not merely for recreation or ſport, is deducible from this, that every effort of attention, and therefore the learning of muſic, is, in children, attended rather with pain than pleaſure. It is equally evident, that children are

not

not inſtructed in muſic as the agreeable employment of their liberal leiſure; for ſuch perfect enjoyments could not be reliſhed by their imperfect faculties, nor the moſt complete fruits of life gathered from their crude immaturity. But, perhaps, children are taught muſic that it may contribute in their riper years, to their recreation, their improvement, or their enjoyment. Yet theſe purpoſes may be better attained without learning the art, or ever touching the lyre. The Perſian and Median kings attain them completely, when they enjoy the correct execution of the beſt muſical performers; the Lacedæmonians, without learning muſic, boaſt that they can readily diſtinguiſh between manly and effeminate airs; between melodies that contribute to moral diſcipline, and thoſe that vitiate the mind, or diſſipate themſelves in empty ſound. To diſtinguiſh and reliſh good victuals, is it neceſſary to be a cook? Which of the poets ever introduced Jupiter ſinging and harping? Such occupations are univerſally aſcribed to inferior divinities; and among men, we know that they belong to mercenary practitioners, whoſe undivided application to muſic has given them great proficiency in this art, but has debaſed their ſouls and narrowed their faculties; whereas by truly liberal and ingenious minds, muſic is ſeldom conſidered as a ſerious engagement, and is rarely practiſed, but as a recreative paſtime, or a natural expanſion of jovial merriment. Such are the doubts attending the accurate arrangement and proper uſe of muſic;

BOOK V.

music; and such the difficulties in ascertaining the place which this agreeable art ought to hold, and the function which it is calculated to perform, in the important system of political discipline.

Solution of these difficulties.

Yet, let it be considered whether this refined art, though it cannot be accurately and exclusively referred to any one of the ends above specified, may not in some measure comprehend them all. Play is introduced for the sake of recreation; and affords no small degree of pleasure, merely as a repose from the pain of labour, of which it is the natural remedy. But the liberal exercise of our best energies is sweetened by pleasure as well as ennobled by dignity; for happiness, which consists in this exercise, certainly includes both these elements. Now music, whether simple or accompanied by poetry, is acknowledged and felt to be one of the most delightful of pleasures; wherefore Musæus says,

"Of human joys, the sweetest is to sing."

On this account, its power is summoned to gladden our festivities, to brighten and exalt the enjoyments of peace and prosperity. Our children, therefore, ought to be instructed in music, because every innocent pleasure is not only useful as a salutary and seasonable recreation, but desirable in itself as one of the best enjoyments of life. But as the lives of most men are a continual variation of toil and repose, they are apt to confound the light and temporary pleasure of recrea-

recreation, with thofe more permanent and more ferious joys, which conftitute the perfection of human happinefs; efpecially fince there is this refemblance between them, that neither of them have reference to futurity, our nobleft and moft delightful energies *terminating* in *themfelves*, and our lighteft and moft frivolous paftimes, being the medicine of *paft* labours, and relative to nothing that is future.

The efficacy of mufic in moral difcipline.

Yet it is worthy of confideration, whether recreation and enjoyment be not both of them, in this cafe, mere acceffories; and whether mufic, if properly directed, may not effect a more important purpofe; promote moral improvement, refine the fentiments, and exalt the character. Mufic will be acknowledged to have this tendency, fhould it appear capable of affecting the paffions and changing the manners; and that it really does this, manifeftly appears from various examples, and particularly from the melodies of Olympus, that cannot be liftened to without infpiring enthufiafm, which is plainly a moral affection. Independently of meafure or melody, even the fimple cries of nature, when faithfully imitated, powerfully excite our fympathy, and difpofe us to joy or to grief. Mufic is naturally pleafant, and the main object of moral education is to teach us to be pleafed or offended as propriety requires, to love what is truly amiable, and to hate what is truly deteftable. Nothing, therefore, is of more importance than to learn this art, and by cuftom to confirm our approbation of thofe rythmical fucceffions of melodious founds, which

BOOK V.

which are expreffive of decent and dignified manners, of manly and honourable actions. Ingenuous and well-difciplined natures find in the varieties of melody and rhythm, ftriking refemblances of anger and meeknefs, of manlinefs and temperance, and of all other fuch moral affections, as well as of their contraries. This is proved by the effect of mufical performance; which, while we liften to it, changes the form and quality of the foul, melts it to tendernefs, or hardens it to fortitude; and the habit of being thus powerfully affected by the refemblances of manners, is nearly related to that of being affected ftill more powerfully by their realities; fince, were we highly delighted with looking on a portrait, for no other reafon than its beautiful form, it would follow of neceffity, that we fhould alfo be ftill more delighted with beholding the original. Of all the objects of our fenfes, founds are the moft ftriking refemblances of manners. The objects of our touch and of our tafte have no moral refemblance whatever: and even in the objects of our fight, fhapes and colours, the refemblance is faint and imperfect, becaufe calm and motionlefs, and rather a mere fign of manners than their natural imitation, fince manners can only be exhibited by actions, and therefore only reprefented by motions, by which alone actions are forcibly expreffed. Yet even the mere figns of manners are not to be rejected as things ufelefs in education; and our youth ought, doubtlefs, rather to contemplate the works of Polygnotus, and fuch artifts as fkilfully employ

The caufe of this efficacy explained.

employ thofe figns or marks, than ftare on the unmeaning productions of Paufon. But if the mere figns be ufeful, how much more efficacious muft be the refemblances. And fuch refemblances evidently prevail in the *melodies ;* each of which having its diftinctive character, produces its peculiar effect ; fo that our affection changes with each change of the mufic ; and in hearing one melody we are agitated with quite different emotions from thofe with which we were affected upon hearing another. At the will of a fkilful compofer, the mind expands into joy, or contracts into grief ; fome airs melt us into foftnefs, while the Dorian mode confirms our fortitude, and the Phrygian infpires us with enthufiafm. Thefe remarks have been well illuftrated by the writers on mufic, who take experience for their guide ; from which it appears that the efficacy of time, that is of rhythm or meafure, is not lefs than the efficacy of tune, that is of the modes and melodies. Some movements are brifk and lively, others grave and fedate ; fome vulgar, and expreffive of irregular paffions ; others liberal, and expreffive of well-governed affections. But mufic confifts in the fkilful combination of time and tune, from which its power appears manifeftly ; and, therefore, the propriety of teaching it to youth, efpecially as mufic is naturally pleafant, and the attention of that early age is difficultly detained in any exercife or employment in which pleafure is not an ingredient. It appears alfo that there is an affinity between meafures and melodies, and that

 both

BOOK V.

both have a near relation to the foul; from which fome have inferred that the foul is harmony, and others, that harmony is one of its effential attributes.

Chap. 6.

That children fhould be taught to perform mufic.

We now proceed to examine whether children fhould be taught, not only to underftand and relifh, but to practice and perform mufic. This queftion muft be anfwered in the affirmative; for it is impoffible, at leaft exceedingly difficult, to be a good judge of performances which we are ourfelves unable to execute; and whatever affections or qualities mufic may excite or produce, its efficacy will be the ftronger when it is the work of our own hands. Befides this, children require fome employment to occupy and exhauft their reftlefs activity; for which reafon Archytas's rattle is no contemptible invention, fince while fhaking this noify plaything, their activity is agreeably and harmlefsly employed. Education, well directed, is the rattle of boys; and at this age they may be taught arts, which it would mifbecome them afterwards to exercife, but of which the practice in youth will enable them in manhood to relifh works of art the better, and to appreciate them the more fkilfully. The objection to mufic as illiberal, may be eafily removed, if we diftinguifh between that tafte and fkill in the art, which would difqualify a man from performing the offices of a citizen, and that tafte and fkill which would be attended with no fuch pernicious effect. If the mufic that we ftudy, enervates or debafes the foul, or the inftruments on which we practife, diftort or en-

feeble the body, or if the mind is narrowed by the intenſe application to one ſecondary purſuit, it is plain that this ingenious art will occaſion much miſchief, and both incapacitate the young for learning their political duties, and diſqualify the old from performing them honourably. The artificial and complicated muſic, therefore, which has little other merit than the difficulty of execution, and little other effect than to aſtoniſh the gaping multitude, but which has engroſſed and degraded our public exhibitions, ought never to have been introduced into education, whoſe beſt purpoſes it is only calculated to pervert.[b]

To what extent muſical ſkill ought to be cultivated.

Muſical performance may be cultivated, and manual dexterity acquired; but the degree in which they are deſirable, is limited by that proficiency requiſite for enabling us to reliſh liberal rhythms and manly melodies, not to practiſe thoſe vulgar ſleights and muſical trifles which delight children, ſlaves, and even ſome brute animals. It is plain, therefore, that the ſimpleſt inſtruments deſerve the preference, as fitteſt for the purpoſe of education. The flute, the harp, and others of that kind, are to be rejected as too artificial and complex, and requiring more attention and practice than liberal minds can ſpare from more important purſuits. The flute is, beſides, better fitted to excite enthuſiaſm than to regulate the affections, and is therefore better

What inſtruments are fitteſt to be employed.

[b] For better underſtanding what follows concerning muſic, the reader may conſult Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. v. p. 238. & ſeq.

adapted to purgation than to inſtruction; to operate as a violent remedy under violent diſorders of the mind, than to ſerve in uſual health for ſalutary nouriſhment. In playing the flute it is impoſſible to uſe the voice, on which account our anceſtors finally rejected this inſtrument, which they had firſt introduced into education with innumerable other novelties, amidſt the intoxication of their Perſian victories. After the repulſe of Xerxes, a Lacedæmonian exhibiting at his own expence a chorus of muſic, himſelf played on the flute; and there was then ſcarcely an Athenian citizen totally unacquainted with this inſtrument, as appears by the picture dedicated by Thraſyppus of the muſical exhibition, which he defrayed and directed. But on mature reflection, the flute was proſcribed in education, and its uſe forbidden to freemen; and the ſame may be ſaid of the dulcimer and various other inſtruments of different ſhapes and names, which are fitly employed for amuſing the vulgar, by their admitting wonderful diſplays of manual dexterity. It is an ancient and well-contrived fable, which ſays, that Minerva, after inventing the flute, rejected its uſe. The reaſon why ſhe did ſo, is not a bad one; namely, that ſhe was angry at ſeeing how much the blowing of the flute diſtorted her countenance. Yet it is far more probable, that Minerva, who is believed to preſide over learning and ſcience, diſdained an inſtrument which contributed nothing to mental improvement; which neither fortified diſcipline, nor ſharpened intellect, nor elevated

elevated ſentiment. All complex and difficult inſtruments are, therefore, to be baniſhed from the pure region of education, and to be conſigned to the ſordid diſplays of mercenary practitioners, who cultivate muſic, not for any ſalutary purpoſe, but for the low gratification of an illiberal audience; whom ſuch things only can pleaſe as nouriſh their corrupt paſſions, by a mean compliance with which, the muſical performers in our days diſqualify themſelves in mind and body, from performing the duties of good citizens.

Chap. 7. Analyſis of muſic.

In muſic two things are to be conſidered, tune and time, the varieties of the former conſtituting the different modes and melodies, the varieties of the latter conſtituting the different meaſures and rhythms. Are all theſe gradations and all theſe proportions of ſound to be uſed indifferently, or ought due ſelection to be made? Ought this ſelection to be invariably the ſame, or ought it to be modified by the different ends and purpoſes of muſical performance? And in muſic, which is the principal, time or tune? For minute and circumſtantial ſolutions of theſe queſtions, we refer to the philoſophical writers on muſic, meaning to touch but ſlightly on the ſubject, and as far as ſeems requiſite in a work on legiſlation. We approve the general diviſion of muſic into moral, practical, and rapturous; according as it is fitted to regulate our affections, to excite us to action, or to inſpire us with enthuſiaſm. Experience proves that different melodies and rhythms are reſpectively

Its diviſion into moral, practical, and rapturous.

 adapted

BOOK V.

adapted to these different purposes; so that as moral strains are to be employed for mental discipline and liberal pleasure, the enthusiastic, and sometimes the practical, may be listened to for the purpose of what, by a natural metaphor, is called purgation[c], which shall be more fully explained in our treatise on Poetry. Let it suffice at present to observe, that those passions (such is the unison of minds) by which one person is strongly affected, are felt in a certain degree by all around him[d]; and, therefore, when skilfully expressed by the musician, they will be powerfully communicated, especially to those who, by their natural constitution, are peculiarly exposed to their influence; and whose extreme sensibility will thus be excited and agitated, and thereby purified and refined[e], and (*as melancholy*

What is meant by purgation of the passions by music.

[c] Plutarch de Auditione, p. 42. edit. Paris, quotes a saying of the philosopher Ariston, that neither a bath nor a discourse did any good unless they cleansed and purified; using the verb from which the substantive here translated "purgation" is derived. In the following sentence, by a bold mixture of metaphors, he says, λογῳ δριμει την διανοιαν αχλυης πολλης και αμβλυτητος γεμουσαν εκκαθαρη. "That we ought to be thankful to philosophers, who, by the severity of their exhortations, purge our understanding from the thick darkness and bluntness with which they are filled."

[d] Compare above, c. v. ακροωμενοι των μιμησεων γιγνονται παντες συμπαθεις.

[e] This obscure sentence is best explained by a collateral passage in Plato de Republica, p. 625. edit. Ficini. He is treating of the necessity of combining in a well-directed education, music with the gymnastic; because men who apply only to music, will soften into effeminacy; and those who apply only to the gymnastic, will harden into brutality. In expanding and illustrating this observation, he says that strength is increased and courage confirmed by the gymnastic; but what will happen if a youth is trained to the gymnastic only? ουκ, ει τι ενην αυτου φιλομαθες εν τῃ ψυχῃ, ἁτε ουτε μαθηματος γευομενον ουδενος, ου ζητηματος, ουτε λογου μετεσχον, ουτε της αλλης μουσικης, ασθενες τε

choly is purged by tears[f]) disburdened and lightened with a pleasurable relief. Thus it is that, at

---

τε καικωφον και τυφλον γιγνεται, ἁτε ουκ εγειρομενον, ουδε τρεφομενον, ουδε διακαθαιρομενων των αισθησεων αυτου. "In this case, even should he naturally be endowed with an ingenuous and inquisitive mind, yet having never tasted the pleasures neither of science, nor investigation, nor reason, *nor the other music*, his condition as a man will be that of blindness, deafness, and debility, his faculties having never been *nourished, excited, agitated, and purged.*" What Plato means by saying, *the other music*, may be understood by the words of Strabo in the admirable mythological digression in his Tenth Book, where he remounts to the root and source of mysticism in the human heart, and examines the fabulous traditions and religious arcana of his country, with that liberal criticism which became an historian, that was a traveller and a philosopher. ευ μεν γαρ ειρηται και τουτο, τους ανθρωπους τοτε μαλιστα μιμεισθαι τους θεους, ὁταν ευεργετωσι· αμεινον δ'αν λεγοι τις, ὁταν ευδαιμονωσι· τοιουτον δε το χαιρειν και το ἑορταζειν και το φιλοσοφειν και μουσικης απτεσθαι· μη γαρ ει τις εκπτωσις προς το χειρον γενηται των μουσικων εις ἡδυπαθειας τρεποντων τας τεχνας εν τοις συμποσιοις, και θυμελαις, και σκηναις, και αλλοις τοιουτοις, διαβαλλεσθω το πραγμα· αλλα ἡ φυσις ἡ των παιδευματων εξεταζεσθω την αρχην ενθενδε εχουσα. Και δια τουτο μουσικην εκαλεσεν ὁ πλατων, και ετι προτερον ὁι πυθαγορειοι, την φιλοσοφιαν, και κατα ἁρμονιαν τον κοσμον συνεσαναι, παν το μουσικον θεων εργον ὑπολαμβανοντες. Ουτω δε και ἁι Μουσαι θεαι και Απολλων Μουσαγετης, και ἡ ποιητικη πασα υμνητικη ουσα· ὡσαυτως δε και την των ηθων κατασκευην τη μουσικῃ προσνεμουσι ὡς παν το επανορθωτικον του νου τοις θεοις εγγυς ον.—"It has been well said, that a man most imitates the gods, when he does good; but it would be better said, when he is happy; that is, when he enjoys merriment and festivity chastised by the decent charms of music and philosophy. For though music is often degraded in our theatres, in our streets, and at our entertainments, into the pander of sensual passions, yet the art itself ought not, therefore, to be arraigned, but rather the merit of that discipline fairly estimated, of which music is the principle and the source. On this ground Plato, and the Pythagoreans before him, called philosophy, music, maintained that the world subsisted by harmony, and that music in its largest sense, meaning arrangement and proportion, shone in every work of the gods. The muses themselves are goddesses; Apollo is the leader of the muses; and poetry, which originally consisted in hymns, was invented to sing the praises of the divinity. To music the ancients also referred moral philosophy,

[f] Plato de Repub. l. III.

BOOK V.

at the celebration of Orgic rites, enthuſiaſm vents itſelf and evaporates in thoſe ſacred melodies, during the performance of which the mind undergoes a kind of purgation, and is thereby cured of its frenzy. The ſame thing happens in all other violent affections, whoſe exceſſes cure themſelves; and of which, in proportion as the preceding agitation has been the greater, the ſubſequent relief proves the more delightful.

The different kinds of muſic; their nature and effects.

To this purpoſe theatrical muſic might be happily directed; but as the ſpectators at theatres conſiſt, not merely of the liberal and enlightened, but of the vulgar and illiterate; of mechanics, manufacturers, ſervants, and ſlaves; ſuch perſons require paſtimes ſuitable to their taſte; and their perverſe minds can reliſh none but perverſe muſic; a muſic overſtrained by the vehemence of contention, and disfigured by a crowd of motley embelliſhments. But that which is a fit amuſement for ſlaves and men of ſervile characters, would be of all things the moſt improper for the liberal diſcipline of youth. To the purpoſe of education, the manly Doric, and other congenial moral melodies, are found to be the beſt adapted. Socrates in Plato's Re-

---

phy, or ethics, conſidering as the gift of Heaven whatever tended to exalt and purify the mind.*"

* Literally, "conſidering as near to the gods whatever is corrective of the mind." If every work of the gods partook of muſic, then moral philoſophy, as corrective of the mind and a gift of Heaven, might be referred to muſic as the ſpecies is to its genus. But this will not neceſſarily follow, if we tranſlate with Caſaubon, "that all muſic is the work of the gods."

public

public admits no other modes of music but the Dorian and Phrygian; but there is an inconsistency in admitting the latter after he had excluded the use of the flute, for the Phrygian is among melodies what the flute is among instruments, a pathetic enthusiastic strain; and so peculiarly adapted to dithyrambics, that when Philoxenus attempted to set these rapturous hymns to Doric music, he found the thing impossible, and naturally reverted to the Phrygian mode. The Dorian is to be preferred for its firmness, gravity, and stability, as holding the middle place between two excesses, that of fury on the one hand, and that of effeminacy on the other.

The different kinds of music respectively adapted to different periods of human life.

In education we ought never to lose sight of possibility and propriety; and propriety generally lies in the middle between two vicious extremes. Propriety, therefore, is mediocrity; but this mediocrity, in practical matters, does not consist in an indivisible point, but admits of considerable latitude, and is to be modified in different cases by different circumstances; and in the case of music, chiefly by the circumstance of age. Strong sounds and rapid movements accord not with the debility of declining years. The writers on this subject, therefore, justly blame Socrates for banishing the gentle languor of soft music, as producing the noxious consequences of wine, when the ardour of intoxication has given place to painful lassitude or listless torpor. But men measure every thing by their own standard; and that may be approved by

by old age, which ſeems feeble or languid to the prime of life. Youth, alſo, has a muſic peculiarly adapted to it. This is the Lydian, which unites grace with ſtrength, and while it regulates the affections, has no ſmall tendency alſo to embelliſh the manners. It is plain then, that poſſibility, mediocrity, and propriety, are views and boundaries, of which, in education, we ought never to loſe ſight.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VI.*

INTRODUCTION.

IN this Book Ariſtotle approves himſelf, as even Locke acknowledges, "a maſter in politics;" ſurpaſſing in perſpicuity and preciſion every writer ancient or modern in explaining how "civil ſociety is formed into different models of government, and the ſeveral ſpecies of it[a]." His writings on this ſubject are eminently diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of his rivals and detractors. Aſſuming a loftier ſtand, his ſight has a wider range; and while his ſituation is more commanding, his eye is alſo more piercing. A great part of his life was employed in doing for moral and political philoſophy, that which, with regard to modern geometry, Vieta and Deſcartes began; Barrow and Leibnitz and Newton ſo wonderfully carried on and improved; and that which Waring and a few others of our contemporaries are ſtriving ſtill further to extend and perfect. The extraordinary elevation which that noble ſcience has attained, is owing chiefly

* Commonly publiſhed as Book IV.
[a] See Locke's Letter to King.

to

to obſtinate and patient induſtry in improving and perfecting the ſigns by which our notions of magnitude are compared; and the reſults of our compariſons ſurely drawn, and clearly expreſſed. The Stagirite was equally ſucceſsful with thoſe great men, in the ſtill more important taſk of ſimplifying and improving the ſigns or expreſſions by which compariſons are made, involving the civil happineſs of mankind and the beſt intereſts of ſociety. His diſtinction between the eſſential members of a commonwealth and its barely ornamental concomitants; his diviſions and definitions of the different forms of government, with the important principle by which the form is diſtinguiſhed from the ſubſtance; the mutual relations between government and laws; and the relations between both theſe and the variable moral nature of man, which make thoſe inſtitutions and arrangements, that are juſt and ſalutary in one country, unjuſt and pernicious in another; theſe and other collateral points are explained in the preſent Book, with a copiouſneſs that affords ſatisfaction, and a clearneſs that defies contradiction.

In treating of the *ſovereignty* in a ſtate, our author analyſes this complex object into deliberative, appointing or elective, and judicial, powers. To juſtify his diviſion in compariſon with that which modern writers have ſubſtituted in its ſtead; namely, powers legiſlative, executive, and judicial; it may be obſerved that in every community the ſovereignty, whether reſiding in one, the few, or the many, muſt neceſ-

ſarily

farily be employed in deliberating concerning public meafures; in electing or appointing magiftrates; or in diftributing juftice, and deciding differences. But the work of legiflation, when once complete, ought never afterwards, according to our author, to be touched but with a cautious and trembling hand[b]; and to fay that the actual fovereign, whether king, nobles, or commons, or all three collectively, are invefted with the plenitude of legiflative authority, is in his opinion to grant to them a power, which, in its full extent, they cannot ever rightfully exercife, unlefs it could be fuppofed that one generation of men might be fairly entitled to intercept from pofterity the improvement made, and the light accumulated in the long courfe of preceding ages. To do this, is a ftretch of authority to which the moft defpotic princes of Afia have never yet laid claim. In the abfolute monarchies of Europe, while unjuft wars were undertaken, exorbitant taxes impofed, and temporary regulations refpecting every public meafure capricioufly made, and capricioufly abolifhed, the fundamental laws of their refpective kingdoms were acknowledged and refpected by thofe branded as the wildeft and moft furious defpots. In matters of policy, that cannot be juft or fit, which never can be ufeful; and our author endeavours to prove that it never can be ufeful for a nation completely and fuddenly to depart from its hereditary inftitutions: a depar-

[b] See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 117.

ture

ture which, deftroying that principle on which the efficacy of all laws is founded, would deftroy government itfelf[c]; that illuftrious work of nature, which mere human powers, as they could not originally eftablifh it, cannot have a right to purfue thofe meafures by which it is moft likely to be eventually overturned.[d]

The branch of government now denominated the executive, Ariftotle calls the appointing power, when it refides in one; the electing power, when it refides in many. His language is more accurate than our's. To give orders, and to appoint or elect thofe empowered to carry them into execution, is doubtlefs a branch of the fovereignty; but the part merely executive belongs to low inftruments; and all the intermediate functions, between the firft order or appointment, and the final execution or effect, fall within the department of dependent and refponfible minifters.

After thus analyfing the fovereignty, the author proceeds to examine how its different elements are diftributed in the different forms of government, and how they ought to be placed in a well-conftituted commonwealth; holding the juft mean between the vicious extremes of domineering oligarchy and furious democracy. Nothing can be added to the copioufnefs and perfpicuity with which he explains under what circumftances democratical and oligarchical

[c] See above, b. ii. c. vi. p. 118.
[d] Ibid. b. i. c. ii. p. 25, & feq.

laws

laws are to be alternately ſelected; and on what occaſions neither the one nor the other ought to be entirely and excluſively adopted, but rather both to be blended into one really political and truly ſalutary inſtitution. The perfection of practical matters, as he often obſerves, lies not in a fixed and indiviſible point; it varies with the indefinite variation of circumſtances; but the beſt practical teſts of good government, he holds to be univerſally the two following: firſt, when men of the middle ranks abound more than either the inſolent rich or the turbulent rapacious poor; and ſecondly, when there is a difficulty in determining to which of the ſimple forms of government the conſtitution moſt inclines, and ought moſt properly to be referred. There is a pleaſure not to be expreſſed, but which every friend to his country muſt warmly feel, in reflecting that Ariſtotle's two teſts are more applicable to the government eſtabliſhed in this iſland, than to any other which hiſtory exhibits.

The praiſes which the author beſtows on the ſuperior happineſs of the middle claſſes in ſociety, tends to reconcile the people at large with their reſpective lots, and to ſhew that the condition to which every man by an ordinary degree of prudence and good fortune may attain, is preciſely the beſt in which he could be placed. The miſeries of individuals, as well as the convulſions of nations, originate in that moſt prevalent and widely diffuſed error of conſidering rather their relative than their abſolute advan-

 tages.

BOOK VI.

tages*. To the bleſſings of health and competency, with ſecurity and a good conſcience, what ſlender additions can be made by the moſt extenſive power and moſt unbounded opulence? The loweſt ſituation in civilized ſociety is preferable to the higheſt among barbarians. But inſtead of contemplating with grateful complacence the real enjoyments within its reach, diſcontent broods over its comparative inferiority; and each thinking too highly of himſelf, even the more fortunate individuals will ſcarcely allow that full juſtice is done to their merit; while they depreciate the prodigious ſum common to all, and magnify the minute differences by which the ſhares are diſtinguiſhed.

* Suique ipſam, *malo arbitrio*, quo a proximis quiſque minime anteiri vult, penituiſſe. T. Liv. l. vi. c. xxxiv.

BOOK VI.

ARGUMENT.

Governments — Their claſſification. — Democracy — Its four kinds. — Conſtitutions — One thing by law — Another in fact. — Materials reſpectively fitted for different governments. — Mixed governments. — Teſts of good government. — How governments may be meliorated. — Sleights by which the nobles deceive the people — And the people the nobles. — Analyſis of the ſovereignty — Conſtitution of its different branches — Agreeably to the different ſpirit of different governments.

BOOK VI. Chap. I.

Politics, as a ſcience, how it ought to be treated.

IT is the buſineſs of every ſcience, and every inquiry that bears a reference to any whole claſs of objects, to conſider not only the powers or capacities belonging to the beſt and moſt perfect individuals comprehended under that claſs; but thoſe which belong to the claſs in general, or rather to the moſt conſiderable portion of it; and alſo thoſe which belong to ſuch individuals of the claſs as are peculiarly circumſtanced. The maſter of exerciſes, the phyſician, and every other artiſt, pays due attention to this threefold diviſion. The teachers of the gymnaſtic art, for example, well know that of the youths committed to their care and diſcipline, few are capable of attaining the moſt athletic habit, or likely to carry off the firſt prizes either of ſtrength or agility. Yet it is

 the

BOOK VI. the duty of their profeſſion to improve the natural powers of their diſciples, and to exerciſe each of them in ſuch accompliſhments as are moſt ſuitable to their reſpective views and particular conſtitutions. It is not enough, therefore, for the ſpeculative politician, if he would render his ſpeculations practically uſeful, to conſider what arrangements beſt ſuit men provided with a complete accumulation of external and internal advantages. He muſt conſider alſo, what are the arrangements beſt adapted to the particular circumſtances in which communities are placed; and moſt likely to promote that particular ſcheme of national happineſs which the founders of the commonwealth have thought fit to prefer; though neither the moſt deſirable abſolutely in itſelf, nor the beſt even in relation to the means and materials which nature or fortune had ſupplied. Above all, the political philoſopher ought moſt diligently to inveſtigate that form of government adapted to mankind in general, circumſtanced as they are moſt commonly found to be; from the neglect of which inquiry, authors who have written well, have not written uſefully. In all matters of practice, poſſibility is to be conſidered as well as perfection; and things eaſily accompliſhed are preferable to thoſe barely poſſible. In oppoſition to theſe maxims, projectors in politics content themſelves with deviſing arrangements adapted only to men formed and circumſtanced agreeably to their mind and wiſh, the mere creations of their own fancy; or if they condeſcend

ſcend to take leſſons from hiſtory, they are ſatiſfied with extolling and recommending the Lacedæmonian or ſome other approved government, without ſtopping to reflect whether the ordinary circumſtances in which nations are placed, will ever allow them to imitate ſuch admired models. For it is not an eaſier taſk to regenerate a conſtitution, than originally to eſtabliſh it; ſince in working this reformation, it is neceſſary that men ſhould not only learn what they did not formerly know, but *unlearn* many things which they had previouſly been taught[f].

Chap. 2. — How governments are to be divided and claſſed.

To treat the ſcience of politics completely and uſefully, we muſt not be contented with the general diviſion of governments into monarchies, ariſtocracies, and republics; and their reſpective corruptions, tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies. It is neceſſary ſtill farther to examine wherein one government, or one corruption of government, differs from another bearing the ſame name. We ſhall then more eaſily diſcern for what materials each political ſtructure is beſt adapted; what are the changes which it is moſt likely to undergo; and what are the laws and regulations by which it may be preſerved, ſubverted, or amended.

Chap. 3. — General diviſion.

The cauſe of the wide variety in governments muſt be ſought for in the wonderful diverſity of their conſtituent parts; for a ſtate is a very complex object, compoſed of individuals

[f] In the firſt chapters of this book there is much derangement, and much repetition. I have endeavoured to expreſs the author's ſenſe in fewer words, and with greater perſpicuity.

 and

BOOK VI.

and families; ſome rich, others poor; ſome ſubſiſting by agriculture and paſturage, others by manufactures and commerce; and ſome provided with arms, while others are altogether defenceleſs. The higher claſſes of men are alſo variouſly diſtinguiſhed by their abilities, their virtues, their birth, or merely by their wealth; which laſt, when conſiderable, enables them to rear and train horſes, a circumſtance which alone has been ſufficient to decide the nature of the government. For in ancient times, wherever the national force conſiſted in cavalry, oligarchy was prevalent; as among the Chalcideans, the Eretrians, the Magneſians ſituate on the banks of the Meander, and many other wealthy communities of Aſiatic Greece[f]. It is plain, therefore, that governments vary according to the differences of thoſe conſtituent parts of the ſtate, which either engroſs or ſhare the ſovereignty. The moſt palpable, and alſo the moſt ſpecific difference (as will appear hereafter) is the diſtinction of riches and poverty: wherefore, all governments have been divided into oligarchies and democracies, as the winds are divided into the north and the ſouth, the former comprehending the weſt, and the latter the eaſt; and as melodies are divided into the Dorian and Phrygian, all other kinds of muſic, in proportion to their reſpective proximities, being aſcribed to the one or the other of thoſe very different ſcales. But the general di-

[f] Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. vii.

viſion,

vision, above given in this work, appears more satisfactory and more useful: namely, that certain polities are wisely combined and justly tempered, as certain harmonies are skilfully composed and properly blended; that other polities, as well as other harmonies, are vicious deviations and base corruptions, whether they be strung into despotism, or relaxed into democracy.

Chap. 4. Particular division.

The more minute subdivisions of governments must be obtained by the same means, by which other objects of science are compared and classed. In zoology[h], we begin by considering what are the constituent parts of animals, or in other words, the parts essentially necessary to their existence. These are some one of the senses[i], with an instrument for seizing, and another for receiving food, together with some instrument or member by which the motions belonging to the animal may conveniently be performed. But all these parts or organs are susceptible of great variety in their respective structures, since, in some animals, one member is very differently formed from an *analogous* member in other animals; that is, from a member answering a similar purpose. But if our enumeration of the parts or organs be correct, and if we have carefully distinguished the differences in the structure of each organ, we must obtain the whole number of kinds or classes by multiplying the number expressing the differences in one constituent part, into the product

[h] See Analysis, p. 145.
[i] ἑνα των αισθητηριων. See Analysis, &c. p. 48.

 of

BOOK VI.

of the numbers expreffing the differences in all the other conftituent parts.

The conftituent parts of commonwealths.

The fame principle applies to the claffification of commonwealths, thofe complex moral entities, confifting of many parts or members, differently conftructed, and varioufly combined. An effential ingredient in every commonwealth is, that great portion of the people employed in providing food, which may be varioufly fupplied by the different modes of induftry and accumulation above fpecified. A fecond indifpenfable ingredient confifts of thofe employed in arts and manufactures, whether neceffary for fubfiftence, or ufeful for accommodation. A third clafs of the people are thofe converfant about exchange or traffic, foreign as well as domeftic. The foldiers form a fourth clafs, not lefs neceffary than any of the preceding; fince communities are collected for all-fufficiency, and cannot have attained their end, if continually expofed to deftruction or fervitude. Judges, to adminifter juftice, and perfons qualified by their abilities to deliberate and decide concerning public concerns, are the fifth and fixth claffes: for if a foul be neceffary to conftitute an animal, not lefs than a body, juftice, valour, and political wifdom, are not lefs effential to a ftate, than thofe exertions of bodily labour by which daily wants are fupplied [k]. The feventh and eighth claffes confift in thofe who perpetually, or interchange-

[k] The author here, as elfewhere, blames Plato for confidering in his "Republic" foldiers as mere fupplements, while he places hufbandmen, weavers, &c. among effential parts or members.

ably,

ably, exercife the various duties of executive magiftracy; and thofe who, by their feafonable contributions, fupply the occafional exigencies of the public fervice. Of thofe various offices or functions, fome indeed may be united in the fame perfon. The fame individual may alternately decide as a judge, and deliberate as a fenator; the fame hands may alternately hold the plough and brandifh the fpear. But as opulence and poverty cannot in any country be afcribed to the fame perfon at once, the moft diftinct claffes of every ftate are the poor and the rich; and the evident differences in government muft refult from thefe diftinctions; from power engroffed by wealth, or power ufurped by indigence. Kings, they fay, are chofen in Æthiopia on account of their beauty and ftature. If the fame rule prevailed in electing republican magiftrates, the principle of election would be highly oligarchical, becaufe the tall and beautiful are always the fmaller number. The rich alfo are commonly the few; and the poor the many: but to conftitute an oligarchy, the few, who are mafters of the government, muft be rich; and to conftitute a democracy, the many, who are mafters of the government, muft be poor; for it is only when both circumftances concur in thofe governments, that their refpective characters are ftrongly impreffed, and their oppofite genius fully difplayed. At Appollonia, near the Ionian fea, and in the ifle of Thera, the defcendants of the firft fettlers retained the whole government in their hands, notwithftanding

ing powerful acceſſions of new inhabitants. But the government was not a democracy, becauſe the rulers were inconſiderable in number when compared with the ſubjects over whom their power was exerciſed. At Colophon, on the other hand, the many were maſters of the government; yet they did not conſtitute a democracy, becauſe, before the Lydian war, the far greater proportion of the inhabitants of that commercial city were poſſeſſed of conſiderable opulence.

Democracy, its four kinds.

The nature of oligarchies and democracies muſt vary in conſequence of variations in their parts or elements. When the notables, or nobles, are diſtinguiſhed by their education and virtue, there will reſult a very different kind of oligarchy from that in which the ſovereigns of the ſtate are characteriſed merely by their birth or their wealth. The differences in the people at large are occaſioned chiefly by the different occupations which they purſue. Some live by agriculture; others by manufactures and commerce; and many cities and iſlands ſubſiſt chiefly by the ſea. Their veſſels are employed in war, commerce, fiſhing, and carriage. In ſome places, almoſt the whole ſhipping is deſtined for one ſingle uſe; as the fiſhing boats of Byzantium and Tarentum, the gallies of Athens, the merchantmen of Ægina and Chios, and the tranſports of Tenedos. Among the commonalty of a country, there may alſo be a variety in the proportion of mere populace, perſons deſtitute of property, condemned through poverty to the meaneſt drudgery,

drudgery, and participating, on one ſide at leaſt, of a foreign or even ſervile extraction. Such are the differences in the parts or elements, from which ſuch a variety of diſpoſitions, habits, manners, and characters muſt neceſſarily flow, as will render thoſe arrangements which ſuit the genius of one people altogether unſuitable to that of another. The firſt kind of democracy requires that all men ſhould be treated alike; that the rich and the poor ſhould indifferently ſhare the government, and enjoy an authority in its deliberations and meaſures exactly proportional to their numbers. Liberty, the partiſans of this government aſſert, is chiefly to be found in democracies; and when all men are placed on a foot of equality, then, and then only, this liberty will be complete. The ſecond kind of democracy requires a ſmall qualification in point of fortune, in thoſe entitled to offices of government. The third kind excludes from thoſe offices perſons branded by any note of infamy, or chargeable with any public delinquency. The kind firſt mentioned does not make theſe diſtinctions, but admits to magiſtracy without exception, the citizens at large. Yet all theſe democracies are governed by general and fixed laws, which it is the duty of magiſtrates and aſſemblies to adminiſter and apply, without ever interpoſing their own authority, unleſs the law be ſilent or its voice uncertain. But there is a fourth ſpecies of democracy, differing from the others juſt mentioned, in this important particular, that it is governed not by permanent laws,

but

BOOK VI.

but by occafional decrees. This happens through the dangerous artifices of demagogues, a defcription of men for which there is not any room in countries fubject to law; but where law is fet afide, the authority of wife and good men is overturned, and that of demagogues eftablifhed on its ruins; the people in the affemblies affuming the form of one complex monarch; tyrants not individually, but collectively. The authority of the many is reprobated by Homer, in what fenfe is uncertain [1]. In fuch a democracy, then, the people knowing itfelf to be an abfolute monarch, affumes all his pretenfions, and exercifes all his prerogatives; fetting every principle of order at defiance; rewarding and honouring none but the bafeft flatterers; and exhibiting in all its tranfactions the fame contraft to a well-conftituted republic, which a tyrannical ufurpation exhibits to a legal monarchy. Of the real individual tyrant, and of this tyrannical corporation, the manners are precifely the fame. The decrees of the one are as defpotical as the edicts and ordinances of the other. Both prove the bane of human fociety, the oppreffors of virtue, the munificent rewarders of vice. The court flatterer flourifhes under the tyranny of one man; the demagogue under the tyranny of the multitude; and the flatterer and demagogue are equally folicitous to extend that

[1] ὐκ αγαθη παλυκοιρανιη, Iliad, ii. v. 204. Ariftotle fays, it is uncertain whether Homer meant to brand the complex tyranny of the multitude, or the authority of many individually. Pope prefers the former meaning, "That worft of tyrants, an ufurping crowd." Iliad, ii. v. 242.

unlaw-

unlawful domination on which their own influence depends. The demagogue perſuades the multitude to diſregard the authority of precedent, and to trample under foot every law of the conſtitution, that full ſcope may be given to the authority of occaſional decrees, well knowing that while the paſſions of the multitude govern, he who can beſt wield thoſe paſſions muſt be maſter of the ſtate. The multitude liſten with delight to one who ſeems to have nothing at heart but to promote their intereſt, or gratify their pleaſure; and cheerfully accept his invitation of taking the public concerns entirely into their own hands; ſo that every eſtabliſhed magiſtracy, and every regular function of political power is enfeebled, ſuſpended, or utterly aboliſhed. The author, therefore, who arraigns ſuch a democracy as unworthy of the name of government, ſeems to reaſon juſtly; for what government can ſubſiſt without laws? If we admit, therefore, democracy to be a form of government, it is plain that a ſtate continually ſubject to the caprice of occaſional decrees, cannot properly be claſſed even under the name of democracy.[m]

Chap. 5. Oligarchy, and its four kinds.

Of oligarchy as well as of democracy, there are various kinds. The firſt kind is that in which

[m] This worſt ſpecies of democracy is what Polybius calls an ochlocracy.—It takes place, he obſerves, wherever the will of the majority prevails; one caſe only excepted, that of a people among whom it is habitual and hereditary to venerate religion, law, virtue, and old age. Comp. Polybius, l. vi. c. iv. & c. ix. This ochlocracy, he obſerves, neceſſarily terminates in the tyranny of one deſpot. Ibid.

which all political power belongs to men of a certain cenfus or fortune, and in which this cenfus is fo high, that the great body of the people are totally excluded from every fhare in the adminiftration. The fecond kind is that in which the pecuniary qualification for office is not fo high as totally to exclude the majority of the citizens, but in which the various councils and magiftracies fupply by election the vacancies that happen among their own members; if they elect from the citizens at large, they act conformably to the principle of an ariftocracy; if they confine their choice to men of a certain cenfus only, they act conformably to the principle of an oligarchy. A third kind of oligarchy takes place, when offices are hereditary; and a fourth, when in addition to this circumftance, the magiftrates govern by their own will and pleafure, and not by eftablifhed laws. This laft and worft kind is called in Greece a dynafty. It bears the fame relation to oligarchy that tyranny does to monarchy, and that the turbulence of the democracy laft defcribed bears to the fair equality of popular government.

A conftitution fometimes one thing by law and another in fact.

Such then are the various kinds of oligarchies and democracies. But it ought not to efcape the notice of a diligent inquirer into politics, that a conftitution may be of one kind by law, and of another in fact. Some ftates are governed democratically, of which the fundamental laws are not democratical; and others are governed oligarchically, of which the fundamental laws

laws are not oligarchical. In fuch commonwealths the practice of the government is at variance with its theory; and this moft frequently happens in confequence of a filent, gradual, and therefore unperceived revolution. In operating this revolution, there is fometimes a long conflict between laws and manners.— Manners finally prevail. The law remains only as a dead letter; while the men who have effected the change, become mafters of the commonwealth.

BOOK VI. How this happens.

The forms of oligarchy and democracy, which we have hitherto examined abftractedly, have each of them fuitable materials with which they naturally incorporate. A people fubfifting chiefly by agriculture, and poffeffed, as is ufual with fuch a people, of very moderate fortunes, naturally arrange themfelves into a legal and well-conftituted democracy. They may fubfift comfortably by labour, they would be foon ruined by idlenefs; they contrive a government, therefore, which requires as little expence of time as poffible; and employ on all occafions, when it is practicable, the great machine of law to fave the labour of man. Their affemblies convene but rarely, becaufe they never convene unneceffarily. A certain cenfus is requifite for enjoying a fhare in the government; but this cenfus is fo moderate that it may be acquired by every induftrious citizen, without greater exertions of labour than are neceffary to make provifion for his family. Among fuch a people, government is carried on without falaries, without revenues, and

Chap. 6. Of the people qualified for enjoying the beft and cheapeft form of democracy.

BOOK VI.

Of the people fit only for the worst and most extravagant democracy.

and without taxes. The affairs of the community, therefore, are left to assume their natural order; since men have no undue motive to engage them to abandon their own profitable concerns, in order to employ themselves in matters which will be much better managed without their unseasonable interference.[a]

Between this simple and frugal democracy, and that which naturally establishes itself in consequence of wealth acquired by commerce or conquest, there are two intermediate gradations; one, in which without requiring any qualification in point of fortune, all those who are not of a servile or foreign extraction, are held partners in the government; and another, in which without any regard even to descent or birth, all those who are freemen enjoy the rights of citizens. Yet as under both these gradations, salaries and fees of office are unknown, there will not be any unseasonable interference in matters of administration; and the regularity of law will prevail over the caprice of human affection. The fourth kind of democracy arises the last in point of time, because it cannot take place till cities have acquired a certain measure of population and of wealth. A great population, and that condensed in cities, makes the multitude feel, and enables them to exert their strength. All men indiscriminately claim a share in the government; and as most people

[a] This meaning is naturally suggested by what immediately follows.

cannot

cannot, without reducing themfelves to beggary, afford time for exercifing the functions of the citizen or ftatefman, their public fervices muft be paid by the commonwealth, and the revenues of the ftate muft fupply the deficiencies of their private fortunes. By fuch an expedient the poorer citizens obtain a greater command of leifure than even the rich themfelves. The former have nothing to care for, their wants being fupplied by the public; the latter are encumbered with the weight of their private affairs; and on every occafion fo much outvoted, that they often ceafe to attend any affemblies whatever, either deliberative or judicial, thus abandoning their country to the licentious and lawlefs multitude.

Chap. 7.

Of the people fit for living under the different kinds of oligarchy.

The firft kind of oligarchy naturally takes place, when there is a great, but not an exceffive difproportion, among the eftates of individuals; and when the cenfus requifite for fharing the government excludes the majority of the people, yet comprehends, however, fuch a confiderable number of men, that motives of perfonal intereft are outweighed by confiderations of public good. Exceffive wealth and exceffive poverty are equally productive of that reftlefs temper which fubverts laws and ruins ftates. When the members of a democracy are not fo poor that they muft fubfift at the public expence, and the members of an oligarchy not fo rich that they difdain the management of their private eftates, neither the one nor the other will be eafily perfuaded unfeafonably to inter-

BOOK VI.

interfere in matters of government; and their own intereſt and convenience will naturally lead them to prefer the authority of laws to that of men. But when the wealth of an oligarchy increaſes as the number of its members diminiſhes, then ambition will take poſſeſſion of every breaſt; and the *oligarchy* will be exactly the more vicious, in proportion as it approaches to *tyranny*. While diffident of its own ſtrength, it will content itſelf with commanding elections, and raiſing to office its creatures and dependents. It will then proceed to govern by itſelf without the inſtrumentality of others, and advancing from one ſtep to another in its ambitious career, will render its power firſt abſolute, and then hereditary; thus ſucceſſively degenerating into what has been called a lawleſs and tyrannical dynaſty.[o]

Chap. 8.

Of ariſtocracy, and its different kinds.

Beſides monarchy, democracy, and oligarchy, there are two other kinds of government; that which is commonly called an ariſtocracy, and that which we have named by the general appellation of all commonwealths, a republic; a form of political arrangement which, as it rarely occurs, has been omitted by Plato and other writers. In ſtrictneſs of language, an ariſtocracy is that form of polity in which the preeminence of birth, wealth, and every ſuch political advantage totally diſappears and vaniſhes in compariſon of that which is infinitely greater

[o] Ariſtotle here repeats that this kind of oligarchy correſponds with the fourth ſpecies of democracy.

than them all; a government in which civil honours are diſtributed or apportioned by no other rule or ſtandard but that of virtue alone; and in which the duties of a good man perfectly coincide with the duties of a good citizen. But the ariſtocracies which commonly prevail, are formed on a coarſer model; and as they differ from oligarchies on the one hand, ſo they differ from this perfect republic on the other. In ſuch ariſtocracies, reſpect is had, not merely to wealth, not merely to virtue, not merely to ſtrength and numbers; but all thoſe political advantages claim their reſpective ſhares of political conſideration; and, combined with each other, form the rule or principle according to which honours and offices are diſtributed and conferred. Such is the political arrangement of the ariſtocracy of Carthage. Virtue, pure and unmixed, is not the governing principle of that ſtate. Yet virtue ſtill enjoys a certain ſhare of influence; maintaining in the political conflict, an honourable ſtruggle againſt wealth and numbers; equal to either of them ſingly, though inferior to their united ſtrength. In Sparta, virtue and numbers long divided the field; and the reciprocal ſhocks of thoſe contending principles maintained the pre-eminence of the few, and the freedom of all. There are then various kinds of ariſtocracies, beſides that which is the beſt and moſt perfect; and to thoſe already mentioned, we may add every form of mixed government in which the balance of power viſibly inclines to the ſide of the few.

BOOK VI. Chap. 9.

Of a republic, ſtrictly ſo called, or mixed government:

It remains now to treat of this mixed government and of tyranny; which laſt we throw into the background, as being of all others the leaſt deſerving the name of polity. The nature of a mixed government, or what for diſtinction ſake we call a republic, will evidently appear by conſidering the elements of which it is compoſed. Theſe are, oligarchy and democracy; though ſuch mixed governments as incline moſt to the ſide of democracy are commonly called republics, while thoſe which incline moſt to the ſide of oligarchy are commonly called ariſtocracies; becauſe morals and education ſeem to have a natural connection with wealth; the rich being already in poſſeſſion of that very object for the acquiſition of which men are moſt frequently ſtimulated to injuſtice. In vulgar language, therefore, a rich man is confounded with a good one; and as there are only three diſtinct principles which contend for political authority, virtue, wealth, and numbers, (for birth may always be analyſed into hereditary virtue or hereditary wealth,) it is plain, that if we comprehend under the name of ariſtocracy, all thoſe governments in which virtue forms a conſtituent element, we muſt define a republic, ſtrictly ſo called, to be that in which wealth and numbers, that is, the prerogatives of the few, and the rights and liberties of the many, are duly reſpected and impartially maintained. The laws, therefore, adapted to a republic, muſt be formed by properly blending thoſe which prevail in democracies and oligarchies. When, with regard to

its definition.

to any one object, the respective laws of these distinct forms of polity are not incompatible with each other, both are to be employed; when they are totally inconsistent, neither of them is to be employed, but a new law is to be framed holding a due middle between them; and when the oligarchic and democratic laws regulating any object, are both of them complex, and consist of many articles or clauses, some clauses are to be copied from the one, and some from the other. In oligarchies, for example, the service of the rich as jurymen, is compelled by a fine; but that of the poor is not rewarded by a fee. In democracies, on the contrary, the attendance of the poor is rewarded, but the non-attendance of the rich is not punished. A law, truly politic and republican, must unite both those partial regulations, by punishing the non-attendance of the rich, and paying the attendance of the poor. Again, in oligarchies a high qualification, in point of fortune, is necessary to constitute the right of voting in the national assembly; in democracies this qualification is often reduced to a mere trifle. A good political law will adopt neither of these extremes, but prefer and establish what is the just middle between them. Again, appointment to office by suffrage is most suitable to the nature of an oligarchy, and appointment to office by lot is most suitable to the nature of democracy; in the former government a high census is required in the candidates: in the latter a small census only, or none. A well-constituted republic,

By what nice principles established, and regulated; illustrated by examples.

republic, therefore, will borrow the clause respecting the mode of appointment to office from oligarchies, and the clause respecting the pecuniary qualification of the candidates, from democracies. It will *elect* its magistrates, but without paying undue regard to their opulence.

Rule by which it may be known whether a republic be well constituted.

The strongest proof, that a republic is well composed and happily blended, results from this, that the terms oligarchy and democracy may be applied to it with equal, though not exact propriety. Such a republic seems to comprehend both extremes, because it contains a due mixture of opposite principles, nicely poised and accurately adjusted. Of this kind is Sparta, which many call a democracy, because the children of the poor enjoy a similar education with those of the rich; because, in their advancement to manhood, the same institutions and modes of life still embrace both ranks; in their dress and diet there is not any distinction; they eat at common tables, and the clothes of the most wealthy are such as even the poorest can afford to wear. Of the two highest magistracies, the citizens elect the one, and may be themselves elected to the other. The senators are chosen by the assembled multitude, and every one of the people may be chosen to fill a place in the council of the Ephori. On the other hand, many call Sparta an oligarchy, because all offices are conferred by suffrage, none bestowed by lot; and because the power of life and death resides in the breasts of a few. A well-

well-mixed republic, then, muſt participate of oligarchy and democracy; it muſt ſeem to be both, and neither; and it muſt ſubſiſt by internal vigour, not by foreign influence. Any form of commonwealth, good or bad, may be kept together by the impreſſion of external force; but that form is good which flouriſhes by its native energy; for this can only take place, when each component part feels its own benefit intimately connected with the ſafety of the whole.

Chap. 10.

Of tyranny, and its different kinds.

We now proceed to ſpeak of tyranny, rather for the ſake of method, than that ſuch an inſtitution is at all worthy of conſideration. In treating of monarchy, we formerly examined whether kings were, in general, uſeful in a commonwealth; and under what particular circumſtances royal government might with propriety be eſtabliſhed. We likewiſe mentioned two kinds of tyranny, both of which bear a reſemblance to royalty; the firſt is, that which generally prevails among Barbarians, and which is conſonant to their genius and character; the ſecond is, that which occaſionally prevailed in ſome countries of Greece, the government of the Æſymnetes. Both the barbarian monarchs and the Grecian Æſymnetes, were unqueſtionably tyrants, ſince they exerciſed unlimited and abſolute power. But they reſembled kings in this, that their power was voluntarily conferred, cheerfully ſubmitted to, and, therefore, lawfully eſtabliſhed. But there is a third kind of tyranny, which moſt properly deſerves that

 odious

BOOK VI.

odious name, and which ſtands in direct oppoſition to royalty; it takes place when one man, the worſt, perhaps, and baſeſt in the country, governs a kingdom with no other view than the advantage of himſelf and his family; a government, which it cannot be ſuppoſed, that thoſe who know what freedom is, ſhould voluntarily endure.

Chap. II.

Principles by which it may be determined, what is practically the beſt form of government.

We proceed now to inveſtigate what is practically the beſt ſort of commonwealth; not ſuch a commonwealth as requires for its conſtruction any extraordinary combination of virtues and talents, embelliſhed by an accumulation of external advantages; the union of all which ought to form the object rather of our prayers, than of our hopes; but ſuch a commonwealth as is adapted to the ordinary condition of ſociety, and of which moſt men are qualified to be members. The ariſtocracies which we formerly deſcribed, are either too refined for the coarſeneſs of practice, or approach ſo nearly to what we have called a republic, that they may be examined by the ſame principles, and eſtimated by the ſame ſtandard; and, indeed, the maxims which we formerly eſtabliſhed in our treatiſe of Ethics, will enable us to appreciate the practical value of all governments whatever. The beſt and happieſt life, we proved in that treatiſe, to be a life of virtue, unobſtructed in its exertions by external impediments; and virtue itſelf, we proved by an accurate and full analyſis, to conſiſt in mediocrity. What the beſt kind of life, therefore, is to an individual, the beſt

beſt government is to a ſtate; for the government I mean (as above ſpecified, not the government conſtituted by law, but the government exiſting in fact) is the life of the ſtate. The perfection, therefore, of this political and incorporated life, muſt be found within the ſame limits or boundaries which comprehend that condition of external circumſtances, and that inward frame of mind, conſtituting the happineſs of thoſe individuals of whom communities are compoſed.

Illuſtration of theſe principles; and the praiſe of mediocrity.

With regard to external circumſtances, communities are compoſed of three claſſes of men: men encumbered by wealth, men oppreſſed by poverty, and men enjoying a happy mediocrity of fortune. Exceſs of wealth, like ſuperiority in ſtrength or in beauty, diſdains the dictates of propriety, and ſpurns the authority of reaſon: extreme poverty, like weakneſs and deformity, ſours the temper, and debaſes the character. The former exceſſes produce inſolence; the latter engender baſeneſs: and theſe, together, form the ordinary ſources of all human turpitude; the one ſpreading into every ſpecies of audacious guilt, the other ſinking into every kind of cowardly fraud and mean miſchief. Under great inequality of external circumſtances, a city therefore muſt be filled, not with men, but with deſpots and ſlaves, of thoſe unfit for exerciſing legal authority, and thoſe unfit for yielding liberal obedience; while friendſhip, the bond of ſocial life, is broken, deſtroyed, or corrupted into contempt on the one ſide, and into envy on the other. A certain mediocrity is

BOOK VI.

is neceſſary to equality, equality to friendlineſs, and friendlineſs to ſecurity. Under all governments, the happineſs of thoſe men is moſt ſecure, whoſe condition is above committing wrong, and too humble to expoſe them to envy. Therefore, Phocylides[n] ſaid, and prayed,

> " How happy is the middle walk of life,
> " O! may it be my portion in the ſtate!"

It is plain, therefore, that the beſt commonwealth is that in which middling men moſt abound; and prove, if not more powerful than both, at leaſt, ſuperior to either of the extremes. When this does not take place, the commonwealth neceſſarily degenerates either into oligarchy or into democracy; both which forms of government are much more likely than a republic abounding in the middle ranks to fall under the tyranny of one man; as ſhall be explained more clearly hereafter, in treating the ſubject of political revolutions. Such a republic is not only leſs liable to be ſubverted: it ſubſiſts unagitated by ſedition; the great intermediate maſs reſtraining the activity of the two hoſtile extremes; for this reaſon, democracies are found to be more durable than oligarchies, becauſe in the former, the middling claſs is more numerous than in the latter; and large commu-

[n] A gnomic or moral poet of Miletus, who flouriſhed five hundred years before Chriſt, the contemporary of Theognis, of Megara; which two, together with old Heſiod, Iſocrates conſiders as the beſt maſters of life and manners. Orat. ad Nicocl. The remains aſcribed to Phocylides do not contain the words in the text: but although they amount to only 215 verſes, they thrice repeat the ſentiment. See vv. 12. 52. 65.

nities

-nities enjoy more tranquillity than ſmall ones, which, from the paucity of their members, have few citizens of an intermediate condition between riches and poverty. It is this intermediate claſs, however, that alone balances and keeps ſteady the veſſel of the republic; when this claſs is deſtroyed or removed, an outrageous democracy takes place, which is ſpeedily overwhelmed in its own fury.

The paſſions of individuals and of ſtates, reſiſt the eſtabliſhment of the beſt government;

The beſt legiſlators have, in point of rank and fortune, been men of an ordinary level. As to himſelf, Solon atteſts this in his poetry. The ſame is to be ſaid of Charondas, and of almoſt all others. Lycurgus was not the king, but the legiſlator of Sparta. A republic founded on the ſalutary principles of mediocrity and juſt equality is, indeed, a rare phænomenon. Of all thoſe inveſted with power, one man alone°, as far as hiſtory informs us, could be prevailed on to eſtabliſh ſuch a political arrangement; moſt other leaders, whether of the nobles or of the people, never contenting themſelves with equality, but always aſpiring to ſuperiority, and alternately abuſing their advantages for giving an undue preponderancy to their reſpective factions. In this fatal ambition they have been encouraged and confirmed by the leading ſtates of Greece, which have always been ſolicitous to mould every neighbouring republic after their own

° Ariſtotle perhaps means Cliſthenes, the Athenian, whom he praiſes in other parts of this work, particularly l. vi. c. 4. See the Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xviii. p. 118. Cliſthenes reſtored the inſtitutions of Solon. This was his chief merit. I rather think, therefore, that Ariſtotle means Solon himſelf.

BOOK VI.

own model. Blinded by paffion, contending parties have been unable, or unwilling, to perceive any thing between the miferable alternative of commanding with infolence, or obeying with fervility; and fubftantial happinefs has therefore been almoft conftantly facrificed to filly pride. Having thus examined what is practically the beft commonwealth, it will be eafy to appreciate the merit of all others, by their degrees of approximation to this model of perfection; a model, which the legiflator ought always to keep in view under every condition of fociety, but which the wide variety of materials, on which he has to operate, will enable him to imitate under different circumftances with more or lefs exactnefs, and more or lefs facility.

which is a limit and model of perfection, to which legiflators ought continually to approximate.

Chap. 12.

The legiflator and ftatefman ought always to ftrengthen the middling clafs, and to render it more powerful than either extreme.

In every community whatever, the ftability of government requires, that thofe who defire its continuance fhould be more powerful than thofe who defire its diffolution. The political arrangement, therefore, of every ftate, muft always depend on the prevailing inclination of that party which is preponderant; and this preponderancy again muft confift either in quantity or quality; quantity, denoting mere fuperiority in number; and quality, the diftinguifhing excellencies of the upper ranks; birth, wealth, education, the love of glory and of the republic. Quantity and quality often acting in oppofite directions, their relative forces muft be eftimated, and a proportion inftituted for difcovering which principle will prevail in the conflict.

If

If one party ſurpaſſes in quality more than it is ſurpaſſed in quantity, it is plain that the balance muſt incline to the ſide of the few, and different kinds of oligarchies muſt neceſſarily be eſtabliſhed. If, on the contrary, the popular party exceed more in quantity, than they are excelled in quality, democracy muſt prevail: the firſt and beſt kind of democracy, if the majority of the people be huſbandmen; the laſt and worſt, if tradeſmen and manufacturers; and, in proportion to the ingredients compoſing them, the intermediate kinds, more or leſs faulty. But, in all thoſe caſes, a wiſe legiſlator will conſtantly endeavour to comprehend, in his ſcheme of polity, men of the middle rank, and to render them, if not more powerful than both the extremes, at leaſt ſuperior to either; becauſe, when this takes place, the government is likely to prove durable. There is not any reaſon to apprehend, that the rich and the poor ſhould lay aſide their natural animoſities, and conſpire againſt this claſs which is comparatively on good terms with both, and the natural mediator between them. The contending parties cannot, therefore, weaken or diminiſh its influence, without proportionally ſtrengthening the power of their reſpective adverſaries. But thoſe who eſtabliſh oligarchies neglect this conſideration; and by aſpiring to an imaginary good, incur a real evil: for the prepoſterous ambition of the great proves ruinous to more ſtates than even the unjuſt violence of the multitude.

The

BOOK VI. Chap. 13.

The political fleights by which the great deceive the multitude, regard five objects. 1ft, The affembly.

The great, in order to difguife their ambition, and the multitude, in order to palliate their injuftice, have recourfe to many juggling artifices, by which they endeavour mutually to deceive each other. Thefe devices regard the five following objects; the affembly, the courts of juftice, the magiftracies, the militia, and the gymnaftic exercifes. To engrofs all power in the affembly, the rich and noble eafily delude the people into a law, exacting a fevere fine for non-attendance from men of a certain cenfus. Such men, therefore, will be careful to attend; while the poor, who are not liable to any penalty, will for the moft part defert their duty, and thus abandon their fhare in the government.

2d, Courts of Juftice.

A fimilar contrivance fucceeds with regard to the courts of juftice, and the duty of ferving as jurymen. By a law of Charondas[p], a fine was in this cafe impofed even on the poor; but fo fmall, that it ferved no other purpofe than that of faving appearances; for when one trick is difcovered, another is fubftituted in its ftead. Thus, all who have infcribed their names in the public regifter, are entitled to exercife the functions of deliberative and judiciary power; but if, after this, they neglect to exercife them, they fubject themfelves to a fevere penalty; the poor, therefore, avoid enrolling their names, left they fhould incur the penalty.

3d, The magiftracy.

With regard to burdenfome offices, they are permitted to excufe themfelves from holding them, without

p See above, b. ii. c. x. p. 141.

other

other proof than that of their own oaths; they are not compelled, under heavy fines, to provide themſelves with arms, nor to acquire ſkill in the gymnaſtic exercifes; and all theſe exemptions, which they are taught to regard as indulgences, effectually diminiſh their conſideration in the ſtate.

BOOK VI.

4th and 5th, Arms and exerciſes.

The lower claſſes of men ſometimes endeavour, in their turn, to encounter the artifices of the great with ſimilar addreſs. The non-attendance of the rich in the aſſembly, or courts of juſtice, is not puniſhed; but their own attendance is rewarded; and this fee or reward, which is to them a mighty matter, is far too ſmall to operate as a motive on their ſuperiors. A well-conſtituted republic ought, as we obſerved before, to fee the poor, and fine the rich; by which means, both parties would be rendered diligent in the diſcharge of their political functions, and neither ſide be enabled to engroſs power, and uſurp the commonwealth.

Thoſe by which the democratical party deceive the great.

Wealth is a thing relative and indefinite; and the cenſus, therefore, in each ſtate, muſt vary with the circumſtances of the community. It ought never to be ſo high, as to leave that portion of the citizens which is excluded from office, more conſiderable than that which is admitted; otherwiſe, the government cannot be expected to prove durable. The mere populace will eaſily ſubmit to excluſion, but they will not tolerate injuſtice, or brook inſult. They will even fight boldly, if they are fed abundantly; and the patient ſubmiſſion of the people may generally

Rule by which the cenſus ought to be eſtabliſhed.

BOOK VI.

generally be enſured by the prudent moderation of their ſuperiors.

Rule by which the military force ought to be eſtabliſhed;

The cenſus, we have ſaid, is a thing comparative and indefinite: but the right of bearing arms has its preciſe limit. It muſt be beſtowed on citizens, and them only; for to diſarm men is little leſs than to enſlave them. In ſome ſtates, as the republic of Malea, all thoſe who have ever borne arms, exerciſed the deliberative and judiciary powers; but offices of executive magiſtracy belonged to thoſe only who were actually enrolled as ſoldiers. After the ſubverſion of royalty, the firſt governments in Greece were entirely in the hands of military men, and thoſe wholly horſemen; for before the invention of tactics, the ſtrength of ſtates conſiſted merely in cavalry. But as populouſneſs increaſed, and tactics were improved, the ſphere of political conſideration was extended, and the people at large became ſharers in the great partnerſhip of government. What is now regarded as an ariſtocratical republic was, therefore, anciently *called* a democracy, but had, in *fact*, a ſtrong tendency to oligarchy, or even to royalty. The intermediate ranks were then few in number, and deſtitute of ſtrength; and therefore they, as well as their inferiors, eaſily ſubmitted to the authority of the ſame men in peace whom they had been accuſtomed to follow and obey as their leaders in war.

illuſtrated by hiſtory;

Chap. 14.

Analyſis of the fore-

Having thus examined ſtates in relation to the materials of which they are compoſed, and ſhewn how many, and what kinds of compoſitions

tions refult from the various combinations of the fame fimple elements, we muft proceed to analyfe and explain what is properly called the fovereignty. This complex object comprehends the deliberative, executive, and judicial powers[q]; powers, which muft be differently regulated and diftributed in relation to the nature and plan of each particular conftitution; but which, in all conftitutions, ought to be regulated and diftributed agreeably to public utility, the great end of all legal governments. The deliberative power is generally fuppofed to include the right of determining concerning war and peace; concerning laws, treaties, alliances, death, banifhment, and confifcation; as well as the right of calling the magiftrates to account for malverfation in office. Thefe important matters muft be entrufted either to the people at large, or to a certain defcription of the people conftituting one or more diftinct councils: or fome of thofe great queftions muft be decided by the popular affembly, and others committed to diftinct tribunals, or particular magiftrates. That all matters of deliberation fhould be decided by all the people, which is confonant to the nature of democracy, is fufceptible of many variations; for all the people may be entitled to deliberate and decide, either collectively, or fucceffively;

Sovereignty into the deliberative, the executive, and judicial powers.

Wherein the deliberative power confifts.

The various modes in which it may be regulated in democracies;

[q] I have here expreffed Ariftotle's fenfe in modern language. In this chapter he treats concerning that part of the fovereignty which he calls, το βυλευομενον, tranflated the deliberative; in chapter xv. concerning that part which he calls το περι τας αρχας, tranflated the executive; in chapter xvi. concerning that part which he calls το δικαστικον, tranflated the judicial.

BOOK VI.

which latter obtains in the republic of Telecles the Mileſian. In ſome republics, the different magiſtrates form a ſupreme council, which directs the ordinary buſineſs of government; but magiſtracy is exerciſed by men drawn promiſcuouſly from tribes, wards, diſtricts, and the minuteſt ſubdiviſions of the people, until it paſſes ſucceſſively through the whole body. Yet the citizens at large never convene in the popular aſſembly, except for the purpoſe of making new laws; of regulating the conſtitution; or of hearing, on any important emergency, the reſolves of the magiſtrates. In other republics, the aſſembly convenes not only for thoſe purpoſes, but for the purpoſe of elections, for deciding war and peace, and for examining the conduct of men in office, who, on all ordinary occaſions, direct, as well as carry on, the buſineſs of government, acting for the people at large[r], from whom they are appointed by lot, or elected by ſuffrage. Another mode of conſtituting the deliberative power is, that the national aſſembly convene, to appoint the magiſtrates, to take an account of their adminiſtration, and to decree war or peace; but that all other matters be determined, as well as

[r] In modern language, repreſenting the people at large. We ſhall ſoon find deliberative and elective aſſemblies, compoſed of a part of the citizens, acting for, or repreſenting the people at large; which Ariſtotle ſometimes conſiders as the beſt form of democracy, and ſometimes qualifies with the title of πολιτεια. εισι δε οι τροποι του παντας, πλειους. εις μεν, το κατα μερος, αλλα μη παντας αθροους. This is ſaid with regard to deliberative aſſemblies, c. xiv. and with regard to elective aſſemblies, he ſays, c. xv. το δε, μη παντας ἁμα μεν καθιςαναι, εξ απαντων δε, : : : πολιτικον.

con-

conducted, by distinct magistrates, or ministers appointed by lot, when ordinary talents and plain honesty are sufficient for the proper discharge of their duty; and elected by suffrage, when, in addition to these qualities, experience and skill appear requisite for the due execution of their office. The last and worst mode of constituting the deliberative power, is that of lodging it on all occasions with the great body of the people, convened in the public assembly, and rendering the magistrates, as to matters of volition, mere passive instruments for executing the pleasure of the multitude. This preposterous distribution prevails only in that kind of democracy, which we have proved to be analogous to oligarchic dynasty and monarchic tyranny.

In oligarchies;

All the modes of regulating the deliberative power, above explained, are consonant with the nature of democracy; but when this power is always lodged with a part of the community, or with a particular description of men, to the perpetual exclusion of all others, an oligarchy necessarily takes place. Yet, when this description includes men of moderate fortunes, and when all who acquire such fortunes are of course summoned to the council, and when there are certain fundamental laws, which even this supreme council does not think itself empowered to abrogate or alter, the moderation of such an oligarchy approaches nearly to the arrangements of what we have called a well-constituted republic. That also may be called

 a mode-

BOOK VI. a moderate oligarchy, in which men of a certain census elect a council entrusted with the deliberative power, but bound to exercise this power agreeably to established laws. The oligarchy degenerates into a tyrannical dynasty, when the deliberative body supplies, by its own authority, the vacancies among its members; or, what is still worse, when prudence in deliberation is supposed an hereditary virtue, and the right of deciding absolutely for the community at large is vested in certain families, and descends from fathers to their children [a]. When some matters of deliberation are entrusted to the magistrates, and others committed to the people at large, particularly the alternative of war and peace, and the impeachment of men in office, such an arrangement may be called aristocratical; particularly when the magistrates are appointed by election, or by a mixture of choice and chance, that is, appointed by lot from persons whose characters have been previously examined, and generally approved. The mixture of lot and suffrage, and the appointment to some deliberative functions in the one way, and to other deliberative functions in the other, is consonant to the nature of what we call a republic. Such then are the modes of distributing this portion of the sovereignty, conformably to the nature of different governments.

in mixed governments.

How democracies and oligar-

It would be highly conducive to the improvement of what is now called democracy, were

[a] See above, p. 334. with which compare Polybius, vi. 8. vol. ii. p. 471. edit. Sweigh.

that

chies may be improved into better governments.

that oligarchic regulation to be introduced which fines the rich for non-attendance. By this means, the aſſembly would be better compoſed, and its deliberations more moderate and more ſalutary, the paſſions and intereſts of different orders mutually repreſſing that violence to which all of them, unchecked, are liable. It would, alſo, prove greatly advantageous, that in each tribe or diſtrict, certain deliberative functions ſhould be conferred by ſuffrage, and others diſtributed by lot; and if the populace be extremely numerous, that only certain diviſions of them ſhould be entitled ſucceſſively to receive fees, or allowed ſucceſſively to try their chance in the appointment by lot. In oligarchies, on the other hand, the people at large might be rendered leſs hoſtile, nay, friendly, to the government, were certain deliberative functions entruſted to men choſen from the whole promiſcuouſly, or were an inſtitution to be introduced ſimilar to what prevails in ſome republics, called the *Council of Preadviſers*, who prepare and impartially examine thoſe public queſtions, which the nobles or citizens are afterwards entitled to decide. Nay, the nobles or magiſtrates might aſſume the office of preadviſers, which would give them a negative, before debate, on all popular decrees; or they might ſubmit public meaſures to the free diſcuſſion of the people, reſerving to themſelves the right of ultimate deciſion. In republics, the people convened in the national aſſembly ought to have the power of acquittal, but not of condemnation; the latter, in the laſt reſort, ought

 always

BOOK VI.

always to reft with the magiftrates and the law. The reverfe of this prevails; the power of acquittal depends on the few, that of condemnation is lodged with the many. So much with regard to the deliberative power, which conftitutes the foundation and root of the fovereignty.

Chap. 15.

Of the executive power in republics.

The executive power of government muft neceffarily be entrufted to magiftrates, in whofe appointment, regulation, and diftribution, there is a great variety of cafes. How many magiftrates ought there to be? with what functions ought they to be entrufted? how long ought each office to laft? a year, fix months, longer than the former period, or fhorter than the latter? Ought any offices to be for life, and ought the fame offices to be held more than once by the fame perfon? Still farther, who ought to elect or appoint the magiftrates? from whom ought they to be chofen or appointed? and in what manner ought the appointment to be made? A philofophical ftatefman ought clearly to comprehend all thofe varieties, and to be capable of folving each queftion in all the ways that are particularly adapted to the nature and end of the different forms of government.

Wherein the executive power confifts.

Firft of all, it is not perhaps clearly afcertained what properly conftitutes a magiftracy. A ftate requires many affiftants and many fuperintendants—priefts; ambaffadors; facred heralds; exhibitioners, at their own expence, of public amufements; all of whom, if not neceffary for its mere fubfiftence, are yet effential to its

its well-being and happinefs. None of thefe, however, are called magiftrates, though they be appointed, as all magiftrates are, by fuffrage or lot; neither do we call magiftrates thofe deftined to functions merely fubfervient to œconomy, as corn-meters; nor thofe employed in offices rather menial than magifterial; offices, which in ftates moderately wealthy, are commonly configned to flaves. He then is a magiftrate who, in his own perfon, or affociated with colleagues, is in certain matters entrufted by the public with the power of deliberating, of judging, above all, of commanding; and to define the word more nicely is not neceffary for our prefent purpofe.

The difcrimination of offices in relation to the magnitude of the community, and the various forms of government.

To return then from words to things, we obferve that the divifion of labour greatly facilitates all purfuits, and that each kind of work is beft performed, when each is allotted to a feparate workman. To the complicated affairs of government, this obfervation is particularly applicable; but is not always poffible that it fhould be practically applied. Small communities require nearly the fame diftinct offices of magiftracy, that are neceffary in large ones; but they do not require, that the duties of any one office fhould be fo often exercifed, or that the magiftrates fhould fo often perform precifely the fame functions. Small communities therefore, may, without much inconvenience, admit of pluralities; and this is a fortunate circumftance, fince it would not be eafy, in fuch communities, to find a fucceffion of men willing

and well qualified to exercife all public offices feparately. It is neceffary, therefore, to have recourfe to an accumulation of employment, and to make the fame individual anfwer feveral purpofes; competently, though not perfectly; like thofe complex contrivances, the *obelifco-lychnia*, which, in the houfes of the poor, ferve alternately as fpits and candlefticks. Some offices muft be feparated, on account of the different places in which they are exercifed; and others, on account of the different objects or perfons to whom they relate. Can the fame magiftrate, who prefides over the police in the market-place, direct that important object elfewhere? Ought he, who fuperintends the modefty of boys, to have the additional burden of guarding the morals of women? Under different forms of government there muft be different magiftrates, and thofe invefted with different degrees of power, and appointed from different defcriptions of perfons. The office of fenator is confonant to the nature of democracy; but that of preadvifer, which was above defcribed, is peculiarly applicable to oligarchy. In fome democracies, indeed, the authority of the fenate is inconfiderable; but this happens only in that laft and worft kind of democracy, where the people, corrupted by fees, forfake their private affairs, to carry on the lucrative trade of government. The cenfor of manners, is a magiftrate adapted only to an ariftocracy. What fhould he do in a democracy! Is it poffible, under fuch a government, to keep the wives of the poor in their houfes! and his remon-

ftrances

ſtrances would be ſuperfluous in an oligarchy, where women, eſpecially the wives of the magiſtrates, are diſſolved in luxury.

The various ways of appointing magiſtrates.

We now proceed to the important ſubject of the appointment of magiſtrates; a ſubject included within three terms, each of which admits of three variations. The three terms are, thoſe who may appoint, thoſe who may be appointed, and the manner of the appointment. Thoſe who appoint, may conſiſt either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in ſome offices, they may conſiſt of all; in others, of a part. Thoſe who may be appointed, may conſiſt either of all the citizens, or of a part only; or, in ſome offices, of all; in others, of a part. The manner of appointment is alſo threefold, by election; by ſuffrage; in ſome offices by election; in others by ſuffrage. There are, therefore, in all, nine variations or differences; and it comes to be conſidered in how many ways thoſe nine differences may be combined with each other; the appointers, the appointed, and the mode of appointment entering into each combination. The three variations or differences, in the appointers, combined with the ſame number of variations or differences in the appointed, will give, it is plain, nine combinations of two terms; and each of theſe nine may be repeated three times, ſince the appointment may be made in three ways. There are, therefore, in all twenty-ſeven combinations, or twenty-ſeven varieties in the appointment of magiſtrates; of which varieties, ſome are conſonant to the nature of one kind of

of government, and others to that of another. That *all* the citizens ſhould be capable of appointing or capable of being appointed, is conſonant to the nature of democracy; but more eſpecially when the word *all* is taken to denote the whole body of the citizens collectively. It alſo denotes the ſeveral tribes and minuter diviſions of the citizens, which, united, compoſe the whole. In this latter ſenſe, all the citizens are capable of appointing ſucceſſively, or of being ſucceſſively appointed; each diviſion enjoying thoſe advantages in its turn; which regulation, while it prevents the tumult incident to numerous aſſemblies, enſures the benefits of equality and freedom [s]. We have ſhewn that each of the three terms concerned in the appointment of magiſtrates, admits of three varieties. If two of the terms, namely, the appointers and appointed, be limited to two varieties only, and conſiſt in all elections either of the whole or a part of the citizens, without coupling together the whole and the part in the manner above ſpecified, then all the varieties in conſtituting magiſtrates will be reduced to twelve [t]. For the whole citizens may appoint

[s] Such, according to Ariſtotle, was once the plan of the republic of Mantinæa, ſo juſtly celebrated; and ſuch was the republic of Telecles the Mileſian. Polyb. l. vi. c. xliii. Ælian Var. Hiſt. l. ii. c. xxii. Maximus Tyrius, Diſſert. vi. The laſt mentioned author calls Mantinæa an ariſtocracy, which the learned Schweighæuſer, Annot. ad Polyb. t. v. p. 384. ſays, agrees with Ariſtotle, Polit. l. vi. c. iv. This, however, is not true; for Ariſtotle calls it a democracy.

[t] When there are three varieties in each of the three terms, then $3 \times 3 = 9 \times 3 = 27$; but when two of the terms are ſuppoſed to vary only

appoint from the whole, by suffrage; by lot; in some offices by suffrage, in others by lot: or the whole may appoint from a part by suffrage; by lot; and sometimes by suffrage, sometimes by lot. This, then, affords six varieties; and there must be the same number precisely when a part only appoints. For this part may appoint from the whole by vote; by lot; or sometimes by vote, sometimes by lot; and likewise from a part, by the same three modes of appointment, that is; by vote; by lot; and sometimes in the one way, sometimes in the other. There will, therefore, be twelve combinations, without coupling together the whole and the part, either in the appointers or the appointed; that is, without reckoning the combinations resulting from the right of the whole to appoint in some cases, and a part in others; and from the capacity of the whole to be appointed in some cases, and a part only in others. A simple democracy requires that the whole collectively should appoint from the whole by vote, by lot; or in some offices by vote, in others by lot. A well-ordered republic requires that the whole not collectively, but separately by divisions, should appoint from the whole, or from a part; by suffrage, by lot, or by a due mixture of both. An oligarchy requires that a part only should be invested with the right of appointing, either by vote or by lot;

adjusted to the different forms of government.

only in two ways, then $2 \times 2 = 4$. & $4 \times 3 = 12$. The text is corrupt; and it seems scarcely possible to give any clear explanation of it, that will not be liable to philological objections.

BOOK VI.

lot; or in ſome caſes by vote, in others by lot; and this laſt mode, as it is moſt ſatisfactory to the people at large, is moſt favourable to the ſtability of the government. In ariſtocracies, all the citizens may be inveſted with the right of electing, but the elected muſt be perſons of a certain deſcription. In oligarchies, the ſphere of the candidates, as well as that of the electors, muſt be narrowed and confined to perſons of a certain cenſus. Such then are the principal modes of conſtituting magiſtrates, which are reſpectively adapted to different governments; but when different modes are equally well adapted to the frame of the government, the propriety of preferring the one to the other will depend on the duties and functions of the office or magiſtracy itſelf. Under the ſame form of government there may be good reaſons for appointing a general in one way, and a judge in another.

Chap. 16.

Of the judiciary power.

Of the three portions of the ſovereignty above mentioned, the legiſlative, the executive, and the judiciary, the laſt only remains to be treated. The varieties of courts of juſtice are limited by the different modes in which they may be conſtituted; the qualities of the members of whom they may be compoſed; and the various kinds of cauſes which they are empowered to determine. Judges may, like other magiſtrates, be appointed by ſuffrage, or by lot; from all the citizens indiſcriminately, or from perſons of a certain deſcription only; but the different nature of the cauſes which they are empowered to deter-

Judicial proceedings reduced to eight kinds.

determine, forms the ſpecific diſtinction among courts of juſtice. Theſe cauſes may all be reduced to the eight following claſſes: 1. The reſponſibility of magiſtrates; for in every government not arbitrary, there muſt be a court of impeachment. 2. Acts of injuſtice reſpecting the property of the community, whether committed by magiſtrates or private perſons. 3. All acts, by whomever committed, which have a tendency to ſubvert or change the conſtitution. 4. All matters relating to fines and amercements. 5. Diſputes concerning contracts of a certain importance, or concerning objects exceeding a certain value. 6. All cauſes concerning homicide, including under that general name, malice propenſe, chance medley, and all the various caſes in which the life of a man is acknowledged to have been taken away, but the criminality of the act is the matter in queſtion. The court of Phreattæ in Athens tries perſons who, having fled for murder, have returned to their country; which cauſes, however, cannot prove ſo numerous as to require a ſeparate juriſdiction, even in large communities. 7. The cauſes of ſtrangers, whether among themſelves or between ſtrangers and citizens, form the ſeventh claſs. 8. The eighth includes pecuniary queſtions of ſmall amount, five drachmas or a little more, which muſt indeed be determined, but which ought not to occupy the attention of a numerous tribunal. How inferior courts are formed, is not always a matter of the moſt eſſential importance; but unleſs thoſe ſupreme judicatures be well regulated,

BOOK VI.

gulated, which decide great political queſtions, and aſcertain men's rights in ſociety, confuſion and ſedition will enſue.

The various ways in which courts of judicature may be conſtituted.

Such courts may be conſtituted from the citizens at large, appointed by lot or ſuffrage, to judge of all political or public cauſes; or the judges in ſome cauſes may be appointed by lot, and in others by ſuffrage; or in trying the ſame cauſes, or cauſes of the ſame nature, the ſame court may be conſtituted partly by ſuffrage and partly by lot. There are, therefore, four ways in which the judges may be appointed from all the citizens collectively; and there are preciſely as many when courts are conſtituted from all the citizens, not collectively, but ſucceſſively; that is, when each diviſion of the people enjoys in its turn the privilege of ſupplying the country with judges. Again, if the judges are to be appointed from men of a certain deſcription only, courts may, on this ſuppoſition alſo, be conſtituted in four ways. For men of this deſcription, diſtinguiſhed by wealth, birth, or merit, may be appointed by lot or ſuffrage to try all political or public cauſes; or the judges in ſome cauſes may be appointed by lot, in others by ſuffrage; or in trying the ſame cauſes, or cauſes of the ſame nature, the ſame court may be conſtituted partly by lot, and partly by ſuffrage. There appears, therefore, to be in all twelve modes of forming judiciary aſſemblies, without coupling together the whole and the part; that is, without ſuppoſing that ſome courts are formed from the whole citizens collectively or ſucceſſively, and

and others compofed of men of a certain defcription only; or that the numbers of the fame courts are chofen partly from the citizens at large, and partly from men of diftinction.

Adjufted to the different forms of government.

That all political or public caufes fhould be determined by judges chofen from the people at large, is agreeable to the nature of democracy; that all fuch caufes fhould be determined by men of a certain defcription, is agreeable to the nature of oligarchy; but that fome courts fhould be formed from the citizens at large, and others from a diftinguifhed portion of the citizens; or that the members of the fame court fhould be appointed, fome of them from the whole body of the people, and others from a diftinguifhed part of the people; fome of them by lot; and others by fuffrage; all thefe mixtures and combinations are agreeable to the nature of a juftly conftituted and fairly balanced republic.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VII.*

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK VII.

THIS Seventh Book treats of political revolutions, whether ſlow and gradual, or rapid and violent; whether originating in the nature of civil ſociety itſelf, or reſulting from the form and principle of different conſtitutions of government. Had the author written with the expreſs deſign of benefiting the preſent age, this part of his work could not be more uſeful or more ſeaſonable. Even a more ſerious attention is due to it, than to any thing which the preſent times could poſſibly produce; ſince at this momentous æra, when the nations which have overturned their own governments, are continually exhorting and encouraging neighbouring ſtates to imitate their example, we here find the opinions of the wiſeſt man of antiquity on the great and awful queſtions which now agitate the world: the opinions of an author remote from our concerns, unmoved by our

* Commonly publiſhed as Book V.

paſſions,

paſſions, unaffected by our intereſts. On this ſerious ſubject, therefore, which now more than at any other period in modern hiſtory, comes home to the buſineſs and boſoms of individuals, I need not be greatly apprehenſive of tiring the reader, when I endeavour to place in a clear and ſtrong light, thoſe obſervations of the Stagirite, which ſeem beſt calculated to anſwer the immediate purpoſe of public and preſent utility.

From the nature of ſociety, which, as above explained, is not a mere maſs but a ſyſtem, implying a diſtinction and ſubordination of parts; and ſtill more palpably, though not more neceſſarily, from the nature of property, the creature of ſociety, which in its very eſſence implies inequality, there muſt grow up and co-exiſt, with every community of men, whatever be the form of the commonwealth, a popular and an ariſtocratical intereſt [a]; and thence, not indeed a perpetual conflict, but a perpetual tendency to conflict, between the rights and privileges of the many, and the pre-eminences and prerogatives of the few. This fermenting diſcontent may be hindered from blazing into ſedition, either by force or by art. All ranks may be levelled by the cruel hand of deſpotiſm; they may all be confounded by the wild rage of democracy. But theſe are remedies which cure the evil by killing the patient. The important

[a] In ſome of the Italian republics of the middle age, the people deſtroyed the nobles; but the diſtinction immediately ſprang up between "il popolo graſſo & il popolo minuto;" and faction, inſtead of being ſoftened, was thereby exaſperated. Machiavel, Nerli, Malavolti, paſſim.

queſtion

question is, how this tendency to dissension may be repressed, without destroying that degree of independence or security which is essential to happiness, or that degree of power and authority which is essential to humanity itself; since indispensably necessary in rearing and holding together the fabric of political society, in which all the perfections of humanity originate, and in which only their energies can be unfolded and displayed.[b]

The proposed question Aristotle endeavours to answer. He observes that the evil most threatening to society, may be lessened by skilful political arrangement, nicely adapting to each other the principles and springs of government; but that it never can be eradicated unless one portion of mankind are so trained and educated that they will disdain to commit injustice, and think themselves more degraded by offering an insult, than even by receiving it; while those of an inferior stamp, how much inclined soever many of them may be to do wrong, are convinced that it cannot be done with impunity, and that they cannot hurt their superiors, without thereby more materially hurting their families and themselves[c]. In an age exposed like the present to the conflict of opposite and unrelenting factions, the Stagirite, therefore, maintained that oligarchies, aristocracies, and every description of government vested in the few, can only be upheld by moderation in language as well as in behaviour; and that a

[b] See above, p. 23, & seq. [c] Book ii. c. vii. passim.

single

fingle word of contumely had fometimes fhaken the proudeft *dynafties*[d].' He maintained, that popular governments on the other hand, could reft fecurely on no other foundation than that of political juftice; which confifts in diftributing to each individual his due, and in affigning to wealth and birth, as well as to talents and virtues, their legitimate diftinctions and fair honours. While he thus endeavours to moderate the hoftility of contending extremes, and to fmooth their mutual afperities, he ftrenuoufly exerts himfelf to make the middle claffes of men love and cherifh their condition as the very beft and happieft in which they poffibly could be placed; and, therefore, to reject and repel every attempt that might difturb or deftroy it, as a daring invafion of their deareft interefts. Governments are good and nations happy, in proportion to the preponderancy of the middle ranks, and their ability to defy the pride and oppreffion of the great, as well as to refift the rapacity and malignity of the vulgar. Where this grand teft of national felicity is found, the citizens or fubjects ought to regard as matters of little moment, and even to confider with diftruft, any propofed additions to their political advantages; which it will be always eafier for vice and folly to deftroy or diminifh, than for the moft enlarged wifdom to meliorate or extend.[e]

Governments muft always have their imperfections, while conducted by fuch imperfect

[d] See above, p. 334. [e] See above, Book iv. c. xi.

 creatures

BOOK VII. creatures as men, whofe nature it is to beftow an undue preference on the prefent above the future, and on a flight immediate benefit refulting to themfelves above a far greater, more extenfive, and more permanent advantage accruing to the public. All governments, therefore, that ever were eftablifhed or devifed, have contained, on the flighteft examination, innumerable inconveniences; which, when deeply and intimately mingled in the nature of the conftitution itfelf, ought rather to be patiently endured than violently corrected[f], becaufe they are as much more tolerable than would be the evils of anarchy and fedition, as a ftate of civilization in which men lie under many oppreffive reftraints, is preferable to that of favage ferocity in which they are continually tearing to pieces each other; a melancholy fpectacle which hiftory never fails to exhibit, when government is for a moment fufpended, or its powers to a certain degree enfeebled. The inherent vices of man, his pride, avarice, ambition, and felfifhnefs, render it neceffary that power fhould fomewhere be exercifed, left injury fhould every where be committed; and the fewer and feebler thofe vices are, the government will naturally be the milder and more moderate. All plans of policy which fuppofe a complete reformation in the manners of mankind, are chimerical; but reformation to a certain point, falutary difcipline will gradually pro-

[f] See above, Book ii. c. vi. p. 110, & feq.

duce;

duce; and exactly in proportion to the effect of this discipline, governments may be meliorated, and one syſtem of policy be rendered more gentle and more deſirable than another[g]. For this reaſon our author obſerves, that the more ſociety is improved and education perfected, the more equality will prevail, and the farther will liberty be extended.

But even this political equality or liberty has, according to the Stagirite, its fixed and unalterable limits; ſince no political advantage, except the equal protection of juſt laws, can be carried to its utmoſt height, without becoming inconſiſtent with other advantages, collectively more important. Men in one ſenſe are born equal; they are all equal as to their viſible powers or *energies*, becauſe they are all at their birth devoid of *any* that can be of the leaſt public utility; but they are even then, extremely unequal as to their latent endowments or *capacities*; ſince, with preciſely the ſame treatment and the ſame education, different individuals will attain very different meaſures of courage and wiſdom, as well as of ſtrength and agility. This original inequality is confirmed and ſtrengthened by the exigencies and neceſſities of ſociety, under all its poſſible forms; which, the more perfect it is, the more perfectly it will concur with the views and intentions of nature in promoting the benefit and happineſs of the human race; purpoſes that can only be pro-

[g] αιει δε το βελτιστον ηθος, βελτιονος αιτιον πολιτειας. Polit. l. viii. c. i.

 moted

BOOK VII. moted by the subordination of passion and ignorance to reason and wisdom. This is the great and paramount law of political society by which all men are bound from infancy to old age, and from their birth to their death[h]. Society then is a system, having the good and perfection of humanity for its end, and requiring for the specific purposes for which the system is ordained, an interchange of action, a reciprocity of aid, a distinction and subordination of parts; heads to contrive, and hands to execute. For this reason, the inferior ranks of men, those habitually employed in personal service or productive industry, were debarred in most Grecian republics from high political functions; functions deemed incompatible with those mean and mercenary employments, that have a tendency to narrow or debase the faculties; to obstruct liberal thought, and restrain manly exertion. What is properly called the populace in contradistinction to the people at large, then consisted almost entirely of slaves; a palpable and odious deformity in the ancient republics; since a great proportion of mankind was thus subjected to a government, not of law, but of arbitrary will[i]. Yet perfect equality and universal suffrage are

[h] "A natural aristocracy is diffused by God through the whole body of mankind." Harrington's Oceana, p. 14. edit. 1656. "An army may as well consist of soldiers without officers, as a commonwealth consist of a people without a gentry." Ibid. Yet Harrington, surely, was not a man of a slavish mind. How far have the professed followers of Locke, the Rosseaus, the Turgots, the Prices, &c. outdone the enlightened friends of liberty in former ages!

[i] See above, b. i. c. iv. p. 36. The Grecian institutions, as I have there shewn, tended to palliate, but certainly did not cure the evil.

arrange-

arrangements not leſs blameable or leſs dangerous; ſince, as our author perpetually inculcates, theſe wild projects would totally ſubvert the principles on which ſociety is built, and overturn the great fundamental law on which only it can reſt.

Innumerable examples might be given of the ſame kind, all conſpiring to prove that an ambition to reach perfection in one point of advantage, is deſtructive of other advantages not leſs eſſential. An experiment has been made in our own times of forming a ſimple legiſlature; or, in other words, of confiding what is called by Greek writers the deliberative power of government to one ſingle aſſembly. This experiment ſtands in direct oppoſition to the recorded wiſdom of antiquity, which maintained that two deliberative aſſemblies were eſſentially neceſſary in every well-regulated ſtate, becauſe abſurd and ruinous reſolutions were much leſs likely to be taken by two different bodies of men deliberating concerning the ſame object, than by one body of men only; whether a ſenate of the nobles, or an aſſembly of the people. If we ſuppoſe it to be ten to one, that ſuch an extraordinary combination of circumſtances ſhould occur, as might extort from one of thoſe courts or aſſemblies a decree ruinous to the ſtate, or to any part of it, the rules of calculation will teach us, that it is not twenty, but an hundred to one, that the ſame decree ſhould at the ſame time be confirmed by the ſecond court or aſſembly, differently compoſed, and

differently conftituted. For the fafety of the public, therefore, two deliberative bodies are always better than one; and according to the fame principle of reafoning, three would be ftill better than two, and four better than three. But it is eafy to perceive, that though the purpofe of mature deliberation would thus be more perfectly fecured by the multiplication of courts and affemblies, the great end of feafonable and wife decifion would not thereby the more probably be attained; but on the contrary, through delays and diffenfions, would commonly be entirely defeated. From this plain and palpable example, we may learn to perceive with our author that, in matters of far more difficulty and delicacy, political wifdom confifts in avoiding extremes. He continually inculcates and repeats, that the propriety of practical things lies not in an indivifible point, but in a broad middle; that in them nice accuracy is not to be aimed at; but that we muft be contented in politics with fuch a degree of perfection as fuits the coarfenefs of the fubject; nor prepofteroufly forego, by over-refinement in one point of advantage, other advantages ftill more folid; relinquifh certainty for hope; or incur the danger of real evil for the fake of imaginary improvement.

Of all political errors (an error long prevalent in the practice as well as in the theory of the Greek republics) the greateft is that of thinking that the inftitutions of one people may be fafely communicated to another, differently endowed

endowed and differently circumftanced. Men are no where to be found unwritten tablets. Their minds are deeply impreffed by education and habit, as well as by the events of time and chance, which giving to each nation its diftinctive character, peculiarly adapt it to that form of political arrangement into which it has been gradually moulded. The eftablifhing of governments is the work of time; and to new-model them fuccefsfully and happily, requires ftill more time than originally to eftablifh them; becaufe laws operate as practical principles of moral conduct, and old principles muft be obliterated by time and cuftom, before the new can by the fame means be communicated and impreffed. Men deftitute of principles are the moft odious and moft abominable of favages; and practical principles are to be acquired by practice only; they are the refult of repeated acts, fortified by time and familiarifed by cuftom. Yet in direct oppofition to thefe maxims of reafon, confirmed by univerfal experience, we have feen the revolutionary doctrines which prevailed in the worft times of Greece, revived in the prefent age; and a fingle nation propofing in a tone of authority the inftitutions, which fhe herfelf has thought fit to adopt, to all the countries around her; and, in her eagernefs not only to diffufe her political principles as extenfively as the world, but to reduce them every where to practice, ftriving, with the cruel tyranny of Procruftes, to fit the body of each captive

captive traveller to her murderous and torturing bed.

When Ariſtotle oppoſes innovation, however, it is not on coarſe popular arguments: he does not appeal merely to our feelings; he does not addreſs our *prejudices;* he does not attempt to excite a ſuperſtitious veneration for antiquity. To prefer what is ancient, merely becauſe it is ancient, and to deduce the expediency of our laws and cuſtoms merely from the practice of our remote anceſtors, he well knew, was to appeal to the imagination and paſſions, in a caſe that ought to be decided by the ſole authority of reaſon. In various parts of his works, and not leaſt in his book on political revolutions, he powerfully intereſts the heart; but he always endeavours to reach it by the road of the underſtanding: nor did it ever occur to his diſcernment, that any thing could be prudently ſaid to the feelings of the former, which might not bear to be examined by the light of the latter. With him, mere feeling was but a part of the low animal nature, a part which in brutes is directed to its proper ends by an intelligence not their own; but which in man muſt, according to the ordinance of Deity itſelf, be directed and diſciplined by reaſon and cuſtom, that it may thus be ſtrengthened into habit and exalted into virtue; for, in the language of ancient philoſophy, virtue, as the attribute of a man, is ſynonymous with habit. In every well-regulated ſtate, early inſtitution is the great forming and vivify-

vivifying power of government; and that which education begins, the law carries on and perfects[f]. They are both practical principles, and

[f] Aristotle places the stability of government chiefly in the three following points; first, the respect due to age and experience; secondly, the distribution of honours and offices according to evident and approved merit; thirdly, an education accurately adapted to the pattern of the commonwealth. Were we to examine the history of all the governments on earth, we should perceive that they have been upheld by an adherence to those grand principles, and subverted by a departure from them. I shall select, for the sake of illustration, the examples of China and France; the former of which is rendered familiar to the reader's mind by a recent publication, and the latter is impressed by the momentous events and unexampled calamities which mark the present times. In China, the paternal authority is the main pillar of the political edifice; all offices are bestowed, according to the proficiency of the candidates in useful knowledge, by comparative trials, similar to those by which academic honours were formerly conferred in Europe; and the education of youth is so accurately fitted to the plan of the government, that the education in China exactly suits that country, and it only. The consequence of all this is plainly attested in history: the constitution of China has been and continues, the most invariably stable of any known in the world. The constitution of France, on the other hand, has been completely subverted in the course of a few years. What are the causes? The veneration for aged experience had ceased; intrigue supplied the place of merit; and the principles instilled into youth, and into the public at large, directly counteracted the spirit of the government. The ministers of Louis XV. are known to have set the first example in France of bestowing the highest dignities of the church on young gentlemen of family; thus degrading those sacred honours which Aristotle maintains ought to be the exclusive reward of venerable age; from which chiefly they derive their awful influence over the minds of men. Their ambition, and that of their successors under a new reign, rendered them the armed abettors of American independence. Reasons were to be found for justifying a measure in direct opposition to the laws of nations, and the faith of treaties. These reasons were only to be deduced from that principle, fruitful in monsters, the unalienable sovereignty of the people; which was, therefore, now first adopted in France; cherished, invigorated, and propagated with a degree of zeal and activity which established a democracy in the public mind, even during the existence of the monarchy. The disorders of the finances were the immediate occasion, not the primary cause, of the revolution. The notables, and afterwards the states general, had only to assemble in order to prove by their conduct that opinion governs the world.

right

right only, when originating in a right practice; by means of which, combined with example and exercise, they operate an early and wonderful change on the passions and appetites; so that as reason fortifies and improves, these subordinate powers of our nature are continually more disposed to acknowledge her authority, and to mingle with her, in due time, in the sweetest harmony. To alter laws and political institutions without the most evident necessity, is, therefore, wantonly to tamper with the spring of moral action; to weaken or destroy that principle in man, on which the persuasive efficacy of all laws is founded; from which governments derive their strength; and individuals, their security.

In opposition to the tenets which have been so industriously propagated in some modern nations, Aristotle, while he inhabited the freest and most democratical republic of all antiquity, maintained that, from a due mixture of aristocratic elements, the fabric of political society derives both its solidity and its splendour. The very popular doctrine, therefore, which maintains that all power is derived from the people[g], to

[g] According to Dr. Price, liberty is "The power of a civil society to govern itself by its own discretion, or by laws of its own making, by the majority, in a collective body, or by fair representation. In every free state every man is his own legislator." Price on Civil Liberty. This definition contains the essence of Locke on Government, and of its French transcript, Rousseau's Contrat Social." Locke, I firmly believe, was a religious man, and a good subject; yet by a strange combination of circumstances, the philosophical opinions of this great adversary of Aristotle, have had no small tendency to promote scepticism, and his political principles to encourage rebellion.

to the majority of whom it unalienably belongs, and by whom it may always lawfully be refumed, muft have appeared to him not lefs wicked than it is weak, not lefs deteftable than it is extravagant; efpecially, could he have forefeen that many of the authors who fupported this wild affertion, fhould have exerted themfelves moft ftrenuoufly to deftroy all reverence for thofe inftitutions, which, while they enlarge the wifdom and exalt the affections of the few, have the moft direct tendency to reftrain the vices and to moderate the paffions of the multitude. What renders Rouffeau of Geneva, and other writers of that ftamp, fo hoftile to Chriftianity? They tell us that it commands fubmiffion to the higher powers; and is, therefore, a religion fit only for flaves[h]. But an author, not inferior to Rouffeau in vigour of fancy, incomparably his fuperior in point of learning and judgment, and a far better advocate in the caufe of true liberty, had long before proved that the pretended flavifhnefs of Chriftianity amounts to nothing more than that its awful fanction may be employed to fupport eftablifhed magiftracy, and uphold lawful authority[i]. In this particular, Chriftianity commands what philofophy had uniformly prefcribed; maintaining that obedience to authority is effential to humanity[k], fince the powers of human nature cannot be unfolded

[h] Contrat Social, l. iv. c. viii.

[i] Buchannanus de Jure Regni apud Scotos, c. lxiii. lxiv. & lxv.

[k] This fentiment is well expreffed by Jofephus, in defcribing the principles of the moft philofophical fect among his countrymen: ου γαρ διχα θεου περιγινεσθαι τινι το αρχειν. De Bello Judaic. ii. 8.

but

but in a ftate of fociety; and fince, without government, fociety could not for a moment be fecurely preferved, any more than it could, without government, have been originally eftablifhed. Upon this foundation, the Stagirite afferts that birth and wealth, as well as talents, morals, and experience, ought to have their due weight in every community which has the good of the whole for its main object, and that every principle which tends to maintain a reafonable and moderate ariftocracy, ought to be improved and cherifhed, in order to counteract that dangerous propenfity to fedition and anarchy, which, wherever they prevail, render the habitations of men more bloody and more abominable than the dens of wild beafts[1].

As a due proportion of ariftocratic elements is effential to the very exiftence of a commonwealth, it is a queftion of the utmoft importance how this neceffary ariftocracy ought to be conftituted? When fuperiority in wealth is accompanied by fuperiority in worth, which will naturally happen when the higher ranks are more watchfully and more liberally educated, in proportion to the extent of their fortunes, the plain and palpable diftinction of opulence will then, doubtlefs, be entitled to a certain degree of political pre-eminence. The evil is,

[1] απειρος γαρ ἡ της επιθυμιας φυσις, ἡς προς την αναπληρωσιν οἱ πολλοι ζωσι. How is this univerfal evil, the fenfelefs defires and dangerous propenfities of the multitude, to be controlled? αν ἡττυς τε ωσι, και μη αδικωνται. "By the weight of authority, and the equity with which it is adminiftered. Polit. l. ii. c. vii. p. 324.

when

when the respect either for wealth, or for birth, which is recommended chiefly as hereditary wealth, gives to such distinctions, independently of the education and manners with which they ought to be accompanied, too decided and too overbearing a superiority; and when the aristocracy is thereby so much narrowed, that its interests are detached and separated from those of the community at large. The worst species of aristocracy degenerates into what Aristotle calls a *dynasty;* the absolute power of fierce and arbitrary chieftains over timid and servile vassals. When power is not an appendage of the person or the individual, but belongs to the whole body of nobles, who serve mutually to check and controul each other, the government, by a proper degree of moderation in the magistrate, may be rendered safe and salutary, and the object even of affection to the governed[m]. But the best adjustment of those aristocratical elements is that by which they are rendered subservient to the interests of the community at large; productive of its prosperity, and conducive to its stability. Aristotle has endeavoured to shew how these desirable ends were attained in some governments of antiquity. But the most illus-

[m] This observation is strongly confirmed by the history of the two aristocracies of Venice and Bern, the former (till its late destruction) comprehending the most beautiful and best cultivated territory in the north of Italy, and the latter extending over the third part of Switzerland. Under both those governments the subjects have long enjoyed an enviable condition of peace and prosperity; happy in themselves, and therefore contented with their masters. But it would be an error to believe that those republican institutions which suit a certain mediocrity of circumstances, might be safely adopted by great nations.

trious

trious example of this kind which the hiftory of the world ever exhibited, is the ariftocratical arrangement in the conftitution of Great Britain. The nobles of this country are not invefted individually with any degree of pre-eminence or authority that can be at all dangerous to the meaneft of the people, fince all executive power flows folely from the crown, and is exercifed by refponfible minifters; a king of Great Britain being conftitutionally, in the words of the Stagirite, "a public guardian;" and his high office, "a pledge and fecurity that the nobles fhall not be fubjected to injuftice, nor the people to infult[n]." The peers, taken collectively, form a fecond

[n] Polit. l. v. c. x. p. 403. That the majefty of the throne is the beft fafeguard of equal laws and public liberty, is a truth perpetually attefted in the annals of modern Europe. The people at large, whenever they had an opportunity of declaring their fentiments freely and fully, uniformly maintained the authority of their kings againft the arrogant pretenfions of priefts and nobles, and the daring invafion of upftart factions. The nations of the north and of the fouth on every occafion difcovered the fame difpofition, and preferred even the abfolute power of a prince to the more dreaded exertions of a divided authority. To the deputies of the people at large, affembled not as ufual at Odenfee, but in the midft of the populace of Copenhagen, the kings of Denmark owe the prerogatives which they have enjoyed fince 1660. The crown of Sweden, which had been trampled on by the nobles in 1756, was reftored to its ancient fplendour by the co-operation of the burghers and peafants in 1772. If we examine the hiftory of the cortes of Spain, the ftates general of France, the diets of Germany, we fhall fee in all thofe affemblies alike, that the Tiers Etat, the deputies of the people, were the moft ftedfaft adherents to the fovereignty of kings *; and in England, when monarchy was overthrown by a combination of knavery and fanaticifm,

* In the tumultuary ftates of 1614, the deputies of the people defended againft the nobles and clergy the authority of an undivided executive. "Que l'autorité du roi foit et demeure abfolue fur tous fes fujets de quelque profeffion qu'ils foient; & foit ce tenu pour loi fondamentale du royaume que la perfonne du roi eft fainte et inviolable, auquel eft due toute obeiffance et fidelité, fans qu'il foit loifible à aucun de fes fujets, de quelque qualité et condition qu'il foit, ecclefiaftique ou feculier, de s'en exempter."

a ſecond deliberative aſſembly, which was formerly proved to be an inſtitution eſſentially requiſite in every well-regulated ſtate. They conſtitute alſo the propereſt tribunal that could poſſibly be deviſed for trying perſons impeached by the Commons. A ſeat in the Houſe of Peers is naturally and not unfrequently the reward of important ſervices and illuſtrious merit; and muſt, therefore, continue to operate in the commonwealth as a perpetual incentive to emulation, and an unceaſing ſpring of energy. With all the privileges and advantages peculiar to that order, the peers are entitled even to reſpect, only when they exhibit characters ſuitable to their rank. They dare not oppreſs; they dare not injure; they cannot inſult with impunity the meaneſt of their fellow-ſubjects. They are intimately united in their moſt eſſential intereſts with the other branches of the conſtitution. They cannot, conſiſtently with their own ſafety, co-operate with thoſe leaders of the people who might be inclined to inſtitute a republic; becauſe their own honours and pre-eminences originating in the monarchy, can only be upheld by its ſtability; they could not abet the meaſures of thoſe courtiers or miniſters (were it poſſible to find any of ſuch conſummate folly) who might be inclined to render the crown ab-

fanaticiſm, it was re-eſtabliſhed with more general conſent than was, perhaps, ever given to any public act by ſo great and populous a nation.

BOOK VII. folute; becaufe they would thereby not only furrender the birthrights of their own children, but totally degrade and debafe themfelves. Their lives, and liberties, and properties, are maintained by the fame falutary inftitutions, which guard thofe of the people at large. Compared with this ineftimable benefit of juft and equal laws, how light in the balance are their pre-eminences, their diftinctions, and their titles? The conftitution of England has taken for its model Nature herfelf; and in afferting the exclufive privileges of the few, offers to the enjoyment of all, great and abfolute benefits, before whofe fteady luftre and intrinfic worth, perfonal and relative advantages fade away and vanifh.

BOOK VII.

ARGUMENT.

Caufes of feditions. — Infolence and rapacity of men in power. — Secret combination of obfcure factions, &c. — Particular caufes in each form of government refpectively. — How governments are to be preferved. — By ftrengthening the middle ranks, &c. — Of laws relative to Democracy — Oligarchy — Monarchy — Tyranny.

BOOK VII. Chap. 1. Of the primary caufes, or fountains, of fedition.

HAVING confidered almoft all the other queftions that formed the object of this inquiry, we proceed to examine the important fubject of political revolutions; their nature and number, their caufes and their confequences: an examination which will enable us to determine by what regulations and expedients, government in general, as well as each form of government in particular, may be ftrengthened and upheld. Juftice, the great law of the moral world, is acknowledged in all communities; but diffentions, and thence revolutions, take place, becaufe the rules of juftice are often eftimated by very different ftandards. The citizens at large, becaufe they are all equal in freedom, think themfelves entitled equally to participate in all other advantages; the diftinguifhed portion of the community, becaufe they are fuperior in fome particulars, think themfelves entitled to claim pre-eminence in all

other reſpects; and as it is difficult for any ſyſtem of government to gratify the expectations of the rich or noble, on the one hand, and thoſe of the people at large on the other; the ſeeds of diſcontent lurk in the boſom of every community, and require but a favourable ſeaſon to ferment into ſedition. Birth, wealth, ſtrength, and every ſuch political element, ſtrives to extend its influence, and to enlarge its dominion; and when checked in its ambitious purpoſes, is prepared to convulſe the ſtate. Virtue alone remains contented with the place allotted to it in the general arrangement, and though contributing more to the happineſs of civil life than all its other elements united, yet virtue never emblazons its titles, nor exaggerates its prerogatives; it neither plans conſpiracies, nor foments factions; and in this forbearance, it ſhews as much wiſdom as goodneſs, for the virtuous are comparatively ſo few in number, that ſhould they imprudently enter the political liſts, their party would be foiled in every conflict.

The general object and aim of revolutions.

Such then are the principles, and, as it were, the fountains of ſedition; of which the object may be, either to ſubvert eſtabliſhed government, or to acquire the principal ſhare in adminiſtration; to change monarchy or ariſtocracy, into a republic or a democracy; or to incline the balance of power, more than the conſtitution warrants, to the ſide of the prince, of the nobles, or of the people; to alter or aboliſh ſome particular magiſtracy, as Lyſander, at Sparta, endeavoured to deſtroy the office of king;

king; and Pausanias, in the same republic, strove to abolish the authority of the Ephori. At Epidamnus[n], the power belonging to the heads of tribes was transferred to a senate. The government was thus partially altered.[o]

The best means of preventing them.

In all political conflicts, the contending factions alternately appeal to justice; but the one party, as we observed before, measures justice by an arithmetical, and the other by a geometrical standard[p]; whereas, in fact, it ought to be regulated by both; and such governments as equitably combine arithmetical and geometrical proportion into one compound political ratio, can alone expect to be prosperous or stable. Regard ought, therefore, to be had to preeminent advantages peculiar to the few; regard ought, also, to be had to ordinary but useful qualities, common to all; yet, in the great partnership of a commonwealth, if men's shares are to be apportioned by one single ratio only, that of equality, in point of safety, is preferable[q]; for in democracies, there is but one principle of discord, the jarring interests of the many and of the few; but in oligarchies, the

[n] Epidamnus an Illyrian city, and one of the most considerable sea-ports on the coast of the Hadriatic. See History of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. p. 185.

[o] The next sentences have a reference to similar changes in Athens; but the text is imperfect and corrupt.

[p] See what is above said of arithmetical and geometrical proportion, vol. i. b. v. c. iii. p. 370.

[q] The author here prefers democracy to an oligarchic dynasty, as explained above, b. vi. c. vii. p. 330. But every people are not fit for living under the former government, "since, wherein some savage multitudes differ from wild beasts, is not easy to point out." See above, b. iii. c. vii. p. 216.

BOOK VII.

few not only maintain a perpetual conflict with the many, but frequently quarrel with each other; whereas, the diffenfions of the people, among themfelves, are comparatively flight and inconfiderable. Befides, a democracy is nearer to what we have called a republic, or government refiding chiefly in men of the middle rank; which, of all popular conftitutions, is the beft and fafeft.

Chap. 2.

In political revolutions three things to be confidered.

In examining the nature of political revolutions, we have to confider the fituation of mind or difpofition of thofe who are diffatisfied with the exifting government; the caufes which excite this diffatisfaction; and the various felfifh paffions of which the meaneft, when fully roufed, is fufficient to inflame difcontent into fedition. Men who think themfelves worthy of being treated as equals, will not contentedly fubmit to be treated as inferiors; and men who think themfelves entitled to pre-eminence, will not contentedly brook equality. The fituation of men's minds, therefore, which fits them for attempting revolutions, is a conception, well or ill founded, that they are deprived of their due rank in the commonwealth. This rank is a complex object, and refolves itfelf into profit and honour. Men, therefore, are tempted to fedition by a defire to increafe thefe objects, and to diminifh their contraries; to increafe their profits and honours; or, on the other hand, to prevent lofs and avoid difgrace. They are tempted to fedition, not merely that they may enrich or aggrandife themfelves, but becaufe they

Of the caufes of difcontent incident to

they ſee other men unjuſtly enriched, and unjuſtly aggrandiſed; and, oftentimes, the moſt ſolid merit offends by the glare of too conſpicuous a proſperity. The ordinary ſources of ſedition then are, inſolence, contempt, fear, diſproportionate or too rapid increaſe, and immoderate elevation. Impelled by ſuch cauſes, men fly to arms, and ſuddenly ſubvert the government. The ſame event happens as ſurely, but more ſlowly, through the combination of obſcure factions[r]; through negligence in the magiſtrates, particularly in diſregarding the effect of ſmall alterations; and through a variety of differences and incongruities, particularly a moral diſſimilitude in the citizens.

all governments.

That the inſolence, the rapacity, and the invidious honours of men in power, are, all of

Chap. 3.

The inſolence and rapacity of men in power.

[r] Of this there is a ſtriking example in the following paſſage of Livy, l. ix. c. 46. "Eodem anno (ſcil. U. C. 449.) Cn. Flavius Cn. filius, ſcriba, patre libertino, humili fortuna ortus, ceterùm callidus vir et facundus, ædilis curulis fuit. Ceterùm Flavium dixerat ædilem forenſis factio, Appii Claudii cenſura vires nacta; qui ſenatum primus, libertinorum filiis lectis, inquinaverat: et poſtquam eam lectionem nemo ratam habuit, nec in curia adeptus erat quas petierat, opes urbanas, humilibus per omnes tribus diviſis, forum et campum corrupit. Ex eo tempore in duas partes diſceſſit civitas: aliud, integer populus, fautor et cultor bonorum, aliud, forenſis factio tenebat." This unfortunate diviſion of the city, fomented by Appius, a proud ariſtocrat, and by Flavius, a plebeian notary, gave to the rabble of the Forum a decided advantage over the ſound and reſpectable part of the community. The former party ſupplied by experience and trick, their groſs defects in point of fortune, morals, and liberal education. Their triumph, however, was not laſting. The illuſtrious Q. Fabius, who from this atchievement, acquired the name of Maximus, purged the commonwealth from this excrement, which he threw into "four city tribes." Omnem forenſem turbam excretam in quatuor tribus conjecit, urbanaſque eas apellavit. Tit. Liv. ubi ſupra.

 them,

them, caufes of fedition, is too obvious to require illuftration. Refentment is eafily tranfferred from perfons to things. In odious hands, authority itfelf becomes hateful: and the feelings of mankind confpire with their reafon, to deftroy a government pregnant only with mifchief, difgraced by private injuftice, or deformed by public peculation. The undue influence of one man, or of a few, and their elevation towering too high above the level of the community, converts free governments fometimes into monarchies, and fometimes into *dynafties*, the worft fpecies of oligarchy. To prevent fuch fatal revolutions, the Argives and Athenians have recourfe to the oftracifm. But it is better to reprefs the firft fymptoms of immoderate elevation, than to counteract its tendency by a remedy as cruel as it is violent; a political amputation, which fevers from the commonwealth thofe qualified to form its beft defence and higheft ornament.

Fear its twofold operation as a caufe of fedition.

Fear operates in two ways as a caufe of fedition; fince thofe who dread to fuffer wrong, will attempt to difarm the oppreffor; and thofe who have committed wrong, will attempt to anticipate the hand of vengeance.

Contempt, its operation illuftrated by examples.

Contempt converts oligarchies into democracies, when the ftrength of the many is brought into comparifon with the weaknefs of the few; and the fame paffion fubverts democracies, when the concerted wifdom of the few is contrafted with the folly and anarchy of the multitude. The tumultuous democracy of Megara was deftroyed

by

by its own violence. The ſame cauſe overturned the popular government of Thebes, after the famous battle in the vineyards. Anarchy ſubjected Syracuſe to the tyranny of Gelon; and the diſorderly behaviour of the Rhodians enabled an ariſtocratical conſpiracy to ſeize the government.

The diſproportionate increaſe of any of the conſtituent parts of the commonwealth.

The diſproportionate increaſe of any of the conſtituent parts, is not leſs fatal to the political, than to the natural body; and when any of theſe parts is changed, not only in quantity or bulk, but in organization or form, new governments muſt reſult, ſpecifically different from the old. Such alterations happen ſometimes gradually and imperceptibly; at other times, ſuddenly and palpably. Soon after the Perſian invaſion of Greece, the flower of the Tarentine nobility was cut off in a battle againſt the barbarous Iapygians; and this diſaſter, diminiſhing, by a ſudden jerk, the weight of the ariſtocracy, enabled the people to change the *mixt polity* of Tarentum into a ſimple democracy. The overthrow of the Argives by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, compelled them to aſſociate their peaſants to the honours of government. In the Lacedæmonian war, the Athenians were ſummoned to take the field in the order of the muſter-roll; and the moſt diſtinguiſhed portion of the citizens thus ſuffered a great and ſpeedy diminution; which operated the ſame effect on the form of government, as would have been produced by a ſudden and diſproportionate increaſe of the populace.

Govern-

The ſecret combination of obſcure factions.

Governments change gradually through the ſecret combination of obſcure individuals. At Heraea, the ariſtocratical mode of appointment to office was changed for one more popular, becauſe a combination of mean mechanics determined to vote for none but perſons of their own level. The higher ranks of men, therefore, preferred the capricious deciſion by lot, to the certain partiality of election.

Negligence.

Governments are changed through negligence, when high offices of ſtate are entruſted to perſons unfriendly to the conſtitution. The oligarchy of Oreum[s] was thus ſubverted by Heracleodorus, a partiſan of democracy. Great revolutions ſometimes ariſe from ſlight neglects. At Ambracia[t], the cenſus requiſite for a citizen was ſmall. It was imprudently reduced to nothing; and the country ſoon fell into the hands of a houſeleſs rabble.

Diſſimilitude of manners and character; its effect in producing revolutions

Nothing is more unfriendly to public tranquillity than diſſimilitude of character in the citizens. A heterogeneous aſſemblage of mixed tribes cannot ſpeedily coaleſce into a nation; and communities, which have grown populous by ſudden acceſſions, are generally torn by ſedition. The Achæans and Træzenians[u], united in coloniſing Sybaris; but the Achæans reinforced

[s] Formerly, Hiſtiæa, a city in the iſle of Eubæa. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 389.

[t] A Corinthian colony in the Ambracian gulph, which derived its name from Ambrax, the grandſon of Lacaon. The capital was ſituate on the doubtful confines of Theſprotia and Moloſſia. Comp. Stephan. Byzant. Pauſan. Eliac. p. 437. & Tit. Liv. l. xxxviii. c. 4.

[u] Træzené, a city in the territory of Argos.

illustrated by examples.

by new colonies from home, expelled the Træzenians. The Sybarites who colonifed Thurii, experienced a fimilar misfortune; and claiming fuperiority over their fellow-planters, in virtue of their prior poffeffion of the country, they were driven into banifhment. The new inhabitants of Byzantium were difcovered confpiring againft the old; attacked, defeated, and expelled. The Antiffæans firft received with hofpitality, but afterwards ejected by arms, the Chian exiles; and the exiles of Samos ejected the Zanclæans[x], by whom they had been hofpitably received. Apollonia, on the Euxine, was deformed by domeftic difcord, from the moment that its populoufnefs was increafed by a new colony. After the expulfion of their tyrants, the Syracufans enrolled as citizens, mercenaries and foreigners. Diffenfions and battles enfued. Amphipolis admitted a colony from Chalcis[y]: moft of the original inhabitants were driven into banifhment. So true it is, that every promifcuous multitude cannot be fafhioned into a commonwealth, the formation of which requires materials fkilfully prepared, and muft be the work of time; for the

[x] Zanclé, the ancient name of Meffana, now Meffina, derived from the Sicilian word ζαγκλον, a fcythe or fickle. Steph. Byzant.

[y] The Chalcis in Thrace, which gave name to the Chalcidicé. Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. c. xv. p. 196. The Thracian Chalcis was fo called from its metropolis, the principal city in the ifle of Eubæa, fituate at the narroweft part of the Euripus, where Eubæa is fuppofed by Pliny to have joined the continent of Bœotia. Plin. l. iv. c. 12. This city colonifed the eaftern fhore of Sicily, and was the mother of a new Chalcis, of Naxos, Catana, Leontium, and other Sicilian republics. See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. ii. pp. 12, & feq.

causes

BOOK VII.

causes of dissension are innumerable. Even the diversities of local situations engender parties, and foment faction. At Athens, the inhabitants of the Piræus are distinguished from those of the upper city, by their fond admiration for democracy. In the city of Clazomené, the inhabitants of the main land were commonly at variance with those in the island. Localities, equally unimportant, distracted into parties the citizens of Colophon and of Notium[1].

Chap. 4.

Even the frivolous quarrels of the great.

In war, the smallest ditch or rivulet disorders the ranks, and breaks the phalanx. In politics, every distinction forms a ground of separation, and opens a source of hostility; and the slightest differences may occasion the most important revolutions, when they happen to arise among persons of weight in the state. Syracuse was anciently divided into two exasperated factions, in consequence of a frivolous love-quarrel between two young men, who happened to be both in the magistracy. In the absence of the one, the other corrupted his mistress[2]; the injured man retaliated, by seducing his colleague's wife; and the whole state took part with one side or the other. The difference, slight in itself, had this extensive consequence, because it arose between persons in the magistracy, and thus affected the source and principle of the government itself; and the principle, or beginning, by the trite

Their baneful effects illustrated by example.

[1] Notium derived its name from νοτος, the south, being situate a few miles to the south of Colophon. History of Ancient Greece, vol. i. p. 292.

[2] τον ερωμενον.

but

but juſt proverb, is counted "the half of every thing;" ſo that a ſmall deviation from rectitude at the firſt outſet, diverges into a great and even indefinite diſtance at the further extremity. Shortly after the Perſian invaſion of Greece, the diſpute of two brothers, men of note, concerning their father's inheritance, involved Heſtiæa in a civil war. The rich ſided with the fortunate brother; and the poor took party with him who complained of being deprived of his patrimony; and of the concealment of a large treaſure which, he ſaid, had been found by his father. An ancient quarrel about a marriage occaſioned all the ſeditions that have happened at Delphi to the preſent hour. A bridegroom, terrified by ſome unlucky omen, rejected the bride; whoſe relations, enraged at this injury, conveyed into his pocket, while he was ſacrificing, a quantity of the ſacred money, and then ſlew him as guilty of ſacrilege. At Mitylenè, two young women, heireſſes, occaſioned all the misfortunes of that republic, and the war with the Athenians, in which Paches took the city. The young women were the daughters of Timophanes; Doxander ſought them in marriage for his two ſons; his demand was ſlighted; he meditated vengeance, began to cabal at home, and applied to the Athenians, with whom he was allied by hoſpitality, and ſtimulated them to a war, which proved ruinous to his country. An incident nearly ſimilar occaſioned the ſacred war at Phocis. An heireſs was concerned; the authors of the ſedition were

BOOK VII.

were Mnafias, the father of Mnefon, and Euthycrates, the fon of Onomarchus. A contract of marriage changed the government of Epidamnus. The father of a young woman betrothed, happening to be archon, had occafion to exercife his authority as a magiftrate, in fining his intended fon-in-law; the latter, thinking himfelf not only injured but affronted, confpired with thofe diffatisfied with the government, and effected a revolution.

Governments overturned by an alteration of the relative importance of their conftituent parts.

Governments are changed, when the relative importance of their conftituent parts is altered. During the Perfian war, the council of the Areopagus, by the wifdom and firmnefs of its meafures, acquired juft renown; and the merit of this tribunal, compofed of the principal citizens, tended to invigorate the ariftocracy; but foon afterwards, the Athenian feamen, confifting of the loweft rabble [b], having gained the battle of Salamis, and thereby raifed their country to the fovereignty of the fea, increafed the weight of democracy in a far greater proportion. The credit gained by the Argive nobles in the battle of Mantinæa, and the defeat of the Lacedæmonians, occafioned the attempt to deftroy the popular government at Argos. The Syracufan mariners having conquered the Athenians, changed, on the other hand, the mixed republic of Syracufe into a fimple democracy. The merit of the people of Chalcis, in affifting the nobility of that city to deftroy Phoxos, the ty-

Examples thereof.

[b] See above, b. iv. c. vi. p. 256.

rant,

rant, procured for them a ſhare in the government. A circumſtance exactly ſimilar converted the oligarchy of Ambracia, after the expulſion of the tyrant Periander, into a democracy. And the obſervation univerſally holds, that whenever any portion of the ſtate, magiſtrates, nobles, or people, has procured for the public ſome ſignal advantage, a foundation will be thereby laid for political commotions, which often terminate in revolutions. For the honours beſtowed on thoſe public benefactors excite jealouſy, and embitter envy; and the benefactors themſelves, elated by their newly-acquired importance, diſdain to reſt ſatisfied with their hereditary rank and preſcriptive advantages.

General theorem on this ſubject.

Governments, alſo, are univerſally liable to be ſhaken, when parties, animated by principles of mutual hoſtility[c], are nearly equal in ſtrength; when the natural influence of wealth, or of nobility, is reſiſted, for inſtance, by the weight of numbers and the independence of induſtry; for ſhould either the rich or the poor be incomparably more powerful than their adverſaries, the weaker party abandons the ſtruggle in deſpair. For this reaſon, virtue, though the principal element in public happineſs, and therefore juſtly entitled to political pre-eminence, ſeldom, however, comes forward to aſſert its pretenſions, and to claim its well-earned reward. Virtuous men know how inconſider-

Governments diſturbed in conſequence of the near equality of hoſtile parties.

[c] Parties are thus animated when there is not a middling claſs between the great and the vulgar to hold the balance between them. See above, b. vi. c. xi. p. 348.

able

able their own party is; they feel and acknowledge the irrefiftible ftrength of their opponents.

All revolutions effected by force, or by fraud, or by a mixture of both.

Such then is the general nature of political revolutions. They are produced either by violence, or by fraud, or by the union of both; for, fometimes, what is begun by fraud is ended by force. It was thus that the tyranny of the four hundred was eftablifhed at Athens. The people were firft cheated out of their liberties, by the delufive hope of Perfian fubfidies; and when the deceit was difcovered, the four hundred had recourfe to arms. In this cafe, force was employed as an auxiliary to fraud; but fraud is often fufficient to do the work alone.

Chap. 5.

General caufes of revolutions modified by the nature of each government in particular.

The caufes of fedition, hitherto enumerated and explained, apply univerfally to all governments; but thefe general caufes are varioufly fubdivided and modified by the nature and form of each government in particular. The impudence of demagogues is the ordinary bane of democracies. By private calumny, and public impeachment, thefe incendiaries exafperate the poor againft the rich; and compel the rich, through their common fears, to unite into an exafperated faction, actuated by oppofite interefts to thofe of the community at large.

Democracies ruined by the impudence of demagogues.

The refentment of men of property, provoked by the wickednefs of demagogues, overturned the democracy of Cos. In Rhodes, the demagogues profecuted and defrauded the Trierarchs, in order to corrupt the foldiery; the troops, raifed from the promifcuous multitude, were

thus

thus ſeduced and bribed at the expence of thoſe who generouſly equipped and maintained the guardian navy of that maritime republic. But the indignation of the Trierarchs mutinied againſt this complication of ingratitude and injuſtice, deſtroyed the demagogues, and overturned the democracy. Heraclæa, ſoon after its populouſneſs was augmented by an Athenian colony, fell a prey to ſedition. The perſecution of demagogues drove moſt families of diſtinction from the place; but the emigrants returned with an armed force, and eſtabliſhed an oligarchy. Revolutions, proceeding from ſimilar cauſes, and exactly ſimilar in their iſſue, happened at Cumæ and at Megara: And it may be regarded as a general theorem in politics, that demagogues are the peſts of democracies, ruin liberty under pretence of preſerving or augmenting it, corrupting the multitude by indulgence, and exaſperating the rich by agrarian laws and the weight of public burdens, till neceſſity compels the latter to reſiſt oppreſſion by force, and to fight in their own defence with courage heightened by deſpair.

Why democracies in ancient times terminated differently from the manner in which they terminate at preſent.

In ancient times, when the talents of the ſtateſman and the general were often cultivated by the ſame man, democracies often ended in tyrannies. The demagogues, equally ſkilled in war and in eloquence, ſupported their arguments by arms, and eked out fraud by force. But ſince rhetoric has become a ſcience of ſuch extent, that none can acquire it in diſtinguiſhed perfection, but thoſe who cultivate it with undivided

BOOK VII.

divided attention, demagogues have been contented with deceiving the people, and have feldom attempted to enflave them. Tyrannies, befides, were of old more frequent than now, becaufe it was then ufual to entruft particular magiftrates with more extenfive difcretionary powers, (witnefs the Prytanes of Miletus,) and becaufe, while men lived fcattered in the country, diligently employed in their hufbandry, cities were lefs populous than at prefent, and therefore lefs capable of refifting with concert and activity, the eloquence and artifices of their demagogues, efpecially when reinforced by military fkill and martial fpirit.

How demagogues deceive the people, and by what means their machinations might be defeated.

The confidence of the multitude, however, was the great engine by which thefe military politicians and politic generals affailed the freedom of their country; and the pledge of this confidence was their hatred and perfecution of opulence and nobility. It was by perfecuting the wealthy Pediaci that Pififtratus enflaved Athens: Theogenes purfued the fame plan at Megara, and there met with fimilar fuccefs. Dionyfius, by the impeachment of Daphnæus and other rich men, raifed himfelf to the throne of Syracufe. Democracies fink into the loweft degeneracy, when the national affembly is perfuaded to fupplant the authority of laws by the caprice of occafional decrees: This generally happens through the feduction of thofe, whofe ambition to obtain office is too extravagant to regard any civil duty, and too violent to be checked by any moral obftacle; and who avail

10 them-

themſelves of the confuſion and tumult incident to crowded aſſemblies, to precipitate the heedleſs multitude into the moſt ruinous meaſures. To prevent or diminiſh this evil, it will be expedient to alter the mode of election to magiſtracy, and to entruſt this power not to the people collectively, but to the various parts or tribes into which the community happens to be divided.[a]

Chap. 6.

Cauſes of the revolutions in oligarchies.

Inſolence or injuſtice of the magiſtrates.

There are two moſt manifeſt cauſes of revolutions in oligarchies. When the people at large are groſsly injured by men in power, they willingly hearken to and follow any leader of ſedition; but this leader is more eſpecially dangerous, if he happens to be one of the magiſtrates. This was the caſe in Naxos, where Lygdamis, jealous of his colleagues, overturned the oligarchy, and afterwards made himſelf king[b]. When an oligarchy, the name of which denotes that the few govern the many, is ſtill further narrowed, ſo that magiſtracy, inſtead of extending by rotation among the general maſs of wealthy and eminent citizens, is confined within the circle of a few families, opulence and eminence will not patiently brook an abſolute excluſion from authority, but will rather convulſe the ſtate than ſubmit to be debarred from civil honours. In the concentrated oligarchies of Marſeilles, Iſter, and Heraclea, the political edifice was overthrown in conſequence of the narrowneſs of its baſe. The wealthy citizens of Marſeilles never

Oligarchies overturned by narrowing their baſe.

Examples thereof.

[a] See above, b. vi. c. xv. p. 357.

[b] Athenæus, l. viii. p. 348.

 ceaſed

BOOK VII.

ceaſed plotting againſt the government, till all men of a certain cenſus were declared capable of holding offices, not indeed ſimultaneouſly, but, as in ſome other countries, alternately or ſucceſſively; that is, firſt, the eldeſt brother of a family, and then the younger, or if more in number, each in his order. The rigour of oligarchy was thus mitigated at Marſeilles. In Iſter, the oligarchy was changed into a democracy: And at Heraclæa, the power which had formerly been lodged in few hands, was communicated to ſix hundred citizens. The diſſenſions of the Cnidian nobles, reſpecting the limitation of candidates for office, encouraged the people, headed by one of the better ſort, to attack and overthrow the oligarchy. In ancient times Erythræ [c] was well and wiſely governed by the family of Baſilides, of which the individuals lived in perfect harmony with each other: yet the people diſdained to remain ſubject to their authority, and to permit thoſe honours and offices, which they conſidered as the public ſtock, to continue the patrimony of a family.

Oligarchies deſtroyed by the flattery of ſycophants.

Oligarchies not only periſh by external violence, but ſuffer, and ſometimes ſink, under internal diſorders; they are not exempted from the peſt of demagogues, flattering partiſans of tyranny, as the demagogues in democracies are of licentiouſneſs, and who, to promote their own views,

[c] There were cities of this name in Bœotia, Locris, Lybia, and Ionia. That in Ionia was one of the twelve Ionic cities, and founded by Neleus, ſon of Codrus. It is now reduced to a miſerable village, but ſtill called Erethri. See Hiſt. of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. pp. 101, & ſeq.

ſeduce,

Examples thereof.

ſeduce, inflame, and betray that party in the ſtate to whoſe intereſts they affect to be moſt entirely devoted. At Athens, Charicles was the demagogue of the thirty tyrants; and Phrynichus was the demagogue of the arbitrary faction of the four hundred. When perſons by their cenſus capable of office are dependent on the people for their elections, like the ſtate gardens of Lariſſa and Abydus, thoſe who covet preferment frequently have recourſe to the diſhoneſt arts of ſeduction and flattery. The ſame conſequence happens, when the judiciary power is in the hands of the people at large; the nobles are ruined in the courts of juſtice, and the oligarchy is thus overturned: this was the fate of the government of Heraclea[d] on the Euxine. Sometimes an oligarchy is narrowed into a junto; and the party, illegally excluded from office, is compelled in its own defence to appeal to the people.

Oligarchies overturned by ſpendthrifts, by mercenaries, and by the arrogance of the magiſtrates.

Spendthrifts are always promoters of innovation: in oligarchies they ſtrive to uſurp tyranny for themſelves, or to procure it for one who will reward their labours. At Syracuſe the ſpendthrift Hipparinus warmly ſeconded the views of Dionyſius. The profligate Cleotimus, by the aſſiſtance of a colony from Chalcis, raiſed an inſurrection in Amphipolis. In Ægina, a man of ruined fortune, diſtinguiſhed by his well-known tranſaction with Chares, attempted to

[d] One of the Greek cities on the ſouthern coaſt of the Euxine, of which Sinopé was the mother and the queen. See Hiſt. of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxvi. p. 224.

change

BOOK VII. change the government. Ambition and rapacity often ſet the members of oligarchies at variance with each other; and when divided among themſelves, they are eaſily ſubdued by the people. This happened at Apollonia on the Euxine: but where perfect harmony prevails, an oligarchy is not eaſily ſubverted; witneſs that of Pharſalus. The oligarchy of Elis was narrowed into a cabal of ninety ſenators, whoſe authority was arbitrary, and whoſe office was perpetual [e]. In war, oligarchies are ruined for want of confidence between the nobles and the people: the former hire mercenaries for the public defence, and the leader of the mercenaries often becomes maſter of the ſtate. It was thus that Timophanes made himſelf tyrant of Corinth. When there are different bodies of mercenaries under different leaders, theſe will ſometimes combine their ſtrength, and form themſelves into what is called a dynaſty, the worſt ſpecies of oligarchy. To prevent theſe evils, the nobles, when they have occaſion to uſe the ſervice of the people in war, ſometimes voluntarily admit them to a ſhare of the government. In peace, oligarchies are ſubverted when the nobles and the people are mutually ſo diſtruſtful of each other that they commit the ſafety of the ſtate to a garriſon of foreign mercenaries, whoſe commander, inſtead of continuing the mediator between the two parties,

[e] Ariſtotle ſays their election reſembled that which prevailed in electing ſenators in Sparta. The text is corrupt. See above, b. ii. c. vii. p. 127.

makes

makes himſelf the maſter of both: this happened both at Lariſſa and at Abydus. The overbearing inſolence of individuals, quarrels about marriages and law-ſuits, ſometimes occaſion public commotions which terminate in revolutions. Diagoras's diſappointment in marriage overturned the oligarchy of the knights or horſemen of Eretria[f]. Seditions aroſe in Thebes and in Heraclæa in conſequence of the degrading ſentences paſſed on Archias and on Eurytion, that they ſhould ſtand (the former for adultery) in the pillory in the market-place. The deſpotic arrogance of the magiſtrates ſubverted the oligarchies of Chios and Cnidos.

In conſequence of the events of time and chance.

Revolutions alſo happen in conſequence of the events of time and chance, independently of human deſign or human foreſight. In oligarchies, and in what we have called republics in oppoſition to wild democracies, a certain cenſus is requiſite for holding civil offices; all whoſe fortunes fall ſhort of this ſtandard are excluded; ſo that the majority of the people are excluded in oligarchies, and thoſe who in point of fortune are conſiderably below the middling claſs, are excluded in republics: but in conſequence of a long peace, or other fortunate events, the value of lands may be ſo greatly enhanced, that the poſſeſſions of the pooreſt man ſhall exceed the

[f] A flouriſhing ſea-port of Eubœa before the Trojan war, oppoſite to Delphinium in Attica. Strabo, p. 687. It was demoliſhed by the Perſians in their invaſion, but its ruins were to be ſeen in the time of the above-mentioned geographer. Ibid.

BOOK VII.

regulated cenfus: and this, whether it happens flowly or fuddenly, will occafion a political revolution. Governments change not only from one form into a contrary, but from one fort of democracy or of oligarchy into another that is different; as from governments acknowledging the authority of laws to democracies ruled by the caprice of the multitude, or oligarchies confifting of a junto of tyrants.

Chap. 7.

Caufes of the revolutions in ariftocracies.

The fupreme authority may center in a few men of wealth and credit, or may refide in a few perfons of diftinguifhed virtue; in the latter cafe the government is called an ariftocracy, and is expofed to revolutions from the paucity of thofe invefted with power. From a coincidence in this circumftance, an ariftocracy is liable to be confounded with an oligarchy, which a high-minded people muft always be defirous to overthrow.

Their fimilarity to oligarchies, which a high-minded people will not brook.

The Partheniæ, fprung from the beft blood of Sparta, but degraded by the illegitimacy of their birth, and debarred from public honours, were caught confpiring againft their country, and fent to colonife Tarentum. The lofty virtue of Lyfander difdained to acknowledge a fuperior even in a king: the ftubborn audacity of Cinadon[s] confpired to deftroy every Lacedæmonian of a rank fuperior to his own. Ariftocracies are alfo liable to convulfions in confequence of the great inequality of private fortunes, efpecially when, by an invading enemy, any confiderable part of the country has

[s] For all thefe events confult the Hiftory of Ancient Greece.

been

been ravaged, and the inhabitants reduced to beggary: this happened to Sparta in the Meſſenian war, when the people inſiſted on an equal diviſion of lands, as we learn from a poem of Tyrtæus, called the *Eunomia*, by which he appeaſed the ſedition.

The magiſtrates corrupted by their honours.

As the accumulated honours even of good men are apt to excite envy and jealouſy, ſo the moderate and defined honours of bad men prove incentives to the luſt of dominion, and encourage them to attempt rendering their power arbitrary and their honours unbounded: this fatal project was at Carthage adopted by Hanno; and in Sparta by King Pauſanias, who repelled the invaſion of the Medes.

Revolutions in republics, or mixed governments,

An error in the original ſtructure of government often proves ruinous to republics and ariſtocracies. When the ingredients of virtue, wealth, and numbers (eſpecially the two latter) are unequally combined, or improperly blended, the compoſition has a tendency to ſeparate with noiſe and violence into its conſtituent elements: when the balance inclines to the ſide of numbers, a republic, that does not degenerate into a ſimple democracy, retains its original and ſpecific name; but when the balance inclines to the ſide of wealth, it is frequently, though improperly, called an ariſtocracy. Of thoſe two ſorts of republics, that verging to democracy is the moſt ſecure and the moſt permanent, becauſe the majority are maſters of the ſtate, and the people at large, as before obſerved, are leſs liable to the temptations of a ſelfiſh ambition: yet wherever

BOOK VII.

when the elements of wealth and numbers are not equally balanced:

wherever the political forces of wealth and of numbers are not duly adjufted, that is, when they are not proportioned to each other with as much accuracy as matters of practice require or admit, the fabric of the conftitution is always liable to overfet. Sometimes it falls on that fide to which it formerly inclined. A republic thus relaxes into a perfect democracy; and what is called an ariftocratic government is ftrung into a tyrannical and cruel oligarchy: but this does not invariably take place; for when the prevailing powers are guilty of grofs injuftice, the ftrenuous efforts of their oppreffed antagonifts to recover their due weight in the ftate, fometimes change the conftitution into its direct contrary; the refentment of the poor changing an ariftocratic republic into a democracy, or the indignation of the rich converting a popular republic into an oligarchy. The former event happened at Thurii; the balance of political power being on the fide of the nobles, or rather on that of property, they yielded to the temptation of injuftice, and engroffed, contrary to law, almoft the whole lands of the country; provoked at their rapacity, the people, who were warlike, flew to arms, expelled the mercenary garrifon, and divefted the nobles of their overgrown and unjuftly acquired eftates.

unexpected effects thereof,

Examples.

Caufe of revolution peculiar to a republic inclining to an ariftocracy.

An ariftocratical government, in proportion as it partakes of the nature of an oligarchy, has a tendency to foment infolence on the one hand, and to excite refentment on the other. By committing too much authority to the nobles, it enables

enables them to promote what they take to be their private or domeftic interefts, at the expence of what is the intereft of the community at large. The connection formed by marriage, between a family of diftinction at Locris and Dionyfius the tyrant, ruined that ftate; and fuch a connection would not certainly have been permitted either in a democracy, or in a well-balanced ariftocratical republic.

Example.

The neglecting of little matters, as altogether immaterial, was formerly faid to be a general caufe of political misfortune. Nothing, however little, fhould be regarded as unimportant which touches the fpring of the government; fince by changing the form of the fmalleft part, the beauty of the whole fyftem may be deftroyed. It was the cuftom at Thurii, that thofe who had been officers in the army fhould not be re-elected to military command till after an interval of five years. Some fpirited young men, whofe martial ardour had acquired for them great popularity among the troops, endeavoured to procure a law for enabling them to retain their rank: a committee of the fenate appointed for examining this bufinefs, at firft refifted, but finally yielded to the project of innovation; thinking, that being gratified in this one point, the officers would not proceed farther, but allow the conftitution in general to remain unaltered; but in this they were miferably difappointed. New alterations were propofed, which the magiftrates, now overawed by an armed force, durft not venture to oppofe; their

Neglect in little matters.

Example.

BOOK VII.

their authority was thus overturned; and the government fell into the hands of thofe who had been gratified in their firft dangerous demand.

External caufes of revolutions in republics.

Such are the internal fources of the diffolution of governments. They may alfo be deftroyed by external violence. To this evil they are particularly expofed, when a neighbouring ftate is governed on principles directly oppofite: or when this oppofite fyftem prevails in a ftate more remote but alfo more powerful, with which the governments in queftion are connected by the ties of commerce and confanguinity, or by the relations of war or alliance, of war undertaken or meditated, of alliance enjoyed or coveted. It was thus that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, as their fortune alternately rofe and funk in the fcale of Greece, refpectively deftroyed, the former oligarchies, and the latter democracies; becaufe each of thofe domineering republics afpired to mould the political edifices of their neighbours or allies after their own model.

Example.

Chap. 8.

How good governments are preferved:

We now proceed to examine how governments in general, and each form of government in particular, are to be upheld and perpetuated. Firft of all, it is evident, that if we clearly comprehend the caufes which deftroy governments, we may eafily difcover thofe which are beft fitted to preferve them; for deftruction and prefervation being things in their nature contrary, contrary means will be fuccefsfully employed to produce thofe contrary effects. In well-

well-balanced republics, then, all deviations from eſtabliſhed laws are to be carefully avoided, eſpecially in matters, which becauſe they are little, are apt to appear inſignificant: it is by ſmall expences that the greateſt eſtates are brought to ruin, becauſe the occaſions of ſuch expences are ſo numerous, that they may be conſidered as countleſs and infinite; and becauſe men are always liable to be deceived by the vulgar ſophiſm, that one grain makes not an heap; and therefore that a trifling expence may ſafely be incurred, or a trifling alteration may be harmleſsly made.

BOOK VII.

by avoiding ſmall, and ſeemingly inſignificant alterations:

The next rule of importance for upholding the ſtability of well-mixed governments is, that the nobles and the people be mutually on their guard againſt the political artifices or juggling ſleights, formerly enumerated and deſcribed[f], by which the one party endeavours to diſguiſe its ambition, and the other to palliate its injuſtice.

by counteracting political ſleights.

Some republics have been long preſerved, not by the excellence of their ſtructure, but through the ſolid virtues of thoſe who governed them: though appointed from men of a privileged order, the magiſtrates, while they lived with their colleagues and equals in fraternal harmony, were careful never to inſult, never to injure their inferiors; they were careful never to provoke the proud by contempt, nor to exaſperate the poor by rapacity; and the leaders of the

Governments, defective in their ſtructure, preſerved by the virtues of the magiſtrates:

[f] See above, b. vi. c. xiii. p. 342, & ſeq.

multitude

BOOK VII.

multitude moſt diſtinguiſhed for their merit, whatever might be the circumſtances of their birth, were ſeaſonably exalted to a higher claſs, and thus aſſociated to the honours of government[g]. When the nobles are extremely numerous, they form a ſort of democracy among themſelves, and ought therefore, in managing the affairs of their own order, to adopt the inſtitutions beſt calculated for preſerving that form of government. It will be uſeful, for inſtance, to inſiſt on a frequent rotation of office; and in ſome caſes to enact that magiſtracies ſhall be held only for the term of ſix months; for as democracies have their demagogues, ſo oligarchies and ariſtocracies have their tale-bearers and ſycophants, mean and malicious flatterers of men in power; who, in proportion to the extent and duration of that power, will be more likely to degenerate into tyrants.

by the proximity of danger:

Governments are ſometimes preſerved, not by the remoteneſs, but by the proximity of danger. The terror hanging over them keeps men continually on their guard. This ſalutary vigilance may be excited by imaginary cauſes, when real ones are wanting; by approximating diſtance, and anticipating futurity. The dangerous animoſities of the great are to be diligently watched, and, if poſſible, ſpeedily appeaſed; and much care is to be applied that

[g] The reader's own ſagacity will apply theſe obſervations to the effects reſulting from the different conſtitution of the privileged orders, as they have been called, in the different countries of modern Europe.

thoſe

thoſe who ſtill remain diſpaſſionate and impartial, be not whirled within the vortex of either of the contending parties: diſcord between men diſtinguiſhed by rank, fortune, and office, may produce the moſt baneful effects, becauſe its operation is exerted on the firſt principle or moving power of government; and to perceive and obviate errors in their principle or beginning, which might ſwell to much greater evils, is the work of no ordinary ſtateſman. To prevent ſuch revolutions as gradually proceed from the augmentation or diminution of private fortunes, it will be neceſſary to have recourſe to the cenſus. In ſmaller ſtates, which are liable to more frequent concuſſions, the cenſus may be taken annually; in larger republics, every third or fifth year; and the qualifications for office muſt be heightened or lowered in proportion to the increaſe or diminution of eſtates.

by obviating errors in their firſt principles;

It is dangerous under every form of government, whether ſimple or mixed, whether democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy, to allow ſuch diſproportionate exaltation of particular men, or particular families, as greatly overtops that of perſons and families of their own order. Honours to be laſting muſt be moderate; and there are but few minds of ſuch a firm, reſiſting texture as to bear with impunity the infectious aſſaults of ſudden and ſignal proſperity. Yet if any honoured individual has been greatly exalted by an accumulation of dignities, it is not adviſable to reduce him at once to the ordinary

by preventing the diſproportionable exaltation of individuals or families:

BOOK VII. nary level; his too luxuriant honours muſt be lopped gradually; and above all, it ought to be the aim of a wiſe legiſlation, in the firſt place, to prevent, if poſſible, any individual from attaining too conſpicuous a ſuperiority in power, in wealth, or in the number and ſtrength of his adherents; or, if the evil has not been prevented, to remove him from his vantage-ground at home, under pretence of employment in honourable commiſſions abroad.

by the cenſorial power: Since manners have ſo powerful an influence on government that many are found willing to overſet the conſtitution for no other reaſon but that in future they may be at liberty to live as they liſt; it is uſeful in every commonwealth to have a particular magiſtracy to ſuperintend the manners of the citizens, and to check or diſcourage every deviation from that mode of life which is beſt adapted to the nature and principle of each form of government.

by ſtrengthening the middle ranks: The events of time and chance will often give to ſome one of the conſtituent parts of a ſtate, or to ſome particular magiſtracy, more than their due importance and their proper weight. This alteration muſt be carefully watched, and wherever the balance inclines, whether on the ſide of the rich, the noble, or the populace, care muſt be taken to correct the preponderancy; and by the diſtribution of honours and offices to equaliſe the contending factions, and to ſtrengthen that intermediate portion of the people which is always more ſtedfaſtly

faftly attached to the public welfare, than either thofe who are elated by wealth, or thofe who are depreffed by poverty[h].

by preventing peculation:

Every principle of law, and every maxim of government, ought to be fkilfully and fteadily directed againft the peculation of men in office. Oligarchies, efpecially, ought never to lofe fight of this object; for the people at large will be greatly incenfed when they are not only excluded from offices and honours, but robbed by thofe who adminifter the one and engrofs the other; whereas the firft hardfhip, taken feparately by itfelf, will be greatly foftened by the confideration that an exclufion from public employments operates as an advantageous exemption; and allows thofe who enjoy the immunity, to apply with undivided attention to the improvement of their private fortunes[i].

by paying the magiftrates with honour, not with fees and falaries:

A republic, in which the various offices of ftate fhould be paid merely by honour, but rewarded by no emolument whatever, might unite the advantages both of ariftocracy and democracy, without incurring the inconveniences of either. The people at large might be entitled to every employment; but the poorer fort would certainly wave their claim to unprofitable pofts,

[h] See above, b. vi. c. xi. p. 337.

[i] Such maxims were purfued for many centuries by the ariftocracy of Venice, where all honourable offices were proportionably expenfive. The policy of the ariftocracy of Bern was directly the reverfe. A man's fortune might be often ruined by holding thofe offices which belonged exclufively to noble Venetians; his fortune is always benefited by holding thofe which belong exclufively to the citizens of Bern.

that

BOOK VII.

that they might ply their profitable trades. They would relinquish public concerns to those who had more time to spare than themselves. The better sort of the citizens, therefore, would thus escape the grievance to which they are subjected in democracies, of being frequently governed by persons greatly their inferiors; and the poorer and lower classes of men would escape the grievance, to which they are subjected in aristocracies and oligarchies, of being legally and perpetually excluded from all public preferments. The abolition of fees and salaries will not, however, be alone sufficient to ensure the benefits of this salutary regulation. The revenues of the state must be publicly received, and publicly deposited; and separate accounts of them must be kept in the halls of the various tribes, wards, and fraternities into which the republic may happen to be divided.

by exactly inspecting the administration of the public revenues.

The demagogues in democracies must not harass the rich by agrarian laws, and the demand of expensive exhibitions.

To maintain the stability of democracies, the leaders of the populace must cease to harass the rich and noble by agrarian laws. The old proprietors must not only retain their hereditary lands, but also enjoy, unmolested, their annual fruits; which, as matters are now managed, are often indirectly and imperceptibly wasted for purposes the most useless and the most frivolous. Shows, dances, vain illuminations, and pompous processions, are unprofitable to those who behold, and ruinous to those who exhibit, them. A reasonable people, instead of condemning their richer fellow-citizens to such grievous ex-

pences,

pences, would turn with disdain from the childish gratifications for which they are incurred[k].

In oligarchies peculiar indulgences should be granted to those classes of the people who are excluded from a share in the sovereignty.

To maintain the stability of aristocracies or oligarchies, great regard must be had to those classes of the people who are excluded from a share in the sovereignty. Injuries committed against them, especially when accompanied with insult, must be punished with more severity by the magistrate than those committed against persons of his own rank or his own order. Such subordinate employments as are attended with fees or perquisites should be granted in preference to the poorer sort of citizens; and to promote equality, as much as is consistent with the nature of the government, it will be proper to restrain the freedom of donations and marriage contracts, and thereby to limit or prevent the accumulation of too many estates in one family.

A similar rule applicable in all governments.

It is of essential use in preserving all governments, that those who are the least sharers in the sovereignty, be treated with great equity, and even peculiar indulgence, in all other respects. In oligarchies, the people, in democracies, the wealthy, ought respectively to enjoy every advantage and every preference that is not incompatible with the nature of the government. The superiority given to them in

[k] It appears from the History of Greece, that this was indeed most salutary, but with respect to him who proposed it, very dangerous advice. By a law of the demagogue Eubulus, it was made capital at Athens, to propose diverting the theatric funds to any other purpose than that of the public amusement. History of Ancient Greece, vol. iii. c. xxxii. p. 473.

 matters

BOOK VII. Chap. 9.

matters of little moment, will difpofe them patiently to brook their inferiority in folid power.

The requifites for holding fupreme magiftracies.—Patriotifm. Capacity. Virtue.

To partake of this power, or of what in every ftate forms the fovereignty, three qualifications are effentially requifite. The fupreme magiftrates muft be animated with the warmeft love for that conftitution, the government of which they are called to adminifter. They muft be endowed with the capacities and powers neceffary to the difcharge of their high functions. They muft, in the third place, poffefs that particular fpecies of virtue, and efpecially of juftice, which, in each form of government, is beft fitted to enfure the ftability of that particular conftitution; for as juftice is meafured by different ftandards in oligarchies and democracies, it is plain that, in a political fenfe, the virtue of juftice is itfelf variable, and that what is right in one government, may be wrong in another.

When thefe requifites do not all concur, by what rule the preference among them is to be decided.

When the three requifites above mentioned do not concur in the fame perfon, an important queftion will arife, to which of them is the preference due? In the appointment, for inftance, of a general, a man prefents himfelf poffeffed indeed of great military talents, but not remarkably diftinguifhed by his juftice or his patriotifm. Another is eminent for thofe virtues, but has never exhibited any fignal proof of his genius for war, and his capacity for command. By what rule ought the preference to be decided? We anfwer, there is a middle portion of talent, as well as of virtue, that is the

the ordinary lot of humanity. Whatever exceeds this middle portion can fall to the ſhare of a few only. Many men poſſeſs enough of juſtice and enough of patriotiſm to make good generals; but there are few endowed with that degree of ſkill and experience which is requiſite for the honourable diſcharge of high military truſt. This degree of ſkill and experience is, therefore, chiefly to be regarded in the choice of a general. Were we to appoint a public treaſurer, we muſt ſtill reaſon on the ſame principle, and becauſe we reaſon on the ſame principle, we muſt in this caſe vary our deciſion; and give the preference to moral, rather than to intellectual, accompliſhments. The ſkill, experience, and capacity, requiſite in a magiſtrate of this deſcription, are ſuch as the greater part of mankind may be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs. But his juſtice and integrity ought to riſe above the common level; and it will be the beſt recommendation to his office, that thoſe virtues ſhine in his character with more than ordinary luſtre.

Application of the rule to particular caſes.

But as to a proper diſcharge of public offices in general, it may be aſked, why I have ſaid that there are *three* eſſential requiſites? Let us ſuppoſe a man endowed with a ſufficient capacity for his employment, and animated by a warm love for his country; will not thoſe qualifications alone render him an upright and uſeful ſervant of the public? I anſwer, they will not; and affirm that, in addition to them, and in order to complete the character of a good magiſtrate or miniſter, a third ingredient muſt

Proof that patriotiſm and capacity are not alone ſufficient to form the character of a ſupreme magiſtrate.

BOOK VII.

necessarily enter into the composition. He must possess, at least in a certain degree, the practical habit of all the virtues, without which, how much soever he may love his country, and how well soever he may understand its interests, he will often be hindered by sloth, dissipation, intemperance, or cowardice, from rendering it any essential service; nay, he may be tempted by those, though oftener by contrary vices, to do his country much positive mischief. Men are generally clearsighted enough in perceiving their own interest; and they cannot be suspected of not loving themselves with an affection sufficiently sincere; yet how many, through a defect of moral attainment, daily plunge themselves into inextricable distress? Can it be expected that they should treat their country better than they treat themselves?

In what manner laws are relative to different governments,

Laws, we have said, are things relative, and therefore variable; and in order to be good, they must be adapted to the circumstances of the people for whom they are promulgated. Whatever law is well adapted to the constitution, will facilitate its motions, invigorate its health, and thereby confirm its stability; and especially if the law, pregnant with that which we have often mentioned as the great and principal element of political safety, conspires to convince the people at large, or at least that portion of the community which is most numerous or most powerful, that their interest and happiness are intimately connected with the preservation and permanence of the constituted authorities.

Besides

Besides this, the safety of states requires that the legislature should never lose sight of that golden mean, which is universally overlooked or despised in corrupt republics. Many institutions, seemingly favourable to democracy, have proved its ruin; and many institutions, seemingly favourable to oligarchy, have totally destroyed that form of government. Demagogues and sycophants, the partisans of the multitude, and the flatterers of the great, regard that plan of policy which they respectively espouse, as the consummate pattern of perfect excellence, and therefore think, or affect to think, that they cannot possibly do too much for promoting the interests of democracy on the one hand, or of oligarchy on the other. In this, however, they err egregiously; and set themselves in opposition to the first principles of society, and to the whole analogy of nature. The limb of an animal may be elegant without being straight; and the nose, that characteristic feature, may deserve in a certain degree the epithets of depressed or aquiline, and yet this small deviation from straightness into curvature may heighten and embellish beauty. But if you increase too much its swell or its depression, you will thereby disfigure the whole countenance. There is not any reason whatever, why the same observation should not apply to forms of government. The popular and aristocratical powers, acting in nearly opposite directions, will, if nicely adjusted, keep the motion of government straight and uniform. This right line, however, may, by

particularly to democracies and oligarchies.

Illustration.

by a ſmall variation in the relative force of the generating powers, deviate a little into either of the oppoſite curvatures, without affecting the beauty of the ſyſtem. But if you vary this force or celerity too much, if you render the democracy too democratical, or the ariſtocracy too ariſtocratical, you will firſt of all enfeeble, then ſhake, and finally ſubvert the government. The nature of democracy requires that the ſupreme authority of government ſhould reſide, not in the diſtinguiſhed few, but in the great body of the people; the nature of oligarchy or ariſtocracy, requires that the ſupreme authority of government ſhould reſide, not in the people at large, but in the few diſtinguiſhed by wealth or virtue. Both oligarchies and democracies, therefore, imply the exiſtence of thoſe oppoſite deſcriptions of perſons, the rich and the poor, the few and the many. Theſe deſcriptions are the elements of which ſuch governments are compoſed; and in proportion as you diminiſh or deſtroy either of the conſtituent elements, you muſt impair or demoliſh the whole fabric of the conſtitution. How abſurdly, therefore, do thoſe demagogues and thoſe ſycophants reaſon, who, the former in democracies, would plunder and haraſs the nobility; and the latter, in oligarchies, would oppreſs and perſecute the people? How weak as well as wicked are thoſe oaths which are taken in ſome oligarchical governments; "I will reſiſt the populace with all my might; I will bear them eternal ill-will, and never ceaſe to inflict on them every injury in my power?"

The errors of demagogues and ſycophants.

Did

Did these haughty but contemptible nobles consult their own interest and honour, they would swear the direct contrary; "I will never injure the people, I will always treat them with kindness."

The citizens must be taught to shape their lives by the pattern of the commonwealth.

But the main source of political safety consists in an expedient now universally neglected by states, though it has more efficacy alone, than all other contrivances combined. How wisely soever laws may be framed, and with whatever precision they may be penned, they will prove impotent and useless, unless those who are destined to administer them, be carefully trained to shape their lives agreeably to the pattern of the commonwealth. The constitution of a state, as well as that of an individual, may be ruined by intemperance; and the danger of intemperance can only be prevented by early and assiduous culture. If the government, therefore, is a democracy, the education must be democratical; if it is an oligarchy, the education must be oligarchical. But an education properly adapted to either of these forms of government, must not be such as will excite their respective magistrates to indulge their political propensities, and to gratify their selfish or factious passions, but such as will give to their public conduct that firmness and moderation, which the safety of the state requires, and without which it will be impossible for the popular party long to defend the democracy against the nobles; or for the partisans of the Few, long to defend the oligarchy against the people. Education, when

Of democratical and oligarchical education.

BOOK VII.

when properly directed, is the preserving and vivifying principle of all good policy; but as it is now conducted, it becomes the cause of instability, and produces frequent revolutions. Under every species of oligarchy, the children of the great are brought up delicately, and often indulged criminally. The children of the poor are hardened in their bodies by exercise, and fortified in their minds by discipline. Can it be expected that weakness should long continue to prevail over strength; or that men softened by sloth, should long continue to command men invigorated by exertion? In democracies, on the contrary, where justice is defined by equality, and where it is thought sufficient, that all be treated alike, without considering whether each will thus have his due, liberty too naturally degenerates into licentiousness, and the citizens, instead of submitting cheerfully to the salutary restraints of discipline, think themselves entitled, as Euripides says,

> "Each man to live as perverse will directs:"

because otherwise, forsooth, their liberty would be abridged. But this is absurd in the extreme. To be obliged to shape our lives to the pattern of the commonwealth, is not slavery but safety. Such then are the causes and contingencies which, in republics, promote or prevent revolutions: We now proceed to explain those causes and contingencies which have been found to overturn or to uphold monarchies.

Monar-

Of revolutions in monarchies.

Monarchies, whether limited or abſolute, are liable to nearly the ſame changes and accidents which befal republics; for royalty is analogous to ariſtocracy; and tyranny is compoſed of rigid oligarchy and the worſt ſpecies of democracy, and is, therefore, moſt ruinous to its ſubjects, as containing the evils and deformities of two peſtilent miſchiefs. The two kinds of monarchy are different in their origin. Royalty is produced from the weight and influence of the nobles concentrated in one diſtinguiſhed and illuſtrious character, in order the more firmly to reſiſt the dangerous encroachments of the populace. Tyranny, on the other hand, is generated by the combined ſtrength of the populace, who think they can never enough exalt the leader who undertakes to defend the popular cauſe, and to repel oligarchic oppreſſion. Moſt tyrants, therefore, have ſprung out of demagogues, who had captivated the affections of the people, by traducing and perſecuting their ſuperiors. This, I ſay, has happened in large ſtates; for in ancient times, and before the aggrandizement of cities, kings would often tranſgreſs the limits of their lawful power; and magiſtrates, availing themſelves of the duration and importance of their civil and religious offices, which then laſted much longer than they do now, would often by theft or robbery uſurp a throne. The tyranny of Pheidon of Argos was nothing but an undue extenſion of his royal authority. The ſame may be ſaid of the other tyrannies which about that time prevailed in Greece.

The origin of royalty.

Of tyranny.

BOOK VII.

Greece. Phalaris of Agrigentum, and the tyrants of Ionia, were originally republican magiftrates, who abufed the authority of their elective functions for obtaining unlimited power. But Panætius of Leontium, Cypfelus of Corinth, Pififtratus of Athens, and Dionyfius of Syracufe, all thefe, and many others, acquired tyranny by flattery; they firft captivated the *affections* of the people, before they enflaved their *perfons*.

Royalty analogous to ariftocracy.

Royalty, we faid, is analogous to ariftocracy. It may, in fact, be analyfed into the fame elements; fince kings are created for their perfonal or hereditary worth, and for the benefits which they feem capable of conferring, or which they have actually conferred on their nation. Codrus, who defended the Athenians in war; Cyrus, who delivered Perfia from bondage; the martial leaders of the Lacedæmonians, Macedonians, and Moloffians, whofe fuccefsful valour acquired lands for their refpective followers, and maintained them in quiet poffeffion of their important conquefts; thefe and fuch illuftrious men received the honours of royalty from the admiring gratitude of the public, and adorned the throne by the fame virtues through which they were enabled to afcend it.

Definition of a king; and contraft between kings and tyrants.

A king, in his nature and end, is a public guardian. His office is a pledge, that the nobles fhall not be fubjected to injuftice, nor the people to infult. A tyrant, as we have faid and repeated, is not effentially governed by any public-fpirited motive; and if ever he confults the intereft

tereſt of his country, it is merely as that intereſt happens accidentally to affect his own. To enjoy pleaſure, the meaneſt pleaſure, is the only reaſonable aim of a tyrant; to acquire glory, the brighteſt glory, is the aim of a king. A tyrant, therefore, delights in wealth, as furniſhing means to his end; a king delights in honour, juſtly obtained and hardly earned. A tyrant is guarded by mercenary foreigners; a king, by the affection of his people.

Analyſis of tyranny; the inherent evils of its conſtituent elements;

The miſchief of that complex thing a tyranny, will manifeſtly appear by conſidering the inherent evils of its conſtituent elements. It is compoſed, we ſaid, of rigid oligarchy and of lawleſs democracy. From the former it borrows that rapacity for wealth, (the proper end of oligarchy,) without which the tyrant can neither purchaſe criminal pleaſure, nor pay his mercenary attendants. In imitation of oligarchic magiſtrates, the tyrant will diſtruſt and diſarm his ſubjects, plunder and baniſh them, as fear or avarice directs; and, diſregarding every domeſtic and every ſocial tie, tranſplant them, as ſuits his conveniency, from one diſtrict to another, and thus tear aſunder their affections, and render them ſtrangers in their native country. From democracy, on the other hand, tyrants will borrow their animoſity to the nobles, and loſe no opportunity of deſtroying them, ſecretly or openly; of baniſhing them from their country, and of inflicting on them every calamity, that either vengeance can dictate, or that fear may ſuggeſt. For tyrants never forget

BOOK VII.

get that the moſt diſtinguiſhed portion of the community muſt ever be the moſt hoſtile to their government, and the moſt able as well as the moſt willing to ſubvert it; becauſe of ſuch men, ſome will be ambitious of dominion, and all of them muſt be impatient of ſubjection. Tyrants, therefore, regarding them as hindrances in the way of their power, and obſtacles to the unbounded gratification of their paſſions, will never loſe ſight of the advice of Periander to Thraſybulus, "that in order to reap the full harveſt of their government, it is neceſſary to cut off the talleſt ſtalks, and to level the political field."

Cauſes of the revolutions in tyrannies.

From theſe obſervations, it is plain that both the cauſes which precede, and the conſequences which follow revolutions, muſt be nearly the ſame in monarchies and in republics. The immediate and impelling cauſes of innovation, are injuſtice, ſuffered or apprehended, fear, contempt, and eſpecially ſuch acts of injuſtice as

Inſult.

are accompanied with inſult. The ends in view are to ſtrip the tyrant of his ill-gotten wealth, and to diveſt him of his uſurped power, in order to apply the former to the exigencies of the community, and to divide the latter among lawful magiſtrates. Conſpirators ſometimes ſtrike at the tyranny, ſometimes at the perſon of the tyrant. The latter takes place in the caſe of inſult; for perſons inſulted commonly ſeek not

Examples.

advantage, but vengeance. It was thus that Harmodius and Ariſtogeiton overturned the tyranny of the Peiſiſtratidæ. The inſult offered to his ſiſter, animated the hand of Harmodius;

 the

the infult offered to his beloved Harmodius, fharpened the fteel of Ariftogeiton. Periander of Ambracia provoked the vengeance even of his pathics by the infolent obfcenity of his language. Philip of Macedon was flain by Paufanias, becaufe he made light of the difgrace which that young nobleman had fuffered from the audacious impurity of Attalus. The indignant manhood of Derdas punifhed by death the brutal affaults of Amyntas, furnamed the Little[i]. The refentment of blows and ftripes has often threatened the fafety of men in power, and often proved fatal to them: witnefs the Penthalidæ at Mitylené, and alfo Penthilus himfelf, the former of whom were deftroyed by Megacles, the latter by Smerdes; witnefs alfo, the affaffination of Archelaus King of Macedon, effected at the inftigation of Decamnichus, whom that prince had caufed to be whipped, in compliance with the defire of Euripides the poet[k]; who was provoked at being taunted by Decamnichus for his ftinking breath[l]. Innumerable inftances might be given of kings and tyrants who, through fuch caufes, have been at once deprived of their power and of their lives; efpecially when the indulgence of their unbridled paffions has been accompanied by an open defiance of the fentiments of mankind, and

[i] A few fentences are omitted, the fubject being as impure as the text is corrupt.

[k] Hiftory of Ancient Greece, vol. iv. c. xxxiii. p. 6.

[l] This paffage is fomewhat abridged. Compare Diodorus Siculus, b. xiv. fect. 37.

when

BOOK VII.

when injury has been heightened by mockery and infult.

Fear, contempt, &c. with examples.

The fear or the contempt of fubjects often proves ruinous to kings. Xerxes commanded Artabanus, the captain of his guard, to kill Darius. Artabanus did not obey the order, thinking the King himfelf might forget, or be willing to revoke it, as the command was given in his cups. But the officious envy of courtiers failed not to refrefh the King's memory; and Artabanus, alarmed for his own fafety, confpired and flew his mafter. The mean effeminacy of Sardanapalus, who, if the ftory told of him may be credited, was found weaving and fpinning with his women, excited that contemptuous indignation which tumbled him from the throne. The drunkennefs of the younger Dionyfius, which rendered him defpicable to his fubjects, animated the republican patriotifm of Dion, and enabled him to rid Syracufe of a tyrant. This paffion of contempt is moft likely to operate on two claffes of men; on the friends of the monarch, who, becaufe they enjoy his confidence, think it will be eafy for them to deceive and to deftroy him; and on the minifters of his power, becaufe they think it will not be difficult for them to ufurp his dominion. Cyrus was only the general of a provincial army; but he became mafter of the Eaft, becaufe he defpifed the luxury of Aftyages, and the flothful effeminacy of his guards. Seuthes, the Thracian general, confpired againft his mafter Amadocus, and feated himfelf on his throne. Some-

Sometimes avarice, and ſometimes ambition, combines with contempt, and accelerates revolutions. The love of money made Mithridates dethrone Ariobarzanes. Ambition often ſprings up in men of courageous natures inveſted by monarchs with high military command; for courage becomes enterpriſe, when armed with power. Ambition alſo, in another view, is productive of revolutions; an ambition not to gain power, but to obtain glory. Conſpirators, animated by this principle, are few in number; for they muſt diſregard what moſt men highly value, perſonal ſafety; and like the high-minded Dion, muſt be careleſs how far they proceed in their enterpriſe, but think, that while invading the power of a tyrant, the firſt ground they gain will be an honourable grave.

External violence, the hatred of republics;

Monarchies, like other forms of government, periſh through external violence. An interference of intereſts renders them obnoxious to democracies: for as potters, according to Heſiod, envy potters, ſo is a ſingle tyrant expoſed to the hatred and vengeance of a tyrannical populace. An oppoſition of principle and ſyſtem renders tyrannies odious to royalties and ariſtocracies. The ariſtocracy of Sparta, therefore, deſtroyed many tyrannies; as did alſo the republic of Syracuſe, while wiſely governed. In deſtroying monarchies, external violence is often aſſiſted by domeſtic diſcord. This happened in the caſe of Gelon; and recently in that of the younger Dionyſius. Thraſybulus, Hieron's brother, playing the demagogue, corrupted by pleaſures and profligacy

aſſiſted by internal diſcord.

 the

BOOK VII.

the heir-apparent of Gelon's monarchy, that he himſelf might be king. A conſpiracy was formed to deſtroy the perſon of Thraſybulus while his tyranny remained ſafe, but a part of the conſpirators ſeized the opportunity of diveſting the whole family, at once, of honours which no individual of it ſeemed worthy to wear. The family of Dionyſius was divided againſt itſelf; for Dion was his kinſman. By the aſſiſtance of the people he expelled the tyrant; but through the unjuſt ſuſpicions of the ſame people, he was afterwards himſelf moſt unworthily ſlain.

Different operation of hatred, contempt, and anger.

Of the two cauſes which deſtroy tyrannies, hatred and contempt, the firſt is inherent in the very nature of tyranny, ſince that man cannot fail to be odious, who is inveſted with arbitrary power. Contempt, though not eſſential to tyrany itſelf, is, however, a more frequent cauſe of its deſtruction. Experience juſtifies this remark. Thoſe who were the firſt to mount a deſpotic throne, have for the moſt part been able to preſerve it; they were odious, but not contemptible; but their ſucceſſors, naturally becoming contemptible as well as odious, have univerſally been diveſted of their unlawful power; and as ſhamefully diſgraced as they were unworthily exalted. Anger may be regarded as a ſpecies of hatred; it differs however in this, that as its proceedings are deſtitute of reflection, it is always more prompt, and ſometimes more efficacious; but hatred, as it acts under the direction of reaſon, though more ſlow, is commonly more dangerous and more fatal. The arbitrary government of the individual periſhes (to ſpeak in general)

general) through the ſame cauſes which deſtroy rigid oligarchies and lawleſs democracies; both of which are nothing elſe but complex tyrannies.

Of revolutions in limited monarchies.

Royalty is not eaſily demoliſhed by external violence; and this form of government often laſts long, ſince honours are naturally durable in proportion as they are moderate. Royalty periſhes, however, through the internal diſcord of men in office, and through the prepoſterous ambition of kings to make themſelves abſolute. At preſent, ſtates are ſeldom erected into royalties; for amidſt the great equality of mankind, few are thought worthy of unrivalled pre-eminence, or deemed capable of ſuſtaining with dignity a lawful and voluntary ſceptre; and a king, whoſe authority muſt be ſupported by force or by fraud, immediately degenerates into a tyrant. To the cauſes, therefore, already mentioned of the deſtruction of monarchy, we muſt add one peculiar to hereditary monarchy; the contemptible characters of youths born in the purple, and their proneneſs to offenſive inſolence. The authority of ſuch youths cannot be *voluntarily* endured; and thus, the government, if a royalty, is effectually deſtroyed, and a tyranny, probably of ſhort duration, ſubſtituted in its ſtead. Theſe and other ſuch cauſes produce revolutions in monarchies.

The worthleſſneſs of youths born in the purple.

Chap. II.

Limited monarchy preſerved by moderation.

The means of their preſervation, it is plain, muſt in general be directly contrary to the cauſes of their deſtruction. As to limited monarchy, or royalty, the more it is limited, the longer

BOOK VII.

longer it is likely to laſt. Moderation, therefore, is the great preſervative of this form of government. Princes, the farther they recede from deſpotiſm, and the nearer they approximate to equality of right with their ſubjects, are the leſs expoſed to hatred, envy, and all that train, or all thoſe complications of paſſions, which ſo often prove ruinous to their power. Moderation long upheld the monarchy of the Moloſſians. The royalty of Lacedæmon, which has proved ſo permanent, was, from the beginning, moderated by diviſion between two kings; and farther attempered, under Theopompus, by a due mixture of popular and democratic powers.

When that wiſe prince inſtituted the office of the Ephori, he abridged the power of royalty, but increaſed its ſtability. The ſhort-ſighted pride of his queen aſked him, whether he was not aſhamed to tranſmit to his poſterity a ſceptre leſs ſplendid than that which he had received from his anceſtors? "No, ſurely," he replied; "I ſhall tranſmit to them a throne more ſtedfaſt and more durable."

Abſolute monarchy preſerved by the two contrary modes of intenſion and remiſſion.

Abſolute monarchy, or tyranny, is preſerved by the two contrary modes of intenſion and remiſſion. The firſt mode conſiſts in tightening the reigns of power, by vigilance and ſeverity; it is uſual and hereditary among tyrants. The ſuſpicious and ſtern Periander exerciſed it in all its bitterneſs at Corinth. The cruel inſtitutions of the Perſian monarchs are ſtamped with the ſame character; and the maxims which we formerly mentioned, of mowing the talleſt ſtalks; of

of prohibiting, under ſevere penalties, convivial meetings of clubs and aſſemblies; of deſtroying public ſchools; and of ſubverting every eſtabliſhment that may have a tendency to engender mutual confidence, or to create a national ſpirit; all theſe precautions, and others of the ſame kind, would, if any thing could, render tyranny ſecure. It will tend to the ſame purpoſe, that perſons of diſtinction frequent the halls, or crowd the gates, of the palace; their machinations againſt the government will thus be eaſily diſcovered and ſpeedily ſuppreſſed; and their minds, degraded and debaſed by the ſervility of court attendance, will finally become incapable of forming any generous reſolution. Theſe, and ſuch like, are Perſian, Barbarian, and tyrannic maxims, directly tending to deſtroy that freedom of communication which is as eſſential to mutual confidence, as mutual confidence is eſſential to boldneſs of enterpriſe. Spies, accuſers, inſidious liſteners, like the Syracuſan tale-bearers, are inſtruments uſeful to tyrants, whoſe intereſt it is to ſet their ſubjects at variance, inſtigating the people againſt the nobles, and the rich and noble againſt each other. Above all, the poverty of the ſubjects is the beſt pledge of the permanence of tyranny; for people impoveriſhed have neither the leiſure to contrive, nor the means to effect, revolutions. The pyramids of Egypt, the magnificent dedications of the Cypſelidæ, the rebuilding of the Olympian temple by the ſons of Piſiſtratus, the ſumptuous works of Polycrates of Samos; theſe

BOOK VII.

The former mode explained with an enumeration of tyrannic maxims.

Examples.

were the productions of toil and misery, monuments as useful for the power of monarchs, as ruinous to the prosperity of their subjects. Enormous contributions in money, and enormous contributions in labour, have precisely the same tendency. By both alike the people are reduced to poverty and wretchedness; their *time* is enslaved; they must be beggars or drudges; and men robbed of leisure are not likely to recover liberty. Under the tyrannical government of Dionysius, the subjects of Syracuse returned, in the space of every five years, the amount of their whole property into the exchequer. Still faithful to his principle, the tyrant delights in war; extorting not only the wealth, but the blood of his people, especially since military expeditions are calculated to engross their whole attention, and to confirm their habitual submission. The safety of a king lies in his friends; but a tyrant distrusts *his friends* beyond all others; knowing that all others are willing, but that his friends only are always able to destroy him. The institutions adapted to lawless democracy, equally suit tyranny. The unbridled licence of slaves and of women, forms the reproach of both these governments. The order of society is inverted; in families, slaves are disobedient, and women are imperious; they are spies and accusers of their masters and husbands; and cherished by the single, as well as the complex tyrant, for those odious purposes, they become abettors of unjust domination, which they strive to perpetuate and extend.

extend. None but the worst or meanest of mankind can have credit in democracies and tyrannies. The furious sanguinary demagogue is all-powerful in the first; the cruel unfeeling courtier is alone regarded in the second; for the licentious multitude and the tyrant are governed by their passions; and as their passions are criminal, wicked instruments alone are qualified to gratify them. Tyrants, sensible of their own worthlesness, stand in perpetual need of flattery, without which anodyne, the internal smart of their crimes would render them intolerable to themselves. But men of elevated minds are totally incapable of every species of adulation. Tyrants, therefore, cannot endure any such men; their liberal spirit and conscious dignity are regarded as insolent usurpations of the imperial prerogative. None, therefore, can associate with tyrants, but those who will comply with their humours; and in admission to their table and familiarity, foreigners, as less dangerous, will always be preferred to their native subjects. Such are the expedients by which tyranny is upheld; expedients wicked in the extreme, and indefinite in number, but which are all contrived for the three following purposes: First, to debase the souls of their people; for it is not the part of low-minded persons to become political reformers. Secondly, to destroy all mutual confidence, for without confidence in each other, it is impossible for any set of men to effect a revolution; tyrants, therefore, are necessarily enemies to honesty, not only because men of integrity

Tyrannic maxims all reduced to three.

grity

BOOK VII.

grity are naturally hoftile to their government, but becaufe fuch men alone, by the confidence which their characters infpire, are capable of fubverting it. Thirdly, tyrants will ftrive to reduce their people to indigence and debility; and thus deter them from all thoughts of fedition, by making them fenfible of their total inability to effect any falutary revolution.

The mode of preferving tyranny by remiffion, with maxims by which a tyrant may obtain popularity, and appear not a plunderer but a protector.

This, then, is the firft mode of preferving a tyranny; the fecond is directly the reverfe. We may perceive wherein it confifts, by reflecting on what was above faid concerning the destruction of royalty. As royalty is deftroyed by rendering it tyrannical or abfolute, fo tyranny may be preferved by rendering it royal or moderate; with this condition, however, that the monarch, while he flackens the reins of his power, ftill continues to hold and to guide them: for fhould he once abandon his power, and begin to reign merely by the voluntary fubmiffion of his fubjects, he would from that moment ceafe to be a tyrant, and rife into a lawful prince. His power, therefore, muft be preferved, as the only foundation of his authority; but while he keeps hold of tyrannic power, he may feafonably decline to exercife it, and with great advantage to his own fecurity, begin to play the part of a king. In affuming this borrowed character, he will firft of all pretend to be mightily concerned for the intereft and glory of his country. He will not incenfe the people by lavifhing the hard earnings of their fweat and toil,

on

on harlots, flatterers, and fiddlers. Some tyrants have been ſuch admirable actors of royalty, as even to give their ſubjects a faithful account of their receipt and expenditure. The deluded multitude conſidered them as ſtewards, not as maſters. Thoſe, however, who have power, can never be in want of property; and an ambitious monarch, frequently engaged in foreign enterpriſes, acts wiſely in not leaving at home a rich treaſury behind him, ſince thoſe whom he appointed to guard it, would prove his moſt formidable adverſaries. Generous in his own perſon, he views with complacence inexhauſtible treaſures, always at his command, in the purſes of his ſubjects; yet, he never demands their money or their ſervices but under pretence of the public exigency. It is the honour and ſafety of the country, not the ambition of the prince, that ſummons them to war. They follow his ſtandard readily, regarding him, not as a tyrant, but as a protector. If he proceeds in other inſtances to act his part well, he will endeavour to inſpire, not fear, but reſpect: this, indeed, is not eaſy, if his character at bottom be really contemptible; yet, much may be done by pretending a ſincere love for his country, and exhibiting himſelf to the multitude as the guardian and champion of the ſtate. An abſolute monarch, who would preſerve his power, muſt, in public at leaſt, keep a watch over his voluptuouſneſs, and take care that none of his miniſters or favourites inſult the youth and beauty of either ſex.

BOOK VII.

fex. His wives and miftreffes muft alfo be taught to correct that fupercilious and offenfive haughtinefs, and to reprefs thofe infolent airs, which have already caufed the fubverfion of fo many tyrannies. As to fenfual pleafures, his conduct ought to be directly the reverfe of that ufual with fome princes, who are not completely gratified by the moft criminal indulgence in luft and luxury, unlefs they openly expofe their wickednefs and emblazon their profligacy; challenging the admiration of mankind, for that drunken debauchery and prodigal whoredom which ought to cover them with eternal infamy. A crafty tyrant will avoid giving fuch caufes of offence; knowing, that he who is drunk or afleep is more obnoxious to a confpiracy than the man who is vigilant and fober. Inftead of diffipating his treafures in perifhing luxury, he will employ them in embellifhing his capital, and improving his country. This will exhibit him under the amiable character of a public guardian; and above all, he muft appear to be much addicted to religion, and anxioufly attentive to whatever regards the honour of the gods. Perfons of this character are lefs likely to commit injuftice, and therefore lefs the objects of fear: they are, alfo, lefs liable to fuffer wrong, becaufe men will be afraid of injuring thofe who reckon the gods themfelves in the number of their friends. A tyrant, therefore, muft endeavour to appear religious; but this fpecious fhew of religion muft not be deformed by abject fuperftition. It will contribute much

to his fecurity, to be diligent in difcovering and rewarding merit, wherever it may be found; and to be careful to treat men of eminent talents with fuch diftinguifhed honour, as will leave them little room to regret that it is not their lot to live under a free republic. Of rewards and honours, he himfelf muft be the difpenfer; but punifhments muft be inflicted by the authority of his courts of juftice, or the command of his fubftitutes.[m]

It is a maxim of ftate in every kind of monarchy, never too highly to exalt any individual fubject. When great powers muft be delegated, it is better that they fhould be lodged with a commiffion, confifting of feveral perfons, whofe rivalry and jealoufy will afford the beft pledges of their fidelity; but when the nature of any important function of fovereignty requires that it fhould be intrufted to one only, the tyrant fhould take care, that this minifter be not of too enterprifing a fpirit; or if he has imprudently aggrandized fuch a perfon beyond the due meafure, he muft beware not to curtail him of his ample dignities at once, but flowly and imperceptibly. The fudden fall of an ambitious minifter has fhaken the ftability of many a government. All kinds of offenfive infolence

[m] See Libro del Principe; particularly chapters 18, 19. 21. Machiavel has neither the merit nor the infamy of the maxims ufually afcribed to him, but which he has copied verbatim from Ariftotle. Yet, in defcribing the contrivances for preferving tyranny, whether by the way of intention or remiffion, the Grecian philofopher is more careful than the Florentine fecretary to avoid faying any thing that is liable to mifreprefentation or reproach.

are

BOOK VII.

are to be moſt carefully avoided, eſpecially ſuch inſolence as vents itſelf in acts of violence or luſt. The crafty tyrant muſt perſuade the victims of his outrageous and infamous paſſions, that they are the objects of his love, and repay their ſecret ſubmiſſions by conſpicuous honours. But when he ſuſpects that his inſolence has really offended, he muſt be particularly on his guard againſt men jealous of their honour, incapable of reſtraining their anger, and willing, as Heraclitus ſays, to purchaſe vengeance at the price of their lives.

As every ſtate conſiſts of two principal claſſes, the rich and the poor, the tyrant muſt endeavour to make it appear, that his authority is uſeful to both; or if that be impoſſible, he muſt diligently court and gain the ſtrongeſt party. If *their* favour can be obtained, it will be needleſs for him to have recourſe to the ordinary expedients of emancipating his ſlaves and diſarming his ſubjects, ſince the ſtrength of his guards, abetted by a powerful party among the people, will be ſufficient to uphold his tyranny. It is needleſs to expatiate on this ſubject; for all the other maxims that might be enumerated muſt ſtill have the ſame end in view, to gain popularity, and muſt be calculated to make the tyrant appear, not as a maſter, but as a ſteward; not a plunderer, but a protector[a]. By avoiding

[a] How well did the late Frederic II. of Pruſſia, as well as his model, Philip II. of Macedon, practiſe the more eſſential part of Ariſtotle's maxims! See my View of the Reign of Frederic, c. vi. p. 376, & ſeq.

blameable

blameable exceſs, and confining his life within the bounds of moderation, he will ceaſe to be the object of fear and hatred; his reign will be more illuſtrious and more honourable, in proportion as his ſubjects are leſs miſerable and leſs abject; his throne alſo will be the more ſecure. As to morals, therefore, let him, if it is impoſſible to be virtuous, be at leaſt half virtuous, and not altogether wicked, but only half wicked.[1]

BOOK VII.

Chap. 12.

That oligarchies and tyrannies are the leaſt durable of all governments. Examples.

Of all governments, the leaſt durable are oligarchies and tyrannies. The moſt laſting tyranny on record was that of Orthagoras and his ſons in Sicyon. It continued a hundred years. The cauſe of its long duration was the laudable moderation of thoſe princes, [illegible]d their cheerful ſubmiſſion to the laws. Cſthenes, beſides, was a man [illegible] ſpir[illegible]; and, therefore, by [illegible] [illegible]ontemt, which ſo often [illegible]ies; and he, as well as the [illegible] [illegible]is family, knew the arts of government, [illegible] aſſiduouſly cultivated popularity. His impartial equity crowned the honeſt boldneſs of the judge who, in a diſpute reſpecting a gymnaſtic victory, adjudged the prize to his competitor. It is ſaid, that the ſtatue ſitting in the market-place of Sicyon, adorned with a crown, perpetuates the

[1] Machiavel ſays more explicitly, "non partirſe dal bene, potendo; ma ſapere entrare nel male, neceſſitato." The maxim, if it has any ſenſe, only ſhews that tyranny being a bad thing in itſelf, can only be preſerved by bad means.

remem-

BOOK VII.

remembrance of the judge's integrity, and of Clifthenes's magnanimity. Peififtratus of Athens gave an ufeful leffon to tyrants. When fummoned before the Areopagus, he appeared in perfon to plead his caufe, and refpectfully heard the decifion of that ancient tribunal. The fecond example of a durable tyranny is that of Cypfelus and his family at Corinth. It lafted feventy-feven years and fix months; for Cypfelus himfelf reigned thirty years; Periander, forty-four; and Pfammetichus, the fon of Gondius, three years and fix months. The duration of this government proceeded from the fame caufes. Cypfelus was a man of uncommon addrefs, and knew how to practife every feductive and every popular art. He even difbanded his gua[illegible]s, as [illegible]ufelefs for his fafety. His fon P[illegible]riand[illegible]r was in[illegible]be obta[illegible] tyrant; but his character was [illegible]nobled [illegible] recourfe [illegible] the fpirit, and illuftr[illegible]ted by [illegible]ipating his flaves [illegible]e third and laft ex[illegible]mple [illegible]f a d[illegible] the [illegible]anny was that of the Pe[illegible]ftratid[illegible] a[illegible] Athens. It was not, like thofe abo[illegible]e me[illegible]tioned, uninterrupted; for Peififtratus twice abdicated and fled; fo that in the courfe of thirty-three years, he reigned only feventeen; his fons reigned eighteen years; the whole duration of their government, therefore, exceeded not thirty-five years. That of Gelon and his family in Syracufe was more fhort-lived ftill. Gelon reigned feven years; Hieron reigned ten; but Thrafybulus was banifhed in lefs than twelve months. The greater part of tyrannies

tyrannies have perifhed ftill more fuddenly[m]. Thus much concerning revolutions in monarchies, how they are caufed, and how they may be prevented.[n]

[m] When Ariftotle fpeaks of tyrannies, he here means ufurpations of arbitrary power in countries formerly free; whether under a lawful monarchy, or under a republican government. It is ftrictly confiftent with his principles, that fuch ufurpations fhould be fhort-lived, becaufe they are incompatible with the fentiments, principles, and habits of thinking, moft prevalent among the people at large.

[n] The conclufion of this chapter is employed in refuting Plato's fanciful notions concerning political revolutions; notions founded on the wonderful powers afcribed by the Pythagoreans to periods and numbers. This wild doctrine is explained in the eighth book of Plato's Republic. Ariftotle proves by the facts above ftated, that it is totally inconfiftent with experience. The revolutions, however, which hiftory defcribes, and which theory explains, it is the bufinefs of policy to apply, that the experience of the paft may thus ferve for regulating the conduct of the future. While the fame caufes produce the fame effects, nations fimilarly circumftanced muft, it is thought, neceffarily run the fame political career; obtain by fimilar exertions the fame exalted profperity; commit, through ambition or infolence, nearly the fame errors; and, in confequence of thofe errors, be fubjected to equally dreadful reverfes of fortune. The truth of thefe general obfervations cannot be difputed; but in making particular applications of them, either for the purpofe of confirming their own confidence, or of infpiring terror into their enemies, men are almoft continually deceived by appearances; fometimes miftaking even contrafts for parallels. It is not unufual with the great military republic of recent date, to affume the right of comparing itfelf with Rome, and its naval and commercial rival with Carthage. Yet it is only under one afpect, and in particulars the flighteft and moft fuperficial, that Carthage and England can be brought to exhibit even a falfe air of refemblance; while in their characterifing properties, the two maritime commonwealths form the fubject of a contraft rather than of a comparifon. The one continental, the other infular; the former depending entirely for defence on foreign troops, the latter exulting in domeftic ftrength; Carthage noted for penurioufnefs and perfidy; England equally diftinguifhed for probity and profufion; the African republic, addicted folely to lucrative purfuits, confidering literature and philofophy as things beyond its fphere; Great Britain, the feat of arts and elegance, of growing fame in literature, and of unrivalled pre-eminence in fcience.

The parallel between Rome and France is attended with this fingularity, that the latter has run through the fame ftages in a few years, which

which the former did in as many centuries. It has expelled or destroyed its royal line; abolished privileged orders; laid all honours open to the people at large; displayed the enthusiasm of liberty; proved the connection between this principle and military energy; defeated its neighbours on the Continent; obliged them to supply its armies with pay, corn, and clothing; plundered their altars and temples; carried off their pictures and statues. I need not say more of what France has done; but among the transactions indicating what she in future is likely to do, the reader of ancient history will recollect that Buonaparte is entrusted with nearly the same commission that the Romans bestowed on Cæsar before he became dictator, and in precisely the same countries on both sides the Alps.

The above note was first printed in 1797; and the prediction has been verified in the establishment by Buonaparte, of a military despotism commanding from his slaves, whether called subjects or allies, every particle of labour, every sous of money, and every drop of blood; a tremendous energy, while it lasts, and has materials to work on. Yet as single years in the French empire have hitherto corresponded with whole centuries in the Roman, it may be conjectured that this proportional progress applicable to its growth and aggrandizement, will continue, also, to apply to its declension and downfall; a supposed acceleration, which, amidst many agreeable and respectable qualities, is not a little justified by the hasty, impetuous temper of the French, and their variable, unbottomed character. From the nature of the materials, the empire of Rome was a volcano requiring ages to exhaust it; that of France is a feu de paille, bright, glittering, crackling, and hastily reducing itself by its own violence to dust and ashes.

ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK VIII.*

INTRODUCTION.

BOOK VIII.

THIS Book is placed laſt in order, becauſe it ſeems to have been written to ſupply the defects of ſeveral preceding parts of the work. Ariſtotle had ſufficiently explained the principles and arrangements of the ſimple forms of government; but he thought it might be uſeful further to examine wherein governments bearing the ſame name, might yet eſſentially differ in their nature. This leads him to enumerate and deſcribe the different kinds of democracies and oligarchies, and to ſhew how the worſt kinds might be improved and corrected; and, when thus happily altered, how they might beſt be upheld and perpetuated. In this Book he alſo examines the different kinds of military or naval force in their relation to the different forms of government; ſhewing which kinds of the former are reſpectively beſt adapted to the different modes of the latter. He concludes the

* Commonly publiſhed as Book VI.

BOOK VIII.

Book with an accurate analyfis of the executive power; enumerating and defcribing the different functions of magiftracy effentially requifite in every well-regulated commonwealth. On this important fubject, the following remarks will not appear unfeafonable.

When our author firft analyfed government into deliberative, judicial, and executive[a] powers, he meant fomething more than merely to explain the fubject as a matter of fpeculation. For it is neceffary, he obferves, not only to know what, and how many are political functions, but according to what fubordination they ought to be arranged and diftributed. That they ought to be as minutely fubdivided as ftate neceffity will permit, he thinks moft evident from this fimple confideration, that each individual will be likely to act his part moft properly, when each has his affigned tafk. The military power ought to depend on the civil[b]; that the army may be formidable only to the enemies of the ftate: and the executive power ought to be clearly diftinct from the legiflature; left tyrannical laws fhould be enacted, and thefe executed tyrannically. All magiftrates ought to be refponfible for the exercife of their authority; and their accounts fubject to the infpection of thofe who never themfelves handle the public money. The of-

[a] The executive is called by him the appointing or electing power, for a reafon above affigned, p. 314.

[b] But to reduce it to this dependence is not an eafy matter, as will be experienced by a great modern republic. Yet unlefs this be done, the commonwealth is a camp, and its liberty an empty boaft.

fice

fice of collecting and applying the revenue ought never, therefore, to belong to the same persons who administer justice, and punish crimes; lest the financial administrator should abuse his authority to the base purposes of extortion or vengeance. "The law is above the judge; and the judge, as organ of the law, above all other magistrates. But the office of judge is incompatible with every function, that might pervert his judgment or twist his decisions; for a judge is a ruler, and how can a ruler give straightness to other things if itself be crooked?"[c]

These great political principles afford the nearest approximation which the wisdom of antiquity ever made to that improvement and perfection which the events of time and chance, co-operating with the virtues of our ancestors, gradually introduced into the British constitution. But the grand secret in policy, of a government, carried on by kings who can do no wrong, and whose persons are sacred, through the instrumentality of accountable advisers and responsible ministers, was totally unknown to the free states of antiquity; on which account chiefly, none of them could lay claim to that stability and perpetuity at which, Cicero maintains[d], all wise government ought ever to aim. As this is a point which deserves the greatest attention, I shall not be blamed for making an unnecessary circuit, when I take the best, or

[c] Rhetor. l. i. p. 512.   [d] Fragm. de Repub. l. iii.

 the

BOOK VIII. the only, road to eftablifh fo important a truth on authority which demands refpect, and by arguments which admit not of anfwer.

The learned and judicious Polybius, who was not merely a *fpeculative* politician, but one converfant from his youth with courts and camps, and the management of great affairs, of unbounded curiofity, and with extraordinary opportunities, explains as the main refult of his reading and experience, what he calls the theory of political revolutions: revolutions fo neceffary in their event, and fo immutable in their order, that they may be eafily forefeen, and boldly predicted. The difcourfe is contained in the fixth book of his Hiftory, and applied to the commonwealth of Rome in the beginning of the feventh century from the foundation of the city, the firmeft and moft flourifhing period of the republic; when external victory confpired with internal arrangement to render the public fecurity as ftable, as the policy of the ftate was profound, and its renown was illuftrious.

In that invaluable fragment, the hiftorian finds fault with the ufual divifion of governments into monarchies, ariftocracies, and democracies; obferving that thefe are neither the beft, nor the only, kinds of civil polity. Monarchies are the firft governments in their origin, and the work of Nature herfelf; but they have never yet been fo fkilfully moulded by art, that they had not a ftrong and palpable tendency to degenerate into tyrannies. It is the

the nature of power to corrupt thofe invefted with the exercife of it; and the exercife of hereditary power is, in this refpect, ftill more dangerous than that of any other. When princes, therefore, begin to abufe their prerogatives and authority for the unbridled indulgence of their rapacity, luft, and luxury, their proceedings cannot fail to provoke indignation and anger among the more dignified claffes of their fubjects, whofe temper is the leaft likely to brook difgrace tamely. The people at large will fympathize with their refentment, and affift in deftroying the monarchy, which had degenerated into a tyranny. An ariftocracy will naturally rife on its ruins; fince the gratitude of the public will cheerfully accept for rulers thofe by whom the country was delivered from oppreffion. The new magiftrates will continue for a while to conduct themfelves with propriety and patriotifm; adminiftering juftly and wifely the affairs both of the citizens individually, and of the public collectively. But when the exercife of their power devolves on their defcendants, who have not the merit of their fathers, nor enjoy like them the advantage of having been trained in the fchool of adverfity, thefe unworthy fucceffors will begin grofsly to abufe their pre-eminent functions; giving loofe reins to the moft odious and moft difgraceful paffions. The ariftocracy is thus transformed into an oligarchy; which, finking under the weight of its own inherent vices, will be fpeedily overturned

 by

by the firft leader of the multitude who has courage to affail it; fince the whole body of the people, exafperated by an accumulation of indignities, will be prepared to abet his meafures and to fecond his efforts. The people at large, now taking the commonwealth into their own hands, will eftablifh a democracy; and while the greater part of thofe continue to live, who have experienced the evils refulting from governments of arbitrary will, the community will flourifh under the bleffings of law and liberty. But when the adminiftration of the democracy is delivered down from father to fon through fucceffive generations, the reftleffnefs of man will begin to fpurn advantages with which he is fatiated; ambition will naufeate equality, and figh for pre-eminence; thofe who have accumulated great wealth, will covet a proportional fhare of political power; and to attain this much-envied object, will not hefitate to deftroy their own fortunes by profufion, and to corrupt the public morals by bribery, until the whole mafs of the community be fo deeply tainted with the impatience of rapacity, that the populace will no longer wait for their precarious or tardy dole, but putting themfelves under the command of the firft daring and unprincipled chief, whofe boldnefs equals his wickednefs, will invade the conftitution; fubvert the government; confifcate, banifh, murder, and plunder, until having filled up the meafure of their favage ferocity, the folly of their own paffions delivers

delivers them enslaved and bound, into the hands of a single despot.[d]

Such is the perpetual round, which, according to Polybius, all unmixed governments are found by experience to run; from monarchy to tyranny; from aristocracy to oligarchy; from democracy to the tyranny of the multitude; for every multitude, he affirms, merely as such, is filled with levity and inconstancy, lawless in its pursuits, headstrong in its passions, unjust in its proceedings[e]. In none of the simple forms of government, therefore, is there any constitutional firmness; there stability depends on opinions which are transient, and on circumstances which are accidental. They may be kept afloat by a tide of external prosperity; while the atchievement and partition of foreign conquests conceal the inherent evils of the constitutions under which they are made. But the flame of discord, the longer it is suppressed by the mere accumulation of fuel, will finally break out with the greater violence; which has always been experienced by states whose institutions were well adapted to the contentious activity of war, but which had never been taught to enjoy the in-

[d] The same doctrine is maintained by Aristotle, b. vii. c. v.; and by Plato in the following passage: ἡ γαρ αγαν ελευθερια ἑοικεν ουκ εις αλλο τι η εις αγαν δουλειαν μεταβαλλειν : : : εικοτως τοινυν ουκ εξ αλλης πολιτειας τυραννις καθισταται η εκ δημοκρατιας Εξ της ακροτατης ελευθεριας, δουλεια πλειστη και αγριωτατη. "Excessive liberty is not likely to change into any thing else but excessive slavery. Tyranny, therefore, more naturally results from democracy than from any other form of government; the highest liberty being converted into the completest and cruellest servitude." Plato de Republ. l. ix.

[e] Polybius, l. vi. c. 56. p. 594. edit. Schweigh.

BOOK VIII.

estimable gifts of peaceful leisure and unambitious security.

Having rejected and reprobated all simple forms of polity, Polybius proceeds to examine those that are complex; governments of reciprocal controul; of which, he maintains, the most perfect model was to be found in the constitution of Rome, as it stood in the beginning of the seventh century of the republic. In that constitution, monarchic, aristocratic, and popular elements were so skilfully combined and so equally balanced, that the Romans themselves could not positively ascertain with which of the three species of governments their own ought to be classed[f]. When they contemplated the splendid functions of the consuls, *their* authority seemed equal to that of kings. In the senate they beheld and felt the full strength of an aristocracy. The people at large, headed by their tribunes, appeared imperiously to exercise

[f] The whole of Polybius's observations on this subject seems to have escaped the notice of our great law-commentator Blackstone. "Thus these three species of government have all of them their several perfections and imperfections. Democracies are usually the best calculated to direct the ends of a law; aristocracies, to invent the means by which that end shall be attained; and monarchies, to carry those means into execution. And the ancients, as was observed, had in general no idea of any other permanent form of government, but these three; for though Cicero * declares himself of opinion "esse optimam constitutam rempublicam, quæ ex tribus generibus illis, regali optimo & populari, sit modice confusa;" yet Tacitus † treats this notion of a mixed government, formed out of them all, and partaking of the advantages of each, as a visionary whim, and one that, if effected, could never be lasting or secure ‡."

* Fragm. de Repub. l. ii. † Annal. l. iv. c. 33.
‡ Blackstone's Comment. Intro. sect. ii.

the

the plenitude of democratic power. The consuls, our author obſerves, even before leading their reſpective armies into the field, carry on within Rome itſelf the chief adminiſtration of affairs. To them all magiſtrates, except the tribunes, are ſubject. They aſſemble the ſenate, propoſe matters of urgency for its deliberation, and carry its decrees into execution. They likewiſe convoke the popular aſſembly, report to the people the reſolutions of the ſenate, collect and declare the votes, and give efficacy to the will of the majority. When the conſuls are at Rome, the ambaſſadors of foreign ſtates can, through them only, be admitted to an audience in the ſenate. In military matters their authority is ſupreme. They appoint the military tribunes, enrol the legions, ſelect the men fitteſt for each kind of ſervice[g], and impoſe their undiſputed commands on the allies. All who ſerve under their ſtandards, are alike liable to their coercion and chaſtiſement; and the queſtors attend them in the field, merely to diſburſe whatever ſums they may think fit to demand. Such, Polybius obſerves, are the royal and monarchic powers[h] of the conſuls.

The ſenate is not, however, deſtitute of its due weight in the ſtate. Firſt of all, this re-

[g] Compar. Polyb. l. vi. c. 12. p. 481. & l. vi. c. 20. p. 496. The military inſtitutions of the Romans called forth the whole energy of the ſtate. With them, the public was every thing; the citizens, nothing. According to their age, ſtrength, and ſtature, they were draughted into the ſeveral legions, and diviſions of legions; *cohorts* and *maniples*; without the ſmalleſt regard to their partialities and prejudices. Vid. Polyb. ubi ſupra.

[h] L. vi. c. 12. p. 481.

ſpected

BOOK VIII.

ſpected council governs the exchequer, into which no ſums are received, and from which none are iſſued, but by the expreſs orders of the ſenate. By the ſenate's command only, the queſtors diſburſe all monies for the public ſervice, except thoſe ſums with which they ſupply the conſuls in the field. Even that heavy expenditure which is incurred by the ſtate at the end of every period of five years, for the repairs or extenſion of public works, is made by the cenſors under the authority of the ſenate; which body alſo takes cognizance of all public delinquencies committed in any part of Italy; ſuch as treaſons, conſpiracies, poiſonings, and aſſaſſinations. To the ſenate it belongs to ſettle all diſputes which ariſe in Italy, whether between individuals or communities; as well as to diſpatch all embaſſies to foreign parts, either to treat of peace, or to denounce war; either to offer its advice and protection, or to interpoſe with its authority and commands. When foreign ambaſſadors arrive at Rome, the ſenate receives them in the manner it may judge moſt fit; and anſwers their demands as it may deem moſt expedient. Thence, to ſtrangers who come to Rome in the abſence of the conſuls, the commonwealth appears in no other light than that of a ſimple ariſtocracy.[1]

It

[1] Polybius, l. vi. c. xiii. p. 482. I abridge the author's narrative as much as attention to perſpicuity will admit; yet I am fearful leſt his analyſis of the Roman government prove tireſome to thoſe, who beſide conſidering the importance of the ſubject itſelf, do not continually keep in view the important conſequence that I would deduce from

It may very naturally be inquired, what political functions, then, remain for the exercise of the people at large? the greatest and most important of all; for the people are the dispensers of rewards and punishments. They elect the magistrates, they impose fines on those guilty of malversation in office; they alone can inflict the punishment of death. The laws proposed by the senate are either confirmed or rejected by the people; and the people may either ratify or annul all transactions between the senate and foreign states.[k]

---

from his elaborate discussion. Of all mixed governments, Polybius thinks the Roman, as it stood in his time, the best model of a well-balanced commonwealth. He observes, however, that emergencies must occur, that would infallibly destroy its equipoise. His prediction was fulfilled; as all similar predictions had been fulfilled concerning governments similarly constituted. I presume not to maintain, that he chose for his example, the best model of mixed government that could possibly have been selected Perhaps the ancient Government of the Cretans, whose institutions, as well as manners, had sadly degenerated in his time, might have answered his purpose better; and the equipoise in the constitutions both of Carthage and of Sparta was maintained during a period of longer duration, though of less splendour. But the result of his reasoning, confirmed by that of all the great writers of antiquity, is, that every one of those mixed governments, in many of which there was a nice balance of political powers, and in some of which the people (as above proved) acted by their representatives, yet I say that every one of them contained in itself the seeds of its dissolution. Their radical infirmity originated not in those causes to which it is universally ascribed, the want of representation and a balance; but it consisted principally in this, that their first magistrates, by whatever title they might be distinguished, consuls, archons, or kings, were incapable of performing what Aristotle considers as the main function of royalty, the defending the poor from insult and the rich from injury, and thus keeping the component parts of a state in their proper places, and thereby giving to the constitution inalterable stability.

[k] Polybius, l. vi. c. xiv. p. 484, & seq.

In

BOOK VIII.

In this complex form of the Roman conftitution, the moving powers are, according to Polybius, admirably adapted to the purpofes of harmonious co-operation, and of feafonable counteraction; fince the parts reciprocally control each other, linked in a nice chain of mutual dependence. The confuls, at the head of their armies, depend both on the fenate and on the people; on the fenate, without whofe authority their foldiers cannot be provided with corn, or clothing, or pay; which can either prorogue their command, or appoint new generals; which can aggrandize and emblazon their tranfactions, or depreciate, vilify, and obfcure them; and without whofe willingnefs to furnifh the requifite expence, they cannot be gratified with the honour of a triumph. The confuls are dependent, alfo, on the people, to whom, at the year's end, they are refponfible for their behaviour in command; and to whom it belongs, either to ratify or to annul their tranfactions with foreign powers.[1]

The fenate and the people are held in a connection not lefs intimate, which compels them mutually to refpect each other. The people alone can inflict the moft tremendous of all punifhments. They can diminifh the collective honours of the fenate; they can abridge the fortunes of its members; and the *veto* of a fingle tribune, who is naturally the creature and the organ of the people, can ftop all proceedings in

[1] Polybius, l. vi. c. xv. p. 486, & feq.

the

the ſenate, and even prevent the aſſembling of that council. But the people, in return, muſt reſpect the will of the ſenators, both collectively and individually; for the ſenators are their employers, paymaſters, and judges. In every part of Italy there are innumerable works, conſiſting in buildings and repairs; the culture of lands and gardens; the management of mines, rivers, and harbours, all which objects are let to farm by the cenſors, and undertaken by the people. There is ſcarcely a ſingle Roman who is not involved in theſe contracts; ſome farming under the cenſors at a certain price; others being partners with the farmers; a third claſs being ſureties for them; and a fourth, in ſupport of theſe ſureties, pledging their own fortunes to the ſtate. But in enforcing or modifying all ſuch bargains, the power of the ſenate is ſupreme. This council can extend the time limited for performance; can lighten the conditions of the contract; and when any inſeparable obſtacle occurs, altogether releaſe the contractors. Beſides this, in moſt other civil cauſes of magnitude, judges are ſelected from the ſenate. The people at large, therefore, will be careful how they provoke a body, from whoſe members they have ſo much to hope, as well as ſo much to fear[m]. Nor is there reaſon to apprehend that they ſhould wantonly thwart the inclinations of the conſuls, to whoſe authority all the citizens both collectively and individually

[m] Polybius, l. vi. c. xvi. & xvii. p. 488, & ſeq.

are

BOOK VIII.

are amenable in the field. From this ſkilful adaptation and intimate dependence of the parts, that harmony of action reſults by which the political machine is impelled regularly and rapidly towards its propoſed goal[a]; reſiſting all attacks, ſurmounting every enemy, and continually extending the dominion of the republic. When the terrors of danger are exchanged for the joys of victory, and the minds of men might

[a] There is a difference between mechanical and moral powers obſcurely hinted at by Polybius. The former, acting neceſſarily and invariably, will, when equal and contrary, deſtroy each other. But in politics two contrary powers may exiſt ſimultaneouſly; and the movement of government, inſtead of being weakened or ſtopped, may be ſometimes thereby ſtrengthened and accelerated. In the Roman conſtitution, beſides the *Comitia Curiata*, which was chiefly uſeful in arming military commanders with the ſanctions and authority of religion, there exiſted in Rome, from the time of the Publilian law enacted in the 414th year of the city, two legiſlative powers, the *Comitia Tributa* and the *Comitia Centuriata*; the former founded on the balance of numbers; and the latter on the balance of property. A dictator might be legally named by the conſuls, neither controlable in his exerciſe of power, nor accountable for his adminiſtration in office; which, though limited to the ſpace of ſix months, afforded time ſufficient for the ſubverſion of a government. The power of the dictator was occaſional and extraordinary; but at all times the veto of a tribune was alike formidable. He might ſtop all meaſures and all deliberations; and, as the tribunes were the creatures of the multitude from which they derived their authority, they would often be inclined through intereſt and vanity, to flatter popular paſſions, and to blow up every guſt of diſcontent into a ſtorm of ſedition. Yet notwithſtanding theſe ſeeming incongruities, the body politic was held together by the charms of victory and glory, and the neceſſity of acting continually againſt innumerable enemies *, in defence of a country in which the great enjoyed pre-eminences and honours, and the people at large more freedom and more advantages than any other nation in the ancient world. Such was the ſtate of Rome until that combination of circumſtances was produced, which, Polybius ſuſpected, the commonwealth would be unable to ſurmount.

* Externus metus, maximum concordiæ vinculum. Tit. Liv.

might be elated and intoxicated through excefs of profperity, the benefit of a government of reciprocal control is eminently confpicuous; fince thofe branches of the ftate that would tower too high, and expand too widely, are checked in their movements, and even anticipated in their tendencies, by the continual preffure of the powers to which they are obnoxious.[o]

This is a glorious panegyric of the republic, as then conftituted, and then circumftanced. But Polybius reluctantly acknowledges that the compliment would foon ceafe to be applicable; for the component parts of the ftate would be kept in their proper places through reciprocal counteraction and control, only while the minds of men were neither inflamed by the luft of power, nor loofened from the reftraint of principle; and while the commonwealth, continuing in a progreffive ftate of profperity, could difcharge in its colonizations and conquefts thofe noxious humours which, unlefs drained by fuch outlets, muft prove deftructive to its vitals. But as the meafure of national profperity was filled up[p], the objects of individual ambition would be expanded and magnified; and while the affailing temptations augmented beyond bounds, the virtues to refift them would continually

[o] Polybius, l. vi. c. xviii. p. 492.

[p] εις ὑπεροχην και δυναστειαν αδηριτον αφικηται, p. 576. I have paraphrafed this paffage of Polybius by comparing it with what Ariftotle predicts concerning the deftiny of Carthage. We learn from the Roman hiftorians in general, that the complete colonization of Italy had the effect afcribed to it in the text.

diminifh.

diminifh. The extortion of rapacity would keep pace with the profufion of vanity; and the unworthy proceedings of the Great would finally terminate in their own ruin, and that of the republic; for the people, provoked by the ambition and avarice of one party, and intoxicated by the perfidious adulation of another, would begin to defpife law, to fpurn authority; and, fubjecting the concerns of their country to their own furious paffions, would eftablifh under the fpecious names of liberty and equality, the worft and cruelleft of all tyrannies. This political prophecy began to be verified a few years after it was made, in the feditions of the Gracchi; and was completely accomplifhed in the fubfequent misfortunes of the republic. But it is worthy of remark, that Polybius concludes his difcourfe, after he has fhipwrecked the Romans on democracy; leaving them to infer from his general theory of political revolutions, that this tyrannical democracy muft neceffarily terminate in the exaltation of a fingle defpot.[q]

The

[q] According to Ariftotle's principles, the republic of Rome enjoyed one advantage in common with the great republic of modern growth; viz. its greatnefs: for the parties which neceffarily prevail in all popular governments rendering them peculiarly liable to the pernicious interference of foreign powers, the ftability of a great republic confidered in relation to external caufes of deftruction, whether by force or fraud, muft be much firmer than that of a fmall one. But the modern commonwealth is deftitute of two advantages which had a tendency to preferve the ancient. Firft, a permanent fenate, which gave the ftate continuity of exiftence, and tranfmitted from one generation to another the fame plans and purpofes; and fecondly, the dictatorial and tribunicial powers, which, however liable to abufe, feem indifpenfably neceffary in every populous com-

 munity

The want of conſtitutional firmneſs in the beſt regulated ſtates of antiquity, produced a very general opinion, that nations, as well as individuals, had their youth and old age; their maturity, decline, and conſequent diſſolution. This opinion is warmly patronized by Plato[r]; it is maintained likewiſe by Polybius; it was firſt refuted by Ariſtotle; and it is alſo rejected by Cicero[s]. But it remained for modern times to ſhew, how the vigour of monarchy, acting by reſponſible inſtruments only, could retain the component parts of a ſtate unalterably in their proper ſpheres; and how the merely executive part of government, though clearly diſtinct from the ſovereignty, might be armed with ſufficient power to uphold law, but without either the power or the will to ſubvert liberty. Had this political arrangement been eſtabliſhed in the free ſtates of antiquity, they would not have been liable to thoſe perpetual abuſes of power, which, as Polybius ſays, are by *a natural neceſſity*[t], ſubverſive of ariſtocracies and democra-

---

munity governed on the republican plan, for ſeaſonably ſuſpending the adverſe exertion of exaſperated factions; and thereby preventing contrarieties of intereſt from continually degenerating into ſources of ſedition.

[r] Plato de Republic. l. viii. p. 712. & ſeq. edit. Ficin.

[s] Debit enim conſtituta ſic eſſe civitas ut æterna ſit. Itaque nullus interitus eſt reipublicæ naturalis, ut hominis, in quo mors non modò neceſſaria eſt, verum etium optanda perſæpe. Fragment. de Repub. l. iii.

[t] The natural neceſſity of political revolutions is maintained by Machiavel, Hiſtory of Florence, l. i. ſub initio; whoſe opinions on the ſubject, and even turn of expreſſion, are copied by Hume. Hiſtory of England, vol. ii. p. 441. edit. 1767.

BOOK VIII.

cies; nor would there have been room for that unbounded ambition, which, in all great and profperous ftates, tends, by a *neceffity equally inevitable*, to the deftruction of mixed governments, how nicely foever in other refpects their texture may be combined, and their elements may be balanced. Enterprifing demagogues and fortunate generals would not merely have been refifted in their exertions by the counteraction of equals and rivals, until the bloody conflict ended in the ruin of public liberty; but they would have been repreffed in their tendencies, and overawed in their hopes, by a power far mightier to fave than they were to deftroy; but a power, whofe ftrength would be changed into weaknefs, whenever it attempted to violate liberty, and infringe the laws.[u]

[u] Is it neceffary to obferve as a corollary to this difcourfe, that a neighbouring nation, if fhe confulted her fuppofed intereft and the fafety of her republican government, would inftantly relinquifh the career of ambition, and difband her armies more eagerly and more cheerfully than ever fhe collected them? The ftability of her democratical conftitution can refult only from giving to her national guards or militia a decided fuperiority over foldiers by profeffion. But how many ftubborn difficulties will prefent themfelves in attempting to realife this project! Should many of the requifition men be defirous to return to their families, and fhould the numerous bodies of foreigners in the fervice be difcharged without danger, and without tumult, yet who will be able to perfuade the French veterans to forfake their arms, their generals, and their military habits of life; and prevail on the greater part of them to mix with the peaceful mafs of citizens, while the remainder is difperfed over an extenfive frontier? Yet unlefs this is done, it is morally impoffible that France fhould long enjoy even the name or appearance of a republic. — I leave this note as it was printed in 1797: the conclufion is now juftified by as relentlefs a military defpotifm as ever was eftablifhed.

BOOK VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Of republics of husbandmen — Of manufacturers and merchants. — Imperfections of democracy. — Oligarchy. — Military and naval force. — Branches of executive magistracy. — Magistrates for protecting commerce and contracts. — Of police — Of revenue. — Courts of record. — Controllers of public accounts. — Different orders of priests. — Superintendants of education and morals.

BOOK VIII. Chap. I. Of the elements of governments, and their different combinations.

IN former books, we analysed and examined the complex structure of government, and explained the nature and the differences of the deliberative, the judicial, and the executive, powers. The deliberative power properly constitutes the sovereignty, since the proper office of magistrates and judges consists in obeying its will, and in executing its orders [x]. We shewed also, what are the political arrangements, which in the appointment of magistrates, and in the constitution of councils and tribunals, are best adapted to each form of government; and described what are the active powers by which every political fabric may be shaken and subverted, as well as what are the resisting forces by which it may be upheld and perpetuated.

[x] βουλευτικη και κυρια. Compare above, p. 319. & seq.

But

BOOK VIII.

But as governments, included under the ſame ſpecific name, differ from each other, in conſequence of the different materials of which they are compoſed, and of the various modes in which theſe materials are arranged, it is neceſſary further [y] to examine theſe materials and that arrangement; to conſider whether, for inſtance, a democracy or an oligarchy contains all the conſtituent elements, which are commonly deemed eſſential to democracies or oligarchies; or whether they contain only a certain proportion of them mixed with others of a different kind [z]; what is the effect of this compoſition on good government in general, and what combinations are beſt adapted to each country or nation in particular. We begin by treating of democracy.[a]

Chap. 2.

Of the nature and end of democracy.

Liberty is the foundation and ſcope of democracy; and it is not unuſual to hear that in this government alone, the charms of liberty are diſplayed. Liberty itſelf is allowed to be founded on juſtice; but the juſtice of democracies, being meaſured by arithmetical[b] equality, requires that

[y] Ariſtotle having ſtated the contents of the preceding Books, goes on to conſider the different kinds of governments diſtinguiſhed by the ſame ſpecific name, ἁμα τε περι εκεινων ει τι λοιπον, "and at the ſame time to examine any remaining particulars which bear a reference to the ſubject of his preſent work:" which is ſufficient to ſhew that this Book, as I have obſerved in the Introduction, is chiefly ſupplemental.

[z] Ariſtotle ſays that the reſult of the συνδυασμοι, "the conjunctions of elements," was not ſufficiently attended to in his own times.

[a] I omit ſome parts of this chapter, becauſe the obſervations contained in them are afterwards more clearly expreſſed.

[b] See vol. i. b. v. c. 4. p. 372.

each

each individual citizen ſhould enjoy the ſame political advantages with every other citizen, and that the will as well as the intereſt of the greater number ſhould always be preferred to the will and the intereſt of the leſſer. It is the nature, therefore, of democracy, that offices of executive magiſtracy ſhould be held by rotation; and that in the deliberative aſſembly, the poor ſhould always prevail over the rich, becauſe the claſs of the poor is every where the more numerous. This laſt circumſtance is conſidered as the beſt proof, or moſt evident ſign of liberty; and the ſecond is, that each individual may live as he liſts; for to live agreeably to the will of another is, according to the maxim of democrats, to be a ſlave. On the baſis, therefore, of theſe principles, the following democratical laws may be erected. That every citizen ſhould be capable of holding offices; and where election prevails, that every citizen ſhould be an elector. That the general will ſhould govern each individual; but that each individual, in his turn, ſhould be appointed to declare and execute this will. That offices ſhould be diſtributed by lot, if not all offices, at leaſt all ſuch as do not require the peculiar advantages of ſkill and experience. That a qualification in point of fortune be not requiſite for holding any employment; at leaſt, that this qualification be exceedingly ſmall. That the ſame office (military offices excepted) be not held twice ſucceſſively by the ſame perſon; and that all offices ſhould be of as ſhort duration as circumſtances will admit. That all the citizens be

Laws therefrom reſulting.

BOOK VIII.

capable of being appointed judges of the law as well as of the fact in all forts of caufes, and refpecting all forts of perfons; or, if this be thought too general, in all important caufes, and refpecting all diftinguifhed perfons; for example, in all political queftions, in impeachments, and even in private contracts, where the object is confiderable. That the fovereignty refide in the national affembly, and be as fparingly imparted as poffible to particular magiftrates. Of all magiftracies, that leaft repugnant to the genius of democracy is the fenate; but when falaries and fees are granted for the difcharge of public duties, the authority even of the fenate muft foon vanifh; for the rapacity of the people will fpeedily bring all public bufinefs before the national affembly, and draw all lawfuits and trials before their own tribunals [c]. Salaries and fees, therefore, are effential to the completion of democracy; magiftrates, whofe uninterrupted functions require that they fhould mefs together [d], muft live at the public expence; and fhould occafional meetings pafs unrewarded,

The evils refulting from the form of a fimple democracy, prove that form to be imperfect.

[c] Ariftotle fubjoins, that this had been obferved in the preceding Book; an obfervation which might have led his editors to a better arrangement of his treatife of politics, than that hitherto given.

[d] Ariftotle here enumerates τας αρχας και τα δικαστηρια και βουλην; that is, magiftrates refpectively entrufted with executive, judiciary, and deliberative powers; who, as well as the citizens at large convened in the εκκλησιαι κυριαι, or ftated affemblies, ought, according to the principles of fimple democracy to be paid for political labours. But if the public revenues cannot fuffice for this profufion of expence, then thofe magiftrates at leaft muft be remunerated, whofe uninterrupted functions require that they fhould mefs together; and with them it appears from B. vi. c. xiii. that he means to clafs, as to this particular, the citizens convened in the ftated and periodical affemblies.

yet

yet the people at large muſt be paid for attending thoſe ſtated and periodical aſſemblies, the returns of which are regulated by law for the neceſſary diſcharge of public buſineſs. Birth, wealth, education, morals, are the elements of ariſtocracies; the elements of democracies, therefore, muſt be of a contrary kind; baſeneſs of extraction, groſs ignorance, poverty, and profligacy [e]. No hereditary, no perpetual magiſtracy can exiſt under ſuch a government; and if any thing of that nature had formerly found place in the country, the power of ſuch a magiſtrate muſt be aboliſhed; or if his title be allowed to remain, the honour of bearing it muſt not be conferred by election, but committed to the blind deciſion of chance. Such are the common properties reſulting from the form of a ſimple democracy, and deducible from the definitions given by the partiſans of that government of juſtice, equality, and liberty.

Chap. 3.

How the right of the majority is to be re-

The imperfection of theſe definitions appears in the miſchief of their conſequences [f]. Yet the number of inhabitants, or populouſneſs, is, doubtleſs, the firſt element in the compoſition of

[e] The word βαναυσια denotes mean ſordid labour; but Ariſtotle, by ſaying that the elements of democracy are directly the reverſe of thoſe which conſtitute ariſtocracy, ſhews that he here intends the manners and morals reſulting from that degrading ſpecies of labour; and what theſe manners and morals are, he explains below in chapter iv. of this Book.

[f] I have here inſerted this obſervation, which occurs below, for the ſake of perſpicuity. The ſame inducement has made me tranſpoſe ſome other ſentences, and alſo expand the author's brevity by uſing the ſame words which he himſelf employs on other occaſions when treating ſimilar ſubjects.

 ſtates;

BOOK VIII.

conciled with the due influence of property.

ftates; and to the intereft of the people at large, due regard, therefore, ought to be had in the diftribution of advantages and honours. But populoufnefs, though the firft and principal, is not the only element effential to the end and purpofe of every political affociation; the well-being, comfort, or happinefs of the affociated members. Towards the producing and fecuring of this comfortable fubfiftence of the community, other powers muft co-operate; property, education, morals; without which it is impoffible that any civil partnerfhip or commonwealth can anfwer the purpofe of the partners[s]. How then are we to combine the other elements or caufes of political advantage with mere numbers? How, for inftance, is the regard due to property, a thing effential to the exiftence of ftates, to be reconciled with the intereft of the people at large, and the rights of the majority. Shall we divide the ftate into the two claffes of the rich and poor, and reckon the votes of five hundred of the former, equal to the votes of a thoufand of the latter? Or retaining this divifion, fhall an equal number of deputies be chofen from the clafs of the poor and from the clafs of the rich; and fhall thefe deputies, united in one affembly, appoint by the majority of voices,

[s] Cicero frequently borrows and adorns this fentiment. Refpublica eft res populi. Populus autem non omnes cœtus multitudinis, fed cœtus juris confenfu, et utilitatis communione, fociatus. "A commonwealth is the wealth of the people; but the people are not a mere collection or multitude of human beings; but a multitude affociated according to the principles of juftice, and for the fake of utility." Fragment. de Repub. l. iii.

the

the magiftrates and judges? According to the partifans of democracy, the political fcales ought to be balanced by the mere weight of numbers; according to the partifans of oligarchy, the greateft weight of property ought always to prevail. How can thofe contrarieties be harmonifed into fyftem, but by confidering wealth and numbers as elements of equal importance, or mere units, of which the greater number of fractional parts[h] muft always prevail over the leffer? Suppofe, for inftance, twenty poor and ten rich, and that fifteen of the poor and four of the rich are of the fame opinion: it is plain, that in this cafe there is a greater acceffion of wealth to the fide of numbers, than of numbers to the fide of wealth. Numbers, therefore, muft prevail; but the contrary would happen if the fix rich, exceeding half the reprefentation of wealth, had been joined by ten of the poor, which is half the reprefentative of numbers. When the oppofite fides are equally balanced, it will be neceffary to caft lots, or to have recourfe to the expedients employed in doubtful cafes by tribunals and affemblies. Difficult as it certainly is, nicely to adjuft contrarieties, and to difcover the true theory of political arrangements, it is far more difficult to keep the component parts in their proper places, and to reftrain the injuftice of domineering factions. The inferior party are great ftícklers

[h] The Greeks, it is known, employed proportion for anfwering the purpofe of fractions; but in explaining Ariftotle's fenfe, I have preferred a language familiar to the modern reader.

for

BOOK VIII. Chap. 4.

for juftice; but thofe that are uppermoft fet its maxims at defiance.[1]

Of the different kinds of democracies, and of that which is the beft.

We have fhewn that there are different kinds of democracies, neceffarily refulting from the variety of materials of which they are compofed, and the various diftribution of thofe materials in the political ftructure. Every democracy is a government of the majority; but this government may be more or lefs tempered in proportion as wealth, birth, morals, and other circumftances, befides the mere ftrength of numbers, are refpected by the fundamental laws of the conftitution, and preferred in the diftribution of offices and honours. The principal differences of democracies refult, however, from the different qualities of the people that enter into their compofition; and communities are thus marked with characteriftic diftinctions by their various modes of procuring the neceffaries of life; or, according to the various occupations of agriculture, pafturage, manufactures, and commerce. Agreeably to this divifion, the beft kind of democracy, and likewife the moft ancient on record, is that in which the people fubfift by agriculture; becaufe the beft clafs of working people are thofe employed in the rural

Of the character of men fubfifting chiefly by agriculture.

[1] This lamentation is often made by the hiftorians of Rome, even during the ages moft diftinguifhed for political moderation. "Sed alter femper ordo gravis alterius modeftiæ erat." The reafon is fubjoined. "Adeo moderatio tuendæ libertatis, dum æquari velle fimulando ita fe quifque extollit, ut deprimat alium, in difficili eft: cavendoque ne metuant homines, metuendos ultro fe efficiunt: et injuriam a nobis repulfam, tanquam aut facere aut pati neceffe fit, injungimus aliis." Tit. Liv. l. iii. c. lxv. In the introduction to this book, I have endeavoured to point out the means by which the evil may be cured.

labours

labours of agriculture and pafturage, efpecially the former; and the manners and habits of hufbandmen are alfo the beft adapted to counteract the evil tendency of democratic inftitutions. From their poverty mixed with fimplicity, thofe claffes of men are lefs inclined than any others, to affemble frequently or tumultuoufly; and fummoned to daily labour by the voice of Nature herfelf, they learn to prefer the certain profits of induftry to the precarious acquifitions of rapine. When allowed to retain their own, they covet not the property of others. To them it is a more agreeable tafk, to cultivate their fields, than to compofe laws; and they do not much care to attend the national affembly, unlefs they be well rewarded for their political labours. The greater part of mankind are, in fact, more defirous of gain, than ambitious of honour. As a proof of this obfervation, we may allege the hufbandmen or peafants of old, who patiently brooked abfolute monarchy; and alfo the peafants of our own times, who quietly endure oligarchy, provided they are not ftripped of their property, nor difturbed in their labours; by which fome of them acquire opulence, and all of them avoid indigence. The alteration of the government will not alter their propenfities and habits, which they will carry with them into democracy itfelf; where thofe of them who have any feeds of ambition, will find themfelves fufficiently gratified by the right of electing their magiftrates, and of exacting an account of their adminiftration. In fome democracies, the people

BOOK VIII. ple at large are ſeldom convened in the delibe-rative or elective aſſemblies. At Mantinæa, the uſual magiſtrates were named by deputies previouſly appointed, and the nation continued well ſatisfied with this arrangement; becauſe each individual might become a deputy in his turn, and thus enjoy the advantage of deciding the public reſolutions, and of appointing, approving, and judging thoſe inveſted with executive power. This form of democracy prevailed among the ſhepherds and huſbandmen of Arcadia. But it is uſual, and highly uſeful, in the beſt ſort of democracies, though they intruſt to the people at large the election and judgment of magiſtrates, to enact, however, that the principal offices of government ſhould be held by men of a certain cenſus, or without ſpecifying any fixed cenſus, to enjoin that ſuch great offices ſhould be conferred on thoſe rich enough to diſcharge them diſintereſtedly and honourably. Such a conſtitution is well regulated, for power will be adminiſtered by the fitteſt perſons, whoſe talents are the objects of public approbation; and whoſe honours, not bringing with them any profit, will not be the objects of popular envy. The ſuperior ranks of men will be contented with an arrangement which liberates them from the hard condition of being occaſionally governed by their inferiors; and they will themſelves govern uprightly, becauſe they are reſponſible to the people at large for their behaviour in office: magiſtrates not reſponſible are incompatible with any

kind of good government, ſince power uncontrolled ſuits not the frailty of human nature.

How agriculture is to be encouraged, and the beſt kind of democracy to be eſtabliſhed.

This then is the beſt kind of democracy, becauſe reſulting from the beſt quality of the people, the beſt daily occupations, and the beſt conſequent habits. An important queſtion, therefore, ariſes, how are we to mould the people into this moſt uſeful form? The anſwer will be found in the legiſlation of ancient and moſt flouriſhing ſtates, whoſe inſtitutions encouraged agriculture in preference to all other employments. In ſome countries it was a law, that no individual ſhould poſſeſs above a certain meaſure of ground; in others, this regulation was confined to lands within a limited diſtance from the capital. Some commonwealths have enacted that no family ſhould be allowed to part with its original lot of land, or ancient inheritance; and a law of Oxylus[k] forbids any man to mortgage beyond a certain proportion of his eſtate. The Aphytæi[l] are a populous community with a diminutive territory, yet are all of them cultivators of the ground; becauſe, though a qualification in land is neceſſary for holding offices and honours, yet is this qualification ſo ſmall in value or extent, that even the pooreſt inhabitants may eaſily acquire it. It is impoſſible to miſtake the ſpirit of ſuch

[k] King of the Elians. See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, vol. i. c. iii. & v.

[l] In ſome editions they are called Aphetali. Plutarch. in Lyſand. p. 444. calls them Aphygæi. They inhabited the peninſula Pall[...] in the region of Chalcis on the coaſt of Thrace or Maced[...] See Hiſtory of Ancient Greece, v. ii. c. xv. p. 196. & ſeq. and Strabo Excerpt. l. viii. p. 330.

regu-

BOOK VIII.

regulations, which, while they prevent one claſs of men from occupying more lands than they can themſelves cultivate, call forth the induſtry of the other claſs by aſſigning to them lands of their own, and thereby giving them a ſubject on which that induſtry is always moſt cheerfully exerciſed.

Of democracies of ſhepherds, manufacturers, ſailors, and merchants.

Next to a community of huſbandmen, a nation ſubſiſting by paſturage is the fitteſt for being formed into a democracy. There is much ſimilarity in thoſe two modes of life; and as a preparative for war, the daily occupations and conſequent habits of the ſhepherd are admirably calculated. He is accuſtomed to ſleep in the open air, to march regularly, to encamp cautiouſly; while his body is hardened by exerciſe, his mind is ſharpened by vigilance. All other democracies are of a far inferior ſtamp; for their materials are not capable of receiving any elegant or laſting impreſſion. They are compoſed of wretched labourers and mean mechanics, of manufacturers condemned to unwholeſome air and diſtorting poſtures, of rapacious ſailors and greedy merchants, who navigate and trade for no other purpoſe than that of gain; a purpoſe mean in itſelf, and meanly or wickedly attained, ſometimes by fraud, and ſometimes by rapine. Men ſubſiſting by continual deceit and mutual depradation, muſt live together in crowds, tumbling over each other in populous cities, and readily at the beck of every ſeditious demagogue to aſſemble tumultuouſly, and to act outrageouſly. But in a commonwealth of huſbandmen, families

Why the latter democracies are greatly inferior to the former.

families are ſcattered at due diſtances by the neceſſity of their daily labours. The citizens juſtle not with each other; and their circumſtances neither require nor admit the frequency of popular conventions. It is for this reaſon that a country of great extent, and which eaſily afforded room for the continual diffuſion of colonies at wide diſtances from the capital, might be improved, fortified, and embelliſhed by agriculture alone and its ſubſervient arts, and might enjoy, under nearly a ſimple democratic form, the benefits reſulting from mixed policy.[m]

That the city tribes ought not to aſſemble ſeparately from thoſe of the country.

The properties and habits of huſbandmen, as diſtinguiſhed from mercenary labourers on the one hand, and from manufacturers, merchants, and tradeſman on the other, are ſo eminently conſpicuous and ſo incomparably better adapted to the peaceful enjoyment of every ſpecies of freedom[n], that even in countries where a great proportion of the inhabitants ſubſiſts by arts and commerce, the city tribes ought never to aſſemble ſeparately; every convention, to be lawful, ought to be attended by deputies from the country; ſo that the noxious humours engendered in market-places and courts of juſtice, may be

[m] Ariſtotle ſays, that ſuch people may eſtabliſh an uſeful democracy, and a πολιτεια; which he has before explained to be a mixed government, and the beſt form of republicaniſm. But the ſpirit of his obſervation would evaporate in a literal verſion.

[n] How much does a great modern democracy miſtake its fundamental intereſt, when it is inflamed by the deſire and ſtimulated by the jealouſy of trade, and is ready to begin or carry on war in order to attain commercial ſuperiority, or even commercial equality!

ſweet-

fweetened and purified by a due mixture of more wholefome materials.*

How the inferior kinds of democracy are to be eftablifhed.

Such then is the conftitution of the beft kind of democracy. The other kinds are more or lefs praifeworthy, in proportion as every fpecies of venality is more or lefs completely extirpated; for public functions, gratuitoufly difcharged, are neither the objects of jealoufy nor the fources of faction; they are not fcrambled for by unprincipled indigence as inftruments of profit or pleafure: they are not received as a gift, but undertaken as a tafk by men of property and integrity, who are covetous of nothing but public gratitude. The laft and worft fpecies of democracy, by its political arrangements, admits, and, by the allurement of fees and falaries, attracts and entices all conditions of men to the exercife of every department of executive as well as deliberative authority. It is not every city or commonwealth that is at all fufceptible of fuch a conftitution; and to render it permanent in any country, falutary laws and habitual difcipline muft counteract and control the vicious principle of the government. In order to introduce this form of policy, demagogues think they can never too much ftrengthen the popular party. Baftards, children defcended from the intermarriages of citizens and ftrangers, all forts of materials, howfoever impure and corrupt,

* How wonderfully are our author's remarks illuftrated by a hiftory which he could not know, I mean the Roman! See Livy, b. ix. c. xlvi.

are

are confidered as proper aliment for fuch a conftitution. Yet it is certain that this progreffion in degeneracy has its limit. For when the promifcuous rabble too much overpower the rich and noble, thefe latter claffes of men refume courage from defpair, and, as happened at Cyrené [p], deftroy their oppreffors. The regulations once adopted by that African republic, and afterwards employed by Clifthenes at Athens, are ufeful in eftablifhing democracies. Ancient diftinctions are to be done away; ancient affociations, civil and facred, are tó be abolifhed; new tribes are to be created; new and common folemnities to be inftituted; and every expedient to be employed that may have a tendency to ftamp the people with one uniform character, and reduce them all to the fame level. Democracy may alfo borrow ufeful hints from tyranny. The unbridled licence of women, boys, and flaves is conformable to the nature and principle of democracies and tyrannies. Above all, demagogues muft never ceafe to convince the people that under their favourite democracy, they will be at liberty to live as they lift; this will procure for them the affiftance of the majority; for the greater part of mankind will always be better pleafed to live licentioufly, than to fubmit to the reftraints of falutary difcipline.

[p] This country flourifhed as a kingdom or ariftocracy, and decayed as a democracy. See Hiftory of the World from Alexander to Auguftus, chapter iii. p. 266 & feqq.

BOOK VIII. Chap. 5.

How they are to be preserved.

It is, therefore, an eaſy matter to eſtabliſh a democracy; but the difficulty lies in rendering it permanent. Laws, therefore, of every kind, written and unwritten, muſt continually be ſhaped and fitted to thoſe ends and purpoſes, which, when attained, give ſtability to the popular conſtitution; and of laws, thoſe are to be reckoned the beſt and the moſt democratical, which tend to uphold the power, not thoſe which flatter the paſſions of the majority. It is uſual with the demagogues of the preſent age to gratify the rapacity of the multitude by unjuſt impeachments and corrupt judgments. But men ſincerely attached to popular government, ought to counteract thoſe dangerous and diſgraceful meaſures by getting it eſtabliſhed as a law, that confiſcated property ſhall not be divided among the people, but conſecrated to the gods; a law by which private peculation might be puniſhed without provoking public rapacity, ſince the multitude would no longer accuſe wantonly, or wickedly condemn, thoſe of whoſe forfeitures they would not expect to reap the ſpoils. All groundleſs impeachments ought alſo to be repreſſed by ſevere penalties; and every method employed to convince the rich and noble, that thoſe inveſted with power are not their enemies.

How they are to be rendered more moderate and leſs expenſive

Democracies of the laſt and worſt kind are ſometimes ſo populous, that the public revenues are inſufficient to defray the ordinary expences of government, without the dangerous aid of

fines

fines and confiſcations. When this happens to be the caſe, no unneceſſary aſſemblies ought ever to be held; and buſineſs muſt be diſpatched in the courts of juſtice with all poſſible expedition. In conſequence of theſe arrangements, the expences of government will be leſs oppreſſive to men of property; and although the attendance only of the poorer claſſes be rewarded by fees, yet the higher ranks alſo will for the moſt part attend both the aſſembly and the tribunals, becauſe ſhort and unfrequent abſences from their private affairs will not prove ruinous to their fortunes; and under the control of the beſt citizens, deliberations will be more moderate, and deciſions more equitable. When revenues, on the other hand, ſuperabound, it is now uſual with demagogues to divide the ſurplus among the poor; but this is pouring water into a ſieve. A good ſtateſman, inſtead of being contented with occaſionally relieving the wants of the poor, will continually ſtrive to better their condition; and when he gives them property, will uſe the beſt means for rendering that property permanent and productive. The public ſavings ought not to be ſquandered away in temporary and fruitleſs donatives, but accumulated to ſuch an amount, that when diſtributed to the induſtrious and deſerving poor, they may enable them to purchaſe and cultivate a few acres of land of their own, (which is incomparably the beſt uſe of public bounty,) or to acquire the materials and inſtruments neceſſary for

BOOK VIII.

carrying on manufactures and commerce. When the national favings are too fcanty to admit of ufeful diftribution to individuals, they muft then be divided among the moft deferving diftricts; and the rich, who defray the neceffary expences of government, muft be liberated from the burden of ufelefs entertainments and frivolous but expenfive exhibitions. By fuch political arrangements, the Carthaginian nobles acquired the affection of the people, whofe induftry they encouraged in cultivating the circumjacent territory. It belongs, furely, to the good fenfe as well as to the liberality of the higher ranks of men, to excite, by every means in their power, the productive labour of their inferiors. The example of the wealthy Tarentines is worthy of imitation; who, by communicating many ufes of their eftates to the people at large, obtained univerfal good-will, and greatly improved their poffeffions. At Tarentum, indeed, the populace were farther foothed by the law which enacted that fome public offices fhould be diftributed by lot, while others were conferred by fuffrage. When the fame magiftracy confifts of feveral members, this inftitution may be ufefully varied by appointing fome members by lot, and others by fuffrage. Such are the arrangements which ought to prevail in democracies.

Chap. 6.

Of the different kinds of oligarchies:

As to oligarchies, it is plain that they muft be conftituted on principles totally different; fince the higheft intenfion of oligarchy is diametrically

metrically oppoſite to the higheſt intenſion of democracy. In proportion as oligarchies and democracies recede from their higheſt intenſion, that is, from the worſt conſtitution of each, a tumultuary populace on one hand, and a tyrannical cabal on the other, the diſtance between them is gradually diminiſhed; each preſerving, however, its diſtinctive character, till by continual approximations, they finally run into each other, and blend harmoniouſly in a well-conſtituted republic. In that ſpecies of oligarchy which we call the firſt and beſt, becauſe it moſt reſembles a mixed government, retaining nothing of oligarchy but its undue preference of wealth to other political elements, there ought to be a double cenſus, or two ſorts of qualifications, of which the loweſt ought to entitle thoſe poſſeſſed of it to hold all the inferior magiſtracies. By this means, the beſt portion of the citizens would have a direct and perſonal intereſt in ſupporting the authority of government, and in defending the honours of that privileged order, which, by enjoying the higheſt cenſus would be excluſively entitled to form the ſupreme council, and to adminiſter the great offices of ſtate. Between this ſpecies of oligarchy and that which is the laſt and worſt, there are ſeveral intermediate kinds; each requiring additional props to preſerve it in proportion to the narrowneſs of its baſe. The laſt and worſt kind of all is the moſt difficultly upheld, requiring the utmoſt delicacy of management. Bodies well conſtituted, and hardily diſciplined, reſiſt and ſur- mount

how they are to be eſtabliſhed and preſerved.

BOOK VIII.

mount the viciffitudes and fhocks of life: a fhip well conftructed, and well manned, defies the affailing tempeft; but a puny habit and a leaky veffel are expofed to the danger of finking under the leaft adverfe accident. A narrow oligarchy, therefore, can only be fupported by the political wifdom of its magiftrates, counteracting by moderation and good difcipline that tumult of paffion and intereft which is always ready to affail its fecurity.

Chap. 7.

That forms of government depend on the compofition of the military and naval force, and that this depends on local circumftances.

Forms of government, we have faid, are relative to local circumftances, by which they are often modified, upheld, or fubverted. For local circumftances powerfully influence the compofition of armies, and the compofition of armies often decides the nature of the conftitution. As communities are compofed chiefly of four claffes of men, hufbandmen, manufacturers, merchants, and mechanics [q], fo there are chiefly four elements that compofe national ftrength; cavalry, heavy-armed infantry, light infantry, and feamen. A champaign country, by its fitnefs for rearing and maintaining cavalry, is the beft adapted for the eftablifhing and fupporting an oligarchy, becaufe men of wealth only are capable of rearing and maintaining any confiderable number of horfes. The next kind of oligarchy may be defended by heavy-armed troops, fince to purchafe and keep in repair complete and well-tempered armour, only falls within the reach of perfons poffeffed of no mean fhare of

[q] το θητικον, including journeymen or day-labourers, and flaves.

opulence.

opulence. But light infantry and seamen are, on the contrary, instruments entirely adapted to the establishment or support of democracy; and where the national strength is chiefly composed of such elements, it will be difficult for an oligarchy to subsist.

How oligarchies are to be upheld under unfavourable local circumstances.

The best expedient which can, in that case, be employed for propping an edifice always ready to fall in pieces, is to imitate the conduct of good generals, who, by mixing a due proportion of light troops with the heavy-armed men and the cavalry, often supply by arrangement the defect of numbers. This proportion of light troops must be raised from the youth of most honourable descent, and especially the sons of the magistrates, carefully selected and diligently exercised, whose zeal and merit will render them the fittest champions of the oligarchy. But the disease of such a constitution is too dangerous to admit of hope from the application of one single remedy. It will be prudent, therefore, gradually to impart a share of the government to persons chosen from the people at large, either, as before-mentioned, to those who have acquired a certain census; or, as was established at Thebes, to those who have ceased cultivating for a certain number of years all mean and mercenary employments; or thirdly, in imitation of Marseilles, we may associate to government abilities and virtues, in whatever class of citizens they shall be found. For the safety of oligarchies, it is necessary that the great offices of state should be burdensome.

BOOK VIII.

The people at large will be inclined to tolerate exclufive honours that are dearly purchafed, and to pardon generous ambition, that is rewarded by nothing but an expenfive pre-eminence. At entering upon office, oligarchic magiftrates ought to be fumptuous in their entertainments, and magnificent in their prefents. Architectural embellifhments of the city, coftly dedications in the temples, ought to difplay and perpetuate their patriotic munificence. But inftead of following thefe falutary maxims, which can alone give permanence to their order, the nobles of the prefent day are equally covetous of wealth and ambitious of honour; and uniting infolent pride with greedy rapacity, the oligarchies, in which they bear fway, are nothing better than little democracies.

Chap 8.

Of the divifions of the executive power, and the different kinds of magiftrates.

Having thus examined the general diftribution of the powers of government, relatively to the principal elements of which communities are effentially compofed, it remains to confider the neceffary divifions of the executive authority, and to explain how many and what kinds of magiftrates ought to be eftablifhed in every well-regulated commonwealth. In fmall ftates, it is plain, there cannot be fo many perfons fpared from employments of productive induftry, for exercifing ufeful but unproductive offices, as in ftates that are larger and more populous. Yet every commonwealth, that completely anfwers the end of its inftitution, muft contain nearly the fame varieties of executive magiftracy; fince, without fome offices, a community could

could not fubfift at all; and without others, it could not fubfift happily. It is neceffary therefore, to know what are thofe offices that admit of accumulation, and what are thofe that require partition; what are thofe offices that may be eafily and fafely exercifed by the fame perfon, and what are thofe that cannot prudently be intrufted to the fame hands. The folution of this queftion muft be derived from confidering the number and nature of thofe offices that refult from the great purpofes of political fociety; the fubfiftence, accommodation, fecurity, and comfort of its conftituent members.

Magiftrates for protecting commerce and contracts;

The general end of the political partnerfhip is the well-being of the partners. Men affociate together and unite their efforts, that the operations of the whole community may terminate as nearly as poffible in the happinefs of each individual citizen. But in order to attain, by continual approximations, to this moft defirable end, it is neceffary that the citizens fhould enjoy eafy and regular means of communicating mutual affiftance, and fupplying mutual wants[r]. That fpecies of exchange, therefore, which is directed to the purpofes of accommodation and comfort, not to the fenfelefs, becaufe infatiable purfuit of accumulation or gain, is the moft direct and immediate refult of political fociety; and the firft and moft ufeful magiftrates are thofe appointed to protect internal commerce, and to

[r] See Ethics, b. v. c. vi. p. 377, & feq.

fee

BOOK VIII.

fee that it be carried on freely, regularly, and honeftly.

for maintaining police both in the city and country;

Another concern analogous to the former, and which requires the immediate attention of every ftate, is to take care that boundaries be accurately adjufted; and that ftreets and buildings, whether private or public, be regularly difpofed and folidly conftructed; fo as neither to incommode nor endanger the inhabitants; and that roads be well ftraightened, and kept in conftant repair. Thefe and fuch objects are comprehended under the name of police, which in large ftates is divided into a variety of branches, entrufted to particular magiftrates, who are, fome of them, infpectors of the harbours, others of the fountains, and others of the fortifications; and when their offices bear a reference to the country, they are called keepers of the forefts, and fuperintendents of diftricts.

for collecting and managing the revenues.

Men in their corporate capacity have occafion to effectuate public purpofes, and therefore muft poffefs a common fund. Revenues and contributions thus become neceffary; and there muft of courfe be treafurers to receive and take charge of thefe contributions and revenues, and to diftribute them through the various channels of the public expenditure.

Courts of record.

How regularly foever matters may originally be adjufted, diforders muft foon take place, unlefs there be in every country courts of record. Contracts and judicial decifions, as well as actions, fuits, and accufations, muft all of them, when

when liable to be mifreprefented or difputed, be committed to the faithful regiftry of writing; and this duty of perpetuating the memory of civil acts is plainly the function of one and the fame magiftracy, though the bufinefs is often divided among notaries, recorders, remembrancers, and other functionaries; whofe names have, all of them, a relation to the fame important concern.

Magiftrates for fuperintending the execution of the fentence of courts of juftice.

Next to this is a function of government of all the moft neceffary, and alfo the moft troublefome. The fentences of courts are nugatory, unlefs they be regularly carried into execution. A magiftrate, therefore, muft be appointed for exacting fines, for inflicting punifhments, and for taking charge of thofe anfwerable to the laws in their bodies or eftates. It is not eafy to find men well qualified, and at the fame time willing, to difcharge this moft important function; for the odium attending it makes prudence and humanity decline it, and it cannot be fafely intrufted to infenfibility or knavery. Knaves or fools require to be continually watched themfelves, inftead of being appointed to watch and take charge of others. Much attention is neceffary in regulating this department of office, which will be beft conftituted when divided among a variety of perfons called to exercife it by rotation, or to the different companies of young men employed to guard the city[*]. The odium attending their employment will thus be diminifh-

[*] See Hiftory of Ancient Greece, v. iii. c. xxvii. p. 255, & feq.

BOOK VIII.

diminifhed; and the lefs is the odium that attends thofe appointed to execute the laws, the more eafily and the more completely will the laws be executed. If the fame fet of men were perpetually employed in conducting all matters of this kind, thefe men, how proper foever might be their behaviour, would foon come to be regarded as public enemies. The Athenians, therefore, wifely feparated the functions of fuperintending the cuftody, and fuperintending the execution, of perfons condemned by public juftice; and the magiftrates of one court may very properly be intrufted with carrying into effect the fentences pronounced by another.

Command of the national force.

Moft of the offices hitherto enumerated and explained, may be fitly difcharged without any other requifites than thofe of common fenfe and common honefty. But there are other employments requiring more than ordinary fkill and more than ordinary integrity. To be the general or admiral of the commonwealth; to have the charge of equipping the fleet and marfhalling the army; and to be intrufted, either in peace or war, with troops, garrifons, fhips, and harbours; all thefe are branches of one and the fame function, the command of the national force; an office that cannot be fafely committed except to men of pre-eminent fkill and diftinguifhed fidelity.

Comptrollers of public accounts.

Almoft all magiftrates and officers, civil as well as military, muft be perpetually or occafionally intrufted with the receipt and expenditure of public money. In every well-regulated ftate

ſtate there ought, therefore, to be a particular board for the ſpecific purpoſe of examining and controlling the public accounts; and this board conſiſting of men who never handle money themſelves, but who have a right to be ſatisfied in the name of the public, as to the preciſe amount of the revenues that are raiſed, and the exact manner in which they are employed.

The moſt dignified of all magiſtracies is that with which important national concerns begin and terminate; which aſſembles the people; propoſes matters for their deliberation; and, by its reſpected authority, either confirms or annuls their decrees. This magiſtracy, in which the wiſdom and majeſty of the ſtate are concentrated, is called in ariſtocracies the college of cenſors[t]; in oligarchies, the council of pre-adviſers[u]; in democracies, the ſenate.

Different orders of prieſts.

Religious concerns require alſo their proper magiſtrates to take charge of the temples, ſacred treaſures, and ſacrifices; of which ſome are performed by prieſts of particular diſtricts, the miniſters of particular divinities; and others by thoſe called kings or archons on behalf of the public at large, and in honour of the guardian gods of the commonwealth.

Superintendants of education, morals, and public ſhows.

In well-regulated and flouriſhing ſtates, there are alſo many offices (all departments of the ſame function) which have for their objects the education of youth, as well as the morals of

[t] νομοφυλακες, guardians of the laws.
[u] Reſembling the lords of articles in the old Scottiſh conſtitution.

every

BOOK VIII. every age and of either ſex, together with the decency and ſplendour of dramatic entertainments, and other ſhows and ſolemnities. In democracies, there is not any room for ſeveral of thoſe magiſtrates. Inſpectors of education and of morals would be altogether uſeleſs under ſuch governments; where the wives and children of thoſe dignified with the name of citizens are often, through poverty, employed by them as ſlaves[x]. Such is the general ſketch of the neceſſary branches of executive government.[y]

[x] See above, b. iv. c. xv. p. 357.

[y] In ſome parts of this Chapter, the order of the ſentences is changed for the ſake of perſpicuity; and ſome imperfect ſentences are omitted, the obſervations contained in them being repetitions of what is ſaid in Book VI.

INDEX

TO

THE SECOND VOLUME.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

K.

L.

M.

Magistrates,

N.

O.

P.

R.

Riches,

T.

Traffic,

U.

W.

Year,

Y.

Z.

THE END.

Strahan and Preston,
Printers-Street, London.